068: The Second Punic War - Over the Mountains

Hi, you're listening to the Hellenistic Age Podcast, Episode 68, The Second Punic War Over the Mountains. After the destruction of Saguntum in 219 and the subsequent declaration of war in early 218, the Roman Republic and Carthage were once again locked in a titanic struggle for control over the central Mediterranean. Given the conduct of the last conflict, the Roman commanders assumed that they were going to have to oversee military expeditions in Carthage's Iberian and North African territories. A war theater in both Europe and Africa is certainly what they got, but they never could have imagined what they would have to also deal with was what they feared the most, a full-scale invasion of Italy, audaciously planned and executed by Carthage's leading general Hannibal Barca that would result in fighting across the peninsula for 15 years. Bringing the war to Roman soil was partially intended as a humiliation, a revenge for the campaigns of Marcus Attilius Regulus in North Africa during the years 256-255, but Hannibal knew that to crush his enemy he needed to avoid grappling with the many heads of the Roman Hydra and focus instead on driving a sword through its heart. The number of men that fought and died in the First Punic War was quite staggering, and the Second Punic War was no different in this regard. Though they no longer had access to the men or foodstuffs of Sicily, the Barca's expansion into Iberia enabled the Carthaginians to reap a great amount of silver from Spanish mines to pay for mercenaries and could capitalize on an enormous body of Celt-Iberian warriors, fierce fighters that were skilled in mountainous warfare and equipped in heavier armor. Ironically, many of these troops would become nearly indistinguishable from the Roman and Italian ones, for they would frequently strip the equipment from the bodies of those they killed in battle to replace their own. Hannibal would also continue to levy troops from the various Libyan peoples near Carthage, and alliances struck with the local Numidian tribes, akin to Hamilcar Barca's deal with the Numidian prince Naravas, guaranteed the service of some of the finest cavalrymen in North Africa, which would be continued with the king of the Massilii tribe, Gala, and the prince Massinissa. This relationship would be directly targeted by the Romans as the conflict raged on, and, once broken, it would prove to be a key factor to ending the war. Elephants, perhaps the single most iconic feature of the Carthaginian army, were again deployed in considerable numbers. A few short years prior to Hannibal taking command, the Carthaginian army in Spain was said to be roughly 60,000 infantry, 8,000 horsemen, and 200 elephants. Hannibal's skilled leadership and subsequent campaigning after the murder of his predecessor, Hasdrubal, allowed him to hone it further into a formidable fighting machine, and on the eve of the crossing of the Ebro, it numbered approximately 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. These men would wield arms in a variety of styles, some employing the use of spear phalanxes and others acting as swordsmen. The Numidians were masters of skirmishing tactics, peppering their foes and galloping circles around them before making a sudden retreat, but were also capable of charging against infantry formations and besting Roman heavy cavalry. Despite the large number of men acquired from its Spanish and African allies and vassals, Hannibal was still faced with the logistical nightmare that was Roman manpower. Thanks to their ingenious system of alliance building, Rome was able to supplement its already large citizen body by levying troops from an enormous pool of potential recruits from the other Latin and Italian tribes, often termed Socii. According to Polybius, the Roman army in the year 225 was able to draw from upwards of 730,000 infantry and 72,700 cavalry. Realistically, this number should be reduced by quite a bit, and the Romans could never have supplied or used it to its full capacity, but as Pyrrhus of Epirus unfortunately discovered during his invasion of Italy in the 270s, the Romans could suffer severe losses in battle that would bring larger kingdoms and empires to heel, and yet keep on fighting. With their delegation of command split between two consuls, they were able to also fight on multiple fronts at the same time without much issue. To compensate, Hannibal was hoping to exploit the resentment of the other Italian communities chafing underneath the dominion of Rome, so the Socii would either stop providing troops or outright rebel. Those like the Samnites were still fiercely independent in spirit, and the descendants of Greek settlers in places like Tarentum already showed discontent with their Italian and Latin neighbors during the Pyrrhic War. Syracuse appeared to be firmly in the Roman sphere of influence with the loyal king Hero II sitting on the throne, but the man was now in his early 90s, and rumors suggest that the crown prince Hieronymus was more sympathetic to the Punic cause. Others could potentially become valuable allies for supplying both troops and foodstuffs for Hannibal's army, so long as they sufficiently demonstrated that the Romans could be beaten in battle severely enough to warrant their defection. Doing so on Roman turf was thus even more essential. The plan to invade