(🔥中文字幕)眾議院軍事委員會就情報態勢和對抗中共的努力舉行聽證會| #新唐人

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眾議院軍事委員會就情報態勢和對抗中共的努力舉行聽證會
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從我們的偵察者
從防衛智慧企業的姿態
和能力
在戰略競爭中
並在聯合智慧的努力
反抗中國人民的民主國家
部門的努力
專注於中國
作為國家防衛策略的首要目標
但再一次
我們聽到這次會議
俄羅斯-烏克蘭衝突
已經持續了兩年
北韓繼續測試核彈
在7月10日
哈馬斯實施了驚訝的攻擊
在伊斯蘭
導致了持續的暴力衝突
在伊朗
利用其證據
攻擊伊拉克
以及以色列
並支持
在國際運輸上的
Houthi襲擊
而恐怖組織的威脅
仍然持續在全球
國防智慧企業
擔任了挑戰的任務
以支持部門的努力
在戰略競爭中
對抗中國
並支援剩下的
地區戰鬥部隊
以抵抗在該領域的威脅
以及他們的
堅持的反恐的努力
這並不是一個
容易的任務
我想了解
各領域的角色
在融合這些努力
並確保你的組織
有必要的能力
有需要的能力
是適當的資源
以及存在什麼能力的缺陷
我想歡迎今天的見證人
所有人都在這層委員會前
第一次出席
他們的現有能力
佩洛西·哈里斯女士
擔任國防部長
國防情報
哈克總統
國家安全組織總監
中央安全服務處總監
以及美國的
數據指揮官
克魯茲總統
國防情報組織總監
在時間的意義下
我請見證人
保持開放話題
至少五分鐘
以便我們有更多時間
進行關閉討論
在此
我再次感謝見證人
今天出席
我現在認可
領導人班奈特
對任何開放話題
謝謝主席
我很欣賞這個機會
坐在這裡
但更重要的是
參與這個
非常非常重要的會議
所以謝謝您的打電話
也謝謝所有的見證人
今天出席
在這個會議前出席
在開始之前
我先要提醒一下
所有的見證人
對您的位置相當新
所以歡迎和恭喜
這對您的組織
實在是一件大禮
即使領導人
轉換到其他角色
我們國防情報企業
的成員
仍然繼續
為國家保護
所以謝謝
去年我們有同樣的會議
我們開放了會議
說明目前的
國防環境
是積極的
不僅沒有改變
也變得
我相信我們都可以承認
更加積極
我們看到了
7月7日的
哈馬斯對伊斯蘭的
嚴重攻擊
和人類危機
這些惡性的演員
想要利用
和延續這場戰爭
在整個中東
我們仍然有俄羅斯
它繼續
它是非法的
和不公平的戰爭
這造成了
對俄羅斯人
和俄羅斯人民的
巨大損害
以及威脅美國的利益
我們還有普丁
他仍然堅定
他正在建立新的夥伴
為他提供能力
延續
這場戰爭
我們還有伊朗
它的恐怖分子
和它的核子系統
然後還有北韓
和它的核武
我們還有暴力極端組織
他們繼續
帶動嚴重的攻擊
如同我們看到的
在伊朗和俄羅斯
並繼續填補空隙
那是在
空隙
空隙在
在
在亞洲的島嶼
當然
我們還有中國共產黨
它繼續
帶來相當大的挑戰
它的願意
以激烈的行動
以妨礙
對國際規則
加上
它的廣泛的
努力
去現代化
並且建立
它的控制
對於人民的
自由軍隊
這些
都是引起擔憂的
因為中共
所組織的酷刑行動
繼續妨礙
國際和全球的穩定
根據我最近的旅行
到這個地區
與伯格曼主席
很高興看到
第一
美國的合作伙伴
繼續增長
加強和分享智慧
以抵抗中共的
陰謀行動
國際安全智慧企業
是整體政府的
關鍵元素
對於含有
這些種類的威脅
由於全球環境
仍然積極
現在比從前還要積極
這個委員會
仍然責任於確保
你的組織
擁有資源和權力
必須承擔
我們國家要求的職責
以實際應對這些挑戰
並認可
我們處於
強大力量競爭的時代
國際安全智慧企業
必須準備好
應對這些威脅
國際安全智慧企業
必須保持積極
與企業合作
快速提供
釋放和行動的智慧
在整個部門
並與我們的夥伴
和夥伴們合作
這就是為何這次聽證會
是重要的
我期待聽證
今天所有的聽證人
謝謝主席
我們現在聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽
聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽聽
I want to emphasize how critical it is for Congress to reauthorize Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act before it expires on April 19th.
Additionally, recently proposed legislation has sought to limit
DOD's lawful and appropriate access to and use of commercially available information, or CAI,
which is used to support the full spectrum of DOD missions.
