Jerome Powell talar efter Feds räntebesked | NTD NYHETER

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USA:s centralbankschef Jerome Powell håller en presskonferens i Washington efter att ha meddelat Feds räntebesked, den 19 mars.
#USA #fed #powell #ekonomi
Good afternoon.
My colleagues and I remain squarely focused on achieving our dual-mandate goals of maximum
employment and stable prices for the benefit of the American people.
The economy is strong overall and has made significant progress toward our goals over
the past two years.
Labor market conditions are solid, and inflation has moved closer to our 2 percent longer-run
goal, though it remains somewhat elevated.
In support of our goals, today the Federal Open Market Committee decided to leave our
policy interest rate unchanged.
We also made the technical decision to slow the pace of decline in the size of our balance
sheet.
I'll have more to say about these decisions after briefly reviewing economic developments.
Economic activity continued to expand at a solid pace in the fourth quarter of last year,
with GDP rising at 2.3 percent.
Recent indications, however, point to a moderation in consumer spending following the rapid growth
seen over the second half of 2024.
Surveys of households and businesses point to heightened uncertainty about the economic
outlook.
It remains to be seen how these developments might affect future spending and investment.
In our summary of economic projections, the median participant projects GDP to rise 1.7
percent this year, somewhat lower than projected in December, and to rise a bit below 2 percent
over the next two years.
In the labor market, conditions remain solid.
Payroll job gains averaged at 200,000 per month over the past three months.
The unemployment rate, at 4.1 percent, remains low and has held in a narrow range for the
past year.
The jobs-to-workers gap has held steady for several months.
Wages are growing faster than inflation and at a more sustainable pace than earlier in
the pandemic recovery.
Overall, a wide set of indicators suggest that conditions in the labor market are broadly
in balance.
The labor market is not a source of significant inflationary pressures.
The median projection for the unemployment rate in the SEP is 4.4 percent at the end
of this year and 4.3 percent over the next two years.
Inflation has eased significantly over the past two years, but remains somewhat elevated
relative to our 2 percent longer-run goal.
Estimates based on the Consumer Price Index and other data indicate that total PCE prices
rose 2.5 percent over the 12 months ending in February and that, excluding the volatile
food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.8 percent.
Some near-term measures of inflation expectations have recently moved up.
We see this in both market and survey-based measures, and survey respondents, both consumers
and businesses, are mentioning tariffs as a driving factor.
Beyond the next year or so, however, most measures of longer-term expectations remain
consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.
The median projection in the SEP for total PCE inflation is 2.7 percent this year and
2.2 percent next year, a little higher than projected in December.
In 2027, the median projection is at our 2 percent objective.
Our monetary policy actions are guided by our dual mandate to promote maximum employment
and stable prices for the American people.
At today's meeting, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal
funds rate at 4.25 to 4.5 percent.
Looking ahead, the new Administration is in the process of implementing significant policy
changes in four distinct areas – trade, immigration, fiscal policy, and regulation.
It is the net effect of these policy changes that will matter for the economy and for the
path of monetary policy.
While there have been recent developments in some of these areas, especially trade policy,
uncertainty around the changes and their effects on the economic outlook is high.
As we parse the incoming information, we are focused on separating the signal from the
noise as the outlook evolves.
As we say in our statement, in considering the extent and timing of additional adjustments
to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess incoming data,
the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.
We do not need to be in a hurry to adjust our policy stance, and we are well positioned
to wait for greater clarity.
In our SEP, FOMC participants wrote down their individual assessments of an appropriate path
for the federal funds rate based on what each participant judges to be the most likely scenario
going forward, an admittedly challenging exercise at this time in light of considerable uncertainty.
The median participant projects that the appropriate level of the federal funds rate will be 3.9
percent at the end of this year and 3.4 percent at the end of next year, unchanged from December.
While these individual forecasts are always subject to uncertainty, as I noted, uncertainty
today is unusually elevated, and of course these projections are not a Committee plan
or a decision.
Policy is not on a preset course.
As the economy evolves, we will adjust our policy stance in a manner that best promotes
our maximum employment and price stability goals.
If the economy remains strong and inflation does not continue to move sustainably toward
2 percent, we can maintain policy restraint for longer.
If the labor market were to weaken unexpectedly or inflation were to fall more quickly than
anticipated, we can ease policy accordingly.
Our current policy stance is well positioned to deal with the risks and uncertainties that
we face in pursuing both sides of our dual mandate.
At today's meeting, we also decided to slow the pace of decline in our balance sheet.
Since we began balance sheet runoff, our securities holdings have declined by more than $2 trillion.
While market indicators continue to suggest that the quantity of reserves remains abundant,
we have seen some signs of increased tightness in money markets.
Beginning in April, the monthly cap on Treasury redemptions will be lowered from $25 billion
to $5 billion.
