The Biggest US Submarine Has A HUGE Problem!

World of Submarine
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This is why the U.S. might lose the next peer-to-peer conflict.
Serving as America's first line of defense in case of military disaster,
the U.S. Navy's guided-missile submarines, or SSGNs,
are constantly on the prowl, waiting for orders.
However, due to critical issues surrounding their replacement,
the loss of the Ohio-class SSGNs may leave a gaping hole in America's defense.
These submarines, armed with 154 Tomahawk missiles,
are an impressive force, essential for U.S. military strategy.
But with their retirement looming,
what happens next could brutally impact America's naval capabilities.
To understand the gravity of this situation,
you need to know why SSGNs are so vital,
and what's causing the delay in their replacements.
The Ohio-class submarine is currently the largest U.S. submarine at nearly 19,000 tons,
which is twice the displacement of a standard Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
On board, the boats are armed with 24 nuclear missiles,
each capable of having multiple re-entry vehicles.
However, what makes the SSGNs so crucial to the Navy's operations?
Unlike the nuclear-armed submarines,
the SSGNs are a special subset of Ohio-class submarines that are not armed with nuclear missiles.
But why?
Back in 1994, the Clinton administration decided that,
in order to comply with the regulations surrounding the newest START II treaty,
which was a treaty signed between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their nuclear arsenals,
the best way for the Navy to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
Due to the Ohio-class submarine's immense size and new technologies,
this submarine can stay on patrol for up to several months at a time.
With such a long stay time and being so quiet,
it gives America's enemies pause when contemplating something that could bring the ire of U.S. forces.
In addition to the long stay time,
the Ohio-class boats simply had much more space than their Los Angeles-class attack submarines
or even eventual Virginia-class attack submarines.
However, they would not stay in ballistic missile submarines for long.
These submarines, initially part of the nuclear triad,
have been repurposed to carry Tomahawk land-attack missiles and support special forces,
making them versatile and essential.
They did this by taking all the nuclear weapons off the four oldest SSBNs at the time,
the Ohio, Michigan, Florida, and Georgia,
and then putting vertical launch system modules inside 22 of the 24 torpedo tubes.
Each of these BLS modules could accommodate seven Tomahawk cruise missiles.
All said and done, the new SSGNs could carry an impressive 154 Tomahawk missiles.
But what about the other two decommissioned missile tubes?
The Navy converted the last two remaining tubes into lockout chambers
that could be connected to either a dry deck shelter or an advanced seal delivery system.
Basically, this meant that up to 66 Special Orientation Force personnel
could deploy out of these converted missile tubes to conduct clandestine operations anywhere in the world.
In addition to converting the tubes to deploy seals,
the SSGN boats also received more advanced communication suites.
These classified suites eventually convert the submarine into a forward command post
that can connect with higher headquarters to conduct high-risk operations wherever needed.
As one can see, with the added benefit of 154 Tomahawks
and the ability to deploy more than a platoon's worth of seals,
the SSGNs serve an incredibly vital function in the Navy,
both for deterrence and clandestine operations worldwide.
But this versatility comes with an expiration date, and that's where the problem begins.
What happens when these vital submarines retire?
After all, though they are nuclear-powered, they cannot keep going on forever.
Ohio-class submarines were initially planned for a 42-year service life.
With that broken down into the first 20-year active period,
followed by a two-year nuclear fuel replacement period,
and then a second 20-year active period.
As of the making of this video,
all of the SSGNs currently in service have between 40 and 42 years of active service.
The Navy is trying to squeeze a few more years of life out of these boats.
The Navy plans to retire the two oldest boats in 2026, and the other two in 2028.
Their retirement poses a significant challenge to the Navy's vertical launch capabilities,
creating a potential gap in strategic operations.
Currently, the U.S. Navy has a variety of platforms that host vertical launch systems,
or VLS, armed with Tomahawk missiles.
These platforms include the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers,
the Ticonderoga-class cruisers,
the Los Angeles-class attack submarines,
and the Virginia-class submarines.
However, despite this wide range of platforms,
all of these ships and submarines do not compare to the power the SSGNs bring to the table.
But why?
Though destroyers and cruisers are armed with around 100 VLS cells each,
these cells can only fit one Tomahawk each.
Additionally, these ships carry a wide range of other missiles,
like standard missiles, anti-submarine rockets,
Additionally, with the impending retirement of the remaining Ticonderoga-class cruisers,
the Navy continues to lose surface VLS cells,
since the new destroyers have slightly less cells per ship.
As for the attack submarines,
the Los Angeles-class boats can carry between 12 and 25 depending on loadout,
and the Virginia-class boats can carry up to 37 Tomahawks,
but normally only have 12 in the tubes.
However, as the Los Angeles-class boats continue to retire,
the number of VLS cells will shrink as new Virginia-class boats continue to come online.
To fully grasp the implications of this,
let's look at the planned replacements and the issues they face.
The real question is,
why can't the Navy easily replace these submarines with newer models?
Well, building them is harder than you think.
For starters, there are not a whole lot of manufacturers out there.
