CCP Military Propaganda Shows Xi Jinping’s Losing Power | China Truths

China Truths
61 followers
Welcome to China Truths. In this episode, we will bring you the following story:
CCP Military Propaganda Supports Collective Leadership—A Sign of Change in Zhongnanhai?
Now, let’s dive into the details
00:00 - Introduction
00:19 - CCP Military Propaganda Supports Collective Leadership—A Sign of Change in Zhongnanhai?
#china #chinatruths #chinanews
Welcome to China Truths. In this episode, we will bring you the following story.
CCP Military Propaganda Supports Collective Leadership, a Sign of Change in Xiamen?
Now, let's dive into the details. It's all covered in today's China Truths.
CCP Military Propaganda Supports Collective Leadership, a Sign of Change in Xiamen?
After Xi Jinping's close ally, Miao Hua, the director of the Political Work Department of
the Central Military Commission, was removed from his post, the military has promoted the
concept of collective leadership, opposing the idea of one-man rule. Instead of emphasizing the
military committee chairmanship responsibility system, they highlight the system of division
of work among leaders. Several experts believe this is an unusual signal, possibly indicating
a shift in military power due to internal power struggles or Xi Jinping's health issues.
On December 9, the CCP's military newspaper published an article under the Great Wall
Outlook column, titled Taking the Lead in Upholding Collective Leadership,
with the subtitle Consciously Setting an Example for Upholding Democratic Centralism.
This article was later republished on other official platforms,
including the Ministry of National Defense's website. The article starts by stating that
collective leadership is the core and essence of the democratic centralism principle,
and is one of the highest principles of CCP leadership. It quotes statements from Deng Xiaoping,
Mao Zedong, and Xi Jinping to emphasize the importance of collective leadership.
Deng is cited as saying, CCP leadership is a collective leadership of the party committees,
not the leadership of one or two individuals, and the minority must obey the majority,
and the individual must never override the leadership collective.
The article also references Mao Zedong's criticism of individual leaders who,
under the guise of centralization, engage in one-man rule and paternalism.
It cites Xi Jinping's 2018 remarks at the Central Military Commission's party building meeting,
where he emphasized the division of responsibilities among leaders and that
all important issues should be decided by the party committee.
On Dec. 11, the military website published another article titled Consciously Setting
an Example for Upholding Democratic Centralism, leading by promoting party democracy,
emphasizing that leaders should avoid deciding the outcome personally in discussions and avoid
fixing the final decision personally when forming resolutions. The publication of these articles has
attracted significant attention from observers. Xin Mingchi, a researcher and director at Taiwan's
National Defense Security Institute, mentioned in an interview that there have been numerous
unusual occurrences in the past three months regarding Xi Jinping's power. He pointed out
that mentions of Xi Jinping or Chairman Xi in official media have been decreasing, and there
has been an effort to highlight other figures, such as Central Military Commission Vice Chairman
Zhang Youxia or other Politburo Standing Committee members, which he described as very unusual,
especially within the military. Xin believes that many people have strong opinions about
Xi Jinping's authoritarian role, and the problems highlighted in the military's article seem to
specifically target Xi. Li Lini, a current affairs commentator, pointed out that military leaders
have a specific meaning at certain levels, and within the military, leaders refer to top military
officers. The article from the military website may signal two possible interpretations—one,
that Xi's power in the military has been diluted, as he previously emphasized the
military committee chairmanship responsibility system. Now, with the focus on collective
leadership, it indicates a move towards power-sharing. Another possibility is that
there is significant resistance to Xi's rule within the military. Li pointed out that Xi
recently detained Miao Hua, the director of the Political Work Department, and also previously
removed Zhang Yang from the same position. This suggests that the department may be expressing
dissatisfaction with Xi's leadership. Additionally, a recent image of Xi attending a meeting with the
information support troops, where he was seated among officers in a position that appeared to
suppress him, may indicate covert criticism of Xi. Analysis, internal struggles or health issues
leading to a power transition. The recent military articles no longer mention the military committee
chairmanship responsibility system but focus on the division of responsibilities among leaders.
