noc18-mg22 Lec 49-Oligopoly (Part-2)

IIT Kanpur July 201
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hello welcome back to the lecture series
on micro Kannamma 'kz let us continue
our discussion on cournot duopoly model
last time we have seen how to derive
reaction function of a cooler duopolist
if we follow the same procedure we can
also derive the same reaction function
for farm to or duopoly stew but this
reaction function for form two will have
a different slope and different
intercept
needless to say so now let us plot this
reaction function for duopolist two and
try to find out a solution of this
cournot model okay
now we are going to draw two reaction
functions in such a way that they
intersect with each other that
intersection is required to find a
solution of Qunu model and we will see
why note that I can draw a straight line
reaction function without loss of any
generality it has to be downward sloping
that is what we have observed previously
that there is a negative relationship
between the quantity supply of firm 1
and quantity supply of form 2 so let me
call this reaction function of R 1 R 1 R
1 prime right and let me now superimpose
the reaction function of firm 2 on this
and this reaction function for the duo
Poly's 2 will be a flatter line it will
have different slope and different
intercept
okay so let me mark this intercept and
this is basically my our two reaction
function of two right okay so now how to
find the cournot duopoly model solution
I claim that this is at the intersection
point of these two reaction forms where
these forms will find their profit to be
maximized okay so I call this QC 1 as
the profit maximizing equilibrium output
level of duopolist one and you see two
profit maximizing output level of
duopolist 2 and C denotes basically the
cournot model okay so basically this
intersection point is my uno equilibrium
so the question remains why this
intersection point is referred as the
solution to the cournot model why it's
an equilibrium point so this is what we
are going to discuss now so if we assume
that there is some output level of firm
1 say Q tilde that Q 1 tilde that
assumes that some output level chosen by
form 2 at Q 2 tilde level but what is
the guarantee that actually the firm
will firm 2 will choose the quantity or
output level Q 2 tilde knowing that the
firm 1 has already chosen Q 1 tilde
output so basically the equilibrium in a
cool new model has to be mutually
consistent but there is no guarantee for
that right so it is only at the
intersection point of these two reaction
functions that mutual consistency
happens and we are going to now discuss
that through another diagram so we have
a larger piece of diagram here and let
me first point that cournot equilibrium
again in this diagram and now we are
going to do a stability exercise for
that I need some space that is why I
have redrawn this diagram ok so now what
does a stability analysis mean that if I
get from this cool no equilibrium
whether I can come back to this original
equilibrium or not so let me now start
with some arbitrary level of output
which is given by some number say Q 2 1
okay and if the firm assumes if the firm
one assumes that firm 2 is going to set
its output level at Q 2 1 then
basically the four one will refer to its
reaction function and it then derives or
finds out what is the quantity level it
should produce so you see that given the
output level Q 2 1 which is basically
the initial output level the firm
decides to farm one decides to produce
this much of output level and that is
basically Q 1 1 right so this is
basically the optimal behavior of farm 1
if the farm 2 has chosen Q 2 1 output
level now having seen 4 1 choosing this
Q 1 1 output level the farm 2 will not
sit idle it will go back to now its
reaction function and find out what is
the optimal level of output for each s
the farm 1 has chosen Q 1 1 level of
output and let me call that Q 2 1 okay
so the same process follows as the farm
1 now sees that the farm 2 has chosen or
will choose some output level Q 2 1 it
will now refer to the reaction function
R 1 R 1 Prime and from that reaction
function it will come down to the Q 1
axis to find out what would be the
profit maximizing output level in this
case which is Q 1 2 and this process
will continue until and unless these two
firms which the initial cournot
equilibrium point which is given by the
intersection of these two reaction
functions so basically what we see there
is a journey from here to here and then
from here to there then again from here
to here then from here and basically
finally it converges to the Kuno
equilibrium point so the who know
equilibrium if it exists it is a stable
equilibrium okay so now we are in a
position to state the second-order
conditions of the cournot equilibrium so
these are the second-order conditions so
for that we all know we need to take the
second order derivative of the profit
function of each firm right and what do
we get we get
this right so this implies that the rate
of change in the marginal revenue shall
be less than the rate of change in
marginal cost so basically that means
that the marginal cost must cut marginal
revenue curve from below this is not a
new result to us we have seen this
before so this finishes our discussion
on the cournot market model now we move
on to another duopoly model which has
been proposed by a german mathematical
economist heinrich von Stackelberg and
this is basically step ahead of the
cournot model because the cournot model
has a very naive type of market in
