The True Reasons Why China Can't Target US Aircraft Carriers

Sea and Land
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Chinese shocked! The true reasons why China can't target US aircraft carriers.
Critics of US aircraft carriers have been arguing for decades that the survival of
the world's biggest warships will increasingly be at risk in an era of long-range, precision-guided
anti-ship missiles. In recent years, China has typically been identified as the military power
most likely to drive US carriers from the sea. But the US Navy seems much less worried about
carrier attacks than observers who lack military credentials and clearances. In fact, the outgoing
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, told an audience earlier this year that,
we're less vulnerable now than we have been since and including World War II.
One reason the Navy is not alarmed is that it has invested heavily in new technologies aimed
at bolstering the defenses of carrier strike groups. It also has changed its tactics for
operating near China. But the biggest reason for confidence about the future resides in
the difficulties China would face in trying to find and track US carriers. Large-deck,
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers of the type the US Navy operates seem like they would be easy to
target. They are over a thousand feet long, they are 25 decks high, and they are made of steel that
They have distinctive optical, infrared, and radio frequency signatures. So what can be so
hard about targeting them using the extensive arsenal of anti-ship missiles that China has
accumulated? Well, for starters, there are the huge distances within which carriers operating
in the Western Pacific can hide. The South China Sea alone measures 1.4 million square miles and
is only one of four marginal seas from which carrier air wings could launch attacks against
China. If a carrier is conducting sea control operations, keeping the sea lanes open to key
allies such as Japan, it will likely be beyond the first island chain that parallels the Chinese
coast, and thus able to hide in the vastness of the Western Pacific. It is hard to find anything
in millions of square miles of open ocean, and in the case of US carriers, the target will be moving
constantly. Nuclear power makes that possible. US carriers essentially have unlimited range.
If China's military actually sights a carrier, it will not be where it was seen by the time
weapons arrived. At 35 miles per hour, the carriers can be anywhere in an area measuring
over 700 square miles within 30 minutes. That area grows to over 6,000 square miles after 90
minutes, which is the more likely time elapsed between detecting a carrier and launching a
missile from the Chinese mainland. But let's back up for a moment and consider the multiple
hurdles that Chinese attackers would need to overcome to successfully target a carrier.
First, they would have to find the carrier, then they would have to fix its location,
then they would have to establish a continuous track of its movements,
then they would have to actually target the carrier with specific weapons,
then they would have to penetrate the carrier's multi-layered defenses to reach the target,
and finally they would need to assess whether the resulting damage was sufficient to disable
The Navy refers to this process as a kill chain, and the metaphor is instructive.
Because each step must be accomplished sequentially if any link in the chain
fails the whole process breaks down. The Navy and its partners in the Joint Force
have plans for disrupting potential attackers at each step in the process.
Consider the initial steps of finding and fixing the carrier's location.
China has several options. First, it could use the over-the-horizon radar located on land.
These powerful radars monitor vast swaths of the ocean by bouncing their radar signals off
the ionosphere. The energy will reflect downward, and once it reaches the surface generate indications
of anomalies that return to the original site of transmission via the same path.
China has at least two huge radars that can do this, but their utility is modest.
First, they must operate at long wavelengths that generate relatively little information in
order to bounce off the ionosphere rather than passing through it.
Second, at each bounce to and from the target, much energy is lost.
Third, the resulting picture of surveilled areas is of such low resolution that the
radar cannot establish a target track even if it detects a carrier. Finally,
the radar itself is a large, fixed object subject to preemption at the onset of war.
The second option China has is reconnaissance satellites. It has orbited dozens,
some resembling the electronic listening satellites the U.S. Navy uses to monitor oceans,
others employing optical sensors, and synthetic aperture radar. But to obtain targeting quality
information, the satellites must be placed in low Earth orbit about 660 miles above the Earth's
surface. At that elevation they are traveling at a rate of roughly 16,000 miles per hour,
which means they quickly disappear over the horizon, not to return for more than an hour.
The Navy figures that in order to continuously surveil ocean areas near China,
Beijing would need to establish three parallel north-south tracks in low Earth orbit and
populate each of those tracks with dozens of satellites spaced to assure continuous coverage.
China is nowhere near having such a constellation, and even if it did,
connecting all the overhead nodes with an Earth-bound command and control system to
dispatch weapons against a carrier would be hugely difficult. The third find-and-fix option
China has would be manned or unmanned radar planes. But U.S. carrier strike groups maintain
a dense defensive perimeter in the air around their locations that includes interceptor aircraft,
networked surface-to-air missiles, surveillance planes, and airborne jammers.
No Chinese aircraft is likely to get close enough to a carrier to establish a sustained target
track. The same applies to Chinese surface vessels and submarines, which are even more
vulnerable to preemption by the strike group than airborne assets. So the vital early steps
of simply finding and fixing the carriers would not be easy. Connecting the assets required for
those tasks with the other systems used in later stages of the kill chain would be challenging,
especially given the brief timelines available in which to engage the continuously moving target.
Any weapons dispatched against the intended target would need to negotiate multiple layers
of active and passive defenses, including electronic countermeasures and, in the future,
beam weapons. Some observers have stressed the danger posed by China's recent deployment of
anti-ship ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads. The Navy takes the threat seriously,
and in response has moved most of its missile defense warships to the Pacific.
As a practical matter, though, these weapons make little difference to the balance of power if China
cannot first find, fix, track, and target a carrier. The longer the range of an anti-ship
missile, the more updates it needs in flight to successfully engage a moving target. So without
timely off-board sensor data and an agile command and control system, the weapon will be largely
useless. This generalization applies whether the attacking weapon is purely ballistic or a
hypersonic glide vehicle. If the location of the target vessel is not known in a timely and fairly
precise fashion, then the munition is unlikely to strike its target. The bottom line is that
China is nowhere near overcoming the hurdles required for successful attacks against U.S.
aircraft carriers. Whether those carriers are engaged in projecting air power ashore or
maintaining control of sea lanes, Beijing will be hard-pressed to impede their operation in wartime.
And it's a safe bet that whatever assets China may have for executing such a mission on the
day of war will be quickly reduced by the combined efforts of the U.S. joint force,
whether they be deployed on land, at sea, or in orbit.
