Jake Sullivan on Israel-Hamas War, Sale of AI Chips, China, Ukraine, Trump

Thrifty Thinkers
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2 Video Views·Jan 14, 2025
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talks extensively to Bloomberg in Washington about his years working in the White House with President Joe Biden. Sullivan will be stepping down from his post on January 20. He speaks with Bloomberg's Jenny Leonard about trying to reach a ceasefire deal in the Middle East, new curbs on exports of advanced AI chips made by Nvidia and its peers, the US relationship with China, growth of the US economy, risks of cyber attacks, the health of President Biden, the war in Ukraine, and working with the incoming team of President-elect Donald Trump.
We have a lot to get to, but let's start with breaking news on Gaza.
There's reporting that Israel and mediators have agreed to a draft and are awaiting Hamas's response.
Seems like we're close, maybe closer than ever. We've also been here before.
Well first, I think the
accumulating pressure on Hamas has been really considerable.
They have had their military formations destroyed, their top leader taken out,
their main proxy allies badly decimated, and their sponsor, Iran,
weakened and distracted. So I think the pressure is building for Hamas to come to yes.
I think Israel also has achieved a huge amount of its military objectives in Gaza and therefore they are in a position to be able to say yes.
So there is a distinct possibility that we can get this deal done this week before President Biden leaves office.
But as you say, we've been here before, we've been close before, and haven't gotten across the finish line, so I can't make any promises or predictions.
But just this morning, I was on the phone with Brett McGurk, who has been basically camped out in Doha.
He's been there for more than a week
working the details within the framework President Biden set out last year.
I spoke also this morning with the Qatari Prime Minister and with one of the key Israeli negotiators.
And there is a general sense that this is moving in the right direction.
The question now over the next short while is, can Hamas get to yes, can we get to a final agreement, and then can we begin implementing it in the coming days?
It's there for the taking. So the question is now, can we all collectively seize the moment and make this happen?
Vice President-Elect J.D. Vance said yesterday it will probably get done a day or two before you leave office.
Deadlines like this, specific deadlines, help or hurt the negotiations? And does rhetoric like the one employed by
President-Elect Donald Trump, is it useful to get Hamas to yes?
I think deadlines can serve two functions in a negotiation.
When they're imposed by one party,
frequently a deadline can make the other party think, hey, if I just wait for the last minute, they'll give me everything.
If they're imposed by the mediators,
the Americans, the Qataris, the Egyptians, all basically say, let's focus the mind and get this thing done,
I think they can have a positive impact.
And so I think the pressure building here towards the end of President Biden's term has been considerable and that that will
help contribute to a positive outcome if we can generate that final yes from both sides.
At the same time, this has been a circumstance in which President Biden gave direction
shortly after the election to me, to Brett, and to others on our team, work closely with the incoming team, make sure we have a
united front, we have a coordinated message.
We have tried to do that over the course of the last several weeks, as has the Trump team that's coming in.
I think this is not a partisan issue.
This is an American issue to get our hostages out and all of the hostages out,
bring the fighting to an end and
I think it's how a transition should operate.
I have been struck by this phrase about all hell to pay or all hell will break loose.
Because if you're a Hamas fighter sitting in Gaza, I think it'd be fair to say that you have been
seeing hell rain down on you for 14 months.
The total smashing of Hamas battalions, the killing of the top three leaders,
Sinwar, Dave, Issa, among others, and all of the other ways in which your entire broader network
has been badly degraded and your sponsor has been so badly weakened.
The amount of
firepower and pressure, military pressure, brought to bear on Hamas
has been pretty dramatic over the course of the past 14 months.
I think it's the accumulated effect of that, combined with this
looming period of transition from one president to another, that has created a circumstance where we can't get to it.
It's been the last year
for us on the Middle East.
It's safe to say that it's probably not the region that you thought
coming in would be taking up a lot of your time.
How much has that taken away from your priorities in the Pacific and other regions in the world, or has it?
Look, I really think
one of the
things history will look back on in the Biden administration and see quite clearly is that even as we've dealt with
two substantial geopolitical crises,
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
the outbreak of this conflict in the Middle East, beginning with Hamas's brutal massacre of Israelis
on October 7th, that through all of that, we have never even for a second taken our eye off the ball with the
competition of China. And we have taken a series of actions, supporting alliances, protecting technology,
investing in our surface of strength, that have left us in a position at the end of four years
where we have dramatically improved America's
position in the long-term competition with China, and we've done so while managing the relationship so it doesn't tip over in the conflict.
