NTSB公佈華府撞機事件調查最新進展

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2251 次觀看·2025年2月14日
美東2月14日下午,美國國家運輸安全委員會(NTSB)將就美客機 (CRJ700) 與美軍黑鷹直升機 (H-60) 相撞事件,舉行媒體簡報會,公佈事件調查最新進展,新唐人、大紀元進行網絡直播(即時翻譯字幕)。
中空衝突在雷根國際機場附近
已經結束了
我們有足夠的毀滅證據
所以我們想提供一個調查的更新
並談論下一步
讓我們開始
從黑鷹的旅程中獲得一些資訊
然後通過事故的過程進行
這個特別的飛機
有一個檢查旅程
為黑鷹飛行的飛行員
一般來說
檢查旅程是一個實際的測試
飛行員必須通過
並獲得資訊
來實施具體的飛行員或任務
並不去猜測可能的原因
如往常
您可以關注這個和其他NTSB調查
在我們的網站 NTSB.gov
以及在Facebook Instagram YouTube和X
在NTSB underscore newsroom
我們也是有很多的調查
有些是無法被登錄的
也可以在NTSB.gov
和其他媒體上
我們會盡可能地
幫助你們
我們會盡可能地
最具體的資訊
我們會盡可能地
我會先給您介紹一下黑鹿的路線,然後我會通過出事的過程
這次飛行的目標是在黑鹿飛行的飛行員乘坐檢驗車
一般來說,飛行檢驗車是一個乘坐飛行員必須通過的實習考覈
以實現特定的飛行員或任務任務
軍隊做了三種檢驗車
鑰匙,年度和夜視眼鏡
這是一個結合年度和夜視眼鏡檢驗車
我們相信飛行員可能在飛行時穿着夜視眼鏡
因爲飛行員的身份,他們除了被除外,飛行員也必須和其他人談論離開飛行員
我再說一遍,除了被除外,飛行員也必須和其他人談論離開飛行員
沒有證據在航行檢驗車或CVR的聲音錄像上有這樣的談論
在這個圖表上,您會看到通常會跟隨的航道
飛行員1號航道到飛行員4號航道
這些航道由國家飛行管理局或FAA制定
雖然您看到藍色的線條,但這些航道並沒有定義的線條
您會在圖表上注意到,飛行員應該保持最高飛行高度
除非飛行管理指示,儘管封鎖不允許
飛行員1號航道最高高度是
Cabin John和Chain Bridge的距離1300米
Chain Bridge的距離1000米
Chain Bridge的距離700米
Chain Bridge的距離300米
Memorial Bridge的距離200米
我將在今天下午1點鐘內
從各種電子和其他來源來得到一些早期的調查信息
大約8點15分東方時間
CRJ離開了37,000米的壓力高度
開始下降,在8點30分,黑鶴開始航行
通常在南方,在拉丁斯堡美爾蘭附近行駛
黑鶴的CVR音頻顯示,指揮員飛行員是飛行員監聽
並傳達在電臺上,飛行員飛行員
在8點33分41分,黑鶴飛行員請求飛行員飛行路線1-4
達維森軍隊飛行,由塔控制員批准
在8點38分39分,黑鶴達到拉丁斯堡美爾蘭附近的中間區域
並在拉丁斯堡美爾蘭附近的區域
黑鶴飛行員在南方,在拉丁斯堡美爾蘭附近的區域
達到當地廣州,在8點39分10分,黑鶴飛行員請求飛行員飛行路線1-4
達維森軍隊飛行員請求飛行員飛行路線1-4
達到達到8點40分46分,黑鶴飛行員跑了一個左轉
D.C.A Nightwing,ILS Localizer,RW 1,
Approximately 4000 feet pressure altitude,
170 knots,
Landing gear up and flaps extended to 20 degrees.
840306,CRJ crew made initial contact with DCA tower,
Tower controller then asked if the crew could switch to RW 33.
