A Consideration of THUCYDIDES

Genetic History
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Jan 14, 2025
"A discussion of the Peloponnesian War as described by the Greek historian Thucydides.
"
In 413 BC, an Athenian force was totally defeated on the island of Sicily by the Syracusans and their allies.
Thucydides writes,
They were beaten at all points and altogether. All that they suffered was great.
They were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction.
Their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed.
And of the reaction in Athens, Thucydides writes,
They had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, and they began to despair of salvation.
As for the reaction across the rest of Greece,
The following winter saw all Hellas, stirring under the impression of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily, neutrals,
now felt that even if uninvited, they no longer ought to stand aloof from the war,
but should volunteer to march against the Athenians,
who, as each city reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded.
And in Sparta, Thucydides writes,
The Spartans now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war,
and now issued a requisition to the cities for building a hundred ships.
So now we should consider how all this came about,
and wonder at whatever present conditions in the nature of government and man are laid out in an examinable form by this historian.
For in his own words, this history was intended as a possession for all time,
because this, as in the Peloponnesian War, was the greatest movement yet known in history.
So how did we get to the point when Athens was losing so much of its empire by 413 BC,
and was destined to lose it all by 405?
A few things stand out when we read our Thucydides.
The first and easiest is the imperial arrogance of Athens.
And the second is that they lacked an honest war aim.
Now the enemy was Sparta, yes.
But to read this history makes one conclude that the real purpose was for Athens to remain in a constant state of hostilities,
so that it could form a pretext to attack any country at any time and expand its empire.
The defeat and occupation of Sparta itself was never seriously contemplated as far as we can tell.
And the third thing is the climate of mutual distrust amongst the citizens of Athens and between the Athenians and their allies,
and that the Athenians may have been corrupted by their own rhetoric into the belief that the world turns on a kill-or-be-killed mentality,
and it could only follow that they would look to their own neighbors as ones who would rule them if they could.
As to the first point, that Athens was possessed of a blamable sense of imperial arrogance,
nowhere is this more plain than in one particular exchange in the Melian Dialogues.
In 416 BC the Athenians had landed on the island of Melos because it had refused to submit to them.
And the dialogue between the Athenian and Melian embassies that Thucydides quotes is perhaps the most famous section of this whole history.
And the Athenians advised of the Melians candidly in their words,
"...holding in view the real sentiments of us both, since you know, as well as we do, that right, as the world goes,
is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."
When the Melians do not submit to Athens and the city was taken, the men were killed and everyone else was sold as slaves.
So you would think after dispensing such treatment that Athens could never have expected wholehearted support from any ally.
But when the Athenian fleet set sail on its doomed expedition to Sicily the next year after this affair at Melos,
there was a moment when you'd think that they were disillusioned about their reputation in the world if they ever thought it was a positive one.
On their way to Syracuse, they tried to put in at various points in Italy.
And this is what Thucydides writes,
"...they coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates against them,
and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that,
until they arrived at Regium, and called upon them to assist, to which the Regians replied that they would not side with either party."
Thucydides continues,
"...the generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at the outset,
and by the refusal of the Regians to join in the expedition, they being the first people they had tried to gain and had most reason to count upon."
And when the Athenians attempted to persuade the people of Camerina to join them,
the Syracusan leader, Hermocrates, makes it clear that the reputation of Athens as a perpetrator of evil had spread throughout the Mediterranean world,
and that their atrocities were so well known that they weren't even worth mentioning.
Hermocrates says,
"...we have not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian,
but much rather to blame ourselves, who with the warnings we possess and the Hellenes in those parts,
that have been enslaved through not supporting each other."
And so we can understand Athens had no true friends,
for Athens could not claim to oppose tyranny when they declared war on people, not even pretentiously.
Thucydides says this about the Sicilian debacle after they were already starting to get routed,
"...deep was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their disappointment,
these were the only cities, as in the cities in Sicily,
that they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character,
under democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude."
So it would seem that the Athenians never truly had justice on their side,
and never pretended to it.
Instead, whenever an Athenian argues for a course of action in these speeches,
it always seems to be based on the premise that they must either rule and expand,
or contract and be ruled,
and that all nations must inherently wish to rule all the others,
and that a desire for domination, therefore, is nothing aberrant and bad in itself.
And that is exactly what the Athenians said to the Melians,
"...you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do."
And the Athenians also say,
"...of the gods we believe, and of men we know,
that by a necessary law of their nature, they rule wherever they can."
And in 415 BC, this is what Alcibiades says to promote the Sicilian campaign,
"...we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining what we have,
but must scheme to extend it,
for if we cease to rule others, we shall be in danger of being ruled ourselves."