Italy was audacious, but getting there would prove to be a challenge in of itself. While the Carthaginians were once the uncontested masters of the sea, sailing was no longer much of an option, as the Roman navy had dominated the central and western Mediterranean seas since the 240s. The only other option was to travel overland through the Alps, the large mountain range that acted as a barrier between Italy and much of central and western Europe. Besides the environmental challenges that such an undertaking would require them to overcome, Hannibal needed to pass through largely hostile Celtiberian territory that had not submitted to the Carthaginian control. Beyond these peoples were the many Celtic tribes that lived throughout southern Gaul, the Alps, and the Po Valley in northern Italy. The Roman senate had hoped that the Celts would be able to delay the movement of the Carthaginian army, but the Roman envoy sent to Gaul to try and secure the friendship of the chieftains there were met with a chilly response. Reports of the Roman campaigns against the tribes of the Po Valley and their subjugation had made their way northwest, and the Gallic council dryly noted that while the Carthaginians did no harm to warrant them interfering with any Punic expeditions, the Romans by contrast were causing problems for their cousins on the other side of the Alps. Hannibal was almost certainly aware of the resentment of these communities, and was likely banking on their aid. Indeed, this came to pass in Italy, for when word of Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro reached the tribes of the Boii and Insubres in the Po Valley, they immediately launched a rebellion, resentful of their recent defeats and for the newly settled Roman colonies at Cremona and Placentia. Like with the Socii, the Varchic commander was hoping they would be able to help his cause, or at least try not to create too many issues for him while they passed through southern Gaul and the Alps. If they did, he would show no mercy, and was fully prepared to exploit them when he could. After returning to Carthago Nova to winter for the rest of 219, Hannibal summoned his forces from across Carthage's extensive holdings. To ensure that his levy troops did not repeat the events of the mercenary war, he assigned many African units in Spain under his brother Hasdrubal, and his Spanish troops near Carthage, lest they try to rebel by using their local connections. In the spring of 218, Hannibal crossed the Ebro river, his army numbering almost a hundred thousand strong. The trek to the Pyrenees was particularly harsh, as the Carthaginian army needed to contend with the various Celtiberian tribes that lived north of the Ebro. While it did not delay their progress too much, the fighting was vicious and cost the lives of many. Hannibal had to siphon more of his troops to his officer Hanno, who would stay behind to try and handle any resistance from the local tribes or a possible Roman counterattack. But by the time they made their pass over the mountains and reached the interior of Gaul, the Punic army was down to about 50,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants. It wasn't as large as it once was, but it was still quite sizable, and even more battle-hardened and experienced after months of dealing with resistance from the local Iberians. By late summer, Hannibal's army now found itself at the river Rhone, near the border of modern-day France and Switzerland. Nature once again proved to be a formidable adversary, as Hannibal was now faced with the problem of crossing the Rhone, both from a logistical and a tactical standpoint. Forwarding the river was not an option given its depth, and the number of troops he had with him necessitated the use of many watercraft to navigate across, which would take a fair amount of time and leave them vulnerable to the depredation of any hostile foe. To top it all off, the elephants were proving to be an issue due to their weight and skittishness that made them resistant to either walk on artificial platforms or to swim their way over. More concerning, though, was the hostile Gallic tribe of the Volcai, who had gathered on the other side of the riverbank and looked to prey upon the Carthaginian troops as they tried to make their way across. But in a display of brilliance, Hannibal was able to trick the Volcai by sending a detachment upriver to wade through the opposite bank in the cover of darkness using inflated animal skins. From there, they would surprise the Celts in a sneak attack, and the rest of the army was able to traverse the Rhone unmolested. To solve the elephant's fear of crossing artificial bridges, Hannibal ordered that the platforms be covered with earth and graves to simulate terra firma. In the end, this was only partially effective since the bridge eventually gave way, and the elephants were able to swim the shore from there, though their mahouts were not so lucky and drowned in the process. Hannibal's march over the Alps has been considered one of the great military operations of world history in terms of hardship and daring. Due to thousands of years of rockslides, avalanches, and the general disparity of time, the exact itinerary that Hannibal took remains a mystery, and ultimately is not relevant for our discussion. Polybius speaks of how he visited several of the sites where the army apparently