So it doesn't make the headlines every day the way the Middle East and Ukraine does, but the record and the reality
of the U.S.-China dynamic in 2025 compared to 2021, especially against the expectations of 2021,
I think is quite a remarkable record that the President can take great deal of pride in.
Let's talk about China for a second. You guys announced a new rule this morning on new limits on sales of advanced AI chips.
Can you explain to us, where did that rule originate? How did you get here?
Yeah, what's the backstory? So it originated from a basic reality,
which is that the United States has to pursue two core objectives at once.
The first objective is for the United States itself to maintain
the lead when it comes to frontier AI technology, and that that technology should be developed in the United States and our closest allies,
and not offshore to the rest of the world. And second, we want the world to run on an infrastructure of American technology.
We want data centers around the world that are powering AI applications
with American technology and not with Chinese technology or any other technology.
So how do you achieve both of those things? That was the question presented to the key departments and agencies of the U.S. government.
And so over the course of many months, we worked on a rule that could help us achieve both of those objectives.
On the one hand, ensuring there were protections around the highest end compute capability.
So we were building that out in America and our very closest allies.
And on the other hand, making sure that we had predictable and clear rules for the export of high-end computing capability
so that other countries could reap the benefits of American technology without getting diverted for our competitors and adversaries.
That's the rule that we produced.
And it really stems from, I think, one of the most critical national security imperatives of the next generation,
which is how we make AI work for us rather than against us.
In America, maintaining the lead in AI as opposed to ceding it to China is going to be decisive in making sure that it works for us.
When we came into office in 2021, there were a lot of people who said, it's going to be China, not the U.S., who leads the world in AI.
We are in the lead today.
We're determined to protect, preserve and extend that lead.
So you're on your way out.
The deadline for this rule is very far in the future.
So you punted that.
What are the consequences if the Trump administration doesn't implement this rule?
So I would take issue with the word punt.
What we did is set out a comment period of 120 days.
Why did we do that?
We did that because a rule of this significance needs comment from industry, from civil society, from other stakeholders, so that we make sure that we get this balance I've just described right.
And so we are rigorous and systematic and thoughtful about having a process that allows that comment to come in, allows the new team to digest it and then make whatever adjustments are necessary.
Now, obviously, it's going to be up to them how they want to proceed.
And they may have internal debates the same way we had internal debates about exactly how to calibrate.
I would expect nothing less.
But I would be surprised sitting here today if after 120 days they looked at the landscape as we've looked at it and said, you know, we really don't need this at all.
Let's move on to other things, because the more you study this question, the more critical it is that you have a rule of this kind.
The details to be worked, to be able to secure the objectives.
Everything you've been doing on the Chinatech competition has been under the umbrella of small yard, high fence.
Obviously, it's a very dynamic landscape.
So how do you ensure that regulations stay up to date and you don't unnecessarily make the yard too wide or the fence too tall?
Basically, by showing our homework.
I mean, we put out our first semiconductor rule in October of twenty twenty two.
And when we did it, we said the technology is moving very rapidly.
The development of high end chips, their relative amount of power and compute capability is evolving.
So we're going to have to update this.
And we did. We updated it in twenty twenty three.
We've updated it again in twenty twenty four.
And we expect the Trump administration to keep doing that.
So a degree of predictability that there will be constant iteration and update is part of it.
And then displaying why it is that we chose the parameters that we chose in excruciating detail, which not that many people read.
I know you do.
Some of your colleagues at Bloomberg do.
A lot of people don't.
But we are putting it all out there in a totally transparent way.
And we're not just being transparent publicly.
And explaining the rationale and the logic behind it, because we've got nothing to hide here.
We've got nothing to apologize for.
This, we believe, is core to America's national security.
And we are going to continue to have a degree of transparency on it through the end of our time here.
And I would expect the incoming team will pick up where we left off, because this very much has a strong bipartisan backing.
It's the kind of thing that I think can be carried forward in a new administration.
On that, you know, obviously, all these rules take months and months to come up with.
There's tons of lobbying from all sides to shape what the final rule, the final outcome looks like.
How worried are you when you say that the Trump administration will carry this forward?
They might not like the yards and fences that you put up, or they might also be more prone to negotiate with companies one-on-one.
How worried are you that corporate lobbying could undo some of this framework that you set up,
given how many tech billionaires are in the president-elect's role that might serve as a replacement?
