Au Soudan, l'épicentre du conflit est en ce moment à El-Fasher, la capitale du Nord-Darfour, où la bataille fait rage depuis une semaine. « Des centaines de milliers de civils sont coincés dans la ville assiégée et leurs vies sont en danger », affirme la sous-secrétaire générale de l'ONU pour l'Afrique, Martha Pobee. Pourquoi les rebelles du général Hemedti veulent absolument s'emparer de cette ville ? Et pourquoi les Américains n'arrivent pas à calmer le jeu ? Peut-être à cause de la présidentielle à venir aux États-Unis, estime Roland Marchal, chercheur à Sciences Po Paris. Il répond aux questions de Christophe Boisbouvier. #soudan#darfour#el-fasher 🔔 Abonnez-vous à notre chaîne : https://rfi.my/YTfr 🔴 Suivez RFI en DIRECT vidéo ici : https://rfi.my/YTliveFR 🌍 L’actualité du monde et de l’Afrique en direct : https://www.rfi.fr/fr/ Rejoignez-nous sur Facebook : https://rfi.my/FBfr Suivez-nous sur X (Twitter) : https://rfi.my/Xfr Découvrez l’actu en images sur Instagram : https://rfi.my/IGfr Recevez les dernières infos sur Telegram : https://rfi.my/TGfr
Roland Marshall, good morning.
Good morning.
Why this resumption of violent fighting in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur?
In a way, it has become an absence of fixation and a victory of the forces of General Emmeti
would make it absolutely essential for any negotiation on the political future of the country
and not just on the military outcome of the conflict.
El Fasher is the only large city in Darfur that is currently out of control of General Emmeti?
Absolutely. It is the historical capital of Darfur before it was divided after the conflict of the 2000s.
It is also an extremely important area since it is there that are gathered in displaced camps
and in the cities and villages surrounding El Fasher,
the essence of the Agawa ethnicity that provides the fighters for the Darfurian groups allied to General Borhan.
So a victory of the rapid support forces would be not only a defeat of Borhan
but also a defeat of these groups there,
which would obviously have a very strong impact on the governance of Darfur
but also on the relations of political forces at the scale of the country.
And precisely in the face of General Emmeti, there is a very experienced Agawa war leader with Miniminawi.
Yes, strong, endowed with support and support also Libyan and not just on the side of the Sudanese army.
The balance of power between the two and we see it is difficult
since the clashes started almost four months ago now
and despite the international pressures, they continue.
So we feel that what is at stake for Emmeti is to mark a supremacy on Darfur,
which would also allow him to advance militarily in the Asian provinces of Kordofan
and perhaps in Khartoum where he has difficulties.
And from the point of view of the rebel groups Agawa who signed a peace agreement in October 2020,
it is a way of showing that they continue to exist politically
and that obviously they will have their share in any political settlement
that could take place in the near future.
And from there, their military defeat would mean that these groups no longer have anything to offer
on either side of the protagonists of the Sudanese conflict.
But Miniminawi has not yet lost.
He has not lost, there are the forces of the Movement for Justice and Equality of Jibril Ibrahim
who are also there, some other groups as well.
This represents a very real military potential
which today is headed by rapid support forces.
Despite the embargo decreed by the UN on weapons intended for Darfur,
haven't the two belligerents just received new weapons?
Yes, several reports have come out,
that of Amnesty International, that of Human Rights Watch,
plus of course the work of the Sudanese journalists which is considerable.
All these reports credit that for months,
on the one hand, the military support of the United Arab Emirates to rapid support forces has not ceased,
on the contrary, and that on the other hand, Russians, Iranians, but also Belarusians, Turks, etc.
feed the Sudanese army.
So this embargo is not respected.
I think it first translates one thing,
it is that the American influence in the management and regulation of this conflict
is perceived by all actors as being quite minimal.
Everyone knows that the Security Council is divided
and that from that moment on, the arms trade can go well
and that business is going well for all these arms dealers.