crossed, and he criticizes other historians who suggest that Hannibal was not well informed of the trials and tribulations that lay ahead. As he noted, Celtic armies repeatedly traveled over the Alps to invade or migrate to Italy over the centuries, so it was not a feat of near impossibility. The Barca general was not stupid, and had many agents spread across Europe that gathered information on the routes that he would be needing to travel through. That being said, the size and makeup of Hannibal's army, men primarily from the hotter climates in southern coast of Spain and the North African countryside, along with elephants, complicated the already challenging situation. By the time they began to make their way into the heights of the Alps, it was late September or early October of 218. Hannibal had probably hoped to avoid the snowfall in the most brutal winter conditions, but it appears that the weather turned against him early. Snow had already fallen in the higher peaks, and continued to pile up with fresh powder settling upon the packed snow and ice, creating terrain that provided no traction whatsoever. Man and beast alike were unable to keep their balance, with many slipping off the path and plummeting to their deaths. Those that managed to stay on solid ground were faced with the unpleasant prospects of freezing cold and potential starvation, as supplies ran out. To top it all off, the Barca army also had to contend with attacks by Gallic tribes that lived in the past. Just before he embarked on his ascent, Hannibal was able to intervene in a political dispute among one of the factions of the Alabrogues tribe, and in return he received a great number of supplies and guides for his journey. But while those living on the plains at the foot of the Alps were more amenable to his cause, those residing within the heights of the mountains were not so pleased to see trespassers approach upon their territory. Raiders from these Alpine communities set upon the convoy on several occasions, killing many of the army's stragglers and pack animals before being driven off by Hannibal's rallying of his men. After what seemed like an eternity since making their first steps into the Alps, the Po Valley was now in the sight of the beleaguered troops. It had taken a little over two weeks to make the crossing, a heraclian effort that caused great attrition among Hannibal's men. Of the 59,000 that had crossed the Rhone, only 20,000 infantry and 6,000 horse remained on the Italian side of the Alps. To bolster his now diminished forces, he was going to have to capitalize on recruiting the Celts of the Po Valley, in which he was successful. Resentful tribes like the Insubres soon joined the war effort, but the hostile Taurini needed to be taught a lesson about who really was to be feared. Thanks to his persuasive arguments, the army had gained additional bodies to supplement the thin ranks. But the rest of the army was exhausted, their clothes threadbare and equipment in bad shape. Their exposure to the Alpine weather and lack of food were said to have left them in a Yet through thick and thin, they would continue to fight for their general. Hannibal Barcau displayed the qualities that made him one of the finest generals in history. While enduring the same hardships as his men, he carefully made sure to give them a chance for rest and resupply, visiting them and keeping their spirits up. It speaks volumes that throughout the entire war, Hannibal never once had a mutiny occur under his command. The same could not be Given the multi-ethnic character of his army, Hannibal also had to work hard to ensure that his orders were effectively transmitted to all the contingents. Gallic, Phoenician, Iberian, Numidian, Libyan, and later Italic speakers. This adds an extra layer of impressiveness to his later battles, for some of the maneuvers performed required a high degree of precision and coordination for them to be pulled off. This does not mean that he neglected to protect himself in case the men surveying under him got any funny ideas. According to Appian and Polybius, Hannibal was later said to have repeatedly changed wigs and disguises in order to deceive the unwary Gauls, partially to impress them, but more likely to avoid being targeted by an assassin among the ranks. An interesting observation, but Hannibal was no stranger to using acts of brutal encouragement when he felt the situation demanded it. One notorious incident saw him take captured Celtic prisoners and have them fight to the death, with the winners being given gifts of treasure and armor as a reward. The message was clear, fight or die. With a Punic army finally on Italian soil, it was only a matter of time before the Romans would emerge to defend their lands like an angry nest of wasps. Exactly what Hannibal was looking for. Months of Hannibal's march to Italy, the Romans had been busy preparing for war. The Senate was under the impression that they would need to immediately deploy armies onto multiple fronts, which ultimately was the correct assessment. Buglius Cornelius Scipio was the man to handle the earliest conduct of the war and served as the consul of 218 alongside Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who was sent south to deal with the Carthaginians in North Africa. A member of the prestigious Scipiones family, his father and uncle had fought the Carthaginians in