CAI is lawfully obtained by DOD and subject to stringent handling procedures
to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons.
It is important for the effectiveness of the defense, intelligence, and security enterprise
that DOD and Congress have the opportunity to collaborate
on legislation so as to preserve appropriate access to this data.
In summary, the President's budget supports the Department's programs and authorities
needed to address these global challenges, maintain our strategic advantages,
and provide decision-makers and policy-makers with information at the speed of relevance.
I again thank the members of this subcommittee for your leadership and support.
I look forward to answering your questions here and in our closed session.
I'll now turn to General Hawk for his remarks.
General Hawk, you're recognized.
Chairman Bergman, Representative Panetta, and distinguished members of the committee,
I am honored to be with you today representing the men and women
of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.
Defending the nation is at the heart of our mission.
The People's Republic of China poses a challenge
unlike any our nation and allies have faced before,
competing fiercely in the information domain.
The men and women of U.S. Cyber Command and NSA
continue to use the full scope of our authorities
and the full spectrum of our capabilities
to contest the threats posed by the PRC,
imposing costs, denying benefits, and deterring the adversary.
We will continue to strengthen partnerships across the U.S. government
with foreign partners and with private industry
so that we may operate anywhere we are needed.
We are ready and postured to contest PRC malicious activities
at home and abroad.
While cyber threats have increased,
we are ready to counter these threats
with increased strength and capability.
U.S. Cyber Command and NSA
continue to use capabilities and partnerships
to deny the PRC opportunities,
frustrate their strategic efforts,
and systematically eradicate intrusions.
Our cybersecurity mission is protecting the Department of Defense
and the defense industrial base
from adversary nation states and ransomware attacks.
We are collaborating with U.S. government partners
and foreign partners
to develop and execute intelligence-driven campaigns
to counter adversary activities.
In addition, we continue to identify and share
adversary tools and tradecraft,
enabling public and private partners
to further defend against these threats.
Within U.S. Cyber Command and NSA,
we are making investments in our workforce.
Our talented, agile and diverse people
represent an important competitive advantage
across all of our mission sets.
That is why we are committed
to reducing the time our new applicants spend
in the hiring process
and strengthening our expertise
both in-house and through hiring,
especially those with language and technical skills.
I remain focused on the reauthorization of Title VII
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
which is of paramount importance.
FISA Section 702 is absolutely critical
to our foreign intelligence mission.
There is no substitute for this authority.
The timely, actionable information it provides
cannot be replicated by other means.
As you consider reauthorization,
I look forward to discussing
how this tool enables mission success
and the controls we implement
to ensure the protection of the privacy
and civil liberties of the American people.
I would like to reiterate my appreciation
for the opportunity to testify in front of you today
and for the committee's continued support
of our mission and our people.
I look forward to our conversation.
Lieutenant General Cruz, you are recognized.
Chairman Bergman,
Representative and today's ranking member Panetta,
distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity
to discuss the Defense Intelligence Agency's
assessment of the global security environment,
the complexity, trajectory and rate of change
in the national security arena
is perhaps the highest and most consequential
we've seen in our lifetime.
How we respond matters
and our level of innovation, focus and integration
must match our adversaries stride for stride.
We must position ourselves
and our capabilities to meet threats
we see now and on the horizon
and not simply posture to repeat successes of the past.
DIA and our global workforce
in more than 140 nations around the globe
partnered with our colleagues all across the nation
and in the defense intelligence community
are at the forefront of this task,
collecting, analyzing and operationalizing intelligence
that underpins policy, diplomacy, acquisition
and when needed, combat operations.
It's an honor to join two of my colleagues
in this endeavor,
Honorable Harris and General Hawk
before the committee today.
In my first two months
as the 23rd Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency
I've taken a threefold approach
to setting our course.
First, we are intensely integrated with
and focused on meeting the needs of our warfighters
and our allies and partners
who are engaged in combat operations
around the globe.
Second, we are addressing new
and emerging security and intelligence challenges
that fundamentally alter our operating environment,
ranging from technology and artificial intelligence
to cyber and biosecurity
to a growing number of adversaries
who are interacting and partnering in ways
and towards ends we have not seen before.
In these specific areas,
I've started three 90-day sprints
addressing foundational military intelligence
for cyber,
the need for integrated force tracking
and denied environments
and technical intelligence collection.
Finally, I have focused on partnerships.
The one asset our adversaries simply cannot match.
I've had more than 30 international engagements
to include hosting more than 70
foreign military representatives
in my first 60 days.
Simply stated, the scale of national security challenges
require a new scale
and effective national security partnerships.
My aim in this hearing is to crystallize
these challenges and growing threats
that we see and support this subcommittee
in its critical work of defending the nation.
