Why the US did not shift to nighttime bombing over the Reich in WWII - Deep Dive Review

The Globe Quest
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During the summer of 1943 it was clear that bomber losses were unsustainable. The much needed Long range fighter escorts were some 7 months away. The 8th US air forces considered nighttime bombing as a way to mitigate the losses. A squadron of B-17 were modified and their crews were trained to join the RAF in nighttime area bombing. They flew 35 combat bombing missions over Reich occupied territories. Losses were around twice daylight losses. This and 6 other reasons will be addressed why the US stuck with daylight bombing.
in this clip we see b7s under attack
from German bomber interceptors the
fighters are tearing into the formations
with machine gun and cannon fire by
summer in 1943 it was clear that
unescorted daylight bombing over the
Reich was not sustainable given the high
bomber losses the two paths to mitigate
bomber losses was either to limit the
bomber's range to the range of existing
escorts or shift to nighttime bombing
the other tried bomber loss mitigation
option was to mix in heavily armed and
armored b7s into the formations to act
as escort reps the YB 4S were sent with
the b7s on 17 bomber missions in May
June and July 1943 the trial program was
considered a failure as documented in
this Channel's video the intent of this
video is to review the reasons why the
eth Air Forces did not pursue shifting
to nighttime bombing consideration to
shifting bombing from day toight is
discussed on this page from a
Declassified 1953 US Air Force
historical studies number 92 document
titled development of night operations
194 41 to 1952 these historical study
reports are the gold standard of
collected World War II Lessons Learned
historical data and events Air Force
personnel are to draw on these
documented experiences in preparation
for future conflicts so mistakes will
not be repeated due to high bomber
losses during the summer and fall of
1943 the US may have to shift to night
bombing if long-range fighter escorts
are not available light bombing May
inflict higher us bomber losses from
operational mistakes and enemy action
operational losses come from Nighttime
midair collisions and nighttime Landing
accidents us Crews were unprepared and
under Trin for nighttime duties to
mitigate the risk General akre ordered a
squadron crew to be trained to operate
at night and their b7s be modified for
night bombing missions the US was
unprepared for night air operations when
World War II started little to no night
bombing training had occurred Navigators
lacked nighttime competence without
navigational AIDS bombadiers were
trained to drop bombs on targets that
were illuminated
Bomb release by Pathfinder and radar
would not be available until September
1943 as shown on this chart from a 1946
US Air Force historical studies document
titled the combined bomber offensive
April through December 1943 during
Pathfinder bombing the formations will
release their bombs when the group lead
releases their bombs the group lead
usually will release their bombs by
sighting the Target by radar us bombers
did not have design features for
nighttime bombing us leadership pushed
back to shifting to nighttime bomb
boming is summarized on this page
postwar General Arnold wrote we don't
quite know how to make daylight
Precision bombing work but we will make
it work notice he did not say unescorted
daylight Precision bombing just daylight
Precision bombing in June 1943 a
commander of the 5ifth bombardment wing
recommended nighttime bombing of the
German rur Valley to reduce bomber
losses since no long-range fighter
escort was available this request was
rejected with the response shifting from
daylight Precision bombing to nighttime
area bombing would be an admission of a
flawed us bombing policy commitment to
daytime Precision Target bombing
admission of this policy eror led to the
continuation of daylight bombing with
Associated bomber losses bombing policy
had become an issue of national pride to
some degree after the high losses
suffered during the October 1943
schweiner 2 ballbearing Factory raid
daylight Precision bombing was continued
but somewhat limited to targets within
the range of existing fighter
escorts the following Pages outline
bomber nighttime crew training
requirements and operational challenges
the 4 72nd Squadron B17 Crews were
trained for nighttime bombing in the
fall of 1943 a squadron consisted of two
elements or six planes total bombadiers
will release their bombs by Pathfinders
Pilots require extensive nighttime
takeoff and Landing training and evasive
action required when ConEd by German
search lights are under fighter attack
bomber Gunners need training of
maintaining night vision and combat and
Gunnery procedures while in evasive
maneuvers since the trial missions will
be flown with the RAF radio operators
need to become familiar with British
radio operating procedures and more
Navigator coordination nighttime
navigation was the greatest challenge
daylight navigation is relatively easy
in comparison it will take more than
just a few night flights to be
proficient in nighttime navigation the
safety of the crew and plane is
critically dependent on the Navigator
skill in maintaining the plane's
position within a 15m wide Corridor
Mission success also depends on the
plane's Navigator a poorly timed and
executed attack will likely lead to
Mission failure the plane's position is
dependent on the Navigator relying on
precise dead reckoning and astrostar
fixed calculations bombing was conducted
by targeting the geographical center of
