Why Europe will be stronger without America

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Timestamps:
00:00 Intro
01:16 Macroeconomics 101
03:15 War economy trilemma
08:41 Why does Europe need a military threat
13:21 Discussion + conclusion
16:11 Sponsor
The US wants out of Europe. This leaves the continent vulnerable to a large neighbor that
is projected to outspend all European countries combined next year, at least when it comes to
effective defense spending. So now, in Europe, the debate has begun. What parts of the welfare
state should they cut so that Europeans can afford to defend themselves? Should they reduce
healthcare spending, education spending, or perhaps social protection in general?
This entire debate is nonsense. That's right, in this video I'm going to make the case that the
US leaving Europe to defend itself will make Europe's economy stronger, not weaker. And
therefore, increased defense spending will not require cutting Europe's welfare state.
But look, I realize that this is a bold claim. In fact, if we think about Europe as a person,
like you or me, who needs to spend less on something to be able to spend more on something
else, my claim makes no sense at all. But entire economic systems work in very different ways than
people. So, to find out how increased defense spending will make Europe's economy great again,
let's do a quick refresher on our…
Macroeconomics 101
If we look at macroeconomics in its simplest form, the economy is a system of people and
machines. Also known as labour and capital. People work some hours and using machines,
they produce goods and services. The value of those goods and services is what we call
total output or GDP, gross domestic product. If an economy is operating at its full capacity,
then there is a very low unemployment rate and there are hardly any idle factories. In such a
society, if they want to get more people into the army, it means that companies can make
fewer consumer goods. But, because soldiers still provide a service, defense, GDP may remain the
same. However, given that soldiers still earn money and therefore want to keep buying consumer
goods, of which now less is produced, this may or will likely cause their prices to rise.
Consumer prices going up, that is inflation. So, in this case, thanks to the extra defense spending,
the economy has reached the limit of its capacity to meet all the demand that's there.
This causes inflation. Economists call this overheating. A well-run economy
should have low unemployment and high capacity utilization of factories.
It employs all the resources that it has available and therefore grows
slowly as technology progresses. As we've seen, if a war comes along, such an economy will be
pushed above its sustainable potential, causing inflation, meaning that it's overheating.
This framework can explain what happened to Israel after October 2023 or to Russia today.
Before their wars, these economies were roughly at full potential with really low unemployment.
Then, when their respective wars started, it pushed these economies temporarily above potential,
producing inflation. Therefore, these countries are facing a trade-off between three desirable
things. High defense spending, high civilian spending and low inflation. An economy that is
at full capacity cannot have all three of these desirable things. Therefore, we could call this
the war economy trilemma. After October 2023, Israel was facing this trilemma. Initially,
it spent more on defense and saw inflation go up. Therefore, it initially raised interest rates to
reduce civilian spending. But then, in 2024, it ultimately called off a full-scale invasion of
Lebanon, likely partially due to economic concerns. On the other hand, Russia has chosen to
both raise interest rates and accept higher inflation, for now, to be able to continue
its massive war spending efforts to conquer Ukraine. Now, using this framework, we have
already learned something interesting, I think, about Europeans. High inflation is not an option,
it's not even discussed. Europeans don't control their central bank, so obviously,
the only option then is to cut government spending on welfare. In this context, the current debate,
cutting spending on welfare, makes total sense. If the European economy was, at least,
at or near its full capacity, I would be on board with this debate. I'm not a fan of inflation,
I'm not advocating for ever increasing government debt, but in this video, I'm going to make two
bold claims. The first is that Europe's economy is operating well below its potential. The second
is that the proposed increase in defense spending is small enough to get its economy closer to its
potential without pushing it above its potential. Therefore, the war economy trilemma framework
is not yet the right framework to talk about Europe, because America leaving will make
Europe's economy stronger by bringing its economy closer to its potential. But okay,
this channel is an analysis channel, the goal is to understand our economies based on evidence.
So, what is my evidence to back up these pretty bold claims?
