How Tough Is Life In China? Mass Layoffs, Youth Flock to ‘Leftover Food’, Middle Class Disappearing?

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"Difficulty in Job Seeking for Those Over 35, Analysis: Chinese People Are Already in Decline
How Tough Is Life In China? Youth Are Rushing To Buy ‘Leftover Food’
Foreign Capital Outflow Accelerates, China's 2023 Net Inflow of Foreign Investment May Drop to Zero
Decentralized Debts Present Big Problems for China
Expert: Xi is Inadvertently Cultivating Those Who Would Overthrow Him Amidst Internal and External Troubles
#china #chinatruths #chinanews"
Difficulty in job seeking for those over 35. Analysis, Chinese people are already in decline.
How tough is life in China? Youth are rushing to buy leftover food.
Foreign capital outflow accelerates. China's 2023 net inflow of foreign investment may drop to zero.
Decentralized debts present big problems for China.
Expert, she is inadvertently cultivating those who would overthrow him amidst internal
and external troubles. It's all covered in today's China Truths.
Difficulty in job seeking for those over 35. Analysis, Chinese people are already in decline.
On January 19, buzz spread on Weibo about Pingan Bank, a nationwide joint-stock commercial bank
headquartered in Shenzhen, reportedly slashing 60% of its outsourced employees, including telephone
sales, online customer support, and programming. However, this news hasn't been officially
verified. Different versions of Pingan's layoff story have been making rounds for about two
months. One rumor suggested a 40% staff reduction, which the bank refuted. Yet, a Sina Finance
journalist claimed two weeks ago that several inside sources confirmed imminent restructurings
at Pingan's head office. This is just one instance in a larger trend of layoffs and pay cuts across
China. Nikkei Asia's recent coverage highlighted China's grim unemployment scene, revealing that
job losses are hitting not just fresh graduates but also increasingly those in their 30s and 40s.
35-year-old Mr. Zhou from Foshan, Guangdong Province, shared with Nikkei Asia that his
employer preferred post-1990 hires, leading to his rejection for being slightly older.
Ms. Fan, who hires nurses for a Beijing private hospital, explained that older job seekers,
like those around 35, have higher family expenses, such as childcare, making them less attractive
hires because employers can't cover these additional costs. The ripple effects of
unemployment and reduced salaries are collapsing the lifestyle of China's middle class.
As reported by Reuters on the 18th, Shanghai's high-end coffee shop owner Li Wenqing is feeling
the squeeze. On one hand, the Chinese are becoming more frugal, opting for cheaper coffee.
On the other hand, Li's two Hainan Island apartments, purchased for 4 million yuan
over US$562,000 in 2017, have been unrentable and unsellable for three years,
pushing him out of the middle class bracket. Economics professor Zhu Tian from Shanghai's
China Europe International Business School commented that China is experiencing an economic
downturn, with seven out of ten people he speaks to describing their year as bad.
A financial database relayed an analysis from the finance-focused self-media Bellus,
indicating that a financial crisis is already in motion. The analysis pointed out the current
volatility in the Chinese markets. With weak economic indicators, both Hong Kong and mainland
Chinese stock markets have nosedived. Even markets tied closely to China, like South Korean stocks,
Australian dollars, and New Zealand dollars, are affected. The financial turmoil in China
is likened to a fire spreading from the city gates, affecting everyone in its path and bound
to impact other nations and regions. Early market reactions show signs of distress.
South Korea, as a key supplier of chips and products, and Australia and New Zealand,
as suppliers of raw materials and food to China, are also vulnerable. Now, all market indicators,
from real estate and stocks to bonds and even goods like pianos, are signaling a strong financial
crisis warning. There's no doubt, it's a financial crisis. A self-media news report shared a WeChat
screenshot from a conversation stating, had dinner with the National Development and Reform
Commission yesterday. They mentioned that tough times should be measured in decades,
and they haven't even begun yet. How tough is life in China?
Youth are rushing to buy leftover food. China's economy is worsening, leading to a growing trend
among its youth to consume leftover food. Recently, several businesses have begun to
package unsold daily food items into leftover food blind boxes. Inside these boxes are bread,
milk tea, dumplings, and light meals, offered at a third of their original price,
creating a buying frenzy among many young people.
Jin Xian, a pseudonym in an interview with Beijing Youth Daily, described these boxes
as a lifesaver during his early, financially challenging days in Beijing.
Fresh out of college and new to the workforce, he had to live frugally. He shared how for just
20 yuan, about $2.81, he could get food that would normally cost 100 yuan, about $14.05,
making him a frequent purchaser. Initially a Western concept for environmental conservation,
leftover food blind boxes have gained traction in mainland China as the economy has faltered.