One of the ways that Congress
can provide its most effective support
and defense of the nation
is to reauthorize Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Although DIA collection
does not operate under these specific authorities,
our all-source analysis mission,
our ability to operationalize intelligence
and our support to the Congress
is dependent on those who do.
Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before the subcommittee today.
I'm privileged to lead
the Defense Intelligence Agency
and represent the talented
and dedicated global workforce.
We're grateful for your continued support
and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
I recognize myself for five minutes.
First one question is for you, General Hawk.
Can you explain how your dual hat
as Director of NSA
and Commander of Cybercom
has benefited the intelligence community
as well as the cyber community?
Thank you very much for the question, Chairman.
So from what the determination
as to how we looked at the structure
of both Cyber Command and NSA.
So having a single leader
that is able to lead both organizations.
What it really benefits
from both the intelligence community
and from cyberspace
is how we operate
within the same operating domain,
within cyberspace and with common partners.
We're able to have agility,
we're able to operate with speed
and able to operate with a common intent.
What that really helps
from an intelligence community perspective
is that as we think about the campaigns
that are going to be conducted in cyberspace,
we can start with
how are we going to protect
those key intelligence sources and methods
that allow the nation to have insights,
that allow our combatant commanders
to have indications and warning
while able to generate outcomes
in cyberspace
that meet the demands of our warfighters.
That speed and agility
was something that was looked at closely
when in July 2022,
both the DNI and the Secretary of Defense
commissioned a joint study.
They wanted to look at the dual-hack construct.
Their conclusion
was that it was in the best interest of the nation
and for many of those same reasons,
to be able to move with speed and agility,
the ability to have a common conversation,
particularly with our foreign partners,
about how we partner together in cyberspace
and then how we can move aggressively
when we see threats to the nation
and the Department of Defense.
So I've served in both organizations
for the preponderance of my career
and I'm very comfortable
in terms of how we execute every single day
for both our intelligence mission
and our cyber mission.
Thank you.
The next question is for all of you
for a response.
The DNI and CIA
produced an open-source intelligence strategy
for 24 to 26 last month.
How do each of you envision
implementing the strategy,
especially with the capability of AI
and machine learning
to one,
call down the trove of information
into a manageable amount
for further analysis
and two,
getting ahead
and staying ahead of our adversaries?
So please.
Thank you for the question.
I'll take it from a little bit
of the department's perspective
before deferring to the directors
on their specific enterprise efforts.
From the department's perspective,
the DNI's strategy
is one part of
how we think about the open-source ecosystem.
In the Department of Defense,
we are very focused on making sure
we make the maximum use
of open-source information
to include commercially available
and publicly available information.
And for the portions of the department
that sit in the IC,
we're focused on making sure
that there is a framework
in which they understand
how to use that information
to the maximum degree possible.
From the NSA perspective,
we do not have an open-source
intelligence mission,
but we certainly do leverage
publicly available
and commercially available information.
What we found most benefit
from the overall strategy itself,
it reaffirms how we handle information,
how we use it,
and then how we protect it
in a manner consistent
with all of our oversight
and all of our laws,
all of our values.
So we leverage that information.
It's a critical start point for us
in being able to particularly fill in gaps
when we think about cyber threats.
It's an area that we have leveraged
very deeply,
and we'll continue to follow
the guidelines we've been given
by the department.
Thank you for the question.
For DIA in particular,
we are also designated
as the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise Manager
for open-source intelligence.
So we do this mission
each and every day,
and as that enterprise manager,
we are also deeply involved
in how the rest of the enterprise
is able to pull together
the tactics, techniques, procedures
that are associated
with this particular discipline.
The approach that DIA has taken
since being designated as this
is to take all the steps
that are necessary
to turn open-source
into the same kind of discipline
that we see in signals intelligence,
in geospatial intelligence,
in measurement and signals intelligence.
How do we normalize that?
So across the board,
DIA has put together a program
that starts to deliver this year,
and it is designed
to put a structure around
everything from requirements management,
how do we do collection,
what's the tradecraft
associated with analysis,
how do we do data management
across multiple organizations,
what does a training program
look like for whether it's us
or whether it's the services
that are doing open-source,
and then more importantly,
how do we do the data cataloging?
So if open-source data
is purchased or collected
by one organization,
we're not doing it
across multiple organizations.
We will deliver on the first iteration
of that later this year,
and over a couple of years,
we intend to institutionalize
open-source across the department.
Thank you.
Mr. Panetta, you are recognized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hawk,
Russia and China are using
sophisticated hybrid
and irregular warfare tactics
while harnessing cyber
and technological advantages,
as we've seen over the past decade,
for sure.
This has been abundantly clear,
though, also in Ukraine,
where the forces have merged
advanced technology
with irregular warfare tactics
to increase precision
on the battlefield
and control the information space.
To maintain our advantage,
the United States most should be
looking at new ways,
similar to how the Ukrainians did it,
to integrate our special forces
capabilities with advancements
in cyber and information operations.