Sicily, and now both he and his brother Gnaeus had taken on the mantle of command against the Barcid army. Accompanying Puglius was his 16 year old son, also named Puglius Cornelius Scipio, but better known as the future Scipio Africanus. Though the Senators had firmly understood that Hannibal had been planning for war for quite some time, they were shocked by the speed at which the Carthaginian army had passed through Iberia and into Gaul. They were even more disturbed upon realizing that Hannibal had intended to invade Italy all along, and scrambled to prevent a repeat of the Pyrrhic War. En route to the friendly city of Massalia, Puglius learned of Hannibal's location and ordered that his brother head to Iberia, while he himself would try to intercept the Barcid leader and his army. At one point, the scouting parties of both the Carthaginians and the Romans had fought near the Rhône, but instead of meeting his foes head on, Hannibal chose to conserve his strength and make an exit towards the Alps as planned. With the Carthaginian army gone, Puglius made a speedy return back to Italy to set up shop just north of Etruria with the utmost haste. Upon learning that the consul had crossed the Po river and was building a bridge across the river Ticinius, the modern Ticino near Milan, Hannibal ordered his now rusted army to march out and meet their properly for the first time. Both generals sent cavalry to scout the area, with Puglius riding out with his men. Along the riverbank, the riders met and violently clashed with one another. To compensate for his limited number of horsemen, the consul brought along thousands of Velites to try and harass the Numidians, but they were set upon too quickly to discharge their javelins. Their superior mobility allowed the North African cavalrymen to flank their opponent, and the Roman force was soon driven off the battlefield. Puglius himself was nearly killed after suffering a serious wound he took in the fighting, but the bravery of the young Scipio allowed him to rescue his father from the fray, and all remaining Roman forces made a retreat back across the river to the colony of Placentia. Many of the Celts that were allied with the Romans saw the defeat at Ticinius as a harbinger of what was to come, over two thousand defected to the camp of Hannibal, bringing with them many Roman heads as proof of their loyalty. The city of Clasidia also defected in the process, and Hannibal provided clemency towards any non-Roman prisoners he took. Many of the garrison members would have been Latin allies rather than strictly Roman, an excellent opportunity to provide a display of benevolence that would travel throughout the Italian cities and foster a sense of sympathy to his cause. But assistance soon came in the form of the other consul Sempronius, who had made a beeline from Sicily when news of Hannibal's invasion of Italy made its way to his tent. After linking up with Puglius, who was still recovering from his wounds, Sempronius was able to lead his forces against a small contingent of Hannibals, and emerged victorious. This was a boost in the morale for both the consul and his men, and the Romans were soon itching for a decisive confrontation. In late December, the two armies would come to blows near the river Trebia, an offshoot of the Po that snakes through the Ligurian Apennine Mountains. This would be the first great battle of the Hannibalic War, as Hannibal's military genius would be on full display, and the ancient writers succinctly break down the various factors that the Carthaginian commander took into consideration when formulating his plans. Based on his observation of the previous skirmish and likely informants planted in the Roman camp, he recognized the overzealous nature of Sempronius, who argued with the more cautious Puglius about the need to take an aggressive posture against the seemingly vulnerable Punic forces. Given that Polybius' patrons were the Scipiones, it may be possible that Sempronius unfairly received the lion's share of blame to protect Puglius' reputation, but it's not implausible to believe that the more experienced Roman general was aware of Hannibal's skill after nearly being killed at the Ticinus. This eagerness would contribute to the outcome of the battle, for Hannibal decided to remain on the defensive, which in turn compelled Sempronius to order his legionaries to make a crossing of the Trebia at dawn. While Carthaginian troops carefully prepared their equipment and enjoyed breakfast during the morning prior to the battle, the Roman troops had not eaten, and would already be exhausted after fording a chest-high river at the peak of winter, leaving each soldier's clothes sopping wet and chilling them to the bone. Those who have experienced the effects of being damp in the icy wind understands how debilitating this could be on one's endurance and morale, never mind the danger of hypothermia. Part of the reason why Hannibal was also looking to force a battle was to best utilize the fervor of his newfound Celtic allies while it was at its greatest, conveniently positioning them at the most dangerous spots on the battle line to reserve his African and Iberian manpower, which were far more experienced than any of the Roman recruits. Currently, Hannibal had about 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and the combined consular armies approached 36,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. To stack the odds in his favor even further, the wily commander set a trap. 