You know, I think you'd expect that after four years, I'd be very hard-bitten, maybe quite cynical about just about every element of American politics and policy.
Actually, I have to tell you that my experience in working through our technology and national security policy has been pretty hard-bitten.
I've spent a lot of time with a lot of tech leaders, the CEOs of major technology companies, big tech, the innovators and entrepreneurs in small tech.
And there are exceptions, none of which I will name here.
But by and large, people accept the basic proposition that the United States needs technology controls for the most exquisite technologies for national security applications.
And the debate is over the details.
So I have not found a deeply cynical game being played on this, by and large.
I think it has been a robust and rigorous give-and-take.
But it's interesting to see that American technology leaders have publicly said,
we need a kind of small yard, high fence, or we need something along these lines.
So I think we've built some momentum behind this notion.
I think it's going to be hard to entirely knock that off course.
I think Congress is invested in it.
I think the national security community across the aisle is invested in it.
So can I say, I'll go to sleep at night every night, totally confident that this will be carried forward in the way that I'd like to see it?
No, I can't say that.
But among the initiatives that the Biden administration has really powered and pioneered over the last four years,
this is one that it would come as some measure of surprise to me if the new team threw it out.
Your colleague, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, told my colleagues at the Wall Street Journal that,
quote, trying to hold China back is a fool's errand.
Do you agree?
I don't think it's the right way to think about what we are doing.
The right way to think about it, for me, is just common sense.
If we have a very high-end technology that has deep national security applications,
we don't want it to be sold to a country that can use it against us.
That has been true throughout America's technology policy.
Now, in the Cold War, that meant, basically, a total technology blockade,
indeed, really, a decoupling of the U.S. and Soviet economies.
That's not what we need today with China.
We are integrated.
We should continue to have trade, normal intercourse, even on technology.
That's why we have a small, unified fence.
The goal here is about meeting somewhere in the middle between nothing,
no restrictions, which has never been a part of American policy.
We've had export controls for decades,
and the kind of Cold War-style technology blockade we've had.
We've got to meet in the middle.
That is not fundamentally about holding anyone back or containment or anything like that.
What it is about is the common-sense ability to look the American people in the eye and say,
for certain critical technologies,
we are not going to allow them to be in the hands of people who use them against us.
That's how I look at it.
That can succeed.
I would submit is succeeding.
But I think the other half of what Secretary Raimondo is saying in that comment is
our main purpose and the main thrust of our effort should be investing in ourselves.
And that's been a core feature of the Biden administration,
investment in our industrial base, in our innovation base, in our supply chains,
and in French shoring.
We have made, I think, substantial progress on that front,
but that is a generational project.
I hope that in every dimension that is carried forward.
I have some concerns based on the rhetoric I've heard about whether those investments will be carried forward,
but I think they are profoundly in our interest.
Are investments without export controls the right approach?
If all you have are export controls, and that's it,
and you're not making the dramatic investments in resources of our own innovation and industrial capacity,
then you're not going to succeed.
And that's why President Biden is perfect for it.
Over the last four years, but also more recently,
we've seen major hacks of U.S. telecom systems, critical infrastructure,
and, of course, there's still continued support by Beijing for Russia's war.
Would you say that your approach to China has been successful,
or did Beijing take advantage of the U.S. and your willingness to talk?
So, first, for me, the question is,
in the long-term strategic competition with China,
are we in a stronger position in that competition than we were four years ago?
I think it's not even a close call.
The United States is in such a stronger position today than we were four years ago,
and that is a mark of unwavering success in the relationship.
But then there's a second thing.
Are we careening towards war with China?
I think the last thing the American people want is a massive war with a nuclear-armed power.
And we have also succeeded, even as we have strengthened our position in the competition,
in stabilizing the relationship and managing it so that it isn't tipping over.
I think that is also an unalloyed success.
When we came into office four years ago,
the common prediction was that China's economy was inevitably,
ineluctably going to surpass the American economy, maybe as soon as 2030.
Now, there's a genuine debate about whether it will ever happen.
When we came into office, people said it's going to be China,
not the U.S., who leads the world in AI.
That's not the case today, and we should work to ensure it is the case.
When we came into office, we did not have this strong, robust network
of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific that we have now built,
which allows us to have much stronger deterrence in that part of the world than in other systems.
China is hacking the United States.
They were doing so in previous administrations.
They're doing so today.
Some of these recent hacks, the Salt Typhoon hack,
are dramatic in their scope and scale, and we take them deadly serious.
