Close up of the 2024 Tofu Dreg Bridge Collapses in Mainland China

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Close up of the 2024 Tofu Dreg Bridge Collapses in Mainland China
In China, the term tofu dregs, the pieces left over after making tofu,
is widely used as a metaphor for shoddy work,
implying that a tofu dreg project is a poorly executed project.
The prevalence of tofu dreg projects is due to rampant corruption and graft in China,
as project money is skimmed off the top by and for officials,
leaving less funding for quality materials, qualified staff, and acceptable workmanship.
While projects are often granted to companies with more political connections than qualifications,
in recent years there have been numerous incidents of tofu dreg bridges, buildings, and roads,
causing serious damage.
In this video, we will discuss tofu dreg bridges in 2024
and highlight some typical examples of such projects in mainland China in recent years.
Tofu dreg bridge collapse in Guangzhou, leaving eight casualties.
The Guangzhou Lixinxia Bridge was hit and broken by an empty ship.
Officials reported five deaths and three injuries, placing the blame on the ship's crew.
However, netizens accused the shoddy construction of causing the disaster.
The confusion reported by official media also exposed the bridge's quality issues.
At around 5.30 Beijing time on February 22,
an empty container ship struck the pier of the Guangzhou Lixinxia Bridge
while navigating the Hongqili Waterway, causing the bridge deck to break.
Five vehicles fell from the bridge, including a bus.
Two fell into the water and three onto the ship.
According to an official report from Guangzhou,
the accident resulted in five deaths and three injuries.
The cause of the accident was improper operation by the crew,
which led to the ship's port side hitting the 18 pier of the downstream navigation channel,
followed by the bow striking the 19 pier, causing the bridge deck to break.
However, many Chinese netizens left comments defending the ship's crew,
criticizing the CCP's shoddy construction.
If you don't mind me asking, was the empty container ship too powerful or was the bridge too fragile?
An empty ship can break a bridge pier, so you can imagine the quality of this structure.
It's likely the bridge was at fault.
Any bridge design should account for potential collisions.
This bridge collapsed after one hit.
Those responsible for its construction cannot escape accountability.
Some professionals commented that the bridge design firm bears more than half the responsibility,
with the construction owner and the administrative approval unit also holding unavoidable responsibility.
The ship's owner should bear secondary responsibility.
According to one comment, the Inland Navigation Standards state that the minimum clear width
for a one-way navigation hole on a Class II natural river should not be less than 75 meters
and for a two-way navigation hole not less than 150 meters.
The waterway where the Lixinsha Bridge is located is classified as Class II,
but the span of the main bridge's navigation hole is 55 plus 85 plus 55 meters,
meaning none of the bridge's navigation holes meet Class II requirements.
Additionally, the bridge has no proper navigation marks,
just some colored markers on the piers, which are not visible at night.
According to CCTV reports, the anti-collision facilities of the Lixinsha Bridge appear to be not yet completed.
However, Shanghai's official media outlet, The Paper, reported that the Lixinsha Bridge
completed the installation of new anti-collision devices in 2023.
A tofu-dreg bridge collapsed in Baoji City, Shanxi.
A vehicle was left suspended in the air and nearly fell.
Recently, a series of bridge collapses have occurred in Shanxi, China.
The bridge deck on the expressway in Baoji City collapsed,
leaving a vehicle with its front wheels suspended in the air, almost falling.
On July 25th, a resident of Baoji told Jimu News that a few days earlier,
while passing the Taxiaohe Bridge on the expressway, she noticed a partial collapse of the bridge deck.
To alert others to the danger, she recorded a video.
When she passed by again on the 24th, the affected section had been cordoned off,
preventing people and vehicles from passing through.
According to a staff member from the Baoji Housing and Urban Rural Development Bureau,
a car nearly fell at the collapse site of the Taxiaohe Bridge,
but the road closure and timely intervention prevented further disaster.