Consistent with the Committee's intention to hold primarily Treasury securities in the
longer run, we are leaving the cap on agency securities unchanged.
This action has no implications for our intended stance of monetary policy and should not affect
the size of our balance sheet over the medium term.
The Committee also continued its discussions as part of our five-year review of our monetary
policy framework.
At this meeting, we focused on labor market dynamics and our maximum employment goal.
As we have indicated, our review will include outreach and public events involving a wide
range of parties, including FedListens events around the country and a research conference
in May.
Throughout this process, we will be open to new ideas and critical feedback, and we will
take on board lessons of the last five years in determining our findings.
We intend to wrap up the review by late summer.
The Fed has been assigned two goals for monetary policy—maximum employment and stable prices.
We remain committed to supporting maximum employment, bringing inflation sustainably
to our 2 percent goal, and keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.
Our success in delivering on these goals matters to all Americans.
We understand that our actions affect communities, families, and businesses across the country.
Everything we do is in service to our public mission.
We at the Fed will do everything we can to achieve our maximum employment and price stability
goals.
Thank you.
I will look forward to your questions.
Howard.
Howard Schneider with Reuters.
Thanks for your time.
So, two things on sort of the real side here, inflation and then GDP.
How much of the higher inflation forecast for this year is due to tariffs, and since
the policy path remains the same, are you effectively reading this as a one-time price
level shock?
Okay, so how much of it is tariffs?
So, let me say that it is going to be very difficult to have a precise assessment of
how much of inflation is coming from tariffs and from other—and that's already the
case.
You may have seen that goods inflation moved up pretty significantly in the first two months
of the year.
Trying to track that back to actual tariff increases, given what was tariffed and what
was not, very, very challenging.
So, some of it.
The answer is clearly some of it.
A good part of it is coming from tariffs, but we'll be working and so will other forecasters
to try to find the best possible way to separate non-tariff inflation from tariff inflation.
In terms of your sort of looking through question, too soon to say about that.
As I've mentioned, it can be the case that it's appropriate sometimes to look through
inflation if it's going to go away quickly without action by us, if it's transitory.
And that can be the case in the case of tariff inflation.
I think that would depend on the tariff inflation moving through fairly quickly and would depend
critically as well on inflation expectations being well anchored, longer term inflation
expectations being well anchored.
Well, I guess I'm looking at the out years here and the fact that the policy path doesn't
change at all and inflation is unchanged in the out years also, doesn't that imply
you all have basically decided that there is no signal here and that it's just going
to, we're back to transitory again?
So I think that's kind of the base case, but as I said, we really can't know that.
We're going to have to see how things actually work out.
And the fact that there wasn't much change, I think that's partly because you see weaker
growth but higher inflation, they kind of offset and also frankly a little bit of inertia.
When it comes to changing something in this highly uncertain environment, I think there's
a level of inertia where you just say, maybe I'll stay where I am.
Thank you.
Colby Smith with the New York Times.
You just described inflation expectations as well anchored, but has your confidence
in that assessment changed at all given the increase in certain measures and the high
degree of uncertainty expressed by businesses, households and forecasters?
So on inflation expectations, of course, we do monitor inflation expectations very, very
carefully.
Basically, every source we can find and short term, long term, households, businesses, forecasters,
market based.
And I think the picture broadly is this.
You do see increases widely in short term inflation expectations and people who fill
out surveys and answer questionnaires are pointing to tariffs about that.
If you look in the survey world, if you look a little further out, you really don't see
much in the way of an increase.
Longer term inflation expectations are mostly well anchored.
If you look at the New York, for example, then you have market based and it's the same
pattern.
People in markets are pricing in break evens.
Some higher inflation over the next year must be related to tariffs.
We know from the surveys.
But if you look out five years or five year forward, you'll see that break evens are either
flat or actually slightly down in the case of a longer term one.
So we look at that and we will be watching all of it very, very carefully.
We do not take anything for granted.
That's at the very heart of our framework, anchored inflation expectations.
But that's what you see right now.
And how much weight do you put on the deterioration in consumer confidence surveys?
You said recently that this is perhaps not the best indication of future spending.
But I'm curious what you think is behind this deterioration and to what extent it could
be a leading indicator for hard data.
So let's start with the hard data.
We do see pretty solid hard data still.
So growth looks like it's maybe moderating a bit.
Consumer spending moderating a bit, but still at a solid pace.
Unemployment is 4.1%.
Job creation most recently has been at a healthy level.
Inflation has started to move up now, we think partly in response to tariffs.
And there may be a delay in further progress over the course of this year.
So that's the hard data.
Overall, it's a solid picture.
The survey data, both household and businesses, show significant rise in uncertainty and significant
concerns about downside risks.
So how do we think about that?
That is the question.
As I mentioned the other day, as you pointed out, the relationship between survey data
and actual economic activity hasn't been very tight.