General, can you explain
how U.S. Cybercom
is working with SOCOM
to integrate cyber
and soft capabilities?
And then second,
what's your assessment
of Russia's utilization
of both cyber
and irregular warfare capabilities?
Thank you very much for the question.
So first, how do we think
about our partnership
with U.S. Special Operations Command?
We look at that.
They are teammates
in all of the missions
that we consider.
And so first, both of us do things
in support of the other combatant commands
and our responsibilities.
We will do those independently.
We'll conduct operations
that are linked to those combatant commands.
But what we're increasingly finding
is that there are times
when we're able to look at
something that the
geographic combatant commander needs.
And if we work together
with our special operations teammates,
with our space teammates,
we can identify opportunities
that allow us to produce an effect
that would be larger
than any of us operating independently.
Can you give me an example?
So there are things
that we do in cyberspace
that would require someone
to be in theater
and to leverage
what a special operator
would be doing in country
or in an environment
that we don't reach
as U.S. Cyber Command.
So that's a partnership.
We leverage that.
And then we're able to extend our reach
with our special operations partners.
So that would be an example.
Thank you.
The other area that
in terms of Russia's evolution,
your second part of your question.
I think what we saw
at the outset of the conflict
is Russia operated in cyberspace
in the same manner
that they did in all the other domains.
Not well planned.
It was brute force.
But we also saw Ukraine take actions
that we should learn from.
They were very effective
in moving their data
outside of the country
using Western cloud providers,
gave them resiliency.
And then they also drew upon
any number of nations,
including the United States,
for additional cyber defense activities.
So they were very effective
at the outset.
What we have seen is an evolution
of how Russia continues
to use their cyber forces.
And I think one of the areas
that we want to watch really closely
is how they're using those forces
from an intelligence aspect
versus a cyber effect.
And it's an area
that we'll want to watch closely
and inform our European command teammates.
Thank you.
General Cruz,
last year we discussed
the U.S. Cybercom NSA China Outcomes Group
and the DIA China Mission Group.
Can you give us an update
on those organizations
and how they collaborate with each other?
And if you can answer
as much as possible now,
we can follow up in greater detail
in the classified session, obviously.
In this session,
I'd certainly be happy to cover,
in particular,
the China Missions Group within DIA,
a little bit of how we partner,
and then I'll certainly let General Hawk
talk to the China Outcomes Group.
So a little over a year ago,
my predecessor,
after a series of studies,
put together the requirement
if China is our pacing threat,
how do we integrate
all the activities that we do,
whether it's collection,
whether it's analysis,
whether it is protection
of our own networks,
and how do we do that in a way
that we can then build some campaigns
to create the effects that we need,
both to advance our interest,
advance our collection,
or to protect ourselves.
So the China Mission Group
that we put together
pulls together for the first time
all of our human collectors,
all of our analysts,
all of our effects generators,
if I could use that term
in this environment,
and stitches together
what we might do
with our service partners
and with our interagency partners
to include the China Outcome Group,
and very much focused on
ensuring that we are taking,
identifying collection gaps
and tasking either ourselves
or others to fill those collection gaps
in order to create the outcomes
that we need,
and one of our important partners
is certainly the China Outcomes Group.
General Honk on the China Outcomes Group.
So the China Outcomes Group
is a combined effort
between NSA and Cyber Command
to align our resources
in support of INDOPACOM.
So we have a series of priorities
that we've been given
by the INDOPACOM commander,
and that has allowed us
to really look at
how will we provide intelligence today,
how will we do that in a crisis,
how do we think about
network defense and cybersecurity,
both for INDOPACOM
and for their partners,
and then if we get into a crisis,
what are the things
that U.S. Cyber Command and NSA
can do to assist in generating options
for the INDOPACOM commander?
That continues to work very well
and very closely
with the INDOPACOM team,
and I could give you more details
in the closed session.
Thanks to all of the witnesses.
I yield back.
Thank you, Dr. Jackson.
You're recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you to our witnesses
for being here today.
I really appreciate your time.
Accurate and actionable intelligence
for our joint force
is a key component
of all of our operations.
A well-informed intelligence picture
from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
will be key for decision makers
and military leaders
in understanding
the potential battle space
in the Indo-Pacific
should a conflict with China arise.
Similar to other resources
across the department,
the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
cannot neglect other AORs
and miss an intelligence
collection opportunity.
The risks remain in those AORs
and we have a duty
to be properly postured.
My first question is
while we must focus
on countering the Chinese Communist Party
and their coercive actions,
there are very real threats
to our national security
that exist at our own southern border.
In recent years
we have seen a disturbing trend
of known terrorists
and Chinese military-age males
coming across our southern border.