For claim number one, Europe is operating well below its potential, I have three pieces of
evidence. First, Europe's unemployment rate is well above that of the United States and has been
for a very long time. Second, Europe's capacity utilization, how much it uses its factories,
has kept dropping after Covid, meaning that there are plenty of spare factories, especially in
Germany. Finally, while Europe did see quite a bit of inflation, most research indicates that
this was primarily caused by Covid supply disruptions and then by skyrocketing energy
prices after Russia invaded Ukraine. However, crucially, if Europe needs to spend too much on
increasing its defense, then of course we'll still get to the war economy trilemma trade-off.
But that is currently not the case for four reasons. First, when it comes to manpower,
European think tank Bruegel has estimated that Europe will need about 300.000 new soldiers
if American troops were to leave. At the same time, there are almost 13 million unemployed
people in the EU. So, while of course not all unemployed people are fit to serve in the army,
there is a really wide margin of error here. Second, when it comes to utilizing Europe's
factories, there are some really hopeful signs that Europe can produce enough military material.
First of all, while Europe does rely on the US quite a bit, especially for air defense,
Europe's military-industrial complex is still well diversified enough overall, especially in France,
which never fully trusted the US and therefore maintained military capabilities across all
domains. Third, Europe still has a good industrial base when it comes to industries
that can be transformed relatively easily to make war materials. For example, Europe produces
input materials like chemicals and steel on a much greater level than the US. And, it increasingly
now has empty car factories that can be repurposed. In fact, this is already happening in Germany,
where German defense company Rheinmetall recently announced it may repurpose several
Volkswagen factories to make armored vehicles. Finally, when it comes to spending in general,
Bruegel and NATO have estimated that Europe needs to raise spending from about 1.9% of GDP to 3 or
3.5% respectively. That is still only half of what economies like Russia and Israel are spending on
defense today. Therefore, I think it is likely that the current defense spending will push Europe's
economy closer to its potential rather than over it, making the continent's economy stronger and
thereby keeping government debt loads manageable and avoiding inflation. However, at this point,
you may ask, but hold on a second Joeri, if Europe's economy is operating below its potential,
do we really need defense spending to get it back to potential? Can we instead spend on nicer things
like education or healthcare? No. After all, Europe has been operating far more below its
potential than the US for such a long time now already. So, on its own, Europe has not been able
to bring its economy to potential. Of course, this raises the question, why? In other words,
why does Europe need a military threat to activate the full potential of its economy?
To answer that question, I think it is important to emphasize that there is essentially no European
economy. That is, there is no European government that can decide to increase spending to lift
Europe's economy towards its full potential. Instead, there are countries with exceptionally
low government debt in the north and countries with exceptionally high government debt in the
south. The northern economies are considered to be very competitive and have very low unemployment
while those in the south have very high unemployment and are considered not very competitive.
If we follow standard economic theory, wages in the north should therefore rise as workers are
short-supplied. This would then make these countries less competitive, compelling industry
to move to the south. This would make the south then more competitive, lowering unemployment
and lowering, importantly, the government debt burden in these countries as their economies grow.
However, in Europe, this balancing mechanism is blocked for two reasons. First, northern
countries have long complained that southern governments are too eager to regulate and
overspend, which kept wages relatively high. This is why they forced austerity on the south
after the euro crisis. Since then, countries like Spain have become more competitive.