The front wheels of the car were suspended in the air, the chassis was damaged,
but fortunately the occupants were unharmed.
The bridge deck collapse was first discovered in the early morning of July 17th.
Preliminary investigations revealed that flooding had eroded one side of the bridge abutment,
causing the bridge deck to overturn and collapse.
The Xiaoxiang Morning News quoted a staff member from the propaganda department of the CPC's Zheshui County Committee,
stating that the collapse of the road and bridge was entirely due to rainfall.
However, public opinion suggests the collapse is more likely linked to poor construction quality.
The CCP's official media had previously reported that the first phase of the Baoji City Rapid Trunk Line
had opened to traffic on January 18th, 2023, with the collapse occurring just six months later, on July 17th.
Some netizens argue that frequent incidents like this should prompt investigations into construction and maintenance practices,
rather than being attributed solely to rainfall.
They insist that only a poorly constructed Tofu Dreg Bridge would collapse after such a short period of use.
Two days after the Baoji Bridge collapse, July 19th, 2024, another Tofu Dreg Bridge collapsed in Shaanxi,
resulting in 43 casualties.
The collapse of another Shaanxi bridge and the controversy over blame-shifting.
A tragic bridge collapse occurred in Shaanxi Province a few days ago, causing at least dozens of deaths and missing persons.
The authorities attributed the cause to heavy rainfall, but netizens have questioned whether this was just an excuse to avoid responsibility.
On Friday evening, July 19th, 2024, a highway bridge in Zheshui County, Shangluo City, collapsed due to torrential rain and flash floods.
Officials reported that 25 vehicles fell into the river, 12 people were killed, and more than 31 others remain missing.
However, due to the CCP's habit of falsifying and concealing data, the actual disaster toll may be higher.
Public records show that the Danning Expressway, an important transportation artery in southern Shaanxi, was opened in December 2018.
The collapsed section had been in use for less than six years.
Shangluo officials claimed that torrential rain and flash floods had caused the bridge's collapse, but netizens questioned this explanation.
If heavy rain and floods were really the cause, why were the surrounding bridges unaffected?
Why was this bridge so fragile, with the entire deck breaking?
Many netizens suspect the collapse was the result of another shoddy construction project, with authorities shifting blame onto the weather.
In May of this year, a similar incident occurred on the Meida Expressway in Guangdong, where a bridge collapsed after days of heavy rain, killing 48 people.
The prevalence of tofu projects in China is due to rampant corruption and graft,
As project funds are skimmed off the top for and by officials, leaving less funding for quality materials, qualified staff, and acceptable workmanship,
projects are often awarded to companies with stronger political ties than qualifications.
Furthermore, tribute projects are frequently rushed to completion in time for state anniversaries.
For example, in 2007, a bridge in Hunan Province, where construction was expedited to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the local prefecture, collapsed during construction, killing 64 people.
Additionally, local governments rely on revenues from construction, including land sales and transfer fees, incentivizing them to promote rapid, unchecked growth, even turning a blind eye to substandard construction.
In July 2021, another instance of tofu-dreg construction occurred in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, when torrential rains and flooding brought the city to a standstill.
Zhengzhou was referred to as a sponge city, due to its vulnerable drainage system.
Some argued that the unprecedented rain levels were to blame, but evidence later pointed to weak infrastructure.
Such disasters have occurred multiple times in Zhengzhou, earning it the reputation of being spongy, a consequence of tofu-dreg construction.
After visiting China in early 2011, Canadian journalist Lawrence Solomon stated that many Chinese people fear that a tofu dam might fail, leading to hundreds of thousands of downstream victims.
According to Chinese architect Li Hu, tofu-dreg projects in China are vastly outnumbered by buildings without construction flaws.
Li noted that in most cases, poorly built structures don't collapse, but suffer reduced lifespans or leakages.
A February 2023 survey on natural disaster risks found that China has nearly 600 million buildings.
