沖繩島戰役美國紀錄片

沖繩的襲擊陸上 十一月一日 十一月一日 十一月一日 十一月二日 十一月四日 是無反的 在七天前的設置和十二天前的設置後 大船查看火力檢查 還是搜索敵人的行蹤 軍人也有搜索 在這裡在河邊只有325英里 西部的日本家園 沒有任何炸彈 在河谷海岸航行後 軍隊傳達到北部和南部 航空母艦 航空軍隊和軍隊的高級指揮 密集地觀察我們航行地圖的迅速進展 在海岸上的軍隊通過信息通過信息 報道了缺乏和不緊準的抵抗 從空中我們的觀察員 報道了少量的敵人行動證據 在海岸上 我們的支援艦仍然站立 沒有引發敵人的重火 在軍隊前進 軍隊帶着武器 在五天內 軍隊前進 但在L5 二十四軍隊突然發現 進入日本在沿岸沿岸沿岸沿岸沿岸的 系統防禦部隊 爲標兵 這將是沿岸最開始的戰鬥 敵人把主要的抵抗線移到 沿岸沿岸沿岸沿岸沿岸的 傷因的沿途 在二十四軍隊開始搜索 日式防禦部隊的地面優勢 立刻展現 當時的軍隊 忽然需要所有武器 一切都在他們手中 It was here that they called for the direct support of naval gunfire. The terrain of Okinawa presented many obstacles to our land forces. The trajectory of the howitzers, with a high angle of fall, was not suitable for indirect fire on the cave. Flat trajectory artillery weapons had to be placed for short-range fire. This exposed both men and tanks to withering... Artillery and ammunition had to be moved on roads only wide enough to accommodate a jeep. The roads, built without bottoms, became running troughs of mud during the rainy season. Beach congestion delayed the initial handling of ammunition. Three ammunition ships were sunk by the enemy. Although the troops had a large number of weapons, they were not free to fire them indiscriminately or wakefully. On Okinawa, the rapid mobility of the firing ships helped to overcome these obstacles, demonstrated the full capabilities of naval gunfire forces. Air was delivered in exactly the same manner as field artillery. The naval gun, with its flat trajectory, was able to fire up the ravines running at right angles to the shoreline. Small caliber artillery was unable to reduce certain installations. These had to be destroyed by battleship main battery fire. Deep plunging fire from cruisers and battleships neutralized the Jap and prevented any radical movements by him in his rear. The naval gun complemented the artillery by delivering deep supporting fire on targets out of range of the artillery and on targets accessible only from the sea. Despite floating mines, suicide boats, Baka bombs, and the Kamikaze Corps, to destroy the fixed defensive positions of the enemy, accurate and precise control of fire support was necessary. This was accomplished by the coordination of the ships with the land forces. At the target information centers, all the information centers were located. All information on enemy targets suitable for support fire was assembled, evaluated, and assigned to the appropriate ship. At the outset of the operation, the distribution of fleet elements was determined by the zones of action of the landing forces. Supporting fires were requested by the landing forces to the admiral in command of a particular zone. On Love Plus 6, the cruiser Wichita entered Nagasuka 1, later named Buckner Bay. And on Love Plus 9, our troops landed in the eastern islands, completing their occupation by Love Plus 11. This, coupled with the mine sweeping operations inside the bay, permitted our fire support ships to enter and deliver direct and general support of the 24th Corps from the eastern side of Okinawa. As our ships were now able to fire from both sides of the island, perfect enfilading fires close in to our troops' front lines could be executed. Due to the terrain, the support units often had to interlock their fire. In the northern zone of action, only a small amount of naval gunfire support was delivered. Due to the lack of resistance to the 3rd Marine Amphibious Corps, and because the clearing of mines could not progress as rapidly as the advance of the troops, few ships were required. Thus, by Love Plus 18, we were able to mass our support ships off both flanks of the 24th Corps to deliver a tremendous volume of fire in support of a coordinated attack on that day. The ships delivered a heavy preliminary bombardment just prior to the jump-off, and continued this bombardment deep into the enemy's rear as the attack progressed. Again, the mobility of ships and the use of that mobility to approach and destroy targets inaccessible to fixed positions was demonstrated. But the results of this attack were advances of only 500 to 2,000 yards. It was evident that there were at least 60,000 Japanese troops still to be dug out from their tenable positions in the caves and crags so ideally suited for defense. These caves were so numerous that a single patrol investigated over 500 of them in one day. Both direct and indirect naval gunfire was called for. Five- and six-inch fire was not effective. Eight, twelve, fourteen, and sixteen-inch batteries of heavy cruisers and battleships caused more destruction among the caves than a greater volume of lighter caliber fire. Although the actual point of aim was the mouths of the caves, shells landing close to the target many times produced landslides, which would seal the caves. Main battery enfilading fire was brought close to our own front lines to destroy the caves. The call for fourteen-inch fire, only 400 yards from the troops, proved the accuracy of naval guns in deflection. But the job of destroying these caves was slow and tedious, and continued throughout the operation. On Love Plus 18, the land forces had advanced to a line from Gusukuma on the east to Tsuwa on the west. Opposition offered by the enemy was strong. Within the Japanese lines in this area, 483 artillery weapons of 47 millimeter or greater caliber were originally located. These weapons repeatedly pounded our positions. In a single day, 26 of our tanks were destroyed. Even Yontan Airfield was subject to intermittent fire. At night, the Japanese employed these weapons to disturb rest and resupply. In the Naha area, anti-aircraft radically affected the employment of observation