Why Were The Soviets Ineffective in 1941? (ft. Potential History) | Animated History

Today's video is sponsored by Harry's. Before we start today's episode, I'd like to let you know that I re-uploaded The Battle of Dien Bien Phu because YouTube demonetized and shut down recommendations on the video for a reason they refused to tell me. I'd like to ask anyone who hasn't seen the video yet to check it out, and anyone who's already seen it to come to the new upload and leave a like. Thanks. Hi, I'm Griffin Johnson, the Armchair Historian. Today's video, why the Soviet Union's initial response to the German invasion was so ineffective. As the sirens' echoes turn to wails, it drowns out the panicked shouts of the crewmen scrambling to man their stations. Moments later, the first bombs of the Nazi invasion land around them, violently shaking the ground and coating their tank with shrapnel and dirt. Overcome by the smell of sulfur and burning grass, they scarcely have time to recover when they hear the sound of rumbling vehicles. Operation Barbarossa assembled the largest invasion force in history up until that point, and within a month, the Germans had succeeded in swallowing up a huge chunk of Soviet territory twice as big as France. Hitler expected the invasion to last no more than three months, but just like Stalin, he would be proven wrong. The slugfest that would ensue on the Eastern Front would cost the lives of more Germans than anywhere else during the war, claiming three out of every four of them. With that said, one has to wonder, why did the Red Army fare so poorly in the beginning of the war? But first, a word from our sponsor, Harry's, which was started by two American entrepreneurs who were fed up with overpaying for razors. They knew a great shave comes down to great blades, made with sharp durable steel that lasts. That's why they bought a German blade factory that's been crafting some of the world's highest quality blades for almost a century. By cutting out the middleman, Harry's can offer their razor cartridges for half the price of the leading razor brand. In the Soviet Union, that would have earned our two entrepreneurial protagonists a one-way ticket to the gulag. Today, Harry's is offering our viewers an amazing deal. Get a trial set that comes with everything you need for only three dollars when you go to harrys.com slash thearmchairhistorian. And if you're not satisfied with the quality, you'll get your money back guaranteed. Though I might look 13 again after shaving, I did so with no discomfort or cuts, and this was my first, but certainly not the last time, using Harry's. Make sure to go to harrys.com slash thearmchairhistorian to get your trial set for three dollars. We'll post the link in the description below. Now, onto the video. For decades after the Second World War, the story of Soviet ineffectiveness in response to Nazi aggression remained largely untold, as Soviet censors deliberately obfuscated documentation and suppressed first-hand accounts from the high command. Much of what we know now begins with the Soviet Union's lack of a truly fortified boundary between itself and Nazi Germany. When Eastern Poland was annexed as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a treaty of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Soviet Union dismantled its fortifications on the original border. However, its new border fortifications were nowhere near finished. And yes, while a fortified border proved to be only a slight inconvenience for the Nazi blitzkrieg in the West, just ask the Allies about the Maginot Line, many historians agree that the Red Army would have been much better off at the start of the war had the original border's fortifications not been dismantled and Stalin been content to sacrifice some newly gained Soviet territory to the Germans from the get-go, which he ended up having to do sooner rather than later anyways. Part of the reason this strategy was not employed was that Stalin was under the belief that if there was going to be a war, the Soviets were going to be on the offensive. But one thing was for certain, Stalin was not ready for an offensive or defensive war. On paper, the Red Army could field nearly 24,000 tanks, however less than 30% were combat ready. Most were also obsolete light tanks, such as the T-26 and BT, with only about 500 KV and 1,000 T-34 models available. Additionally, Soviet forces, having few radios, relied on signal flags, in contrast to the Germans, who had radios installed in just about every vehicle. This disparity in communications technology severely compromised Soviet command ability. Their maintenance programs were also haphazard and shoddy, with even the best tanks frequently lacking the replacement parts necessary to last more than a single engagement. It didn't