The race for urbanization in the context of rapid growth has resulted in many residential and major infrastructure projects in China failing to meet required quality standards.
There have been cases where newly constructed buildings collapsed shortly after completion due to their weakness, a hallmark of tofu-dreg construction.
We dare not live in our homes anymore. We demand that the investors refund our money and compensate us for the drop in property prices so we can buy elsewhere," said an upset customer, Zhou Hequan.
Behind her stood hundreds of others with similar demands.
They have hired lawyers to negotiate with the developer, but success seems unlikely.
According to the law, only those who purchased apartments in the collapsed building are eligible for refunds and compensation.
In certain regions of China, the housing market is undergoing a tumultuous nosedive, provoking intense frustration among its populace.
Renowned investor Li Ka-shing's decision to offload Shanghai properties at a jaw-dropping 80% discount epitomizes the severity of the situation.
In Shanghai's Iron Triangle, encompassing the Outer Ring Road and the Shanghai-Minghan Elevated Expressway, property prices have plunged from 140,000 yuan per square meter to a meager 51,000 yuan, reverting to levels not seen since five years ago.
Simultaneously, the astronomical surge in healthcare insurance premiums, 38 times the previous rate, and the stagnant wages, which have merely doubled over two decades, have forced nearly 40 million individuals to abandon insurance payments.
It's an alarming indication of the dire financial straits faced by ordinary citizens.
Housing prices plunge in many Chinese cities, from $22,000 to $8,000 per square meter.
According to a report by First Financial on March 19, the real estate sector is still experiencing setbacks.
Presently, there are 58 real estate firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, which have issued performance projections.
Out of these, 43 companies anticipate incurring non-recurring net losses for the previous year, ranging from around $8.79 billion to $11.76 billion.
When considering real estate companies listed in Hong Kong as well, the cumulative loss disclosed by these firms surpasses $150 billion.
In Shanghai, the housing prices in Shanghai are currently declining, with Menhang being hit particularly hard.
This area, enclosed by the Middle Ring Road, Outer Ring Road, and the Shanghai-Minghan Elevated Expressway, belongs to the Menhang District.
Especially around Meilong Town, near the Outer Ring Road subway station of Line 1, the prices in Luoyang New Village have plummeted the most, directly back to the levels of 2016.
I don't know if buying a house brings you joy or sorrow. For me, it brings immense sorrow. Without a future here, I won't be the owner anymore.
This house was the first one I bought in my life, and now I'm selling it myself. I feel very reluctant, totally reluctant. I don't want to pay the mortgage anymore, I don't want to put too much pressure on myself.
In Guangdong, the situation is dire. Countless regular folks are grappling with substantial losses on their properties as prices plummet.
For instance, a Seaview apartment in Huizhou, once valued at around 900,000 yuan, is now fetching just over 300,000 yuan, marking an astonishing 60% loss.
Similarly, properties in the Diwan Center, previously priced at 12,300 yuan per square meter in 2021, are now being sold for just over 6,000 yuan, resulting in a significant halving of prices.
Whether you're a property developer or an investor, drastic price reductions are now an unavoidable reality if you wish to make a sale.
In Anhui, the house in Hefei has finally been sold unexpectedly quickly. The first house of my life resulted in a loss of nearly 300,000 yuan, which for us ordinary people, feels like our hearts are bleeding, it's really too painful.
The reason for selling the house is due to a decrease in income and the immense pressure of mortgage payments. Paying 5,000 yuan per month for 30 years was too much.
We didn't buy a house in Ningbo at that time because we didn't have enough down payment. From 2021, when we bought this house, until now, we have only visited twice.
The cost of this mistaken choice is truly immense. After working hard and renting in Ningbo for over 10 years, it's all gone now. We can only accept reality and start over from scratch.
There will be no more mortgages in the future, no more paying interest to the bank. Mortgages are terrifying. Thinking about it makes me feel incredibly relieved.