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry would be placed in the open plains near the western bank of the Trebia, where the Romans would least expect an ambush, covering themselves with vegetation to obscure their presence. In the dark hours of that December morning, Numidian horsemen were sent out to harass and aggravate the Roman camp, but fall back if any serious assembly rose up. Sempronius, already itching for battle, took the bait and committed all of his cavalry and skirmishers to chase after attackers. Amidst the blowing snow and sleet, the Romans chose to wade through the frigid waters of Trebia in reckless abandon, made even more difficult due to rainfall in the mountains that caused the river to become swollen with runoff. The rest of the army soon followed suit, eventually making their way to the other shore, exhausted and soaked. Meanwhile, Hannibal's men calmly deployed in a proper formation in a single line while being screened by light infantry. The Celtic allies held the middle, the African and Iberian troops gradually fanned outwards, and about 5,000 horsemen were posted on each flank, with the remaining elephants placed ahead. By contrast, the Roman legionaries occupied their traditional place in the center, with the succii adjacent to them. As each side drew closer, the skirmishing units like slingers and javelin men began to shower each other with missiles, but the fresher Carthaginians soon gained the upper hand. Infantry line met infantry line, the Carthaginian pikemen whittling away at the Italian allies, and the Roman legionaries and Celtic warriors attacked each other with savage fury. Elephants, not seen since the war in Sicily, terrified and trampled the Italian soldiers. Already numerically inferior, the Roman heavy cavalry had tired themselves out in the pursuit of Numidians, and so some pronies had recalled them to the line to take their positions. The only problem was that the Numidians soon descended upon the Romans in full force, showering them in javelins and crushing them into the infantry with a vice-like precision. The trap was now sprung, and both the hidden Punic horsemen and foot soldiers alike set upon the unsuspecting Roman rear. Those in the back were now pinned down and cut to pieces, but the legionaries in the center managed to break through the Celtic line and flee the carnage. At most, 10,000 survivors were able to escape to a nearby settlement, while the rest were either killed or enslaved. Hannibal's losses were relatively few, with the Celts suffering the bulk of casualties, and only one elephant was left alive at the end of the engagement. Sempronis was said to have tried to downplay his defeat while explaining his actions to the Senate fathers, but the death of so many inflicted by Carthaginian arms with relative ease was shocking to the Republic, and an initiative was put in order to gather more troops, fortify cities, and construct a larger fleet. While Hannibal was to winter in the Po Valley, he was unable to linger over his successes for long. The Celts, having taken the brunt of losses at the Trebia, were also growing frustrated that the war had been raging in their lands since the Carthaginians arrived. As soon as the weather began to clear up, Hannibal looked to march further into Roman territory. Rather than taking the most expected route into Etruria, passing near the Apennine Mountains along the coastline where the Romans had positioned armies on either side, the Barca general once again looked to traverse treacherous ground to gain the element of surprise. The route he chose was through the marshlands of the Arno River, a more direct way through the mountains which, after the thaw and snowmelt in the spring, more resembled soot than solid earth. The African and Iberian troops were ordered to go through first, with Hannibal riding atop his last elephant, a bull named Suros, Syrian. Unfortunately, the Celts that followed had to track through the mud that had already been kicked up by those that went before, with quagmires so thick that the hooves of their horses were pulled up in the process, and no camps were able to be set up to allow them to sleep. It cannot be said, though, that there was no form of self-sacrifice for Hannibal. During this four-day journey, he contracted an acute inflammation of his eye that was unable to be treated, which eventually progressed to the point where he suffered a permanent loss of vision. Though tired after facing yet another environmental hurdle, they had reached Etruria in the mid to late spring of 217, to the dismay of the Roman commanders that had awaited them. The elected consul of that year was Gaius Flaminius, a novus homo, a new man that was a brave if controversial figure who distinguished himself in battle against the Celts of the Po Valley during his first consulship in 223. Polybius derided him as a political firebrand and demagogue bent on trying to make a name for himself with laws to limit senatorial power and enfranchise the plebs, while Livy dramatically recounts the ominous portents that were said to have occurred both before and after he took office, such as a sacrificial animal leaping from the altar and spraying blood on the observers after Flaminius delivered the killing