"This is the new weird world that we live in: Essentially, this kind-of neocon war on terror, [with a] massive amount of surveillance infrastructure that was built up, is then kind-of turned into this 'countering populism' infrastructure that the left, which previously were the people who were most suspicious of the war on terror and the various agencies that became extremely bloated under that banner, have now signed up to be to be part of it." - Andrew Lowenthal
In 2005, I founded an NGO, a non-profit that worked predominantly in Southeast Asia, but
also in East Asia and South Asia on issues of online free expression, and also online
privacy and other digital civil liberties issues, we might say.
That was because I'm from Australia.
We were very focused on building bridges between Australia and Asia, and focusing on what was
important around, I guess, the new forms of human rights online that were emerging in
the early 2000s, as the internet rose in use.
We were working in Indonesia.
I lived in Indonesia for five years.
I lived in Thailand for almost four years.
I ran that NGO for almost 18 years, and we're dealing in countries with serious levels of
repression of free speech, oftentimes dictatorships like Myanmar or Thailand, other places around
the region.
So everyone that we were working with, who predominantly would have identified as liberals
and progressives, were interested in human rights, democracy, and free speech.
There was not really ever a question around that.
At some point, the question of disinformation began to pop up, and it was real.
In the sense that there really were state actors, say, in the Philippines who were building
online troll armies to distribute mis- and disinformation online, try and manipulate
elections, decision-making, public opinion, etc.
So that was real, and is still real, and needs addressing.
And there were pernicious laws, such as in Malaysia and Singapore, where they would use
fake news as a way, as mis- and disinformation are used now, to squash dissent.
And the progressive activists that we were working with in the NGOs, they knew that.
And so they were campaigning against these fake news laws.
So when I saw then people in the West start getting into these new forms of pro-content
moderation, they might call it, it was like for someone in the Philippines or someone
in Thailand to start going, oh, you need to trust the government more to manage content
on the internet.
No one was thinking that was a good idea.
And so there was this schism that started developing.
At the same time, because that NGO space is predominantly populated with people from
the middle and upper middle class, they took on far too much of the ideas that the West
was imparting to them, also because the money was coming from the West.
It was coming from the big foundations that they were reliant on.
Your nonprofit, from the outside, almost appears to be like many of these other nonprofits
that exist right now, that actually, in the name of making sure that good, accurate information
is transmitted, are actually playing this kind of censorship role.
So there's actually two things.
So one, that organization was called Engage Media, that I've now left, and then started
this new entity called Libanet.
And the previous organization that still exists today, Engage Media, there were anti-disinformation
initiatives that we participated in, that I thought, I think now, still stand up.
They were, say for example, addressing troll armies in the Philippines that were clearly
kind of state-based manipulation of public-
Well, I keep thinking of the 50 Cent Army, the infamous 50 Cent Army.
Yeah, so these things are real, but they totally overreached, and they overreached partly because
the culture changed, and people became kind of more pro-censorship, and because the philanthropy
changed and started directing people more in this direction.
So you actually saw organizations that at one point had been genuinely kind of trying
to foster free speech and expression become kind of their own worst enemy, I guess.
I don't think they would definitely not see it as that.
I mean, it depends who I'm holding in my mind and thinking of as an example.
If I'm thinking of the local groups that I would have worked with, say in Indonesia,
I think they would have thought that, no, they were combating this kind of state or
kind of corporate, you know, top end of town kind of disinformation.
So I think it's been much more in the West where the shift has occurred conceptually,
where the kind of policing of disinformation or the kind of transparency and advocacy around
it switched from targeting the most powerful actors to essentially targeting everyday people.
And I think that's linked to this idea around essentially the kind of massive amount of
infrastructure that was built up during the war on terror that then became kind of countering
violent extremism, which then became a kind of countering populism or got hijacked to
counter populism and essentially got directed towards everyday people.
That's why I say, for example, in Australia, for the Twitter files that I did there, the
Department of Home Affairs, which is essentially where the kind of counterterrorism unit is
housed, are dealing with an account with only 20 followers.
What is that doing?
Why does it need to be doing that?
It's completely off mission, at least based on the kind of outline that it gives to the
general public.
But internally, there was a massive cultural shift where this became acceptable that was
driven in many respects by progressives.
But it was started by neocons.
This is the new weird world that we live in, that essentially this kind of neocon, war
on terror, massive amount of surveillance infrastructure that was built up, is then
kind of turned into this countering populism infrastructure that the left, which previously
were the people who were most suspicious of the war on terror and the various agencies
that became extremely bloated under that banner, have now signed up to be part of it.
Is it just about the money?
When I hear you talking about this, you mentioned that the philanthropy groups supporting these
different groups kind of changed their focus, i.e. said, well, I need you to do a little
more of X. There's a few million dollars in there for you.
That can mean a lot to a small nonprofit, whatever it is that you're working on, right?
And I'm just wondering how much that didn't actually create this effect wherever it was.
I don't think it's so much you need to do a little more of X.
It's that you're presented with this is a new strategic plan of this foundation.
We're working on climate change, anti-disinformation, and women's equality.
And then you basically get to choose which grant you apply for.
And there isn't a free speech option, or there isn't a whatever other issue that if you were
just handing out money to organizations, they would do something very, very, very different.
But Western philanthropy, well, all philanthropy comes with strings attached.
But I think it became that a lot more strings got put in place post-Trump and Brexit that
the philanthropic sector also freaked out and thought, we can't just be so hands-off
when we give our money out.
Obviously, there were always a certain amount of strings that they decided they had to be
much, much more focused on how the money they gave out was used and that it was very, very
targeted towards their specific objectives.
And so I think part of the panic was to see, well, when we said free speech, we didn't
mean that.
We meant this.
And I think there was a lot of big ideology around the internet at the beginning that
was extremely utopian, that essentially imagined that what the internet looked like at scale
was more people like people from Harvard, people from Yale, and people from the West
Coast.
And then actually, that isn't most people at all.
And then the plebs essentially got on the internet, and they all freaked out and went,
oh, my God, we can't have this.
This is not what we meant.
So they assumed there would be this civilizing process, I don't know why they thought that,
that would come along with this process of getting access to information, et cetera,
et cetera.
And then you see this switch from, well, the internet's beyond our control.
There's an infodemic.
It's dangerous.
And there are problems.
That's absolutely true.
But a certain amount of people were motivated, I think, for good reasons.
And a certain amount of people were going, we're losing political control here.
This is very, very dangerous.
We need to do something.
And it's all mixed up.
So when you look at, say, that diagram of the censorship industrial complex, it's not
that every single organization in there or every single fact checker or university institute
is working for the man.
It's that there's a mix.
There's a total mix.
And that's why, in some ways, it works.