As violent extremist organizations
and our adversaries
continue to become more bold
and expand their reach,
I'm very concerned about
the threats to our homeland
and our intelligence
will ultimately prove to be
probably our greatest defense
against these possible threats.
General Cruz, I'll start with you.
Do you have any concerns,
but I'll ask this of all of you,
do you have any concerns
about the threats
that may have or potentially
could come across our southern border
based on the increased number
of known terrorists
and Chinese military-age males
who have crossed our border?
And how has that increased your workload?
And are we adequately resourced
to remain vigilant
regarding these threats
while simultaneously focusing
necessary resources on Indo-Pakistan?
So let me answer that two ways.
One is one of the advantages
that DIA has
in this very complex mission
is that in addition to DIA itself
at the headquarters,
we also man the J-2s
at each of the combatant commands,
and that gives us an ability
to stay connected
to each of the combatant commands' threats,
and that includes NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
as you are tracking today.
So we're intimately involved
either directly at the headquarters
or at the commands
working the migration issues,
the human issues,
or in the other case you mentioned,
PRC coming across the southern border.
We are always concerned
about what may come across
the southern border.
We have not seen to date
the things that would cause us
to notify you of increased concern,
but that's always a pathway,
and more to talk,
I'd be happy to talk more in detail
when we get to the classified session.
Yes, sir. Thank you.
Garvin,as we look at the southern border,
we just recently participated.
The DNI led a look
at how could we as an intelligence community
examine how we could better
provide intelligence
as it looks at fentanyl
and how it makes its way
to the United States.
As we look at that,
I think from our perspective
in the National Security Agency,
we're proud of the work that we've done
to be able to illuminate threats.
The area that I'm probably
most concerned about
is we are illuminating
most of those threats
from Section 702.
That has allowed us to see
what it looks like for precursor chemicals
coming from companies in China,
how they make their way to Mexico,
and then how criminal organizations
can then move those.
So I am concerned that we are
going to lose our opportunity
for those insights
unless Section 702 is reauthorized.
Thank you.That's helpful,ma'am.
Thank you for the question.
I'm confident that the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise
is fully engaged on these issues.
Many of them are a whole-of-government effort.
They cross domestic and foreign intelligence,
and so I have full confidence
that our agencies are fully engaged
in that effort.
From my seat,I'm constantly monitoring
the resource tradeoffs.
That includes making sure
we are making the right investments
and we're not taking
unnecessary tradeoffs,
particularly in the counterterrorism space.
OK,I have one more question
kind of related to that,
to the funding issue.
But funding for the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise
is split into two major components,
the National Intelligence Program
and the Military Intelligence Program.
For FY24,it looks like
the National Intelligence Program
was funded at $72.4 billion,
and the Military Intelligence Program
was funded at $29.3 billion
for a grand total of $101.7 billion.
For FY24,the request actually appears
to show a slight decrease
for a total funding of 101.6
instead of 101.7.
When you factor in the record inflation
that we've seen over the last few years,
this is really a pretty severe cut.
So my question is,
wait,I can get some more details
on exactly what the issues are
at Women's Classified Session,
but I'd like to ask
each of you real quickly,
are we adequately resourcing
the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?
How are we justifying cutting funding
for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
at a time like this
when we need to ensure
that our intelligence is rock solid?
I'm happy to go into further detail
in the closed session,
but I'm confident that
there has not been a decline in capability
in the Military Intelligence Program,
which is the portion I can speak to.
I think that the decline that you note
is due mostly to phased program acquisitions
and other factors,
which I'm happy to dive into
in further detail,
but I'm confident that we have not
made a reduction in capability,
particularly within the MIP.
OK,I'm out of time,
but one of you want to say something real quick?
Otherwise,I'll yield back.
I prefer to talk about it
in the closed session,
if you don't mind, Congressman.
Yes, sir.
Thank you. I'll yield back.
Thank you.
Representative McClellan,
you are recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
and Ranking Member Panetta
and to our witnesses for being here today.
Secretary Harris,
one of the key takeaways
from the post-9-11 era
was the importance of our intelligence community
working together
and across agencies
to tackle the threats
that face the nation.
How did the defense intelligence enterprise
work to increase collaboration
with the rest of the intelligence community
in fiscal year 2024
and what can we expect
in fiscal year 2025?
Thank you for the question.
I think what I can offer
is that I think we've only taken
the lessons of the 9-11 era
and applied them to new
and different challenges.
So as I remarked before,
I see the entire defense
intelligence enterprise
really operationalizing our partnerships,
which means we're no longer
just working independently with partners,
but we're thinking about the ways
different agencies can partner
with our allies and partners
in service of common objectives.
I think you've heard already today
some examples of joint work
that is going on inside of the department
to make sure that we are approaching things
with a new and different informed view
that takes into account
all of the different talents
and capabilities
that exist inside the department
and uses them to maximum effect.