There have been plenty of times where people are saying very downbeat things about the
economy and then going out and buying a new car.
But we don't know that that will be the case here.
We will be watching very carefully for signs of weakness in the real data.
Of course we will.
But, you know, given where we are, we think our policy is in a good place to react to
what comes.
And we think that the right thing to do is to wait here for greater clarity about what
the economy is doing.
Nick Timoros, The Wall Street Journal.
Chair Powell, Chair Greenspan wants to find price stability as an environment in which
inflation is so low and stable over time that it doesn't materially enter into the
decisions of households and firms.
Can you say that today, that we have that price stability, that households and businesses
are ignoring price growth when you see buy-in-advance, psychology, big changes in inventories and
surveys that show consumers, at least in the short run, expect higher inflation?
So I do like that definition a lot.
In fact, I used it at the recent conference where I spoke.
So I think a world where people can make their daily economic decisions in businesses and
they're not having to think about the possibility of significantly high inflation.
We know inflation will bounce around.
That is price stability.
You know, I think we were getting closer and closer to that.
I wouldn't say we were at that.
Inflation was running around 2.5 percent for some time.
I do think with the arrival of the tariff inflation, further progress may be delayed.
The SEP doesn't really show further downward progress on inflation this year.
And that's really due to the tariffs coming in.
So delayed.
But if you look at our forecasts, we do see ourselves getting back into the low 2s in
26 and then down to 2 by 27.
Of course, highly uncertain.
So I see progress having been made toward that and then progress in the future.
I think that progress is probably delayed for the time being.
If that's the case, why are there cuts in the SEP for 2025?
So again, people wrote down two cuts the last time.
And they wrote down, you know, meaningful decline in growth from 2.1 to 1.7 in 2025.
A tick up in the unemployment rate, so not much there.
But core inflation up by three-tenths.
And so those two kind of balance each other out.
So people, not everybody, but on balance, people wrote down similar numbers.
The changes aren't that big.
The other factor, though, as I mentioned, is just really high uncertainty.
What would you write down?
I mean, it's just, it's really hard to know how this is going to work out.
And again, we think our policy is in a good place.
We think it's a good place where we can move in the direction where we need to.
But in the meantime, it's really appropriate to wait for further clarity.
And of course, you know, the cost of doing that, given that the economy is still solid,
are very low.
Edward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Edward Lawrence with Fox Business.
So with near 4% unemployment rate, that should be low enough to bring people in from the
sidelines in terms of hiring.
But we're seeing the hiring rates have been stuck at 2023, 2024 levels.
So what's going on there?
Yeah, so that's a feature that has been for some time a feature of this labor market.
You have pretty high participation accounting for aging.
You've got wages that are consistent with 2% inflation, assuming that we're going to
keep getting relatively high productivity.
We've got unemployment pretty close to its natural level.
But the hiring rate is quite low, but so is the layoff rate.
So you look at initial claims or layoffs.
So you're not seeing people losing their jobs, but you're seeing that people who don't have
a job having to wait longer and longer.
And the question is, which way does that break?
If we were to see a meaningful increase in layoffs, then that would probably translate
fairly quickly into unemployment because it's not a big hiring market.
We've been watching that, and it's just not in the data.
It hasn't happened.
What we've had is a low-firing, low-hiring situation.
And it seems to be in balance now for the last six, seven, eight months.
That's where we are.
There's healthy levels of job creation, too.
So overall, it's a labor market that's in balance, and we watch it very carefully.
So then, have we seen the new administration's policies in the economic numbers yet?
And when do you anticipate that happening?
In labor or in other?
In labor and inflation just across the economy.
Have we started to see the new policies take effect in the numbers?
Only in a kind of early way.
I mean, it's only been a few months, right?
For example, the layoffs that are happening here, they're certainly meaningful to the
people involved, and they may be meaningful to a particular neighborhood or region or area.
But at the national level, they're not significant yet.
But we don't know.
We don't know how far that will go.
We'll find out much more.
I mentioned that you saw it.
We've had two very strong goods inflation readings in the last two months, which is
very unexpected.
I think hard to trace it to specific tariffs, but it must have something to do with, it's
either noise, and it will come back, and that's very possible too.
But if it is persistent, then it must be to do with people buying ahead of tariffs or
raising prices ahead of tariffs and things like that.
Those kinds of things happen, and they're very, very hard to capture because so much
of it is indirect.
A great example is their washing machines were tariffed in the last round of tariffs,
and prices went up.
But prices also went up on dryers, which were not tariffed.
So the manufacturers, they just kind of followed the crowd and raised it.
So things happen very indirectly.
And so there'll be a lot of work done in coming months to try to trace all that through.
But ultimately, though, it's too soon to be seeing significant effects in economic
data.
Craig.
Craig Torres from Bloomberg News.
Thanks, Chair Powell.
You said transitory price increases from tariffs are the base case.