The CRJ crew agreed to switch to runway 33
At 8.43.48, the Black Hawk was about 1.1 nautical miles west of the key bridge
The pilot flying indicated they were at 300 feet
The instructor pilot indicated they were at 400 feet
Neither pilot made a comment discussing an altitude discrepancy
At this time, we don't know why there was a discrepancy between the two
That's something that the investigative team is analyzing
At 8.44.27, as the Black Hawk approached the key bridge
The instructor pilot indicated the Black Hawk was at 300 feet, descending to 200 feet
Between 8.44.41 and 8.44.45, the CRJ crew selected 30 degrees of flaps
And then 45 degrees of flaps
At 8.44.49, the CRJ landing gear were down and locked
The aircraft was fully configured for landing, about 6.2 nautical miles south of the airport
At 8.45.27, the autopilot was disconnected
And the CRJ began a shallow right turn off the runway 1 localizer
At a radio altitude of approximately 1,700 feet
And an airspeed of 134 knots
This occurred about 5 nautical miles south of the airport
At 8.45.30, the Black Hawk passed over the memorial bridge
The instructor pilot told the pilot flying that they were at 300 feet and needed to descend
The pilot flying said they would descend to 200 feet
At 8.45.58, the Black Hawk then crossed over the Washington tidal basin
And followed the Washington Channel consistent with helicopter route 1
It is now approximately 2 minutes before the collision
At 8.46.01, a radio transmission from the tower was audible on the CRJ CVR
Informing the Black Hawk that traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge
Was a CRJ at 1,200 feet, circling to runway 33
CVR data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission stating the CRJ was circling
May not have been received by the Black Hawk crew
We hear the word circling in ATC communications
But we do not hear the word circling on the CVR of the Black Hawk
The recorder's group is evaluating this right now
At 8.46.08, the Black Hawk crew responded
They had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation
Which was approved by DCA Tower
At 8.46.29, the CRJ crew received a 1,000-foot automated call-out
At 8.46.47, DCA Tower cleared other jet traffic on runway 1
For immediate departure with no delay
At 8.47.27, or 32 seconds before impact
The Black Hawk passed the southern tip of Haynes Point
A second later, the CRJ began a left roll to turn to final on runway 33
The CRJ was at a radio altitude of 516 feet and 133 knots
At 8.47.29, the CRJ crew received a 500-foot automated call-out
At 8.47.39, or 20 seconds before impact
A radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs
Asking the Black Hawk crew if the CRJ was in sight
Audible in the ATC radio transmission was a conflict alert in the background
At 8.47.40, the CRJ crew received an automated traffic advisory
On the TCAS system stating traffic, traffic
TCAS is the traffic alert and collision avoidance system on the CRJ
At 8.47.42, or 17 seconds before impact
A radio transmission from the tower was audible on both CVRs
Directing the Black Hawk to pass behind the CRJ
CVR data from the Black Hawk indicated
That the portion of the transmission that stated
Pass behind the may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew
Transmission was stepped on by a 0.8-second mic key from the Black Hawk
The Black Hawk was peeing the mic to communicate with ATC
In response, at 8.47.44, the Black Hawk crew
Indicated that traffic was in sight and requested visual separation
Which was approved by DCA Tower
The instructor pilot then told the pilot flying
They believed ATC was asking for the helicopter to move left
Toward the east bank of the Potomac
At 8.47.52, or 7 seconds before impact
The CRJ rolled out on final for runway 33
The CRJ was at a radio altitude of 344 feet, 143 knots
At 8.47.58, or 1 second before impact
The CRJ began to increase its pitch
Reaching about 9 degrees nose-up at the time of collision
FDR data show the CRJ elevators were deflected
Near their maximum nose-up travel
The last radio altitude recorded for the CRJ was 313 feet
And was recorded 2 seconds prior to the collision
The CRJ pitch at this time was again 9 degrees nose-up
And roll was 11 degrees left wing down
The CRJ was descending at 448 feet per minute
The radio altitude of the Black Hawk at the time of the collision
Was 278 feet and had been steady for the previous 5 seconds
The Black Hawk pitch at the time of the collision
Was about a half degree nose-up with a left roll of 1.6 degrees
Now examination of the wreckage will assist in determination
Of the exact angle of the collision
Now we're confident with the radio altitude
Radio altitude of the Black Hawk
At the time of the collision that was 278 feet
But I want to caution that does not mean
That's what the Black Hawk crew was seeing
On the barometric altimeters in the cockpit
We are seeing conflicting information in the data