And in 427 BC, this is what the infamous Cleon said to the Athenians
when he was trying to persuade them to execute the entire adult male population of Mytilene,
"...if, right or wrong," he says,
"...you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle,
and punish the Mytileneans as your interest requires,
or else you must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger."
And by those last lines, cultivate honesty without danger,
I think he means that to refrain from violence
is to put a false hope in the world that honesty can beget harmony between nations.
So with self-preservation through rule being the only governing principle Athens had,
they were afflicted with constant mistrust between the citizens
because they'd been convinced to think there was no such thing as a human
who did something for the sake of goodness,
and that the stronger must always endeavor to dominate the weaker.
So of course they'd suspect each other.
Wise words were written by the Portuguese poet Luis Vaz de Camões
in Canto II of the Lusiads,
Where malice rules, it's natural to fear everyone's motives must be similar.
And indeed we can see in Cleon's speech, quoted in Book III,
that he argued for the Athenians to live in perpetual distrust of their allies, at least.
He says,
Your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators
whose obedience is ensured by the superiority given you by your strength
and not their loyalty.
There was also distrust as to each other,
the people who lived inside the city,
as to their true beliefs.
And we can see this in Plutarch's life of Nicias that there were informers running around Athens.
Plutarch writes of Nicias himself,
So cautious was he of informers and so reserved
that he never would dine out with any citizen
nor allowed himself to indulge in talk and conversation with his friends.
This is the climate in Athens
and this climate would become much worse
because after the disaster in Sicily
the Spartans made an alliance with Persia against Athens
and with cities continuing to revolt from the Athenian Empire
a cabal of oligarchs formed
that would briefly overthrow the Athenian democracy.
In the city, it began in 411 BC
when Thucydides writes,
Some of the younger men had banded together
and secretly assassinated one Androcles,
the chief leader of the people.
There were also some other obnoxious persons
whom they secretly did away with in the same manner.
And so the oligarchy, which was to be called the 400,
was set up in fact before it was set up in name.
Thucydides continues,
The assembly and the council still met notwithstanding.
Although they discussed nothing that was not approved by the conspirators
who both supplied the speakers
and reviewed in advance what they were to say,
fear and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators
closed the mouths of the rest.
Or if any ventured to rise in opposition
he was promptly put to death in some convenient way
and there was neither search for the murderers
nor justice to be had against them if suspected.
But the people remained motionless,
being so thoroughly cowed
that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence
even when they held their tongues.
Regarding this sudden silence from the people of Athens
who had been so sure of themselves
as to send an expedition to Sicily
and who had been wooed by orators
assuring them of their right to an empire
because of their superiority
and because of their strength
now reduced to this suspicion
and abiding submission to oligarchy.
How a city full of cowards
could have been deluded into thinking
that they were a courageous bulwark against tyranny
is explained as a concept
in the speech of Diodotus
in Book 3 of Thucydides.
He explains that human nature is such
that it will idiotically exalt itself
whenever it is congregated in a mass.
He says,
when all are acting together
each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity.
And it was over these quieted subjects
who previously had thought so highly of themselves
that oligarchs took such easy control
while these people sat in silence.
Thucydides writes,
the assembly ratified the proposed constitution
without a single opposing voice
and was then dissolved
after which the 400 were brought into the council chamber.
This was in 411 BC.
But it would be removed
the oligarchs would be removed by the army.
The people had lost the city.
Their own suspicious tendencies
had been used against them
by this conspiracy.
Thucydides writes,
the people rendered helpless
and by their being uncertain about each other
it was impossible for anyone
to speak his mind to a neighbor
and to concert measures to defend himself
as he would have to speak
either to one whom he did not know
or whom he knew but did not trust.
Indeed all the popular party
approached each other with suspicion.
So Socrates seems to have been right
when he claimed in Plato's Gorgias
that the rhetoric which had been started by Pericles
had made the Athenians
idle,
cowardly,
talkative,
and avaricious.
These clearly aren't the same Athenians
who had risen up
and ousted the oligarchic
partisan Isagoras
in 507 BC
which is related so heroically
in Herodotus.
People who are politically suspicious
of others must, it seems to me
doubt their own justice
and perhaps this is why
in the second book of Xenophon's history
when Athens was soon to be
taken by Sparta
in 405 BC
the people feared the justice
that might be done to them.
These murderers of Melos,
Scyone, and Tyrone
all cities which were victims
of Athenian genocide
now the Athenians fretted
at the advance of their enemy.
Xenophon writes of that night
after news came that Athens was certain to fall
no one slept that night
as they mourned
not only for the men destroyed
but even more for themselves
thinking they would suffer the same
catastrophes they had inflicted on others.
This is the Athens
that fell.