help that the Russian road network, which was almost entirely unpaved, proved inadequate for the movement of men, tanks, and supplies to the front. Consequently, Soviet armored formations were often restricted by shortages of ammunition, support vehicles, spare parts, and fuel. The Germans, meanwhile, could only field about 3,600 tanks, the most common being the Panzer III. On paper, it was inferior to the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 in the realms of firepower and armor. But the Panzer III had superior ergonomics, optics, vision devices, and a dedicated gunner. As a result, the tank had three times the rate of fire of the T-34, whose commander had the extra responsibility of handling the gun. However, one can't exclusively rely upon statistics regarding armor, gun size, and speed to determine the ability of a tank. That is, unless you're playing War Thunder. To properly see the disadvantages the Soviets faced, one must look at the way the tanks were employed. And to talk about just that, my friend and fellow YouTuber Potential History will be joining us. Hi Griffin. The key difference in their approach to armored warfare was the implementation of a successful combined arms doctrine. The Soviets, while believing in this military concept, which they referred to as Deep Battle Doctrine, lacked the experience to properly implement it as a direct result of the Great Purge. See the Red Army campaign in Poland, or the beginning of the Winter War before the Red Army advance got bogged down for an example of this. They had this down in concept, but lacked the coordination that they needed to achieve it successfully into a proper combined arms maneuver. The Germans, on the other hand, were very familiar with this and had first-hand experience implementing it correctly. So much so that contemporary historians now refer to their interpretation as Blitzkrieg, although they never used the word. The proper term that they used is Bewegungskrieg. German military planners eventually discovered the advantages the T-34 and KV had over the Panzer III in direct engagements, as rare as they were, and sought to minimize any such encounters. Instead, German armors used to exploit weaknesses in enemy lines and cause shock, and most importantly, they worked hand-in-hand with Luftwaffe and the infantry. The speed at which the German tanks were able to travel was advantageous at first, but eventually became problematic. There are many instances during Operation Barbarossa of German infantry, their equipment loaded onto horse-drawn carts, being left behind while Panzer formations moved up to 18 miles per day. This was logistically unstable, and soon the Germans would be in the same situation the Soviets were by the end of the year. Thanks for stopping by, and if you want to learn more about the situation on the Eastern Front by the end of 1941, head over to Potential History's channel for a video on just that. The Soviet Air Force wasn't in much better shape. 80% of the Soviet aircraft were near obsolete on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, and only the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 could be considered modern, although they were still inferior to the German ME-109F. Soviet pilots were under-trained and inexperienced as well. Between January and March of 1941, the average pilot had roughly 12 hours of flight experience, while only 15% had been trained for nighttime fighting. An even smaller percentage had experience flying at higher altitudes, which German bombers were regularly operating in. Initially, German bombers were highly effective due to Stalin's standby orders, which meant Soviet aircraft were parked in tightly packed formations, which left them vulnerable to airstrikes. The Germans destroyed at least 1,200 Soviet aircraft at 60 airbases within hours of Operation Barbarossa's commencement, leaving the Luftwaffe free to assault Soviet armor almost unopposed in the early phases of the war. A hallmark of any authoritarian regime is the systematic eradication of those deemed a threat to the regime's survival. Joseph Stalin's purges subjected tens of thousands to the horrors of the gulags of Siberia, and the military was not immune to these efforts. No one really was, truth be told. Stalin was a keen student of history, and he often reminded his colleagues that the French Revolution was followed by a military coup d'etat orchestrated by Napoleon Bonaparte. To combat this threat, Stalin initiated a cleansing of the Red Army, hoping to quell any leaders daring enough to challenge his power. In no short order, three deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense, 16 Military District Commanders, 5 Fleet Commanders, 33 Corps Commanders, 76 Divisional Commanders, 40 Brigade Commanders, and 291 Regimental