And the Chinese Communist Party often extending its repression beyond its geographical borders.
It's according to a statement by the United States Department of State. But how has the
Chinese Communist Party leveraged TikTok and YouTube social media platforms to influence
American political narratives? Joining me now to discuss is LJ Eades, technology director and
co-founder of the CCP Biothreats Initiative. LJ Eades, thank you so much for joining.
Thank you, Steve. Thank you for having me. It's great to have you, LJ. You recently
authored a report that was published in The Washington Times. Tell us what you found in
your research about the CCP's alleged use to influence American political narratives
and what demographics are they targeting? Right. Specifically, what we're looking at is
the risk of one united front infiltration in the United States and concerns over specific
targeting of intellectuals inside the United States and how those strategic communications
and ideological influences actually work. What we're starting to find was the CCP is
leveraging TikTok more today in a tactical sense, meaning they're specifically needing to target
certain individuals, certain ethnic groups, or certain religious groups, specifically targeting
them. What they want to do and where they need to get to basically promote Beijing is to
leverage an enterprise type platform or media for global discourse power by leveraging cultural and
ideological narratives. What that looks like is not completely TikTok in a sense. That means they
would need to leverage the whole entire media environment. Some of the reports that we're
looking at were specifically published by the propaganda and traditional warfare department by
Henan University, funded by the CCP, which talked about the specific ways and algorithms that they
would use to deliver ideological and political education through TikTok, but other media
platforms as well. Specifically, one of the mentions was YouTube because of YouTube's large
American user base, two times that of TikTok, as well as the age groups that leverage YouTube.
I don't use TikTok. My friend groups don't use TikTok,
and I imagine you don't use TikTok, and part of your colleagues probably don't use TikTok either.
That's a big problem for the CCP. They need to target and have access to this global community
outside of TikTok alone. That's very hard and challenging. That means that they need to have
accesses in place. They need to better understand those environments, understand the narratives,
and how they can push those narratives through all of media. That's really what our report's
about, is that they are focused on the long-term game. TikTok's not the long-term game.
It sounds like what you're describing is sort of a form maybe in the realm of something that
we've heard of called elite capture. If you could sort of break down that term for us.
Right. Elite capture is looking at recruiting, long-term ambitions of recruiting governmental
positions, or even basically children of politicians to work their way in and recruit
them, say young adults, and recruit their way in so that they could have some kind of leverage or
power political environments. Again, that's a strategic move by the CCP to leverage these
people or groups of people over a long period of time. This is a 50-year endgame, not a one-day
or this-year-end type solution. It's a similar process of thinking about how the CCP leveraged
YouTube and these other media environments. That's what they're focused on now and trying
to strategically plan what that looks like, basically to promote Beijing's image.
LJ, the State Department released a statement in response to a report that was just recently
released by the Falun Dafa Information Center highlighting the CCP's intent to escalate the
persecution of this spiritual group in the United States. It said, quote, PRC repression often
extends beyond its borders as authorities engage in transnational repression to surveil,
threaten, and harass PRC nationals, including Falun Gong practitioners, to silence those who
have fled persecution due to their religious or ethnic identity and seek safety abroad.
End quote. With that said, what dangers do you see for these people and communities who've sought
asylum here in America? I think that's a very strategic and tactical
way that the CCP is operating and doing that. They know that we don't practice or have laws
around propaganda. We don't have propaganda defenses. It doesn't even seem like our
lawmakers currently are planning what our propaganda defenses look like. There's not a
propaganda defense strategy here in the United States. So I think that's very concerning,
specifically when we're looking at reporting on the CCP, looking at going beyond TikTok
and focus specifically on U.S. platforms. Obviously, TikTok has a U.S. presence and U.S.
platforms, but we're talking about the broader media in the United States and those media
platforms. So they're obviously talking about it now. They're describing, planning, funding,
the algorithmic nature of what that's going to look like. I think the CCP wants to see us hinder
our freedom of speech or put policies in place that might hinder our freedom of speech. I think
the CCP would be very successful if they made us do that, which is, I think, a big challenge
on Capitol Hill to maneuver that landscape. LJ, it's a very complicated situation and
we really appreciate you shedding some light on it. Thank you. Appreciate it. Thank you.