The Fed Is About to Cut Rates, Here’s What They’re NOT Telling You

Financial Freedom
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The economy weakens and everyone looks to the Fed or any central bank to cut policy rates. But why? They call it stimulus but the real reason is nothing you've ever heard. In fact, Fed officials intentionally lied for decades to keep this quiet. You don't have to take my word for it; hear it from the maestro's mouth as we go down the rabbit hole of interest rates.
As the economy weakens, everyone will look to the Federal Reserve to cut rates. That's what
happened last summer. Faced with a bout of increasingly clear economic weakness, not to
mention significant financial disorder, the Federal Reserve responded by lowering its benchmark policy
rates by 50 basis points and then following it up with two 25 basis point cuts thereafter.
While reducing rates, policymakers reassured the public they were supporting the economy
with powerful means. And everyone went along with it. The financial media filled with headlines and
stories that just repeated that message. Economists were everywhere shaking their heads in agreement,
and most of the general public probably never really gave it much thought. After all, it does
seem to make sense. Lower rates make it cheaper to borrow. Therefore, if the Fed lowers rates,
there should be more borrowing and because of that, more economic activity. There's just one
problem with that line of thinking. It's almost entirely false. The truth is there's a lot more
than one problem with the whole idea. A whole bunch of them. Starting with the fact that rate cuts
have never worked. Certainly not in the way they're intended. In fact, the entire reason we focus on
interest rates at all is because the Fed has no other option. This is another one of these times
when you don't have to take my word for it. Not when it comes straight from the maestro's mouth.
We're told that interest rates are a tool authorities use to manipulate the economy.
What you'll see instead is that on the contrary, rates are information about its conditions,
regardless of what the Fed or any central banker and economist believes. So why do we continue to
believe that low interest rates are stimulus? More importantly, what is it that interest rates are
actually trying to tell us? We badly need to go over the economics, small e economics, of interest
rates. And that's just what we're going to do here in our latest episode of Make It Make Sense.
The theory sounds simple enough. The Fed lowers interest rates, more people can borrow because it
becomes cheaper to do so. There's a boom in credit in the economy, leading to more activity. But if
the Fed lowers rates on lending, then wouldn't that make banks less willing to lend since that would
also mean lower rates of return for them? Well, they say no, no, no, that's not the case. What the Fed
actually does is lower borrowing costs for banks. It actually targets the federal funds rate, which
is a wholesale money rate. So if the Fed reduces borrowing costs for banks to borrow money from
other banks, then those banks will also want to lend more to the real economy. Plus, if the Fed
targets the federal funds rate, which it does, that's only one place to start. That's only one
lever. What is supposed to happen is that these other money market rates, when there's quite a few
of them, move in lockstep with the Fed funds target. And then other interest rates in the real economy,
like the treasury yield curve, are also supposed to move in tandem with Fed policies. That way,
the Fed can lower Fed fund costs for banks, increasing the incentive of banks to lend,
at the same time as lowering other rates in the real economy, which are supposed to build off of
also making it cheaper for businesses and consumers to borrow, therefore more economic activity.
But just by reviewing this theory, however, you should start to be sensing, at the very least,
this is a lot more complicated than it's ever made to sound. What about other parts of the economy
that have little or nothing to do with borrowing or interest rates? Or what if banks are increasingly
risk averse? Then a few rate cuts to their borrowing costs might not make all that much
difference. And in terms of borrowing costs, the federal funds market isn't actually all that
important toward them. How about those other interest rates? If all the Fed does is move a
single rate around Fed funds, what if other interest rates simply don't follow what the Fed
does? After all, what do you think yield curve inversion is? But worse than all that, historically
lower rates don't equate to stimulus at all. And we'll come back to this later on. Most of all,
why don't you ever hear the Fed talk about money? Even when officials say monetary policy, what they
really mean is interest rate policy. Seriously, listen to any speech or press conference from
Jay Powell or anybody else at the Federal Reserve. They'll talk your ear off about interest rates,
but never once does the topic of money ever come up. Keep that in mind as we go through here as
well, and I'll explain why that is and why it matters more than anything else. So given that
setup, you're probably not surprised to learn that interest rate targeting, interest rate cuts
have never actually worked. The Fed more formally adopted interest rate targeting in the late 1980s,
which means there have been a couple of macroeconomic cycles in which interest rate
targeting has been tested in the real world. And it came up irrelevant every single time,
starting with the 1990-91 S&L recession. As you would expect, given what interest rates,
what you're told interest rates are supposed to be, any time faced with a substantial threat to
the unemployment mandate of the Federal Reserve, which means economic downturn and recession,
the Fed will respond, like I said, since the 1980s with large rate cuts. Yet what you see
every time that faced with these difficulties, the recession and unemployment happens anyway,
especially 2001, where interest rates were dropped substantially at the front end by the Federal
Reserve. And again in 2008, we had the crisis anyway. There's no other case that policymakers
can point to that says this stuff works as we tell people it does. So if rate cutting has never worked,
where the hell did this come from? As I said, the truth is the Fed didn't start targeting the
federal funds rate in any formal way until the late 1980s. It had moved toward rate targeting
in the early 80s, but not because this was a better option for Federal Reserve policymakers.