Thank you.
And for each of you,
what is the most pressing capability gap
facing the defense intelligence enterprise
and your specific agency?
What are you doing to mitigate these gaps
and what support do you need from us
to help you do so?
Congresswoman,
I think from our perspective,
the areas that the department
has really asked us to look at
is resiliency.
How do we think about ensuring
that we can deliver intelligence
in competition and in crisis
and if deterrence fails in conflict?
And I think those are areas
that we're going to really examine closely
and those are things that you will see
coming through the department
in terms of budget requests
as we look at those areas
that the secretary is asking us to focus on.
Thank you.
I think what I would offer
is that our most pressing capability gap
is really not just for us
but for everyone.
When asked this question,
I always actually go to a nontraditional route
and I say the thing that I am most concerned about
is our ability to protect our networks,
our people and our data.
So whether that's a counterintelligence piece,
whether it is security
of our highly classified networks,
whether it's the defense industrial base,
it is focused on those efforts
that we need to do there.
We are all working those
and I think what you will see
in the budget that has already been submitted
are the kinds of programs
that will help us in that regard.
Thank you.
And General Cruz,
how is the defense intelligence enterprise
looking to incorporate
emerging technologies such as AI
into its capabilities
and to ensure that these new capabilities
will provide the most relevant information
for our warfighters?
Thank you for the question.
We have established an emerging
and disruptive technologies organization
that is focused really in three areas.
One is on quantum
and that is doing some really good work
on how others are using quantum computing,
quantum comms and quantum sensing.
We have an organization
that is focused on biotechnology and biosecurity.
And then another group
that is working specifically on AI and counter AI
and we can certainly talk through
what some of those lines of efforts might look like.
We also have a sort of a technology
and long-range assessments organization
that is looking out in the 5 to 20-year point
to see what technologies
are in research and development stages
that may not necessarily
be military technologies yet
but could be if applied
and we track those through to acquisition.
And for some of the work
that you are doing in the AI space,
what steps are you taking
to ensure that you can identify
misinformation that our adversaries
may be using through AI?
In the context of the question
and I know I'm about to run out of time
so you may have to submit an answer later.
Five years ago I was at a conference
where an expert said that the ability of AI
to detect misinformation
was going to be outpaced by the ability of AI
to create misinformation
and I've been worried about that for five years.
So if you could provide some information
on what you all are doing
to try to get ahead of that?
I would be happy
either to take that for the record
or answer that in classified session.
There is some important work.
Your concerns are very valid
and it's an issue we've got to stay a step ahead of.
Thank you. I yield back.
Thank you. Mr. Mills,
you're recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our distinguished guests
for being here today.
We've gotten into a very bad habit
of continuing our 1980s fashion
of understanding warfare to only be kinetic,
which has been a really big missed opportunity for us
knowing that the evolution of warfare
has truly gone to an economic resource
cyber supply chain
and even a non-kinetic influence operation campaign.
You know, I argue to many
that we've been in a cold war
for about 20 plus years with China
as they've continued to advance their influences
and also to degradate America's confidence
in our currencies or in developing nations
so they're moving away from utilizing American goods
as well as for using our currency
as its primary source.
In knowing this,
what is it that,
and in my belief personally,
with the China-Russia era
on North Korean geopolitical alignment,
could we not utilize the quantum race,
especially looking at things
like AI quantum entanglement,
self-healing drone capabilities and others
to be utilized in a very similar fashion
to what President Reagan
utilized the space race for
against the Soviet Union
with a way to try and go ahead
and economically cripple them
knowing the PRC's economics
are not where they claim it's at
and seeing that they have
more workforce strikes in the past years
than they have in everyone's history.
So, Congressman,
I'll touch on the quantum discussion
as a start point
and then we can go
wherever you would like to go.
So as we think about quantum,
we're really thinking about it in two ways.
First, we have a research organization
that has been involved in quantum research
since its inception
and it really sponsored
some of those original studies
that enabled the original qubit
to be employed.
So we continue to partner
with academia, with industry
to look at what are
the most appropriate applications
when we think about quantum.
The other is how do we prepare
the nation for a quantum computer
to ensure that we've got
quantum-resistant encryption.
So NSA has published
our first round of
quantum-resistant encryption.
That's an area that we want to work
with the rest of the department
to ensure that we deploy
so that we're prepared
when the event that a quantum computer
is developed and employed.
So I think that's an area
that we're certainly invested in
and we want to continue to advance.
And do you think that
the quantum entanglement capability
is advancing at a pace
that will see us beat China in that race?
I think this is one
that is really difficult science.
And so I think it's one
we want to make sure as a nation
from our perspective
with the resources that we have
we'll employ to continue
to drive that research forward.
I appreciate that.