This phenomenon reflects broader social, business, and consumer dynamics.
These boxes often contain unsold food that's near expiry but still safe to eat,
available at a significant discount. Typically, they're sold in the evenings or just before
shops close, priced between 30% and 50% of the original cost.
While leftover food blind boxes are cutting down business losses, their profitability is limited.
A coffee shop owner explained that the profit margin is tiny after expenses.
A cup of coffee costs 4 or 5 yuan to make, but a blind box sells for just about 7 yuan.
After factoring in platform fees and other costs, the profits are minimal.
The information has sparked lively debates among China's youth.
One netizen questioned, isn't it just due to poverty?
Another commented, what could it be if not the new generation setting aside their pride to seek
a diverse, low-cost lifestyle? They have less money. It has even become a topic for exams,
with discussions on leftover food blind boxes being relevant for both language and politics
classes. Some have raised concerns over the food safety of these leftover food blind boxes,
stating, eating leftovers and then ending up needing in four at the hospital,
that's not really saving money. In recent years, with China's economy in steep decline and high
unemployment rates, many young people have downgraded their consumption habits, foregoing
luxuries like nail salons, live streaming, and food delivery, opting instead for domestic brands
and shoes and cosmetics. Many young people in Beijing are finding enjoyment in cost-free
relaxation methods. They flock to Chaoyang Park, which has no entry fee, to spend their free time
or cycle along Chang'an Avenue in the evenings, with each shared bike ride costing just about 5
yuan, about $0.70. Foreign capital outflow accelerates, China's 2023 net inflow of
foreign investment may drop to zero. On January 19, the CCP's Ministry of
Commerce released 2023 data revealing the establishment of 53,766 new foreign-invested
enterprises in China and the use of foreign investment totaling approximately $158.75
billion, marking an 8% decrease from the previous year. Despite this drop,
the ministry stated that foreign investment utilization remains historically high.
However, the state administration of foreign exchange's data paints a more pessimistic picture,
contrasting with the ministry's relatively positive outlook.
Historically, China has seen substantial foreign investment inflows. The peak occurred in 2021
with around $344 billion in net foreign direct investment, FDI, inflow as reported by the state
Yet, the trend shifted dramatically with a significant withdrawal of foreign capital in 2022,
causing the state administration's net FDI inflow to plummet to about $180 billion,
lower than the ministry's $189 billion. By 2023, this figure was close to zero.
The state administration's most recent data, from November last year,
showed a mere $15.5 billion net FDI inflow for the first three quarters of 2023,
a drastic over 90% decrease from the $160.8 billion in the same period of 2022.
The third quarter even recorded a historic negative net inflow of $11.8 billion,
indicating higher outflows than inflows. Amidst this decline since 2022, the overall
FDI inflow is threatening to cancel out the entire year's gains if the trend continues
into the fourth quarter of 2023. Further highlighting the capital exodus,
the Institute of International Finance reported that $78.1 billion was withdrawn
from China's stock and bond markets in the first 11 months of 2023.
Additionally, Bloomberg's analysis of People's Bank of China data showed a decrease of about
$188 billion in the value of Chinese stocks and bonds held by foreign institutions from December
2021 to June 2023. Decentralized Debts Present Big Problems For China
In the article Decentralized Debts Present Big Problems For China, published on January 19,
Christopher Balding, an expert in the Chinese economy, analyzed the situation of the local
government debt in China, which has become a hot issue. He explains that China's increasing
debt pressure stems from excessive borrowing by consumers, state-owned companies, and local
governments to meet central growth targets. This has put Beijing in a difficult position,
having limited tools to address these debt levels. Balding highlights the unique governance structure
in China, where centralized directives are executed by local authorities. This approach
impacts not only debt management but also the central-local government relationship.
Despite China's image as a centralized authoritarian state, its government
operations are relatively decentralized. For example, in 2022, the central government was
responsible for only 14 percent of total government expenditure, compared to the U.S.
federal government's 74 percent. Local spending is directed by Beijing's growth targets,
often set unrealistically high. This has led to distorted outcomes,
with almost every province reporting growth above the national rate.
This central-local dynamic, coupled with localized authoritarianism,
results in inefficient allocation of resources. For instance, in 2023, around 11,000 semiconductor
firms, heavily backed by the government, shut down. Tsinghua University researchers estimate
local government debt in China at nearly $13 trillion. They suggest that the central government
should assume this debt. However, this poses a challenge, as the central government,
with an annual expenditure of only $500 billion, cannot feasibly service a $13 trillion debt.