Which is why we aren't releasing altitude
For the Black Hawk's entire route
I'm going to turn it over to Sean Payne
For an explanation of that
Sean is Branch Chief of the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division
Thank you
I'm Sean Payne
I'm Branch Chief of the Vehicle Recorder Division
This is the Flight Recorder Lab at the NTSB
I can give some insight into the challenges
Of understanding what altitude
The Black Hawk pilots would have seen
On their gauges in the cockpit
You may see pictures released of showing us
In the lab rebuilding the flight recorders
That's part of our job
But a bigger part is ensuring that the data
That we have downloaded is true and accurate
We call this validating the data
I'm going to define some terms for altitude
In a way that most audiences can understand
I may end up reading much of this verbatim
As I want to be precise in my language
The first term is radio altitude
You've heard this in our other press conference before
This is a measure of the helicopter's height above terrain
In this case the Potomac River
Is measured by bouncing a signal
From the helicopter to the river
We have determined that this parameter is valid
This is good data
This gives us confidence in knowing
Exactly how high the helicopter was above the ground
This parameter is not the primary means
The pilots would have used
To determine their height during flight
The pilots are not typically navigating
Using radio altitude
It is often different from what they see
On their primary altimeters
The next term is barometric altitude
This is typically the altitude
The pilots would use while they are flying
This was not recorded on the FDR
Barometric altitude takes into account
Certain atmospheric conditions
This would be displayed in front of both pilots
On their instrument panel
As I said this was not recorded
The next term is barometric pressure setting
This is an adjustment that the pilots use
On their primary barometric altitudes
Altimeters
To ensure that the altimeter is set properly
This is critical
This was not recorded by the FDR
This accounts for the local pressure
At the time of the flight
Again this was not recorded by the FDR
The next term is pressure altitude
This is more of an engineering altitude
That the helicopter's systems can tap into
This altitude is calibrated
Using what we call a standard atmospheric pressure
We have found that this parameter is not valid
This is bad data
Normally we can use this parameter
To compute the barometric altitude
Displayed to the pilots
Because this data is bad
We have to use other methods
To make this determination
Last
The FDR does not record GPS information
So we cannot simply verify any of this
With GPS information
Such as GPS altitude
This does not exist in the data set
We are working to determine
If this bad data for pressure altitude
Only affected the FDR
Or if it was more pervasive
Throughout the helicopter's other systems
We will have an answer to what altitude
The pilots saw on their gauges
As they were flying
To examine this
We will use a combination of methods
First
We have already started working with
Sikorsky Collins Aviation and the Army
To retrieve engineering documentation
To understand how this may have affected
Other helicopter systems
Next
Because we cannot turn to the FDR
For this information
The wreckage of the helicopter
Needs to be examined
We need to look at the remains
Of the pitot-static and air data system
I must stress that these systems
Were badly damaged in the accident
And this will be difficult
Last
We will need to look at the altimeters themselves
And determine their independent functionality
I'd like to stress
That we've just completed
The on-scene phase of the investigation
We need to follow our process
And be meticulous
Ultimately
This work will determine
The altitude displayed to the pilots
And will be included in our final report
I'll pass it back to the chairman
Thanks, John
What I just read
We are going to publish that online
So I'm not going to take specific questions
Going back to certain times
That I've already read
I think that can get very confusing
And so please refer to what we do post online
I do want to make a few corrections
And also provide some additional information
On a couple of other issues
First, the ATC group
Has been looking at the radio frequencies
The airplane and the helicopter
Were both on two different VHF frequencies
Not UHF
Also, just a correction
Metropolitan Police Department
Recovered the Blackhawk CVR and FDR
Not the FBI
I do want to provide a little bit of information
On ADS-B out for the Blackhawk
ADS-B stands for
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
So the helicopter was equipped with
And capable of transmitting ADS-B out
We don't know why it wasn't transmitting
What we'll have to look at
Is the installation of the equipment
We'll have to look at programming
