Public Law - Rule of Law Part 2

General Principles of Law
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17 Video Views·Oct 28, 2024
Welcome back to the second segment in this Rule of Law, Public Law, Law session.
Now before the break I gave you a range of ways to look at rule of law and we
considered it or we looked at it from a philosophical, we looked at it from a
political standpoint and immediately before the break I said I'm going to
touch on where most law students tend to start their work and that's to do
with Albert van Dijs' Rule of Laws exposition. Now to be fair the general
approach when you're coming to a public law exam and certainly when you're
looking at rule of law is that you tend to get a question that sometimes says or
by and large most of them tend to say you know is Dijs' rule of law or the
exposition of Dijs' rule of law still relevant and so of course you need to
know what is Dijs' explanation of the rule of law. Well his explanation can be
summed up with three broad principles and frankly this is the most widely
accepted and debated view of the concept as it relates to the English
Constitution. He says the rule of law provides for one that there can be no
punishment unless there's a breach of law, two despite your rank or status all
are equal under the law and three rights and privileges are best protected by the
common law rather than a Bill of Rights or in statute. Now by and large you will
we will go through these three but the fact of the matter is you tend to find
that the first two are still of immense relevance today but the third one is not
as relevant and may actually be confined in time to the period when Dijs' was
writing. So let's start with no punishment without law. Well the first
principle mainly looks at the prohibition against arbitrary and
retrospective legislation. What it looks at is that it is an inherently unjust
state of affairs for a citizen to be punished for an act that was legal at
the time he committed the act. Now if the law said it was legal then you not ought
to be told later that it no longer is and so you will now be punished and
although it wasn't a crime when you did it now it is and you are being punished
for that. Well that of course clearly shows or arguably shows that that is a
contravention in respect of rights and as such a contravention of the rule of
law. Now even in Dijs' days at the height of the sort of Victorian laissez-faire
approach and before Parliament became the dominant lawmaker because it wasn't
what we had was you see this development of the common law over time
what we see is Dijs' insistence on a lack of arbitrariness and the absence of
wide discretion which he was expounded did seem somewhat unrealistic. Now you
can see the basis for it but like with anything you're going to of course have
some criticism because the fact is that he was looking at it from the standpoint
of well you should not if you are the lawmaker make something illegal and then
hold me to that later illegal standard when the fact is when I did it it was
not illegal. Now Sir Ivor Jennings actually critiqued that approach taken
by Dijs' and he said well that doesn't really stand up to water does it because
any court can punish me for contempt of court by imprisoning me for an indefinite
period and if I am convicted of manslaughter I may be released at once
or imprisoned for life. If I'm an alien my naturalization is entirely within the
discretion of the Home Secretary. If the Queen declares war against the rest of
the world I am prohibited from having dealings abroad and what we see even
with this point is that go back to contract law when you look at some of
the cases in contract law for example we see situations where particularly in
frustration where someone has made an agreement with a company in a foreign
country subsequently there is a war with that country and we find that there
is an issue with it. The point is Jennings is looking at it from the point
of view of saying that Dijs' approach is somewhat simplistic. He says if the
country is in danger my property can be taken also I might not even get
compensation if a public health authority wants to flood my land in
order to build a reservoir it can take it from me compulsorily. I can be
compelled to leave my work for a month or more in order to serve on a jury. All
these powers and a lot more he said were possessed by public authorities at the
time when Dijs was writing which was in 1885 so he's saying it is somewhat
simplistic to look at that first point and consider well you know it really
should not be that you are subjected to certain types of laws if that was not
the case when you started along the continuum. So back in 1885 we do see that
even at that time Dijs' approach may have been somewhat unrealistic. So
looking at it Jennings said well all of these things could happen and can still
happen as the case may be. Now Jennings going to say that when you look at the
lawmaking process although the three component parts of Parliament, Commons,
Lords, the Crown must agree to legislation this does not mean that
arbitrary laws cannot be passed. Now even if we go back to situations where laws
have been passed the one I'm thinking of is picking on British Railways. Now
I'm not saying it's arbitrary but the point that Mr. Picking was making was
that it had not followed the procedure. Couldn't that be bordering for example
an arbitrariness because again at the time when Mr. Picking started on his
foray of buying the next-door land it was not the law then that he could not
get the land when the railway lines became disused. So Jennings points out to
various situations and not least the Defense of the Realm Act 1914 which he
said this act conferred wide-ranging powers on the executive to deal with the
war situation. Now the bills passed the Commons in one sitting and it sped
through the Lords as well. To that of course you can see the Official Secrets
Act of 1911, anti-terrorism legislation in 2001 and a lot of these legislation
particularly in light of terrorism being in contemporary society a matter of some
concern we do see legislation moving arguably at the speed of light in going
to Parliament. Might it not be that there is some comment to suggest that there
may be a degree of arbitrariness. There's also of course the problem of
retrospectivity which Dicey condemned to make a person liable for an offense
which at the time the act was committed was not an offense he says contravenes
the rule of law. Well that's why Dicey's exposition of that first point is still
relevant because when we look at the European Convention on Human Rights in
article 7 and remember that the Human Rights Act of 1998 which came into force
in 2000 does actually bring over most of the articles including article 7 it
doesn't bring over all of them but it's and we will discuss that in a later
lecture but it certainly brings over article 7 and article 7 prohibits the
retrospective imposition of criminal liability. It is also a presumption of
statutory interpretation that Parliament does not intend to legislate with
retrospective effect and of course a case in support of this is Waddington
and Meyer. Waddington and Meyer is a 1974 case and it supports the concept of the
rule of law and was a case concerned with the question of whether the
Immigration Act 1971 was retrospective and whether it was contrary to article
7 of the ECHR. The act was in effect retrospective but the House of Lords in
their ruling said it was not. Now broadly speaking the act at the time seemed to
have been a somewhat racist approach being taken against Commonwealth
citizens in order to control immigration into the UK and the idea was that the
way it was presented it appeared retrospective but and certainly it's
it said as much but the courts were of the view that this certainly couldn't
stand. Now retrospectivity was also considered in respect of the case of
Burma oil and Lord Advocate. Now the House of Lords denied the application of
law which retrospective effect by using article 7 of the ECHR when we look at
the Waddington and Meyer case but consider the Burma oil case. Well Burma
oil and Lord Advocates we see here that it has a profound effect on the rule of
law because Parliament subsequently passed the War Damages Act in 1965 based
on the actual case and by giving the War Damages Act retrospective effect it
effectively overturned the House of Lords decision in the case and of course
there is an argument that it contravenes the rule of law but this is where you
get the rule of law having a conflict with parliamentary sovereignty because
by virtue of parliamentary sovereignty albeit that clearly the rule of law
appeared to be contravened what took precedence was parliamentary sovereignty
over the rule of law. So in Burma oil and Lord Advocate we see that the courts
certainly was of the view that it was unfair and unconscionable for these
persons to have lost their property at the hands of the government and that
the government ought to for its part compensate them but what we see is the
legislature, Parliament saying that is not the case and that will not stand
which of course bears out that Parliament is supreme and even as we
consider the rule of law does it take second place. Now Dice's second principle
is that all are equal under the law. Now this is one of the more misunderstood
points in respect of Dice's exposition of the rule of law. It is something that
needs careful consideration and in order to start that careful consideration we
will of course take a short break and as soon as we return we start off by
looking at that second point in relation to Dice's exposition of the rule of law.