From now on, if we have money, we'll buy in full, if not, we won't buy at all. We'll never use loans to buy a house prematurely again. We'll live within our means.
Life is short, why burden ourselves with such pressure? We'll live according to our means. Different circles have different ways of living.
The Upscale Domain is a mid-to-high-end property development by Chungkang Property Holdings, a real estate company under Li Ka-shing's control.
In contrast, according to disclosures from real estate agencies, there were over 480 groups of potential buyers participating in this round of presales.
This means that the number of potential buyers exceeds the number of available units by six times, making a lottery inevitable.
Recently, reporters from 21st Century Business Herald visited the sales office of the Upscale Domain to witness the buzz and excitement in the current Shanghai property market.
Due to the large number of visitors, a barrier was set up at the entrance of the sales office, manned by several staff members in black work uniforms, while dozens of real estate agents gathered outside the barrier.
What direction will the Shanghai new property market take?
What is the actual situation regarding the highly anticipated Upscale Domain project?
According to information released by Shanghai, the first batch of new houses introduced this year totaled 4,335 units, the second batch had 4,632 units, and the third batch had 5,216 units.
Due to the large supply and homogeneity of products, there is naturally considerable sales pressure.
Recently, high-end projects with longer inventory turnover cycles have entered the market, adding to the pressure felt by real estate developers.
In early March, Shanghai announced the release of the third batch of new houses.
Among them, the average price of the Binjiang Triumphal Arch was almost $27,000 per square meter, Zhonghai Shenzhen Jolie was $26,785 per square meter, and Xiatou Felicity 268 was $26,645 per square meter.
According to statistics, there were 888 units of new houses in the third batch with total prices exceeding $3.9 million, the highest number in a single batch in the past three years.
An analyst pointed out that there is a significant difference in the speed of product development between Hong Kong-funded enterprises and mainland enterprises.
Mainland real estate developers, especially private ones, are more accustomed to a high-leverage high-turnover development model, which carries higher risks.
Hong Kong-funded real estate developers, who have experienced several cycles of fluctuation, tend to have lower leverage ratios and longer product development cycles, especially from land acquisition to commencement of construction.
The development cycle of this land plot, from land acquisition to delivery, has also been relatively long.
The Metropolis Hyatt Hotel opened in 2022.
In December 2023, the commercial part of the project, Love Metropolis Shopping Mall, opened.
As for the residential part, calculated from 2007, the expiration period of the last batch of homebuyers' property certificates has been 16 years.
Once the residential part of the project is sold out, Li Ka-shing will have no other residential projects for sale in Shanghai, and after the previous sales, he only holds partial commercial properties.
In recent years, the mainland real estate market has entered a period of adjustment.
Many real estate companies have slowed their expansion pace due to liquidity crises.
Hong Kong-funded real estate companies, once important participants in the mainland property market, have also slowed down their development pace.
An analyst told 21st Century Business Herald that Hong Kong-funded real estate companies have always been risk-averse, and Li Ka-shing is particularly sensitive to investments.
In the current market environment, a contraction in investment is not unexpected.
However, they have moved away from the mainstream land auction market, focusing more on developing projects with existing stocks, mostly acquired in earlier years.
The project types are mostly commercial complexes or urban renewal projects, with generally longer development cycles.
Furthermore, the plight extends to construction workers and migrant laborers, who are feeling the brunt of the downturn as construction projects dwindle.
Once enjoying lucrative wages, these workers now find themselves grappling with the harsh reality of unemployment.
Adding to the grim picture, numerous manufacturing facilities are downsizing their operations due to plummeting orders, with some opting to relocate to Southeast Asia in pursuit of cheaper labor.
The landscape of 2024 is bleak, with myriad challenges plaguing various sectors.
It's staggering to witness how numerous large corporations are downsizing their workforce or implementing salary cuts, while smaller enterprises teeter on the edge of insolvency.