In fact, the primary submarine builder the U.S. Navy has had since 1899
has been the General Dynamics Electric Boat Company.
Due to the years of institutional knowledge in creating the first submarines ever used by the Navy,
General Dynamics has been the sole source of how to build submarines for generations.
And the issue with this industry is that scaling the workforce is very difficult.
For example, no Joe Schmo can walk in off the street and apply for a job to work on a submarine.
First, they need loads of education and training,
whether the job is an electrical engineer, a pipe fitter, a welder, or a nuclear engineer.
Because of the criteria in the SUBSAFE program,
the Submarine Forces Quality Assurance Program,
the tolerances for submarines are incredibly tight with no margin for error.
As a result, the people working on these boats must be the best of the best,
which doesn't come quickly or cheaply.
In addition to the intense education and training requirements needed to do the job,
eligible candidates also need to possess top-secret clearances.
These high-level clearances are no joke,
and even if someone is otherwise qualified to do the job,
things like a criminal history, financial trouble,
or relationships with foreign nationals can prevent people from working on submarines.
So this takes an already small subset of people and makes it even smaller.
Limited capacity is another issue that prevents General Dynamics from just cranking out boats.
To control security and quality assurance,
the vast majority of boats are built at General Dynamics' Groton, Connecticut shipyard.
With completing programs that include cranking out new Virginia-class submarines
while also building the new Columbia-class submarines and the Ohio-class replacement,
General Dynamics has to contend with money issues
and infighting within Capitol Hill and the Navy over what the priority project is.
But what has been the stopgap so far?
The Virginia-class submarines with Virginia payload modules were intended to fill the gap,
but delays due to the pandemic and industrial challenges have hampered their production.
The Virginia payload module is essentially an addition of extra VLS cells
by adding an 84-foot section on newer Block V Virginia-class submarines.
With current capacity of 12 Tomahawk missiles,
the payload module will add 28 Tomahawks to the boat,
giving the Block V Virginia-class boats a capacity of 40 available Tomahawks.
However, those Block V boats are having issues with rollout.
Recent Government Accountability Office reports
indicate that the Columbia-class program is already several years behind schedule.
This is because due to previously mentioned issues with finding qualified workers with the right clearances,
General Dynamics is understaffed by about 25% to meet current work projections
of two Virginia-class subs and one Columbia-class sub per year for the next decade.
In addition to chronic manning shortfalls,
the GAO report also identified supply chain issues.
During the COVID pandemic's peak, critical parts availability was interrupted.
This delay caused work stoppages to the Columbia program.
Because of these stoppages, General Dynamics shifted workers from the Block V program
to the Columbia program at the behest of Navy leadership.
This, in turn, created manning shortfalls in the Block V program, bringing it nearly to a standstill.
Along with not having enough people and persistent supply chain issues,
some of the new software used in developing the Columbia-class submarine has been very challenging.
The inability to find workarounds for this issue has caused further delays in the Columbia program.
However, these delays aren't just causing technical problems.
They have broader strategic consequences.
How does this problem affect the U.S. Navy's global strategic positioning, one might ask?
When considering the loss of the Ohio-class SSGNs, the Navy is first and foremost losing options.
Sending a bunch of ships and aircraft to a contested area is a clear sign of military movement that could tip off the enemy.
Sending an SSGN is much more covert and can help the U.S. maintain the element of surprise during an operation.
However, the Block V replacement only has an extra 22 Tomahawks.
To maintain the same level of firepower, the Navy would need 22 new boats to match the Tomahawks lost due to the SSGN retirement.
In addition to this, losing the SSGNs limits special operators on their insertion methods.
While the highly classified USS Jimmy Carter is rumored to have the capability to launch SEALs too,
only the SSGNs are known to have this capability publicly.
With the loss of the SSGNs, the Navy has started working on a replacement system called the Dry Deck Shelter Next program this year.
It would be on board the Virginia-class submarines.
However, this program has yet to roll out, yet has no known date to do so.
Overall, the projected loss of nearly half of the vertical launch capacity will significantly compromise the Navy's ability to project power and respond to global threats.
Considering these challenges, what are the potential solutions and future directions for the Navy?
The Navy currently has a few ideas on how to mitigate this gap.
Navy leadership has directed General Dynamics to dramatically increase its recruitment efforts over the coming years,
growing personnel levels by 25%.
Additionally, Navy leadership has been briefing Congress on the need for more funding for both the Columbia-class boats and the Block V Virginia-class boats.
This is because current approved funding levels were only allocated for the target level budget,
rather than the absolute maximum sealing budget the projects could go to.
Securing additional funding would prevent work stoppages.
It could also incentivize more competition in the supply chain for these boats to prevent sole-source vendors from price gouging or suffering from unplanned events like COVID-19 again.
But while these issues are being worked out, the Navy is prioritizing the production of Block V Virginia-class submarines
and exploring the possibility of dedicated SSGN hulls based on the Columbia-class submarines.
However, these solutions will take time, and time may not be on America's side on this one.
Bye for now.