Yeah, my hope is that
we can get to a point
where quantum entanglement
can be utilized in a multi-drone fashion
that would be enabled to be deployed
to kind of leave our enemies
blind, deaf and dumb on the battlefield
to give us that advantage
for the warfighters abroad.
Ms. Harris, I wanted to ask you
your thoughts on, you know,
how can we leverage
our JSOC capabilities relationships
with allies in the regions
to counter China's efforts
with regards to Africa?
I'm happy to talk
in a little bit more detail
in closed session.
But I think what we have seen
is that those partnerships
are not just belonging to one organization.
I think where we have worked best
is where our partnerships inside DOD
are combined with those of our diplomats
and those of USAID
and other U.S. government entities
that are working in the region
to really deepen the conversation
and understand the different dynamics at play
and figure out how best to work together.
And I guess kind of a follow-on to that
which I'm just curious is, you know,
how can we shorten the decision-making process
between the intelligence community
and respective agencies
or teams on the ground?
So I think that is work
that is ongoing every day.
I think we've come a long way
in shortening that cycle.
I think we have a focus right now
on making sure we are sharing information quickly.
We are proactively making sure
that information is releasable to our partners,
that conversations can happen
at the lowest level classification
that they need to.
All of that speeds the pace of decision-making
and the ease of getting information
out to our operators.
And I know that you all,
and again, I also can speak
to sitting classified briefings
and other areas where we have seen
flies that play a very vital role
with regards to preventing
terrorist attacks by malign actors.
But I would also argue that the FBI
who has violated that,
utilizing backdoor searches
and others 287,000 times
without the appropriate reforms,
these types of warrantless searches
would be in direct violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
Would you not agree?
I can speak to what the current bill offers,
which I think is a meaningful set of reforms
that gets at some of the concerns
that you raise.
I think that we have made a number of reforms
in response to concerns,
but the bill right now
is the most comprehensive reforms
that will ever be made to Section 703.
Well, I agree that there are some reforms.
The FBI is reporting
they have 98% compliance,
but if you look at the over 200,000
violations they had,
that's still over 4,000 a year
that they're violating
in these illegal warrantless searches
that are a direct violation
of our Fourth Amendment
and as constitutionalists.
And those who swear an oath,
that is our job,
protect our constitution
against all enemies,
foreign and domestic,
and that means the violation
is there by government as well.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Keating,
you are recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two days ago,
The Wall Street Journal
published a report
about the private sales
of Starlink assets
and the shipping of them
to Russians,
battlefield sources,
battlefield, I'm sorry,
battlefield sources in Ukraine.
Can you comment about
the threat of these private sales,
either public sales
or through the black market
and what the effect can be
on the battlefield in Ukraine,
but also what it can be
in the hands of non-state actors?
I'm happy to discuss that question
in more detail in a closed session.
I think we have a number of efforts
ongoing to address some of these issues,
but I would need to take that for the record
as not all of them
fall within my remit
within the department.
Just looking at the forming axis
of Russia, China, Iran
and North Korea together,
and could you comment on there
to the extent you can publicly
on the information sharing
that might have resulted
in that closer relationship
and what we could do ourselves
to do it and try and make sure
that we're not falling into
siloing things that we have in the past
and that we have on our part
greater information sharing
across the board
given the expansion of cooperation
with that axis.
So I can take some of this, Congressman,
because I think one of the things
that we have worked really hard on
since the beginning of Russia-Ukraine
is how do we use intelligence
to be able to have
the greatest impact possible
and how all the elements,
the CSAs within the department
and within the community
were able to generate intelligence
and either be used
by the administration
to identify what Russia was doing
but also to inform
our combatant commands.
And I think we have really worked
on the tradecraft
of how do you use intelligence
not just for military targeting
but to create an outcome
that gives some advantage.
So in this case,
how do we expose those activities
in a way that someone
could take an action based on them?
And we could talk a little bit more detail
in the closed session.
Do you think that...
Oh, go ahead.
Do you think that
any of this information sharing
is a threat that
particularly given to Iran
and the Middle East
of sharing this with
their proxy militia forces,
malign forces that they have?
So I think from our perspective,
from my perspective,
as they collaborate,
it brings the potential
for transfer of different
technology or intelligence.
We want to be able to limit that
wherever we can.
I would offer...
It's a great question
as you kind of think through
what is it that the four nations
in particular that you talked about,
Russia, China, North Korea and Iran,
what are they doing now
that they weren't doing before
and what are they increasing?
And I think what we've seen
is the relationships
that Russia has had to build
in order to bring ammunition stocks
and other weapons to them.
Some of the historic friction
that has existed between those countries
is going by the wayside.
And what we don't know
is what is North Korea,
what is China,
what is Iran getting in return?
The information flow
that we expect they're getting in return
is more about technology,
more about capabilities.
It is less focused on
sharing information about the U.S.