Transitory is the base case.
Wasn't it the base case last time?
And didn't the FOMC forecast lower inflation ahead last time?
And wasn't the lesson that it quickly got into services, haircuts, daycare, everything
else?
And so I'm just wondering why the nine aren't taking that on board and are cutting
twice this year?
When you say last time, are you talking about the last-
Pandemic, yes.
During the pandemic.
You could have been talking about the last time there were tariffs, in which case the
inflation was transitory.
Yeah, no, of course, we're well aware of that.
And it's still the truth.
If there's an inflationary impulse that's going to go away on its own, it's not the
right policy to tighten policy.
Because by the time you have your effect, you're in effect by design, you are lowering
economic activity and employment.
And if that's not necessary, you don't want to do it.
In real time, as we know, it's hard to make that judgment.
And we're well aware of what happened, obviously, with the pandemic inflation.
But I mean, we have to look at this as a different situation.
There are differences and similarities.
I mean, it's a different time.
We haven't had real price stability fully reestablished yet.
And we have to keep that in mind.
And we also hear that people are very reluctant to allow prices to go up.
At the same time, we hear that businesses are intending to pass many of these prices
through.
So it's hard to say how this is going to work out.
Steve.
Steve Leesman, CNBC.
Thanks for taking my question, Mr. Chairman.
The Bank of Canada, in its last policy statement, said monetary policy cannot offset the impacts
of a trade war.
What it can and must do is ensure that higher prices do not lead to ongoing inflation.
I wonder if that kind of reflects your own sense of prioritization faced with higher
prices and weaker growth, that the idea is you have to take care of inflation.
So we have two goals, right?
We have maximum employment and price stability.
And we have to balance those.
And there can be situations in which they're in tension, right?
And we actually have a provision in our consensus statement that says,
that's a very challenging situation for any central bank and certainly for us.
And so what we say that we'll do is we'll look how far each of those two measures is
from its goal.
And then we'll ask how long we think it might take to get back to the goal for each of them.
And we'll make a judgment because our tools work in one direction.
We're either tightening or loosening.
So it's a very challenging situation.
Let me say, we don't have that situation right now.
That's not where the economy is at all.
It's also not where the forecast is.
I don't know any mainstream forecasts that really show significant problems like that.
Well, just to follow up, yesterday, the UCLA Anderson forecast said
there's a high probability of a recession.
Where do you stand on whether or not the slowdown you're seeing creates a higher
probability or concern that you may have on recession?
Thank you.
There's always an unconditional possibility of a recession.
It might be broadly in the range of one in four at any time.
If you look back through the years, it could be within 12 months,
a one in four chance of a recession.
So the question is whether this current situation, those possibilities are elevated.
I will say this, we don't make such a forecast.
If you look at outside forecasts, forecasters have generally raised,
a number of them have raised their possibility of a recession somewhat,
but still at relatively moderate levels.
Still in the region of the traditional, because they were extremely low.
If you go back two months, people were saying that the likelihood of a recession
was extremely low.
So it has moved up, but it's not high.
Chris.
Hi.
Thank you.
Chris Rugaber at Associated Press.
As you know, I guess last night, the President Trump fired two members of
the Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency.
And this could cause the kind of legal fight about the administration's power
to fire independent people.
If those firings stand, is that a threat to the Fed's independence?
Could he do the same thing to the Fed board?
So I think I did answer that question in this very room some time ago.
And I have no desire to change that answer and have nothing new for you on that today.
Well, I just, okay, well, maybe I'll have another mulligan.
As you know, I wanted to go back to the consumer sentiment,
particularly the inflation expectations in the University of Michigan survey.
In the summer of 2022, you cited the rise in the long-term inflation expectations
in that index as the reason that you went big with a three-quarter point hike.
So I know you've talked about all the different measures now,
but you seem to not be placing the same weight on that.
And so I'm just wondering, are you dismissing that,
what we saw last week from the University of Michigan?
Or does that carry the same weight as it did in the past?
So I mentioned it back then, but in no way did I place a huge weight on it.
I think that was an ex-post story, but it wasn't the case.
That was a preliminary reading, and so is this.
And it's also, this is that Michigan, the one you're referring to, the longer-term thing.
We look at it, we don't dismiss data that we don't like.
We force ourselves to look at it, but it is an outlier compared to market-based
and compared to other survey-based assessments of longer-run inflation expectations.
So we've got to keep that in mind.
And again, I would just say, we look at all of them, and that one's kind of an outlier.
But, you know, nonetheless, we take notice of it.
Thank you.
Michael McKee from Bloomberg Radio and Television.
There is a worry on Wall Street that when you say you want to study the net effect
of the fiscal policies we may see on the economy, that you would end up waiting too long
and be behind the curve in responding to any downturn.
How can you reassure people that you can spot a problem early enough
unless you decide to be preemptive?