We'll have to look at
Whether there was some sort of equipment malfunction
Or if the ADS-B was turned off
So there are other
A lot of people are asking about
Was it turned off
There are other things we have to rule out first
We're also
The team is going to do a visibility study
The visibility study
We're going to do a laser scan
Of the cockpits of an exemplar CRJ
We're going to also laser scan
An exemplar cockpit of an exemplar Blackhawk
And we're going to take that information
As well as information
From examination of the wreckage
Different seating positions
Different heights
Different eye positions
Also taking into account night vision goggles
And we're going to do
A pretty in-depth visibility study
Which we do often
And see if we can demonstrate
Which we will be able to do
On a software program
What the pilots of the Blackhawk
Could and could not see
Now we will begin moving the wreckage
From DCA
To a secure location over the next week
And that's all I have for now
I am going to take questions again
I'm not going to take questions on specific times
That I read through in the Blackhawk route
Or in the CRJ
As it was moving to runway 33
But all of that will be online at ntsb.gov
And you can find that
So I will take questions
As I call you
Please raise your hand
State your name and your affiliation
Tom
One more time
That's correct
We are looking at the possibility
Of there may be bad data
We're looking at
Were they seeing something different in the cockpit
That differs from the FDR data
Which was radio altimeter
It's possible
But we have a lot of work to do
Until we get to that
So the question is
How critical is the finding
That the crew could have been wearing
Night vision goggles
That is part of our investigation
And it's going to be a factor
In our visibility study
We're going to have to see
What was possible for them to see at the time
Leading up to the collision
And the accident sequence
Is there anything in the voice recorder
That the crew of the Blackhawk could see
Or tell that there was an impending collision
We do not have any indication
That the Blackhawk crew would have seen that
The question is
Visibility in night vision goggles
This is exactly why we do a visibility study
And we'll test that as part of our study
But time will tell
Just to level set here
We're only a couple of weeks out
And we have a lot of work to do
That will be a part of the work
Do we know
If the traffic advisory
That was received by the CRJ crew
Was the Blackhawk
That's something that our ATC group
Is analyzing
So the instructions from ATC
Were to pass behind the CRJ
That transmission was interrupted
It was stepped on
We do not have evidence
On the CVR of the Blackhawk
That they may have not received
Pass behind the
Because the mic key
They were communicating
With air traffic control at the time
Pass behind the was not communicated
Actually it was communicated by ATC
It was not heard on the Blackhawk CVR
Is that clear
So the CRJ crew can hear air traffic control
And communications from air traffic control
The Blackhawk crew can also hear
Communications from air traffic control
But they can't hear communications
From each other back to air traffic control
So it's half the communication
Yes
Well I do want to congratulate
The Secretary Duffy for taking action
Immediately to restrict
Helicopter traffic
Except for certain circumstances
Lifesaving flights and presidential flights
So I think they took the right safety action
We will have to
As we go through our investigation
Look at the accident sequence
And take our investigative information
And determine what next steps should be done
It's too early for us to say
Whether it should be permanent
However that's certainly something
That the Secretary and the FAA
Can do on their own
So here's what I'm going to say
Aviation is the safest mode of transportation
I say this often
You are at greater risk
Getting into your car
To and from the airport
On our nation's roads
95%
We're talking 43,000 people
Are dying on our nation's roads annually
Millions more injured
Aviation is incredibly safe
With respect to any safety recommendations
That may come along
Or any safety deficiencies
That we might identify
One thing I will say
Is our investigative process
We don't wait till the end
Of our investigation
To issue something
That may impact a safety deficiency
So for example
We will issue an urgent safety recommendation
If we see that something
Needs to be acted on immediately
We won't wait till the end of the investigation
We won't wait till the end
To issue recommendations in the final report
We will take action
We will issue an urgent safety recommendation
If we need to
So that's open right now
In all areas
Yes
Yeah, I've read these reports
It's too early to tell
We're going to have to do our visibility study
To look at all possibilities
Of what the crew might have been seeing
So more to come on that
Thank you very much