strike. The mistrust between senate and consul and the need to appeal to his constituency may have played a role in Flaminius' later conduct, but after taking office he led his army to Eretium, modern Arezzo, to try and intercept the Carthaginians. Unfortunately, they soon received the news that Hannibal had already slipped past them and was attacking settlements in the area. Etruria was a wealthy and productive region. Hannibal could raise the countryside for supplies and allowed the Celts to run wild to acquire the loot and captives he promised them. This in turn aggravated the Roman soldiery, many of whom may have had farms or families in the area, and would look to Flaminius for the opportunity to put this wanton destruction and humiliation to an end. Of course, Hannibal was banking on this to be the case and decided to escalate these concerns by camping just out of range of Flaminius' army, infuriating the already anxious troops. By early June, the consul had decided that he could wait no longer and pursued the Carthaginians to the northern coast of Lake Trasimene, the modern Trasimeno, situated on the border of Umbria and Tuscany. Hannibal's army had situated itself on the high ground of the hills just north of the lake as the Romans occupied the lower portion, unable to chase too closely lest they be attacked by Numidian cavalry. The consul was only in command of about 30,000 men and was greatly outnumbered by the Punic force of 50,000, led by a general who mopped up the last Roman army that was even larger than his own. Flaminius' fellow officers were said to have urged caution against trying to meet Hannibal at such a disadvantageous position, for his co-consul, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, was not terribly far away and had already dispatched reinforcements to aid in the effort. Little good it did to dissuade him, as he was determined to strike at dawn. Once again, this played right into Hannibal's hands. The Barca commander exploited the local terrain by using the cover of darkness to move many of his lighter troops behind and around the hills to guard the eastern path that wrapped around the lake before gradually opening up into a plain. As the path ran west to east, the cavalry on the Carthaginian right would be followed by the Celtic warriors, skirmishing units, and the heavier Spanish and African infantry on the left closest to the Punic camp. This was the only way through the region, and the Romans would be hard-pressed to make any progress uphill, while the Carthaginian army was able to reign death from above. On the morning of June 21st, the summer solstice, a confluence of warm and cool air resulted in a deep fog that blanketed much of the lakefront, obscuring Hannibal's hidden units and leaving the Romans unaware of the movement of their foes. Bafflingly, Flaminius chose not to send any scouts forward up the pass to pierce the veil, but instead chose to push forward regardless. When the Romans began to spread out into the plain, a resounding din immediately preceded the thundering footsteps of the opposing army. The Punic cavalry had closed off the way the Roman army came through, and with Carthaginian camp blocking the other exit, the consul and his men found themselves hemmed in, their heels lapped by the waves of the lake behind them. Flaminius made the same tactical misstep less than six years before when he commanded the battle against the Esubres at the Po River, but Hannibal possessed the know-how to capitalize upon it. The fighting went on for about three hours. Some of the Romans tried to swim away in vain, but either drowned or were killed by missiles and blows. Others put up a valiant resistance, and about 6,000 legionaries were able to break through the Carthaginian line and escape the battlefield, though they too were set upon and wiped out in the aftermath. Flaminius, either wandering about in a state of dejection or bravely trying to rally his men, was recognized by an Esubrian chieftain named Deucarius, who galloped towards the consul and speared him through the middle, avenging the defeat that was inflicted upon his tribe less than a decade before. By this point, the Romans had completely collapsed, and the bodies of many littered the battlefield or floated in the tide of the lake like some sort of grotesque lily pads. The Battle of Lake Trasimene left at least 15,000 Romans dead and many captured, with only about 2,000 losses for the Carthaginians. Even worse, the reinforcement of 4,000 sent by the co-consul was intercepted by one of Hannibal's commanders, with half being killed and the other half enslaved. News of the loss sent shockwaves throughout Rome. Mobs crowded the forum, demanding to hear what had happened and the Senate's plan for action. The women camped at the city gates for days and frantically accosted any stragglers and new arrivals for possible news about the fates of their sons and husbands. Hannibal was drawing ever closer to Latium by the day, and the Senate fathers debated endlessly about what could be done to try and halt his progress. With less than two years into his war against the Romans, the son of Hamilcar had demonstrated that he was more than a match for his father's ferocity and dedication to the art of war. Yet, Hannibal still had even greater victories awaiting him, and there appeared to be few who would be able to stand up to his might.