There's the espionage part of that, like Salt Typhoon,
and then there's the potential that China would actually use cyber means
to physically disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure.
We've sent a clear message to China's leaders that if they did that,
if they actually took a physically destructive cyber attack in the United States,
that there would be severe consequences.
I'm not going to go into the details of those conversations,
but they have been consistent and sustained over time,
and we're going to have to continue to deter China from doing that
because we have seen them setting up or positioning to be able to do that in the future.
That's something the new team will have to continue to work on.
Let's move to the EU.
Over the last four years, we've spent a lot of time trying to negotiate with them
on some trade-related issues like the global steel arrangement,
something on large-scale aircraft.
None of these came to fruition.
All have been now punted to the deadline for long to the new administration,
which is not you guys.
Do you think the EU missed an opportunity to work with you guys
on China trade given they're going to come in
and have a much more adversarial counterpart in two weeks?
To answer your question, we have to start from the beginning of the Biden administration.
Just a few weeks before we took office,
Europe and China signed a massive trade agreement,
a comprehensive agreement on investment.
That was right at the end of the Trump administration.
To me, that was a mark of not paying attention to the EU
and working with them on a common approach to China.
Today, that comprehensive agreement on investment is on the shelf.
It is not in force.
In fact, what the European Union has done
is moved into a much more convergent position with us
when it comes to China's economic processes.
We saw that in how we came together with the G7
to describe a common economic approach.
We saw that in living color with the imposition of tariffs
on Chinese electric vehicles just a few months ago.
Now, it is the case that we have our own
pretty limited trade issues
with the EU that we've tried to manage.
On civil aircraft, we actually took a big step forward
with the Boeing Airbus settlement.
On steel and aluminum, we have continued these tariff rate quotas
but have not come up with the comprehensive agreement we should have.
Do I think there was a missed opportunity there? I do.
Do I think that's entirely on the EU?
I mean, that's two parties trying to come to an agreement.
We didn't quite get there.
I think as we look forward, that's something we should work on.
The single biggest thing, though, that I think the US and Europe
need to work together on in the next four years
is a high-standards critical minerals marketplace
so that we are not dependent on China
and giving them the capacity to choke off critical minerals
that are important to our national security.
And that's something that I have made the case to the incoming administration
to really work on.
We took some modest steps in that direction,
but I think we have a long way to go
to be secure in our supply chains of critical minerals.
I would like to see the next team build on the work that we do.
Without going into the details of your transition from the European Union,
do you think they're susceptible to working with the EU?
We obviously know the rhetoric from the president-elect
who has some strong feelings about the European Union.
Do you think that there is...?
Look, I think that there is a...
kind of an inescapable logic
to the fact that on critical issues
relative to the competition with China,
especially the economic and technology competition,
that having a common strategy
with the key market economies of the world
just puts us in a much stronger position to deal effectively with China.
And I think we didn't see as much of that play out
in the first Trump administration,
but I think that the experience of the last eight years...
By the way, including COVID and what it meant for our supply chains,
has had an impact on the thinking on both sides of China
about the centrality of working with allies and partners
on supply chain resilience.
And so I think there will be more opportunities
to work with the EU in the coming years
than maybe there were in the first term.
But, of course, I can't predict exactly
how they're going to rack and stack their credit.
One person that's obviously really large
over the 2024 elections and will also do so
in the incoming administration is Elon Musk.
There's been a lot of reporting
that the White House's failure to invite him
to a 2021 EV summit
is what contributed to his shift against the Democratic Party.
So he worked very hard to get Donald Trump elected.
Looking back and knowing what you know now,
was it a mistake to exclude him
from some of these White House initiatives,
given he's trying to get far-right leaders elected all over Europe?
Look, I'm not going to speak to another person's motives.
And since motive is kind of at the heart of that question,
it's difficult for me to respond to it.
Also difficult for me to look back to an EV summit in 2021
who should or shouldn't be invited.
All I can say is that from the point of view
of the Biden administration,
what we have tried to do over these 40 years
is work across the technology industry,
as I described earlier,
on a range of issues that would enhance our national security.
And I think our record of working with technology leaders
and the relationships that we build, that I build,
is something that I'm proud of and want to preserve.
Your boss, President Biden, last week said
that he would have won against President Trump
if he had stayed in the race.
Do you agree? And could he have for one more year?
So I...
One of the nice things about being national security advisor
is I get to not answer questions about politics.
You're a person in democratic politics.