planes. While the majority of these weapons were destroyed by artillery or overrun by the land forces, at least 127 were destroyed by naval gunfire. This was accomplished by both direct and indirect fire. Guns located by airspot and those positions in the extreme southern sector, which were out of range of land forces' artillery, were pounded. Both day and night, the ships themselves were able to locate the flashes of enemy guns and take them under direct neutralizing fire. At night, gun positions were also furnished by the Target Information Center. On Love Plus 8, the cruiser Tuscaloosa was called upon to protect the 420th Group Artillery on Kisajima, which was being fired upon by Japanese batteries just west of Naha Airfield. The cruiser quickly moved into position, opened up with her main batteries and silenced the Japanese fire. Despite hits from enemy guns, the ships continued their support of the troops. Heavy counter-battery fire often had to be delivered. Almost without exception, the support ships were able to neutralize the enemy fire. The ability of the ships to move into position on call from shore or airspot meant that the troops had a mobile floating artillery that could destroy gun positions inaccessible to their own guns. By Love Plus 35, the land forces had advanced to Shuri. The troops had almost surrounded the towns of Shuri and Naha, but the thick walls of Shuri Castle still defied them. The one answer to this was main battery battleship fire. On call, the ships moved into position, and on Love Plus 52, Shuri Castle was pounded by 14 and 16-inch projectiles for two days. Our troops entered the city to find it a mass of rubble. In similar fashion, Naha was pounded by our ships, artillery and air support for 40 days and 40 nights. Here, the ships were able to stand off the coast and slowly and deliberately, using direct fire and their own spot, reduce the most tenacious of the Japanese installations. The Jap airfield at Naha continued to resist, hoping for reinforcement. Support ships fired from 3,000 to 8,000 yards offshore and methodically neutralized the field until it was overrun by troops. On Love Plus 54, the troops called for fire from rocket and mortar craft as well as the heavy support ships. In a coordinated attack, the land forces swept around the eastern flank of the enemy, taking Yanabaru and gaining tactical control of the main line of resistance. The road net of the Japanese in his last stand afforded him both lateral and vertical communication. But the battleships and cruisers standing off the southeastern tip of the island repeatedly hammered away with interdiction fire by day and harassing fire at night. The roads became almost useless to the enemy. The Japanese troops were forced to divide into three groups. All three positions made the enemy more vulnerable than ever to naval gunfire. Now the ships were able to fire in all directions to disrupt his supplies and wither the remnants of his defenses. South of Yanabaru, the enemy concentrated his forces on the reverse slopes of the hills. But these slopes were open to the sea. Rocket and mortar craft completely broke up the Japanese concentrations. As the land forces advanced, the call continued for rockets and mortars around the southern tip of the island. Slowly and methodically, the support ships themselves progressed through an arc of 270 degrees from Buckner Bay to Sanagashima, squeezing in the already tactically defeated Japanese. The night harassing fire was of sufficient intensity to almost silence the enemy's guns. This permitted the land forces artillery to fire at will, breaking up counterattacks and giving direct close support to our troops. To locate signs of Japanese infiltration or counterattacks, the harassing fire was interspersed with illuminating fire. Over 1,000 starshells were fired each night. Thus by a tremendous volume of fire and the capability of the ships to move into positions required by the targets, the eastern position of the Japanese fell. The western sector fell next, and finally after 80 days, the southern position of the enemy was overrun, completing the occupation of Okinawa. For 80 days and 80 nights, the ships had fired in support of the land forces. Battleships,cruisers and destroyers had stood off ashore only 325 miles from the Japanese homeland to deliver continuous fire for almost three months. 650,000 rounds of 5-inch or greater caliber were delivered. 33,000 tons of projectiles fell on the island. The ships had brought to bear over 439 big guns. This was the equivalent of 39 field artillery battalions, but with even greater caliber. 156 support craft had played havoc with the coastline and coastal caves to which the Japs clung so tenaciously. Despite the fanatical opposition of the Kamikaze Corps, fire was delivered up to 80% of the time that the ships were in the area. At Okinawa,naval gunfire proved its ability not only to supplement other supporting arms, but in itself to give continuous direct support to the land forces. From General Buckner, commanding General 10th Army, to Admiral Turner, commander Task Force 51, came this message. Desire to express my appreciation for splendid support ground operation by support ships. Willingness of ships to close shore, though faced with foul water and enemy guns, permitted more accurate close support and effective deep support. Hard work of crews under trying conditions of long hours at GQ and constant threat of enemy air is especially praiseworthy. Power and accuracy of these ships contributed materially to land success and subsequent minimum loss of life.