So, in the opinion of many observers, General Burhan is supported by Egypt,
while General Emeti is supported by the United Arab Emirates.
Why don't the Americans put pressure on these two regional powers
so that they stop delivering weapons to the belligerents?
So I think, first of all, the Egyptian support for General Burhan is not without nuance.
He was marked at the very beginning of the conflict.
He largely evaporated afterwards,
given the proximity of General Burhan to the Sudanese Islamists.
So Egypt today has resumed talks with Burhan
and has sent intelligence service officials to the port of Sudan.
But it is essentially to try to restart a negotiation process,
since the Americans failed in Geneva in August,
and rather to try a political resolution that would undoubtedly favor the army,
but still which would keep the Islamists at a good distance.
What is true is that General Burhan benefits, once again,
from the marked sympathy of other countries in the region,
notably Saudi Arabia, which is not directly involved in the conflict
and above all tries to assert at the level of the Arab countries
that he is the legitimate government, which has a certain echo.
Mehdi is a prisoner of his alliance with the United Arab Emirates,
which perhaps themselves, we have felt it in recent weeks,
would like to see things evolve, perhaps take on a more political dimension.
But we are in a very difficult situation,
which is that the Americans wanted,
they grasped the problem with the Saudis at the beginning,
the negotiations in Jeddah,
but want to get a ceasefire and humanitarian access without any political negotiations.
However, many experts, many also European special envoys,
think that it would be necessary to launch a political process
in order to achieve a ceasefire as a measure of confidence
in the evolution of this political process.
And there, the Americans will no longer be in a hurry,
I would say fundamentally, because they want to avoid
that Sudan becomes one of the international media
at the time of the elections in the United States,
which would obviously allow each other
to shoot at the democratic camp
by explaining that it is responsible for the prolongation of this conflict.
What is also true is that we have operated from the beginning
in agreement with the Sudanese civil forces
that had led the transition,
by completely excluding the Islamists.
However, this position, I think it must be revisited,
not to give the Islamists the key to any political process,
but certainly to realize
that they represent an internal reality of Sudan
and that they may have to take part,
perhaps with particular conditions,
of a political process that would lead to both the ceasefire
and perhaps the construction of a civil solution to get out of this war.
The Islamists who are currently in the Burhan camp.
Yes, even if some of them,
we say it little often,
often join, for reasons of tribal affiliation,
we join the Abiti camp.
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates
are two important partners of Washington
in the search for a solution to Gaza.
Isn't that also one of the reasons
why Joe Biden is not currently putting pressure
on these two countries in relation to Sudan?
Yes, absolutely.
I believe that the Emirates and Israel
have economic ties that have progressed by 4% last year,
despite the tragic events that we know.
In the same way, Egypt plays a crucial role
in the negotiations of the ceasefire for Gaza,
which means that Egypt today feels again
considered as a regional power
and is acting by wanting to set foot
in the Horn of Africa and on the African continent.
And can better resist the pressures of Washington?
If you will, there is a fundamental problem
that will not be solved before the results of the elections in the United States,
which is that the Biden administration
has had no interest in the African continent.
Do you mean that Joe Biden and Kamala Harris
are not taking any initiative in this region of the globe
for fear of exposing themselves to criticism from Donald Trump?
I think that, no, what is worse,
perhaps my feeling is quite right,
but what I believe is that for the American leaders,
Sudan and Darfur refer to what happened
at the beginning of the 2000s or in 2004 and 2006,
so for the midterm elections of George W. Bush
and then for the second-term elections,
the Sudanese question was an important question
of mobilization in universities,
with media criticizing American foreign policy.
And I believe that, in the same way,
a good part of American diplomacy today aims,
if you will, to prevent this situation
by focusing on the absolute priority
to humanitarian aid, depending on a political process,
and also by avoiding to focus properly
and fundamentally on the causes
and what created this civil war in Sudan
since April 2023.
Roland Marshall, thank you.