What really happened is the monetary system had evolved drastically in the euro-dollar era. It was
a global bank-centered monetary system, and while it was called dollars, there were no dollars in it.
It's entirely ledger money, maybe denominated in dollars, but that's the only traditional tie
to it. There are no physical printed Federal Reserve notes. These are strictly bank ledger
entries. And since this euro-dollar is a global network of bank ledger money, it has little room
or place for something like the Federal Reserve and its antiquated economic and monetary worldview
and the policies that are formed from them. By the way, the Fed came to realize this,
slowly at first, by the 1970s as the euro-dollar was reaching its stride. By the time Paul Volcker
showed up late in the 1970s, policymakers had already come to realize they had no way of
intervening in actual money like a real central bank is supposed to. They were basically shoved
out of the money business. This is why you never hear them talk about it. So if you're a central
bank, which is no longer in the money business, what do you do then? Well, you can either choose
to close the doors and shut down, which is what the Fed really should have done, or you can find
something else that you do control and focus everything you have on that one thing, even if
it isn't all that important. The Fed policymakers had numerous discussions about this over the
decade of the 1980s after realizing this in the 1970s, and more and more they settled on targeting
the federal funds rate, if only because that's the one thing they could basically control. Even though
long before the 1980s, the federal funds marketplace had been greatly diminished by these global
dollar markets outside the U.S. The Fed basically had one option, federal funds, federal funds
interest rate targeting. That's all they did, so they put all their efforts into it, and you don't
have to take my word for it. As Alan Greenspan was discussing with the rest of the FOMC in March of
1991, they really had no other alternative. This was the only thing the Fed could do, the only thing
the Fed could turn to after being pushed out of money. No one at the Fed liked it or was happy
about it, as Greenspan told the policymakers, but they had no other choice but to continue on with
federal funds targeting and to see where it would go. Worse, they lied about this. As St. Louis Fed
President Tom Meltzer said, they did not tell the world that this was taking place. They knew they
couldn't or that would be the end of the Fed, because if everybody knew the Fed wasn't a real
central bank, there'd be no coming back from it. So you can start to see why they have made interest
rates and interest rate policy into this big thing, because that's the only thing they have.
So their only real chance was to sell the world on interest rates, specifically this federal funds
rate. It didn't matter that interest rates aren't what they say or that federal funds wasn't really
important. For the last 40 years, the Fed and all economists friendly to it, which is basically all
of them, have been selling you on the idea that rate policies are the most powerful instrument in
all the entire economy, if not the entire world, if not all of human history. Why? Because again,
that's the only thing they have. If all you have is the Fed funds rate, then in order to pretend to
be a central bank, you have to lie to the world and say that Fed funds is the most important market
and that changing rates in that market will change the world. And when you spell it out like this,
it does sound like the utter nonsense that it actually is. That targeting the federal funds
rate and manipulating it a quarter point here and there can somehow be so precise, powerful control
over a dynamic global marketplace and a dynamic global economy. It is nonsense, but it was given
the stain of credibility by the Great Moderation. See, no one really knew where the Great Moderation
came from. To this day, a lot of people still don't. It was a period of unparalleled prosperity
marked by low volatility in money and economy, free from depressions and big-time crisis,
though there were a few minor crises along the way. But economists were stumped, so CNBC and
Ben Bernanke stepped up and said this interest rate targeting stuff had really done it. And it
was Bernanke more than anyone who constantly claimed credit, overhyping the federal funds
targeting time and time again. And the stock market in the 1990s loved this idea, since that
meant stock investors would never have to worry about the economy again. Everyone could just buy,
buy, buy, since there was this maestro guy who could make everything perfect simply by moving
the federal funds rate around a quarter point here or there. It is 100% preposterous. The Fed
got shoved out of the money business, leaving it to do nothing other than target Fed funds. Yet
somehow this turned out to have been a global godsend? Of course not. The Great Moderation and
its absence of monetary breakdown were due to the mature Eurodollar spreading and financing the
entire world. That's where the unparalleled prosperity came from. But since the Fed couldn't
admit that there was a Eurodollar system doing the work of a reserve currency, what else were
they going to do? Like I said, they should have shut down, but instead they chose to lie to the
world and hope the world would never catch wise, and that the Great Moderation would give this
interest rate targeting nonsense some veneer of credibility and legitimacy, which it did
four times. But it began to unravel. I mean, there were signs in the 1990s, but really in the 2000s.