However, despite significant labour market reforms, southern countries have still struggled
to attract sufficient companies. Many economists have pointed out that this is because
the balancing mechanism was not just blocked by the south, but also by the north, whose
governments have artificially suppressed wages through collective bargaining and by keeping
government investment spending lower than it should be, especially in Germany, which now has
crumbling infrastructure. This dynamic means that southern countries operate below their potential
because they cannot get out of debt. But even more strikingly, it means north European countries
operate below their potential by choice. North European workers have chosen to accept lower
wages voluntarily and north European voters kept voting in parties that underinvested
in infrastructure and education. Why would they do that? That seems rather strange. Well,
according to economists like Berkeley professor Barry Eichengreen, this can for a large part at
least be explained by the fact that European economies have fixed exchange rates or something
similar in the form of the euro and it's not a united country. You see, if exchange rates cannot
be adjusted, a country that is too competitive will accumulate euros. But if a country is not
competitive enough, it will run out of euros completely causing a massive crisis such as the
South experienced in 2011. This theory can explain why, without an external threat,
Europe's economy will be run at below what it is capable of. Northern countries underinvest
and keep wages low, hurting their economies, so that they can stay on top of the economic
packing order, avoiding a crisis at all costs. This hurts the southern economies, which cannot
easily become competitive given that the natural balancing mechanism is blocked by the north.
Now, with a strong external threat, this dynamic is shattered. Poland and more importantly Germany
are now turning on the spending taps. This may slightly overheat their economies, but as these
economies import more from the south, especially from Italy, which is Europe's second industrial
powerhouse after Germany, this will enable indebted southern governments to spend more as well.
In other words, increased defence spending in the north will unlock a virtuous economic cycle in
which increased spending in the north unlocks increased spending in the south, which again
unlocks more spending in the north, right until Europe's economy reaches its full potential.
This means that we don't have to talk about cutting the welfare state just yet, as the war
economic trilemma is not yet applicable to Europe. At least, that is the case that I'm making in this
video. But, could it be that I'm wrong? Yes, of course. You see, on this channel I make economic analysis
based on data and economic theories. I try to be as transparent as I can about the specific data
and theories that I use. However, the world of macroeconomics is highly uncertain. It depends on
the actions of unpredictable politicians and on top of that we don't have access to all the
macroeconomic data even. So, what are the main assumptions that I made to make my case and how
could they be wrong? First, I assume that the estimates about extra spending and manpower by
Bruegel are correct. However, these estimates are based on the current situation on the battlefield
in which the Ukrainians are just holding out against the Russians. But, if Ukraine falls,
in that case, Europe may need to spend a lot more on defence as Russia just got a lot stronger.
My second big assumption was that Europe's economy is below its potential based on current
unemployment and industrial capacity and inflation data. However, thanks to rapid aging, Europe's
potential could rapidly come down. Actually, I think this is the weakest part of my analysis.
In the next 25 years, Europe's working age population is projected by the UN to decrease
by about 50 million. This is far more than the people who are currently unemployed. This could
quickly bring the continent to its potential output and may mean difficult choices with
the welfare state. However, 25 years is a long time. Europe could increase defence spending
now to bring its economy up to its potential and then reduce defence spending as its population
ages. After all, Russia's population is also aging very rapidly, so that threat may decrease
then as well. On top of that, European defence spending could become a lot
cheaper if it was centralized rather than done by each country on their own.
Finally, population projections are not everything. Migration can change substantially.
For example, Spain's population was also projected to decline due to very low fertility,
but instead, it is rapidly rising thanks to migration from Latin America. Who knows,
the rest of Europe could get the same from North America.
Finally, I think it's important to highlight that I assume that Europe's divided nature is
keeping it back. As we've seen, this is a respectable economic theory, but it is not
only one. Another theory is that excessive regulation is holding it back. But if that's
the case, I'd argue that we still don't need to cut the welfare state right now,
we should just cut regulation instead. So, whichever road I followed, I came to the
same conclusion. America's defensive retreat, while extremely regrettable and, importantly,
horrible for the people of Ukraine right now, does have a silver lining. It will make Europe's
economy great again. But, of course, there are many more American allies than just the Europeans
that find themselves in a similar predicament as Europe. What should they do? You can read
all about that in the sponsor of this video, The Economist. I highly recommend you follow
up this video by reading their analysis on how these countries should respond.
Then, read up on their analysis of how Putin aims to trap Donald Trump. And finally,
I recommend you check out this article about how the war has allowed Ukraine's powerful drone
industry to thrive and come to life. Indeed, if you like my analysis but are still hungry for
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