Those businesses that struggled to scrape by last year now find themselves incurring substantial losses.
Even renowned brands like Starbucks, Luckin Coffee, and KFC are grappling with an influx of middle-aged individuals feigning employment.
In the real estate arena, both upstream and downstream segments are reeling, with unsold properties haunting the market.
Over 40 million Chinese abandoned insurance, with rural medical coverage doubling in 20 years.
Over the past 20 years, the nearly 40-fold increase, from US$1.54 to US$58.46, in medical insurance premiums has rendered it unaffordable for the Chinese populace and migrant workers.
This policy, which seems to extract blood from the people to sustain the lives of the elite, coupled with the unfair distribution of medical insurance benefits, has shattered the public's confidence in the system.
Furthermore, media investigations have found that the final straw breaking the public's trust in medical insurance is its inherent unfairness.
This exploitation of grassroots individuals to sustain the lives of the elite has left the general populace deeply aggrieved.
Take the case of 49-year-old Lao Wang, a typical migrant worker who moved to the city in search of work.
However, just a day after the documentary was released, it was promptly taken down by the authorities.
Nevertheless, it's hard to ignore the fact that individuals like Lao Wang, unable to afford medical insurance, are not isolated cases in China.
Didn't I not earn any money last month?
They asked me to pay for medical insurance, but I haven't paid yet.
Isn't it 380 yuan?
They sent this message asking for payment.
I still haven't found any work.
For example, we know from statistics that there are probably over 600 million people in China earning less than 1,000 yuan per month.
So for an elderly person who needs medical services even more, if they don't work in rural areas, they might receive less than 200 yuan in pension subsidies each month.
So, we can compare a bit and understand that for them, the 380 yuan, US$58.46, annual deductible is actually quite burdensome.
According to official Chinese statistics, in the past 5 years, over 40 million people in China have abandoned their insurance coverage.
Rural medical insurance has increased 38-fold over 20 years and 6-fold over the past decade alone, skyrocketing from an initial 10 yuan to US$58.50.
However, while people's income levels have risen by less than 2-fold, ordinary citizens truly cannot afford it.
In the past year alone, 25 million people have opted out of insurance coverage.
Don't be fooled by the seemingly modest sum of US$58.50.
It's important to understand that for a rural family of 5, this translates to about US$290 annually.
According to economic statistics, currently, there are still 600 million people in China with a monthly income of less than US$153.
For them, this amount of money is indeed significant.
Wang Zhanshi, deputy researcher at the National Security Research Institute of the Academy of Military Science, who has long studied China's social security,
analyzed that while US$58.50 may not seem like much, its significance changes when placed in the context of the entire rural income.
Many individuals feel they are paying into a system from which they never benefit.
Essential medications are often unavailable in rural medical facilities, forcing people to pay out-of-pocket at pharmacies.
Moreover, the requirement to pay annually, with coverage lapsing if not renewed each year, makes people feel like their contributions are wasted.
This situation has led to widespread disillusionment with the system.
To prevent people from dropping out of the medical insurance scheme, the Chinese Communist Party resorts to various tactics, including using children and household registration as leverage.
Whether individuals cannot afford the premiums or choose not to pay them, the government perceives it as a threat.
In 2022 alone, an estimated 25 million people withdrew from the program, prompting the authorities to take both soft and hard measures, including setting quotas for village cadres and offering them a 5% commission for each person enrolled.
Recent reports from the Beijing Youth Daily have sparked public attention.
What should be a basic healthcare safeguard for the people has become a tool of social control for local governments.
Depending on the targets, medical insurance can paradoxically serve as a means of social control for local authorities.
For instance, in Shandong, the local government collects fees for using water from the Yellow River for irrigation.
Refusal to pay may result in the cancellation of medical insurance benefits.
Moreover, those involved in rights activism or released from prison are often subjected to harsh measures, including withholding or deducting social security benefits, to ensure compliance.