To begin with, interest rates don't blindly follow the Fed funds target. Now other money rates,
short-term rates, are influenced by it because the Fed does offer a competing interest rate in that
Fed funds market, so other money markets do follow the Fed funds target rather closely. But not
always. There's independence even in short-term money rates, especially in periods of crisis,
which further reveals the truth that the Fed isn't actually a central bank. Even worse though,
lending rates in the real economy are set by the Treasury market, not the Fed. Well, the theory
from the Fed says that the Fed sets the Federal funds rate, and that sets the Treasury market.
That's not the case either. In fact, this was the whole point of Greenspan's 2005 conundrum. Fearing
inflation, therefore wanting to put the brakes on the economy before supposedly overheated,
Greenspan's Fed began raising the Fed funds target, only longer-term Treasury yields from
the middle on out, they didn't go along with those rate hikes. Policymakers, as I just said,
expected all rates to rise in obedience to this Fed funds target, but these didn't. And these
were rates in the Treasury market, which meant that lending beyond into the real economy was
actually tied to this disobedient part of the marketplace. You can also understand why
economists and policymakers don't really like the signals that come from the bond market.
So what Greenspan called a conundrum wasn't actually a conundrum. There was no mystery here.
It was the bond market exposing one key part of the interest rate targeting lie. The Fed only
controls the Fed funds rate, and that doesn't matter nearly as much as they've made it seem
for the last 40 years. But that just raises the question, why? Why wouldn't the Treasury market
follow along with the central bank and what's supposed to be a central bank and its interest
rate policies anyway? Where do market interest rates, where do those come from? So while the
Fed targets Fed funds, shorter duration bond yields are a combination of Fed influence,
that same thing, and more fundamental factors, the growth in inflation expectations and perceived
need for safety. Short-term Treasury rates are somewhat influenced by the Fed funds target,
because lending cash and Fed funds and other money markets, that's an alternative to investing in
short-term Treasuries. So you do have to pay attention to what the Federal Reserve is doing.
However, the further out in time you go, the further down the yield curve in maturity you go,
the less that competing rate actually matters. By the time you get to the middle part of the
yield curve, it's almost entirely about growth and inflation expectations. And that puts interest
rates opposite of what the Fed tries to tell you. Remember, the Fed says it lowers the Federal funds
target to support borrowing in the economy. But historically, low rates occur when there is very
little borrowing, and as it turns out, very little going on in the economy. Like everything else,
the Fed has to have it backwards because it is shoved out of the money business. This goes back
to Swedish economist Newt Wixel, who had it right over a century ago, unlike the Fed, Greenspan,
Bernanke, and all their lies. Wixel has stood the test of time. What Wixel observed is that when the
demand for money in the economy is higher, therefore, interest rates are higher since
everyone, including banks, are competing for money. And that makes sense. Banks have to pay
higher returns to keep the money in their vaults as reserves, and real economy participants are
willing to pay higher borrowing costs because the booming economy means it's worthwhile to do so.
So rates go up when things are good. But when times are bad, no one wants to take that much risk.