Yeah, look, we're aware of the, we're well aware of how things are going to evolve
in the time frames and all that.
And, you know, we will use our tools to foster achievement of our goals to the best we can.
And, of course, we're going to try to be timely with that.
For right now, the hard data are pretty solid.
We are obviously aware of the soft sentiment data and high uncertainty.
And we're watching that carefully.
And we think it's a good time for us to wait for further clarity
before we consider adjusting our policy stance.
Do you think it's going to be hard to get clarity in a government by tweet?
I mean, do you have a feeling that at some point you actually will have a forecast you can trust?
Yes, I think we will.
I just, it's hard to say when that will be.
You know, where these decisions are going to be made
and they're going to be implemented.
And then we'll know.
At that point, we'll know what the decisions are.
And we'll have to make assessments then about the implications for the economy.
Those things will happen.
A lot of them will happen over the course of, you know, in coming months,
certainly over the course of this year.
And we'll be adapting as we go.
Rachel.
Hi, Chair Powell.
Rachel Siegel from the Washington Post.
Thank you for taking our questions.
At the beginning, you were talking about separating the signal from the noise
and tariff inflation from non-tariff inflation.
Can you walk us through what that looked like over the last couple of months,
if there were specifics from the January meeting to now that helped you make those distinctions?
So when we say separating the signal from the noise,
that's just a way of saying that things are highly uncertain
and that, you know, you're reading about developments.
The news is full of developments of tariffs being put on and taken off and things like that.
Some of that is noise in the sense that it's not really telling you anything.
You're trying to extract a signal from that.
And the signal is what's going to be the effect on economic activity,
on inflation, on employment, and all those things.
So that's really when we say signal and noise.
Sorry, the second thing was?
Or similarly for tariff inflation, non-tariff inflation,
ways that you're making the distinction.
That's sort of a special case of that.
You know, the idea being, and I do think that the first two months of this year
are a great example.
You've got high readings for goods inflation
after a string of readings that average close to zero.
And you have to ask, it's coming during tariffs.
But, you know, it's very hard to actually scientifically go back
and match up those increases and say, yes, I can prove that that's from tariffs.
But it kind of has to be to some extent.
Plus noise.
There can be idiosyncratic readings in various categories,
which we'll shortly reverse.
And that happens too.
And that could be a big piece of it.
You know, I think we'll know.
In a couple of months, we'll know whether those were,
you know, where that really was from.
But that's another case where I think it's going to be very,
very challenging to unpack the inflation that we see over the course of this year
and be able to say with confidence how much of that came from inflation
and how much of it, sorry, from tariffs and how much of it didn't.
But that's what we'll be doing.
We'll be doing that, and so will everybody else.
And we'll all be trying very hard to make that assessment.
And, you know, I'm sure we will make a lot of progress on that.
And we already have.
But it's going to be a challenge.
Do you have a sense yet as to what, in your mind,
would make something cross from noise to a signal,
what that threshold would look like?
You know, it would depend on what we're talking about.
I mean, obviously, you're looking for direct evidence
that particular pieces of inflation are or are clearly not caused by tariffs.
For example, if something that was, you know, in the service sector
that was far away from anything that's tariffed,
you might think, okay, well, that is, like, frankly, housing services inflation,
which, by the way, has been behaving well,
you know, which for some time was kind of our problem.
Now it's been, it's slow, but it's definitely, you know,
moving down in a very good way.
It's more now with goods and, to some extent,
with non-housing services inflation.
Kelly.
Thanks for taking our questions, Chair Powell.
Kelly O'Grady, CBS News.
So consumer sentiment has dipped dramatically,
but you say the economy and the hard data is still solid.
What is your message to consumers that clearly disagree
and don't feel that strength?
Because the hard data they're looking at is their grocery bill.
Okay, so a couple things.
The grocery bill is about past inflation, really.
There was inflation in 21, two, and three, and prices went up.
The current level, it's not the change in prices,
they're unhappy and they're not wrong to be unhappy
that prices went up quite a bit
and they're paying a lot for those things.
So that's, I think that is the fundamental fact
and has been for a long time, a couple years,
why people are unhappy with the economy.
It's not that the economy is not growing.
It's not that inflation is really high.
It's not that unemployment is high.
It's none of those things.
We have, you know, 4.1% unemployment.
We've got 2% growth and, you know,
it's a pretty good economy,
but people are unhappy because of the price level.
And I do, we completely understand and accept that.
And just to follow up,
why are you still projecting two rate cuts this year
if your own projections show inflation higher for longer?
Does that mean you see a slowdown
in economic growth as a real threat?
So I think if you, yeah, I mean,
remember we came into this with, at the December meeting,
the median was two cuts, the median was.
And so you come in and you see, broadly speaking,
weaker growth, but higher inflation.
And they kind of balance each other out.
