The Game Theory Behind Trump’s Tariffs | From A Business Professor

Mental Sharpness
237 followers
Comments are disabled for this video.
Hello everyone, welcome to Business School 101.
Today we are going to talk about an interesting topic.
How can the theory of games explain Trump's tariff policies and the retort responses of other countries?
In recent years, we have seen countries all over the world engage in commercial controversies, imposing tariffs on the goods of others in an attempt to gain an advantage.
But do these policies really help the economy or end up causing more damage than benefits?
Even more important, why do countries seem to be trapped in this cycle of tariffs and retortions?
To answer these questions, we can turn to the theory of games, a powerful tool to understand the strategic decision-making process.
By analyzing the tariff war through the lens of the theory of games, we can discover the hidden incentives that guide the actions of each country
and see why commercial wars often lead to worse results for all the subjects involved.
Section 1. The Matrix of Payoffs
To clarify better, let's take into account a simple example in which the two players in the game are the United States and a foreign country.
Each has two possible strategies, impose tariffs or maintain the status quo.
We can use a matrix of payoffs to illustrate the results of these choices.
If both countries choose to maintain the status quo, that is, neither of the two imposes tariffs,
trade flows remain stable, economic conditions remain healthy and both countries receive a payoff of 100.
However, if the United States maintains free exchange while the foreign country imposes tariffs,
the foreign country gains an advantage by protecting its national industries, increasing its payoff to 120.
Meanwhile, the United States suffers from reduced exports, which lower their payoff to 80.
It is also true that if the United States imposes tariffs while the foreign country does not, the United States earns at the expense of the foreign country.
Finally, if both countries impose tariffs, a trade war breaks out, damaging both economies and lowering the payoff of each country to 90.
Now, let's analyze this game through the lens of the theory of games.
From the point of view of the United States, imposing tariffs is always the best choice, regardless of what the foreign country does.
If the foreign country maintains free exchange, the United States earns 120 by imposing tariffs higher than those they would obtain by maintaining free exchange.
If the foreign country imposes tariffs, the United States prefer to impose tariffs anyway since 90 is better than 80.
The same logic applies to the foreign country.
Regardless of what the United States does, imposing tariffs involves a greater gain.
Consequently, imposing tariffs becomes the dominant strategy for both countries.
This means that regardless of the choice of the adversary, each country believes that tariffs are the best option.
This leads to a Nash equilibrium in which both countries impose tariffs.
However, this equilibrium is not the best possible result.
If both countries had chosen free exchange, each would have received a gain of 100 instead of 90.
This example perfectly illustrates the classic prisoner's dilemma in the theory of games.
Even if cooperation, that is, free exchange, would be better for both parties, the lack of trust and the fear of a unilateral disadvantage push both to a worse result.
This explains why when Trump imposed tariffs, other countries reacted instead of backing down, leading to a trade war on a large scale that damaged global trade.
So, is there a way to escape this dilemma?
The theory of games offers several possible solutions.
First, if countries expect to interact repeatedly in the long term, they could be more inclined to cooperate,
knowing that short-term gains derived from imposing tariffs could lead to long-term losses due to distortions.
Second, international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, WTO,
help facilitate trade negotiations and the resolution of controversies, creating trust between countries.
Finally, direct negotiations and trade agreements can prevent a growing cycle of TTIP distortions,
allowing both parties to reach mutually advantageous compromises.
Section 4. The problem with pure strategy.
In the previous example, we analyzed the so-called Nash equilibrium of pure strategy in the Dutch war,
in which each country maintains its current strategy without incentives to change.
Now we are diving deeper into a more complex and intriguing scenario.
What happens when there is no pure, stable equilibrium of strategy?
How should the tariff policies of countries be formulated in these cases?
Let's continue with our example of the United States and a foreign country,
hypothesizing the following payoff structure.
If both countries maintain free exchange, each enjoys a payoff of 100 as before.
If the United States imposes tariffs while the foreign country maintains free exchange,
the payoff of the foreign country drops to 80 while the United States sees their payoff increase to 120.
On the other hand, if the foreign country imposes tariffs while the United States maintains free exchange,
both parties suffer a slight drop in payoffs with the United States, which earns 95,
and the foreign country, which also sees its earnings decrease from 100 to 95.
Finally, if both countries impose tariffs, each suffers greater losses with their payoffs, which drop to 90.
At first glance, it may seem that a country must always impose tariffs to maximize its earnings.
But when we examine the incentives more closely, we discover that there is no pure, stable equilibrium of strategy.
Suppose that the foreign country chooses to maintain free exchange.
In this case, the United States has a strong incentive to impose tariffs, as this would increase its earnings from 100 to 120.
However, once the United States imposes tariffs, the best response of the foreign country would be to impose tariffs too,
since an earnings of 90 is still better than 80.
But if both countries impose tariffs, the United States could find it advantageous to return to free exchange,
since earning 95 is preferable to 90.
Anticipating this, the foreign country would also prefer to return to free exchange, since 100 is better than 95.
This decision-making process back and forth creates a strategic cycle in which neither party is satisfied with a single better response.
Section 5. The role of mixed strategies.
When a game does not have a pure, stable strategy equilibrium, the optimal approach is not to stick to a fixed decision, but rather to adopt a mixed strategy.
The key to mixed strategies is to choose each action with a certain probability,
making sure that the opponent cannot gain an advantage by changing their strategy.
In this case, the United States and the foreign country must select their own tariff policies
so that the other country is indifferent between maintaining free exchange and imposing tariffs.
Through mathematical calculations, we discover that in equilibrium,
the foreign country should maintain free exchange with a probability of 1 5th and impose tariffs with a probability of 4 5ths.
Meanwhile, the United States should maintain free exchange with a probability of 2 3rds and impose tariffs with a probability of 1 3rd.
This means that neither country will constantly adopt the same approach,
but will adapt their policies dynamically, balancing internal protection with the advantages of international trade.
Section 6. How do mixed strategies work in the real world?
In reality, this type of mixed strategy is widely observed in trade policies.
No country follows a purely free exchange or purely protectionist approach.
Instead, they modify their strategies based on economic conditions, sector requirements and political considerations.
For example, the United States could impose high tariffs on critical sectors such as steel or semiconductors to protect national companies,
while at the same time lowering tariffs on consumer goods to guarantee stable prices.
This flexible approach reflects the logic of mixed strategies,
allowing countries to protect their own economic interests while maintaining a certain degree of international trade cooperation.
Section 7. The Conclusion
The analysis of mixed strategies highlights the complexity of international trade policy
and explains why trade strategies often appear unpredictable and flexible.
In practice, extreme policies tend to have negative consequences,
while a balanced approach that dynamically adapts between openness and protectionism
provides a more effective way to manage global economic uncertainty.
By understanding the principles of game theory, we get a more in-depth view of how governments develop trade policies that respond to changing economic conditions.
This is all for today's topic.
If you have any thoughts or questions about this topic, feel free to leave a comment and join the discussion.
Thank you for watching and see you next time.
