In China, a seemingly insignificant event last month is perceived by some international media as an indicator of a potential Cultural Revolution 2.0. Xi Jinping recently convened a meeting in Beijing, endorsing the "Fengqiao-style Working Method," a strategy rooted in Mao Zedong's political maneuvering. This approach involves mass mobilization and internal struggles, with a recent article from China's National Security Department highlighting its relevance to national security. The Fengqiao Experience, endorsed by Xi, was originally employed in the 1960s and later became a model for the Cultural Revolution. Xi's emphasis on this approach reflects economic challenges, financial constraints, and a desire to create a North Korea-like society. Critics argue that this resurrected strategy may not be a lifeline for the CCP, as societal awakening challenges its effectiveness and potential for internal strife. Connect with me: Email: [email protected] Telegram Group: https://t.me/DC2021301
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In the previous month a seemingly mundane piece of news surfaced in China
Yet it carries a deeper significance
Some international media outlets go as far as suggesting that this could be one of the indicators of cultural revolution
2.0
What's the latest development? On November 6, Xi Jinping convened a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing with
104 distinguished representatives of the Feng Chao style working method. Once again
endorsing the so-called new era Feng Chao experience. Previously in September
He had specifically visited Zhejiang to champion the Feng Chao experience
The participants in this meeting were high-ranking officials of the Chinese Communist Party including Li Xi, the
Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Chen Wenqing, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission
Wang Xiaohong, Minister of Public Security
Zhang Jun, President of the Supreme People's Court, and Ying Yong, Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate
The presence of these officials in key roles within discipline inspection, public security, and the judiciary
suggests the substantial importance of this meeting for the CCP. On that very day the
official media outlet of China's National Security Department released an article titled
Utilizing the Feng Chao experience of the new era to wage an upholding a
National security people's war. This piece can be seen as an interpretation of Xi Jinping's ideological
standpoint. The article advocates for the extensive mobilization of all segments of society
aiming to make the conscious protection of national security a
collective effort for each citizen. It calls for the establishment of a formidable people's defense line
dedicated to national security.
What is the essence of the Feng Chao experience that Xi Jinping and his key officials value so highly, and
what signals does it convey?
Since assuming office, Xi Jinping has been avidly studying Mao Zedong's strategies, aiming to
retrace Mao's revolutionary approach. At the core of Mao's political maneuvering lies the Feng Chao experience,
essentially employing the guise of mass movements to mobilize the populace. In September
1962, confronted with economic collapse and a widespread discontent following the Great Famine,
Mao Zedong sought to redirect the prevailing dissatisfaction by initiating the Cultural Revolution.
He openly urged not to forget the class struggle. To set the stage for the upcoming Cultural Revolution,
he commenced the socialist education movement, commonly known as the Four Cleanups Campaign.
This initiative focused on addressing concerns such as clearing work points,
accounts, finances, and warehouses. However, it eventually
expanded into a broader perch in
encompassing politics, economics,
organizations, and ideologies.
Despite Mao's claim that it aimed to prevent revisionism,
its actual purpose was to assess and build momentum for the impending Cultural Revolution.
Commanding in 1962 and calculating in
1965, the Four Cleanup Campaign served as a prelude to the Cultural Revolution,
impacting approximately one-third of China's urban and rural regions.
Stretched over three years, the campaign subjected 5,320,000 individuals to struggle sessions,
resulting in a tragic total of 77,560 deaths.
Within this precursor to the Cultural Revolution, the Fengqiao experience
personally endorsed by Mao Zedong emerged as a model
originating in the Fengqiao district of Zhuji, Zhejiang province.
This experience involved mobilizing the masses and overseeing the transformation of four categories of individuals
landlords, rich peasants,
counter-revolutionaries, and bad people.
How did the Fengqiao district oversees the transformation of these socialist adversaries? On December 21st,
1977, an article titled
Hold High the Red Flag Set by Chairman Mao
Strengthened People's Dictatorship from the Fengqiao District Committee was published in the People's Daily. The article introduced the Fengqiao
experience, emphasizing the mobilization and the reliance on the masses to categorize and queue up adversaries,
conduct educational and evaluative sessions, and engage in ideological struggles.