So you think, and unemployment is really,
they're really only a one-tenth change.
So it's, there's just not a big change in the forecast.
There really isn't modest, you know,
meaningfully higher growth
and meaningfully higher inflation,
which call for different responses, right?
So they cancel each other out
and people just said, okay, I'm going to stay here.
But the second factor is, it's so highly uncertain,
is just, you know, we're sitting here thinking,
and we obviously are in touch with businesses
and households all over the country.
We have an extraordinary network of contacts
that come in through the reserve banks
and put in the beige book
and also through contacts at the board.
And we get all that.
And we do understand that sentiment
has fallen off pretty sharply,
but economic activity has not yet.
And so we're watching carefully.
So I would tell people
that the economy seems to be healthy.
We understand that sentiment
is quite negative at this time.
And that probably has to do with,
you know, turmoil
at the beginning of an administration.
It's making, you know,
big changes in areas of policy.
And that's probably part of it.
I do think the underlying unhappiness
people have about the economy, though,
is more of at the price level.
Victoria.
Hi, Victoria Guido with Politico.
I wanted to ask, first of all,
if you could clarify,
you were talking about how tariffs
were a good part of the uptick
in the inflation forecast.
And I was just wondering
what that specifically refers to.
Is that the tariffs
that have already been put in place?
Is that anticipating some of the tariffs
that might be coming on April 2nd?
And then also, if you wouldn't mind
talking a little more
about the balance sheet decision
and what drove that.
Did that have anything to do
with expectations
of how the debt ceiling,
raising the debt ceiling,
might affect the reserve supply?
Yeah, so in the SEP,
you'll see that there's not further progress
on core inflation this year.
We're kind of flatlining, going sideways.
We don't ask people to say,
to write down how much of this
is from tariffs
and how much of it is not.
But some of it is from tariffs.
We know that tariffs are coming in.
We know that they're probably already,
all forecasters have tariff inflation
affecting core PCE inflation,
core CPI inflation this year,
without exception.
I'm not aware of an exception.
So it's in there.
I can't tell you how much of that it is.
In terms of the balance sheet,
so yeah, we, I think,
I guess the way I'd say it is,
you know, it was the flows in and out
of the TGA that got us thinking about it.
But as we, you know,
as we thought about it,
we really came to the view
that this was a good time
to make the move that we made.
And the broad league committee
came around to the view
that we would do the same thing
we'd already done,
which is once we, I guess in June,
we, was it June?
Whenever it was,
we lowered the pace of QT.
And we're just going to do that again.
We're going to cut it roughly in half.
And the sense of that is,
if you're cutting the pace of QT
roughly in half,
then the runway is probably doubled.
Okay, so it's going to,
it's going to be slower for longer.
And people really like that.
People thought that's,
that's a good idea.
You know, it's like a plane.
You can think of it like a plane
coming in for a landing as we get closer.
And we, by the way,
we still think that reserves are abundant,
although you begin to see some of the,
some of the things we look at
begin to react a little bit,
but we still think that they're abundant.
And of course, now the TGA is emptying out.
So reserves are higher now.
So you can't really see the underlying signal.
So we came around to the view
and it had a lot of appeal.
And so we did it.
Really, it has no implications at all
for monetary policy.
It has no implications at all
for the ultimate size of the balance sheet.
It isn't sending a signal in any hidden way
that you can try to tease out.
It's just not there.
We're basically,
it's very consistent with our plans
and our practices that we've published
and that we followed
since we began this,
what is a very successful,
you know, rundown of the balance sheet.
Again, the second time that we've slowed the pace
and we've said that we would stop
when we were somewhat above
the level we judge as ample.
And clearly, we're not at that level yet,
but we're going to be approaching it more slowly.
It's a common sense kind of a thing
and it had pretty broad appeal,
I will say.
CLARE JONES.
Clare Jones, Financial Times.
You said in January, Chair Powell,
that inflationary expectations
remained well anchored.
Would you still say they remain well anchored today?
And just to reiterate the question,
others have asked if they're not so well anchored,
why hasn't there been a more radical shift
to the policy path today?
Thank you.
So, when we talk about inflation expectations
being well anchored,
we're talking about longer-run
inflation expectations.
And they really haven't moved much,
I mean, if at all.
There's one reading that everyone's focusing on
that it's higher,
but the other survey readings
and the market-based readings
all show relatively, you know,
well-anchored inflation expectations.
You would expect that expectations of inflation
over the course of a year would move around
because conditions change.
And in this case, we have tariffs coming in.
We don't know how big, what's being-
there's so many things we don't know,
but we kind of know there are going to be tariffs
and they tend to bring growth down,
they tend to bring inflation up
in the first instance.
So, I would say, you know,
I'm not dismissing what we're seeing
in short-term inflation expectations.
We, as I mentioned, follow that very carefully.