The centralization of directives clashes with the control of local revenue and expenditure.
China's economic solution seems simple in theory but is profound,
intractable, and thorny in practice. The central government, with limited
revenue and spending capacity, cannot absorb substantial local government debt.
State-owned banks lending to targeted sectors creates distorted incentives,
undermining market forces. Local leaders, seeking favor with Beijing,
invest in projects regardless of feasibility or expertise.
This centralized decentralization reflects a failure of authoritarianism.
The central government relies on local authorities for execution, but local leaders,
as authoritarians in their domains, often disregard Beijing's limits,
focusing on meeting targets to secure their positions or promotions.
This leads to unchecked local power, with leaders incentivizing projects like
unnecessary infrastructure regardless of financial viability.
Balding concludes that China's political system, driven by authoritarian incentives,
perpetuates this decentralization dilemma. Local leaders, emulating strong central figures,
become local authoritarians. This pattern is so ingrained in Chinese
politics that an old proverb describes this behavior,
The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.
With the CCP leader Xi Jinping cracking down on factions and leaders who do not follow him,
even a perfected information machine keeps him detached from local realities.
Until China resolves its political incentives under authoritarianism,
its decentralization problem will remain unsolved.
Expert, she is inadvertently cultivating those who would overthrow him amidst internal
and external troubles. At the end and start of the year, the Chinese Communist Party engaged
in extensive internal purging while projecting a strong economic front and suppressing negative
outlooks. The failure of the CCP's interference in Taiwan's recent election has kept the focus
on the regime's and Xi Jinping's leadership crisis. Amidst internal and external troubles,
Xi Jinping's poor governance and authoritarian rule are inadvertently creating opponents
within Xiongnanhai. Let's dive into an expert's analysis.
In party politics, Xi Jinping last year ousted key figures he had previously elevated,
including Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu,
along with numerous military generals and heads of defense enterprises.
There are recent rumors about a challenge to Xi led by Liu Yuan and other prominent
second-generation red elites. Sun Guoxiang, a full-time associate professor at the University
of Nanhua in Taiwan, argues that since Xi's rise to power, his political rivals have been
eliminated through anti-corruption drives, leaving no significant challengers. However,
Xi's governance failures and dictatorial style are, ironically, nurturing potential future
adversaries. He said that there might be a new storm brewing, and once it gains momentum,
it could trigger a crisis within Xiongnanhai. At the CCP's 20th National Congress in 2022,
Xi's allies gained complete control, reinforcing his dictatorship.
Nevertheless, the government keeps stressing the need for centralized and unified leadership
and penalizing officials who show a lack of initiative or lying-flat approach.
Sun notes that this lying-flat situation started in Xi's second term. Xi's self-assuredness and
desire for control led many to cede total authority to him, fostering a widespread
passive attitude among officials. This could ultimately hollow out the regime's governance
capacity and raise new issues regarding the legitimacy of Xi's rule. Sun also observes
that Xi disrupted the CCP's succession system, raising significant concerns about future
governance in mainland China. Given the regime's inability to enact systemic reforms and unresolved
economic issues, the international community should brace for the CCP's collapse and significant
shifts in mainland China. Will intensified internal conflicts prompt Xi Jinping to wage
war against Taiwan? It's a long-standing belief that Xi Jinping might initiate conflict in the
Taiwan Strait or take military action in the South China Sea when faced with domestic instability
and deep-rooted internal contradictions. However, Sun Guoxiang assesses only a 1%
probability of such a scenario. While acknowledging the CCP's propensity for risk,
he points out their need to substantially counter the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific strategy,
suggesting an unlikely inclination toward an irrational war in the near future.
Su Zhiyun, director of the Institute of Strategy and Resources at Taiwan's Institute of National
Defense and Security, observes that historically, the CCP has resorted to external warfare during
internal crises. Examples include the Korean War in 1950 following the CCP's control over
mainland China, the Xinbao Island clash with the Soviet Union during the early Cultural Revolution,
and the Vietnam War after Deng Xiaoping overthrew the Gang of Four in 1979. These were ground wars
where the CCP employed mass infantry tactics. In contrast, the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea,
or South China Sea conflicts, determined by naval and air warfare and technological capability,
put the CCP at a disadvantage. In agreement, Lin Yingyu, assistant professor at the Institute
of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University in Taiwan,
also expresses skepticism about the likelihood of military action in the Taiwan Strait.
He speculates that the CCP is unlikely to opt for military action currently,
possibly awaiting the outcome of the U.S. presidential election before contemplating
further moves. Don't forget to leave a comment in the section below to share your opinions on
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