It highlighted the dependence on the masses for on-site supervision and transformation. To achieve on-site
supervision and transformation through the masses, a Communist Party
caterer named Xu Gengxian played a crucial role. In the 1970s,
he served as an instructor at the Fengqiao police station and had previously been the deputy secretary of the Fengqiao
District Committee. In his book titled Red Leaves of the Feng River, a
documentary on the generation and the development of the Fengqiao experience, he presented various examples.
One prominent case involved Chen Yingling, a landlord with a literacy
inclination who enjoys writing poetry.
Despite enduring over 20 struggle sessions and even facing mock executions,
where he stood alongside actual death row convicts, Chen Yingling, known for his resilience, refused to confess.
The party later adopted a more subtle approach, having him participate in struggle sessions with other four category individuals,
while orchestrating confessions to ease the process.
Witnessing the others conform, Chen Yingling realized the futility of resisting alone and reluctantly confessed to undergo
transformation.
Another case featured Chen Shanxing, a wealthy peasant subject to annual public criticism and physical beatings.
Despite his initial steadfastness, the party employed a cunning strategy by mobilizing his family to criticize him.
Chen Shanxing returning home to find his wife and children against him,
succumbed to the pressure and confessed.
For most men, enduring external hardship is manageable as long as the family remains a last line of defense.
However, when familial betrayal occurs, resistance becomes nearly impossible.
In such circumstances, the significance of perseverance is profoundly questioned. The CCP
manipulates the most fragile elements of human nature,
employing the dirtiest and most deplorable tactics to sever individuals from their social bonds,
rendering them isolated and defenseless.
Ultimately, people are coerced into surrendering.
Consequently, the purported Feng Chao experience is not about maintaining and resolving
contradictions locally as they assert. Rather, it entails mobilizing the masses to engage in internal
struggles, turning family members against each other, and eradicating any traces of resistance entirely.
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949,
the CCP initially tackled the so-called four categories throughout a simplistic and forceful approach involving
quotas, arrests, and executions.
Movements like the Three-Anti and the Five-Anti campaigns were emblematic of this method,
emphasizing the swift resolution of perceived threats through arrests,
executions, and the installation of revolutionary fear.
Despite its expedient outcomes, this fascist
strategy incurred substantial drawbacks, primarily manifested in two significant side effects. Firstly,
the expenses were excessive.
Implementing processes like arrests, sentencing, or executions incurred a significant operational cost.
Erecting prisons extensively, navigating the complete legal proceedings of the judiciary, and maintaining such activities over an extended period of time
ought to be both time-consuming and financially burdensome for the administrative system.
Secondly, the approach had extensive destructive consequences.
Those categorized as the four classes often represented the elites across various fields,
constituting the most productive segment of society.
However, this resource pool was finite,
especially after the disastrous three-year famine that claimed millions of lives.
The CCP, looking to temporarily ease the pace of repression,
found the Feng Chao experience, a method relying on mass mobilization, denunciation, and internal struggles, appealing.
This approach effortlessly controlled the grassroot population,
achieving results superior to the lethal practice of executions.
In January 1964, the CCP officially endorsed the nationwide promotion of the Feng Chao experience,
emphasizing a reliance on the masses' power, strengthening the people's democratic dictatorship,
and transforming the majority of the four classes into new individuals.
The aftermath of this experience was the formal commencement of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
Leaders comfortably observed as they effortlessly incited their subjects to harm each other in the name of revolution,
leaving no room for addressing the true root causes of societal issues or resisting the individual responsible for the problems.
It was indeed an imperial strategy with minimal costs and maximum effectiveness.
Most ordinary people usually don't get to experience the taste of power.
But in the mass movements of the Feng Chao experience, everyone has the power to oppress and the potential to be oppressed.
Within this setting, the darker aspects of human nature emerge and can escalate into a catastrophe.
During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards, armed with red armbands,
mercilessly targeted classmates, teachers, and even family members,
engaging in life and death struggles at the cost of their own lives,
independent of the state machinery.
Similar dynamics are observed in the CCP's zero COVID policies over the past three years.
Once friendly neighbors adorned with red armbands and dressed in white,
gained a semblance of power to control and oppress others.