Money is easy and plentiful, but only for those who are perceived as safe, like a bank vault. So
banks that are awash in funds, they don't need to pay much to hold them. Same for others like
governments who can borrow money at lower and lower rates. At the same time, participants in
the real economy, those who are perceived to be riskier, have to pay higher and higher rates
until it becomes so uneconomical it isn't even worth the trouble. And while the monetary system
has evolved over the years since then, the principles remain the same nonetheless. When
times are good, you don't want to own safety and liquidity. You don't want to store money in a
bank vault assuming you had physical cash, or you don't want to leave it on a ledger account with a
bank anyway. Instead, you're going to be in the real economy generating much higher returns.
There's competition for money, therefore, even the most safe borrowers out there have to pay
higher rates to hold on to their funds. And when things are not good, depression economics, as
anybody who's perceived as safe and liquid will have all the money they want. Money is easy for
them, but no one else. Rates go down, the ones that we see go down. Rates for the real economy
go up to basically infinity. We see rates going lower when times are tough. This is the interest
rate fallacy which Milton Friedman pointed out at several times in history. During periods when
money is tight and the economy behaving like a depression such as the 1930s, rates go down and
tend to stay there. And as he said too, ahead of the great inflation, during inflationary periods,
or just general booms, rates go up. It's completely contrary to what we're told, and history has
repeatedly shown this is exactly the case. And it was Friedman who chastised the Fed of the early
1930s for saying their monetary policy was easy because they had rates low. And they saw that rates
were low, not realizing that low rates were entirely because money was not easy. And believe it or not,
it was none other than Ben Bernanke who showed the same thing. In his famous 1983 paper,
at least Ben Bernanke the scholar, he observed the same thing, especially from the Great Depression.
Interest rates, Bernanke said, were low and stayed there if only for the best quality borrowers. Money
was easy only for the least risky among the economy. For everyone else, it was to suffer the
bad end of depression economics. Low rates correspond to nothing good. Now obviously, or it should be
obvious, Ben Bernanke in particular and others at the Fed, they're well aware of this history.
He didn't somehow forget his earlier work, which is exactly what got him to where he ended up.
Ironically though, he ended up at the Fed in the same position as those he criticized. And he
duplicated all their policies because, like Greenspan, he didn't have any other choice. There were no
other alternatives. All they really had was the federal funds rate and bank reserves, which I'll
get to in a future video. So even though he knew what he was doing led to the same mistakes as the
1930s, he did them anyway since interest rate targeting was from the very beginning a lie, a
workaround the Fed used, hoping it might work so as to avoid telling the truth and being shut down.
The world should start to make a whole lot more sense when you reorient yourself to some actual
truth, as well as some actual economics, small e economics. Now what the Fed will say about all this
is, okay, so we're lowering the federal funds rate and that might somewhere help some things with a
few more people who borrow maybe a little bit more money than they otherwise would have at the margins
and therefore that a little bit of extra activity can support more in the real economy than
otherwise would have occurred. But that's not science. That's cope and hope. If rates are going
lower anyway, then a few more people borrowing like the Fed says won't really help anyone or
anything and that matches historical observations. The Fed in all of economics, capital e economics,
they want you to believe that higher rates are somehow a restriction on the economy and lower
rates are accommodation and stimulus. While they can be for some, history conclusively shows they
aren't, at least not systemically, and certainly not for the vast majority where it actually counts.
The entire reason you're supposed to believe this comes down to the simple fact the Fed isn't a
central bank. The monetary system evolved many, many, many years ago and left the Fed out of it
and that left the Fed with only one tool, the Fed funds rate, as Alan Greenspan said in 1990 and as
Meltzer said, we lied about it the entire time. Having no other options, the institution has spent
the last 40 years hyping and over hyping this tool, making it seem like it's like interest rate
targeting is the biggest, greatest thing ever. Don't fight the Fed. It doesn't stand up to even
the slightest scrutiny. Even common sense shows just how much this is all utter nonsense. Rates
are fundamental and those fundamentals expose everything behind the Fed, all the lies, all the
psychological manipulation. They tell you what's happening in the real economy. They are not some
lever to be used by bureaucrats because in the end, that's all the Fed has. All the Fed has are the
lies. This is the second in our Make It Make Sense series, the first one on the stock market in the
Great Depression, what really happened there. That's also in our playlist, which we'll keep
adding videos to it as we go along. So thank you very much for joining me. Check out the playlist
for more of these Make It Make Sense videos.