either ground markers or Sky markers
Crews struggled to locate objects on the
ground even if illuminated this was due
to the High Altitude the b7s flew in
addition to the extensive crew training
required b7s were heavily modified to
convert from day to night bombing as
described on this page the B17 was
unsuited for night bombing unless it was
modified 10 navigational modifications
would be required which took 82.5 man
hours to implement new antenna loading
units and G navigational units needed to
be installed in the bomber window
blackout curtain swapping the 19
non-illuminated with illuminated dials
and gauges which took
125.5 hours to make these changes six
major Armament changes were required
including adding a restrictive fire
cutof cams to the guns to keep the
Gunners from shooting their own plane
when in a violent maneuver like escaping
a search light the ball turret's K4
Computing Gun Site was too bright and
needs to be replaced with the
non-computing British Mark III Gun Site
this image shows a ball turret's K4 Gun
Site versus the British Mark III
reflector Gun Site the ball turret's
windows need to be blacked out except
for the forward sighting window and the
ammo needs to be better secured these
windows would need to be blacked out
this modific ification would greatly
reduce a ball turret Gunner's visibility
the flexible guns would also need to be
fitted with new nighttime compatible gun
sites all guns need flash muzzle hinders
to cut down on muzzle flash which would
blind the Gunners the 472nd bomb
Squadron indicated bombers modified for
either day or night bombing cannot be
used for dual rolls without a loss of
combat Effectiveness the first B7
nighttime attack Mission occurred on the
night of September 10th 11 1943 no
flacker Fighters attack the B17 since
they were flying at a high 28,000 ft
altitude two more bombing missions over
France and then hand over Germany all
without losses up to this point it
seemed there were advantages to night
area bombing due to the light German
response bombers were again sent to
Handover 5 days later this time Crews
were ConEd by search lights and attacked
by Fighters a plane was lost on this
mission two planes were lost during the
next two missions the Ford 22nd Squadron
lost three night modified b7s during the
eight bombing missions where a total of
35 effective bombing sorties had been
flown the nighttime bombing loss rate
equated to
8.6% however this loss rate equates to
16.6% when the target was Germany this
compares to a daytime Bomber Crew loss
rate of
7.27% when attacking Germany over the
same period has shown on this table from
a March 1944 headquarters at Air Force
document titled relief of combat crew
Personnel the nighttime sorty loss rate
was over two times the sorty loss rate
of day missions the last and eighth
trial night bombing Mission occurred on
October 4th 1943 Creer experiences to
night bombing was influenced by the
level of German reaction Crews whose
sorties encountered little to no flak
Fighters and search lights welcome night
bombing however those missions where the
bomber was ConEd by a search light for 5
minutes were wanting to return to
Daylight missions B7 Gunners were unable
to see any distances outside their
Windows experienced a drop in morale
night bombing mission were thought in
less regard to day missions and combat
losses were greater than in day bombing
missions Channel commentary the effect
of search lights on bomber Crews is
profound and can be terrifying as
discussed in the channel search light
video this page from a 1942 war
department Military Intelligence
Services document titled tactical and
Technical Trends outlines the effect
search light coning had on British
bomber Crews this includes responsible
for bringing down Fighters and bombers
blinding crewmen making Target
acquisition difficult impairing return
of night vision and having a pronounced
negative psychological effect on the
crew the six reasons why the eth Air
Forces did not shift to nighttime
bombing are summarized on this page us
bombing policy is based on Precision
bombing of targets not area bombing
Precision bombing can only occur during
the day given the limited Target
acquisition sighting at night the b7s
would need extensive modification to
configure them for night bombing bomber
Crews would require extensive training
when the Knight modified b7s did bomb at
night their loss rate exceeded the day
missions Knight combat trained
experienced Germans were expected to
make quick work of inexperienced us
night deployed bombers since they RAF
had experience in night bombing best to
continue us daylight bombing to fulfill
the around the-clock combined bomber
offensive goals the channel adds a
seventh item longrange fighter escorts
were just around 3 months away which
would mitigate the fighter threat Bomber
Crew attrition dropped from 7.27% % in
the summer and winter of 1943 to 4.22%
in February 1944 when long-range fighter
escorts became available during this
three-month window the E Air Force's
bombing policy adopted to somewhat limit
bomber attacks to The Limited range of
the escorts until a critical mass of
longrange escorts were available seemed
the most prudent course of action rather
than shifting to night bombing given the
reasons listed do you agree that
shifting the E Air Forces from day to
night bombing was not a viable option
given the seven reasons listed and the
course of action taken was the most
rational if you've enjoyed this deep
dive video outlining the reasons why the
eth a forces did not shift to nighttime
bombing please consider commenting
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