And today would be one of the last few days
where I get to answer a question about politics
and say, hey, I'm national security advisor, so I can answer that.
So, like, in a week, you can probably ask me that question.
Let me phrase it differently.
Obviously, there's been a lot of criticism from the American people
about, you know, the lack of transparency
about his mental decline.
As the national security advisor
and one person that was in the room almost always,
was there ever a concern to you from a national security standpoint?
No, absolutely not.
And I don't accept the term mental decline
that you, you know, put at the heart of your question.
Um...
I sat with President Biden this past year, on April 26,
when Iran launched 100 ballistic missiles,
200 or 300 armed drones in Israel
in one massive salvo over the course of the meeting.
I sat with him as he coordinated and organized
an unprecedented coalition of countries
and directed the American military itself
to help shoot down those projectiles
defending the hell out of Israel.
And then I sat with him late that night
as he spoke with the prime minister of Israel
about how Israel...
That's just kind of one example of many I could give
about watching the president in action in this situation.
I'm equally sitting just yesterday in the Oval Office
as he prepared to talk to Bibi Netanyahu
about closing this hostage deal.
This is a person who has stewarded American policy,
both domestic and foreign policy,
in ways that I believe are leaving this country much stronger than we found it.
In the hand we are giving the next team
is a good hand, and that is because of the leadership of President Biden.
Your successor, Mike Walsh, was on the Sunday show yesterday.
He said on Ukraine
that they will ask Ukraine to lower the conscription age to 18.
Obviously, you had similar concerns about their manpower shortage.
You never demanded anything in terms of them changing their laws.
Why not?
And do you think this pressure coming from the incoming administration
is going to make...
Well, first of all, they did change their law.
Their conscription age, as of a year ago, was 27.
It's kind of remarkable compared to how we do things,
that from 18 to 27, they lowered it to 25.
They made a series of other changes to their law
to facilitate people under the age of 25, actually.
But you have to recognize that the manpower issue in Ukraine
is an issue that has evolved over time.
It has become more acute over the course of the past year.
And the need for Ukraine to be able to fully populate
its brigades and battalions, as we have flowed in
a massive quantity of the munitions and military equipment.
It has grown, and we've made no bones about that,
and we have briefed a new team on that.
So, let's see what happens now on a going-forward basis.
That's ultimately a sovereign decision Ukraine is going to have to make.
But we have been crystal clear, including publicly,
that manpower is an acute concern,
and it's something that Ukraine will have to address,
even as we do our part to get them the munitions.
Of all the things that the incoming president has promised
to do in the foreign policy and national security space,
what makes you the most nervous that keeps you up at night?
Ah, that's a good question.
You know, having watched the president,
the incoming president, in his first term,
I guess what I would say is,
we don't know how rhetoric on the campaign trail
will rhetoric in a transition
translate into reality and policy.
And so, one of the lessons I took away from that
is, let's wait and see.
Let's actually see what happens.
So, I am not going to, by awake at night,
kind of waiting, I am going to see and assess
and then make my own judgments on that basis.
But I also have sat in very difficult seats
before you and have obviously been subject
to a huge amount of armchair quarterbacking
on every issue under the sun.
That's just in the nature of these jobs.
That's by no means a complaint.
That's just the reality of how it should be.
The people who occupy these positions
should be held accountable by the press,
by the media, but it definitely makes me someone
who is going to be way more cautious
in criticizing anything an incoming team does.
Because one thing I will say is that
when you sit in my chair,
you recognize that national security decision-making
is imperfect people with imperfect information
facing very imperfect choices.
And so, at no time are you going to get perfect results.
And so, I will have, and I've said this to Mike Waltz,
I just have a huge amount of sympathy
and goodwill towards the people
who will occupy these jobs.
Because they're coming into the world
at a time of profound change in transition.
The post-Cold War era is over,
and there is intense competition under way
for what comes next.
And it's going to be difficult, and it has been difficult.
And the real question is, is America's hand getting stronger
and are our adversaries' hands getting weaker?
I think the answer to that question
on the objective evidence is yes and yes.
That's what the incoming team is going to have to keep working with.
And I'm going to root for their success
because their success is our success.
Looking at the clock and knowing that we're out of time,
maybe let's leave on this note, and you have to be short.
What are you most proud of and want to be remembered for?
That's a great question.
I'm both Minnesotan and Irish Catholic,
and so we only like to look at the darkness
and not things we're happy about.
I also believe that when someone says something nice to you,
they automatically have to know it.