On December 4, Xi Jinping inspected the information support troops in Beijing,
where top military officials were present, but his speech in the official report notably avoided
mentioning the chairmanship responsibility system. The military committee chairmanship
responsibility system was first introduced in the early 1980s by Deng Xiaoping.
After Xi Jinping's rise to power at the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012,
the system was reaffirmed in January 2015, with the military press emphasizing that all major
issues of national defense and military construction should be decided by the
military committee chairman, with Xi's authority central to military decisions.
Xin Mingzhu speculates that the current emphasis on collective leadership could be a reasonable
arrangement due to Xi's potential health problems, which might prevent him from consolidating power.
Thus, a more distributed leadership model is being introduced to ensure a smooth transition in case
Xi is unable to maintain his central role. This could also serve to reassure lower-level officials
by ensuring stability and continuity through collective leadership. Xin further suggests that
the promotion of collective leadership might also be a result of internal power struggles,
which would be a significant blow to Xi's authority.
Since Xi's leadership has faced considerable criticism for numerous wrong decisions in
foreign policy and the economy, pushing for collective leadership could be seen as a move
to curb his unchecked decision-making power. Many high-ranking officials who have been dismissed
during Xi's tenure, including Miao Hua, were originally promoted by Xi himself,
raising questions about his ability to choose competent leaders.
Xin speculates that veterans of the CCP, along with figures like Zhang Youxia, are pressuring
Xi to adopt collective leadership. Xi, possibly feeling insecure, may have agreed to this shift.
The older generation of leaders like Wen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, and Zhu Rongji are likely putting
pressure on Xi. His actions during the 20th Party Congress, especially his removal of Hu Jintao,
triggered strong reactions among these veteran officials.
There is growing concern about the future of the Party and the country under Xi's leadership.
According to previous reports, the military media's Great Wall Outlook column is a key
feature of the CCP's military propaganda. The article's placement on the sixth page of the
military publication, instead of the front page, is seen as an indicator of internal political
struggle. While the front-page placement would signal a strong challenge to Xi, the article's
position on the sixth page suggests a message to the military that collective leadership is being
promoted. Democratic centralism as a tool in power struggles. During Xi Jinping's early years,
the CCP often published articles emphasizing the importance of democratic centralism.
However, in recent years, this discourse has declined, while promoting centralized,
unified leadership has been more common. Over the past few months, the CCP's military
press has repeatedly referred to democratic centralism, suggesting that the concept is now
being used in a different context. In June of this year, the Military Political Work Department
issued a Democratic Centralism Reader, which highlighted Xi's centralized military authority.
The document referenced terms such as the two establishes and the two safeguards,
which are used to protect Xi's political standing and reinforce the need to implement
the military committee chairmanship responsibility system. Political expert Wang Yi noted that
democratic centralism is a term used by the CCP to maintain internal harmony,
while leaders protect their vested interests and form alliances. In the past, it was emphasized
to prevent dictatorship and the emergence of a central figure other than the leader.
However, the current use of democratic centralism within the military could be
seen as a tool to pressure Xi Jinping into decentralizing power, especially as internal
resistance to his authoritarian style of rule grows. Wang also suggested that the recent talk
of democratic centralism in military publications is aimed at weakening Xi's power by instituting
collective leadership within the military. This may signify that a shift in the CCP's
internal structure is becoming more formalized and institutionalized, further diminishing Xi's
central authority. Recent information in Beijing suggests that Liu Yuan, the son of former CCP
leader Liu Shaoqi and a retired general, sent a letter to the CCP leadership, warning that the
party could be in danger of collapse. In November 2023, Liu Yuan published an article marking the
anniversary of his father's death, stressing the importance of adhering to democratic centralism
and opposing personal authoritarian rule. This article was seen by many as a veiled critique of
Xi Jinping. Xin concludes that internal party struggles within the CCP are often framed as
concerns for the survival of the party and the nation. These battles are used to justify
political challenges and calls for leadership change.