But when we say expectations are well anchored,
we're really looking at, you know,
longer terms, five year and out.
And there's really no story to tell five years and out,
either in market-based or in surveys.
But we'll watch it.
I mean, we're not, you know,
we're not going to miss any evidence
that longer-term or medium-term
inflation expectations are moving.
NEIL IRWIN.
Hi, Chair Powell.
Neil Irwin with Axios.
Treasury Secretary Besant has observed
that a large share of job growth
over the last couple of years
has been in what he calls government
or government-adjacent sectors,
health care, education.
Do you agree that there's some weakness
in underlying private job growth?
And do you see the composition of job growth
as something that has policy implications?
So that has been the case.
We talked about that
over the course of the last year.
There were some good number of months
and times when a lot of the job creation
was concentrated in, you know,
educational institutions, health care,
state governments, things like that.
There were also times
when private sector job growth
has been moving at a healthy rate.
I mean, they're all jobs.
And remember, we're at very low unemployment
for quite a time now.
So I think it's a good labor market.
But, look, it's something
that we monitor carefully.
From our standpoint,
employment is employment.
But, you know, the elected government
is entitled to have-
we don't have policies
that address different kinds of employment.
But the elected government
has a different role,
and they can have those.
DIRECTOR GENERAL BESANT.
Here's a quick QT question.
Does the committee envision
at some point tapering
the MBS runoff as well?
CHAIRMAN POWELL.
I think tapering it, I don't know.
There's no plan to do that.
You know, at a certain point,
we'll stop runoff.
And we may or may not stop
MBS runoff, though,
because, you know,
we want to stop runoff in net
at some point.
We haven't made any decisions about that.
But, you know, we want the MBS
to roll off our balance sheet.
We really strongly desire that.
But we haven't made any decisions about that.
I think we'd look carefully
at letting that keep going,
but hold the overall size
of the balance sheet in constant
at some point,
a point that we're not at yet.
DIRECTOR GENERAL BESANT.
Simon.
SIMON URBANOVICH.
Simon Urbanovich with The Economist.
Thank you, Chair Powell.
Several times today,
you've said that you feel
you're well-positioned
to wait for greater clarity.
At the same time,
you could point to quite a few
growth risks at the moment.
We've seen a stock market
that's gone quite wobbly,
rapidly cooling housing sales,
plunge in confidence surveys.
Today, not only did the SEP mark down
the growth outlook,
17 of 19 see risks to the downside.
So my question is,
how confident are you
that you're well-positioned,
or is that one more thing
that you're uncertain about?
CHAIRMAN POWELL.
I'm confident that we're well-positioned
in the sense that we're well-positioned
to move in the direction
we'll need to move.
I mean, I don't know anyone
who has a lot of confidence
in their forecast.
I mean, the point is,
we are at a place
where we can cut or we can hold
what is clearly
a restrictive stance of policy.
And that's what I mean.
I mean, I think that's well-positioned.
Forecasting right now,
it's, you know,
forecasting is always very, very hard.
And in the current situation,
I just think its uncertainty
is remarkably high.
And, sorry, standing here today,
would you be surprised
to pivot back towards rate cuts in May?
CHAIRMAN POWELL.
Look, I think we're not going to be
in any hurry to move.
And, as I mentioned,
I think we're well-positioned
to wait for further clarity
and not in any hurry.
MADDIE HEGAN.
Maddie Hegan with CNN.
Thank you, Chair Powell.
The Fed statement released today
removed the line
that previously said
the Committee judges
that the risks to achieving
its employment and inflation goals
are roughly in balance.
Can you explain the decision
to remove that line?
Does it mean that you're now
more concerned about inflation
or about employment?
Actually, it does not mean
either of those things.
You know, sometimes with language,
they- it lives its useful life,
and then we take it off.
And that was the case here.
There's really not meant
to be any signal here.
Over the past year,
you know, conveying the sense
of the balance of risks
was important,
that they be in balance
or close to being in balance.
That was useful as we approached
liftoff, if you remember.
But we're past that-
or, sorry, beginning to cut.
So we just took it out.
I actually would say
that the more important thing now
about risks-
and this is in the pages,
like, 10, 11, 12 of the SEP-
if you look,
participants widely raised
their estimate of the risks
to our uncertainty,
but also of the risks to growth
and our employment
and inflation mandates.
That's a more salient point now
than whether they're in balance.
Just on the stock market,
the stock market has obviously
declined significantly
since the Fed last met.
Are you concerned at all
about some of the market volatility
having a real economic impact
in terms of hurting
business spending
or consumer spending,
especially among
higher income households?
So financial conditions
matter to us
because financial conditions
are the main channel
to the real economy
through which our policy
has its effects.
So they're important.
But what matters
from a Fed standpoint
for the macro economy
is material changes
to overall financial conditions
that are persistent,
that last for a while,
long enough to actually
affect economic activity.