Commanders were removed, violently or otherwise, in the interwar years after Stalin assumed power. Between June 1937 and November 1938, 35,000 Red Army officers experienced the purges firsthand. After losing so many of its most experienced and capable officers, the Red Army was left demoralized and lacking effective leadership. Stalin was a major factor in the Soviet Union's ineffective response. At 8am on June 21st, 1941, he received reports that a German deserter had crossed the border informing Soviet command that the Germans would strike early on June 22nd. Soviet High Command promptly informed troop commanders at the front to be on the lookout for any unspecified provocation. Here's the problem. In the event of a German incursion, Stalin issued orders to Soviet commanders to not yield to any instigation in an effort to prevent big complications. This order, in essence, immobilized Soviet Armed Forces at the start of Operation Barbarossa, contributing to a haphazard retreat and a poorly coordinated counteroffensive. The German deserter's warning proved hauntingly accurate. At 3.45am on June 22nd, Stalin received an urgent call from one of his top generals, Georgy Zhukov. He nervously reported that the Luftwaffe had started bombing several major Western Soviet cities. All Zhukov could hear on the other line was Stalin's breathing. Did you understand what I said? asked the general. Still, no response from Stalin. When Zhukov asked for permission to open fire, Stalin said, permission not granted. This is a German provocation. As late as the Soviet abandonment of Brest a week later, Stalin still insisted that his troops not retaliate, hoping to avoid war. Now, let's examine the Red Army's tactical and strategic failures in the early phases of the war. These failures were a natural consequence of the aforementioned army purges and lack of directive from the top of the Soviet hierarchy, and can therefore, at least partly, be laid at the feet of Stalin. Despite the bravery and ferocity of Red Army soldiers, they were systematically decimated or encircled and captured in many engagements in the weeks and months after Operation Barbarossa's launch. Within a single week, German forces advanced 200 miles into Soviet territory and killed, captured, or wounded some 600,000 Red Army troops. Their encircling tactics created vast pockets of Soviet forces cut off from the rest of the Red Army, contributing to the high number of Soviet POWs. For example, the encirclement of Soviet forces near Kiev in September 1941 led to roughly 453,000 Soviet troops surrendering, while another pocket near Moscow a month later resulted in 514,000 captured Red Army soldiers. In all, almost 2.4 million Soviet troops were taken prisoner by the end of 1941, and most of these men would not live to see their homes again. As for tactics, Soviet military leaders generally clung to wrong ideas about mechanized and infantry-based warfare. Stalin, for example, wanted tanks and armored vehicles evenly dispersed throughout units on the front, as this would theoretically strengthen each unit. Although, to be fair, many contemporary military theorists subscribe to this belief. The Germans, on the other hand, simply massed their panzers together, creating an armored spearhead that broke through Soviet defenses with relative ease. After Stalin's Pyrrhic victory against the Finns in 1940, the Soviets did take steps to reorganize their tanks in such a manner, but they were not able to follow through with these plans before the commencement of Operation Barbarossa. As for infantry tactics, Soviet officers had a tendency to resort to frontal assaults. While this contributed to the Red Army's reputation as being fiercely dedicated and relentless in combat, the emphasis on frontal assaults racked up the body count. Ultimately, combined arms warfare, effective German encircling tactics, and questionable strategies employed by Soviet officers and high command post-Stalin's Great Purge contributed to the scores of Red Army troops being killed or captured in the beginning of the German invasion. By the winter of 1941, the situation had turned dire for the Soviet Union. Nazi forces were at the gates of Moscow and simultaneously besieging Leningrad and Sevastopol. In his moment of triumph, however, Hitler overplayed his hand. The combination of poorly maintained supply lines and the infamous Russian winter ground German progress to a screeching halt, ultimately giving Stalin valuable time to rebuild and retrain his armed forces. The Red Army's unexpected turnaround certainly deserves further elucidation, so if you would like us to make a video on the Soviet Union's effectiveness in the later stages of the war, let us know in the comments below. no no no no look at the top of his head not so fast mr hitler