But that said,
they have shared common interests
in their views of what is the role
in the U.S. in the future
versus their roles in the future.
And I would be remiss
if I did not go back to your question
on Iran and proxies.
We do see information sharing
with Iran and their proxies,
but it is more related about
creating effects on the battle space
that Iran would like to do
but hide its hand.
I think with the race
that's going on between
the development of artificial intelligence
and then our ability to deal with that
artificial intelligence,
how to react to that on our own,
you'll have to deal with this
in a classified way, I understand.
But also on a general sense,
our enemies,
some of the countries I just mentioned,
are they in a situation where
you see them developing
that kind of capability too
to counter that as well
to keep up with it
on the responding side of it?
I think what I would offer is
there's at least two of those four countries
that are deeply focused in that area
and in a classified session
I think we can talk through 42.
OK. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jacobs, you're recognized
for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you so much to our witnesses.
I know we talked a little bit about
Africa and what we're doing there.
I wanted to ask a little more specifically
how we're sort of learning lessons
and thinking strategically
about maybe some of the things
that we are missing in Africa
and making sure that we are looking
not only at sort of targeting
but also the dynamics and populations.
For instance, despite all of the investments
and access we've made in West Africa,
the interagency was caught surprise
by the coup in Niger
despite the huge amount of military assets
that we have in that country.
So I guess, Lieutenant General Cruz,
can you share how and why
as much as you can in an open hearing
we didn't anticipate the coup in Niger?
What lessons we learned from that
and how DIA is working to ensure
we're gathering intelligence
that is more focused on local political
and conflict dynamics,
particularly in places where we do have
big foreign military relationships?
Thank you for the question.
And I would offer a little bit of framing
and then the answer.
So for me, the framing that really has resulted
in, I think, eight military coups
in Africa since 2020
are tied to a combination of many things.
It is humanitarian issues.
It's food insecurity.
It's migration.
It's terrorism.
It's a variety of things
that no amount of military presence
can overturn.
And so when there is a military presence there,
what that does allow us to do
is one of the other organizations that we run.
We run the Defense Attaché Service
and the Defense Clandestine Service.
And that does allow us to have a footprint
with embassies
in all the nations around the globe
that allows us to have
the kinds of interagency conversations
to see what it is that we can detect
and what we can do about it.
And I think in a classified setting,
we can talk a little bit more
about what we saw leading up to Niger
and perhaps what we're doing.
OK, great.
Are there any broad lessons learned
on how you're doing things differently
based on sort of what happened in the Sahel
with the eight coups over the past few years?
I actually think it's too early
to understand how those are playing out
in a couple of areas.
And there's a lot of activity still ongoing.
I think the biggest lesson for us
almost goes back to one of the previous questions,
which is to ensure
while we're focused on China,
while we're focused on
some of the high-end adversaries,
one of the critical responsibilities
of the intelligence community
is to be that guardrail
and to keep a pulse
in some of those other areas.
And so for us,
it's about maintaining attaché presence
and other presence in collection
within the areas you've talked about.
Got it. Thank you.
And I know some of my colleagues
have asked about AI already.
I wanted to ask particularly about AI
and sort of the ethical principles.
I know DoD has adopted ethical principles.
I think that's great.
I think there's still a lot of questions
about how those principles
translate into actionable guidelines.
And one of the things
we've been hearing a lot of concern about
is around AI drones,
particularly ones using facial recognition
used during military operations.
So I guess a question is
how accurate is the facial recognition technology
used by the AI drones
and what measures have been taken
to ensure that it doesn't produce false positives?
For whoever wants to answer.
I think we're going to have to take
that question for the record.
What I can tell you
is that the department is committed
to ensuring the ethical use of AI.
I think you've seen
that the department has put that priority
first and foremost
by elevating the position of our chief
data and AI officer
to a direct report to the secretary.
There is a focus in the department
to make sure we both understand
the challenges those tools will face.
We will face on the battlefield,
but also how best to integrate them
into military operations.
But I'm happy to take back the question.
Thank you.
Yes, I would appreciate that.
And you may have to take this back too then.
But has there anything put in place
to ensure that AI drones
do not accidentally target
innocent civilians during military operations?
Again, I'll take the specific question
back for the record.
But I think as you've heard
many seniors from the department say
just this week on the Hill,
civilian protection is at the forefront
of all of our operations.
Perfect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Thank you.
Well, they have called votes
And the open portion of the hearing
is now adjourned.
We will reconvene in Rayburn 2337
for the classified session
at the conclusion of votes,
which right now we're looking
at walking off the floor about 445 or 1645.
I'm not going to give it in Zulu time.
So we'll just leave it at those two
to figure it out.
But we will all walk back
from the floor to 2337
as soon as possible.
After that, we'll reconvene
there in the classified section.
This portion is adjourned.