So that's what we're looking for.
I'm not going to opine
on the appropriate level
of any market equity,
debt, commodities,
or anything like that.
And I would just point you
to the bigger picture again.
You know, the real economy,
the hard data,
are still in reasonably good shape.
It's the soft data.
It's the surveys
that are showing
significant concerns,
downside risks,
and those kind of things.
We don't dismiss that.
We're watching it carefully.
But we don't want
to get ahead of that.
We want to focus
on the hard data.
If that's going to
affect the hard data,
we should know it very quickly.
And, of course,
we'll understand that.
But you don't see that yet.
Jennifer.
Thank you, Chair Powell.
Jennifer Schonberger
with Yahoo Finance.
As you look to navigate
higher inflation
and lower growth,
the Fed has talked
about heeding the lessons
from the 1970s.
Is the Fed willing
to have a recession
if it means breaking
the back of inflation?
Well, fortunately,
we're in a situation
where we have seen inflation
move down from higher levels
to pretty close to 2 percent,
while the unemployment rate
has remained very consistent
with full employment, 4.1 percent.
So we now have inflation
coming in from an exogenous source.
But the underlying
inflationary picture
before that was basically
2.5 percent inflation,
I would say,
and 2 percent growth
and 4 percent unemployment.
So that's what we did.
That's what, together,
the economy accomplished.
So I don't see any reason
to think that we're looking
at a replay of the 70s
or anything like that.
You know, inflation,
underlying inflation
is still running in the twos
with probably a little bit
of a pickup associated
with tariffs.
So I don't think we're facing,
I wouldn't say we're in a situation
that's remotely comparable to that.
And last month,
the idea of a Doge dividend
was proposed,
which would send $5,000 checks
to every taxpayer from Doge savings.
President Trump and Elon Musk
have supported this.
There's reports there could be
a bill introduced on Capitol Hill.
What impact might that have
on household savings
and spending
in terms of your growth
and outlook for inflation?
You know, it's not appropriate
for me to speculate on
political ideas
or fiscal policy,
for that matter.
So I'm going to pass on that one.
Thank you.
Daniel.
Hi, Chair Powell.
Daniel Avis from Agence France-Presse.
You mentioned that tariffs
are already having
at least some impact on inflation.
I'm just wondering
how you and your colleagues
on the FOMC have been thinking
about the possibility
of retaliatory tariffs
from other countries,
especially with April 2nd coming up.
Was it something you considered
during this meeting?
Thanks.
So since the very beginning,
we've had kind of a placeholder.
The staff has a placeholder
of really a range
of possible outcomes
from tariffs
and from trade policy, generally.
And they generally assume
full retaliation in those.
And so that's kind of
baked into the numbers.
What happens,
it will be complicated
and there will be
some retaliation
and some not and all that.
But ultimately, they're trying to,
with the placeholder,
give us a broad sense
of what this might look like.
When we actually know the specifics,
we'll be able to have
still uncertain,
but, you know,
better informed forecasts.
So yes, that's in there.
Last question goes to Jean.
Hi, Chair Powell.
Jean Young with M&I Market News.
Had a couple of questions
on the balance sheet change
that you made.
So the minutes had initially
described your discussion
on slowing QT as temporary
until the debt ceiling is resolved.
But from what you said earlier,
it doesn't sound like
there's a desire
to kind of regain
the pace of QT that we have
at the moment
after the debt ceiling is resolved.
Is that the case?
Yeah, so we looked at pausing
and we looked at slowing.
And really, people came together
very strongly behind slowing,
not pausing,
for a variety of reasons.
And so people really came to be,
you know, pretty strongly
in favor of this move.
Slows down the path
and probably lengthens it,
you know, doubles it effectively
by slowing it by half.
That people thought
that's a good place to be.
It'll, you know,
help us assure that this path
is a smooth one
as we get closer and closer to that.
So that's how that came about.
I guess my question is more,
was that meant to be
a temporary measure
during the debt ceiling episode?
Or...
You know, it was actually,
it was the TGA flows,
Treasury General Account flows,
that got us thinking about this.
But the more we thought about it,
we came around to this.
And, you know, it is,
yes, it was provoked.
The original discussion
was provoked by that.
But I think what we came up with, though,
was broader than that
and different than that.
It does address that issue.
But it really is also,
it fits in really nicely
with our principles and our plans
and the things we've done before
and the things we said we would do.
So that's why, you know,
pretty, pretty strong support.
I just say it's nothing to do
with monetary policy,
nothing to do with the size
of the balance sheet.
It's just kind of
a common sense adjustment
as you get closer and closer.
Let's slow down a little bit again.
And that way we'll be
more and more confident
that we're getting
where we need to get.
You can take our time getting there.
You know, we're shrinking
the balance sheet every month.
And we think that's,
we think it was a good play.
And as I mentioned, well supported.
Thanks very much.