In these situations, they could be more ruthless than the official state machinery,
even as victims themselves, enduring the hardship of lockdowns, water shortages, and food scarcities.
Therefore, the essence of the Feng Chao experience lies in the mass struggle against one another,
creating an atmosphere of self-preservation
and the perpetual conflict that achieves stability under high pressure.
Xi Jinping, as Mao Zedong's ideological successor, relies on the Cultural Revolution's legacy for his governance experience,
lacking originality.
He particularly favors the once highly acclaimed Feng Chao experience.
Upon assuming power in October 2013,
Xi Jinping openly stressed the need to recognize the profound significance of the Feng Chao experience and uphold its
commendable traditions. A decade later, he, as the chief accelerator,
reiterates the importance of this legacy. What drives this renewed emphasis?
There are three primary reasons to consider.
Firstly, as the economy experiences a downturn and internal conflicts intensify,
Xi Jinping finds himself in a predicament reminiscent of Mao Zedong's era,
much like Mao, whose governance led to chaos with initiatives such as the Great Leap Forward,
competing with the West, and the Three Red Banners,
resulting in a devastating famine and widespread discontent.
Xi Jinping is now grappling with similar challenges.
The economic prospects for China are bleak for the foreseeable future,
prompting Xi Jinping to redirect attention from economic issues. By encouraging internal
conflicts among disgruntled masses, he aims to prevent them from exclusively
directing their dissatisfaction towards his leadership.
Secondly, the government is grappling with financial constraints, making it challenging to sustain the expenses
associated with maintaining stability.
Funding stability efforts is a costly affair, and Xi Jinping currently finds himself in a financial shortfall.
With escalating social tensions, the costs of stability maintenance are on the rise each year.
These expenditures are officially labeled as public safety costs in Chinese documents.
In 2019, the CCP disclosed that the public safety expenditures accounted for
5.9% of the total national general budget expenditure, which amounted to
23.5 trillion yuan.
When calculated, stability maintenance expenses soared to a significant 1.38 trillion yuan.
Notably, in 2019, China's military spending was 1.2 trillion yuan,
underscoring that stability maintenance costs exceeded even those of the military. In the past,
during better economic times, the CCP had some financial reserves, allowing Xi Jinping some latitude.
However, with the present financial constraints and public officials nationwide facing salary reductions,
even economically strained regions are starting to fall behind on salary payments.
Devoid of substantial reserves, Xi Jinping, lacking the financial means for
sustained fiscal investment, is compelled to turn back to implementing the Feng Chao experience
through mass movements due to its cost effectiveness and immediate efficacy.
Thirdly, there is a push to establish a society reminiscent of North Korea.
Despite North Korea facing enduring economic challenges, the Kim dynasty
maintains unwavering stability.
Apart from sustained backing from the CCP, a key factor is the meticulous control over society.
This control doesn't just rely on the formidable reach of state
mechanisms, but extends to rigorous mutual monitoring at the grassroots level, covering every village,
community, and even individual households. Essentially, the strategies employed by North Korea represents an international
adaptation of the Feng Chao experience.
In recent times, Xi Jinping consistently underscores the importance of national security.
But what does this concept truly entail? At its core, it's about preserving political authority.
Hence, his fundamental goal in promoting the Feng Chao experience is to establish a high-pressure
atmosphere akin to North Korea, wherein the populace regulates itself,
preemptively quelling any budding conflicts at the grassroots level before they can burgeon into significant disruptions.
If the Feng Chao experience were truly effective, the CCP could sustain an
ongoing cultural revolution without the need for reform and opening up.
The developmental path since the onset of reform and opening up is essentially the CCP's rejection of the Feng Chao experience.
Xi Jinping's current revival of mass movements,
repackaging an old approach with a new facade, indicates his desperation and the potential dead-end he faces.
Another round of mass movements might be at the end
of his road, but it is unlikely to be a lifeline for the CCP.
Time has changed, and while the CCP may persist in its old ways, the people cannot revert to their former state.
A growing number of enlightened individuals are rejecting his fantasy of initiating another cultural revolution.
Chinese people might engage in internal strife, but they may also, one day,
redirect their weapons towards their true enemies, Chinese Communist Party.
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