strategic interaction right here we have
assumed zero value for the conjectural
variation but the reality is not that
simple why would a firm assume that if
it produces some output level if it
brings some change in its output
decision then the competitor firm will
not do anything so in that matter you
know why we can assume that the output
decisions of these firms are independent
of each other so that is basically a
very naive assumption right so
Stackelberg actually relax that
assumption and he came up with a more
sophisticated
duopoly model so now we are going to
study that so in a Stackelberg model the
duopolist forms role differ from the
kuno one so in the Stackelberg model one
duopoly form becomes the leader form and
the other duopoly form becomes the
follower form so who is a leader and who
is a follower so let us have some formal
definition for these two concepts and
then we will come to the formal
mathematical model
a duopolist firm is leader
if it chooses profit-maximizing
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output
on the assumption
that
the other sailor will accept
that output levels
and
take it as given while
maximizing its own profit
right okay so on the contrary a
duopolist form is the follower who
accepts the others output choice okay so
now we are going to have a mathematical
model which will basically describe how
the leader exploits the follower so in
this case we will assume that the leader
has access to a very critical piece of
information which is basically the
information on reaction guard so if the
leader form knows the exact mathematical
form of the reaction function of the
form 2 or the here we assume that the
leader for me is form 1 without loss of
any generality so if the form 1 or the
leader form knows the exact mathematical
form of the reaction function of firm 2
then basically he makes uses of that
information to set an output level at
the first hand and then enjoys a first
mover's advantage so basically we have
to solve this problem in two steps so it
is quite interesting to note that the
stackelberg model is basically more of a
sequential type game rather than the
cournot model where the the forms the
duopolist forms have chosen their output
simultaneously okay so here while
solving the stackelberg not in the first
step would be to work on work on form to
which is a follower
optimization problem
and these will basically lead to the
reaction function which is a private
piece of information but somehow if that
is stolen then the firm who has this
information becomes the leader so in
this case basically farm one is our
leader
and actually what happens there we will
see that the leader substitutes this
reaction function are to say in its
profit equation before it maximizes its
profit right so this is a two-step
procedure okay to solve a Stackelberg
model will be very complicated if we
don't assume a functional form so for
simplicity let us assume some functional
forms and that assumption or this
simplification will also help us to
compare the cournot model outcome with
the stackelberg model outcome so we will
go for some simple functional forms we
will work with linear demand functions
and cost functions so that we can get
nice-looking functional forms and get
some nice-looking solutions
so our stackelberg model will be solved
with respect to these simplified
functional forms so here I assume
inverse demand function P I equals a
minus B q1 plus q2 right and that's
basically for both of these forms right
okay now I assume that my cost is such
that I have a constant marginal cost
so now I assume my cost structure is
such that that it gives rise to constant
marginal cost and I assume that to be
denoted by C okay and if I assume these
two then my profit function profit
equation for both the forms will become
a minus B q1 plus q2 minus C times Q I
right okay and this is again for I equal
to 1 to 2 okay so now we know how to
proceed this problem we have to
basically find out the reaction
functions right so and that will come
from the first-order conditions so let
me work with the first-order condition
first for both the forms and it will
look like a minus B u J minus C divided
by 2 B and here I assume that I is not
equal to J right okay so these leads to
the reaction function of the iaith form
given J forms quantity or output choice
and this will have a shape like this
okay now let us write down specific
functional form of the reaction function
for farm 2 because that's what our step
1 suggests right we need to know the
reaction function of the follower form
so the follower form is formed two here
so let us note down its reaction
function
right okay so now we have to move to the
step 1
assuming that the leader farm or farm
one knows the reaction function that we
have just derived it will now write down
its profit equation as note that it will
not write Q 2 here anymore because it
now knows that if the if it chooses some
output level Q 1 tilde how its opponent
firm 2 is going to choose its output
level and that is through the reaction
function so here he will simply
substitute the expression that we have
derived here okay and complete its
profit equation so now it's simple for
farm one form one has to find the
first-order condition for profit
maximization right and that he will set
it to zero and then that will basically
give output level Q 1 star profit
maximizing output level for the
stackelberg leader farm as this you can
solve this yourself and then if you plug
back this value of Q 1 star in the firm
2 or the followers reaction function
which we have just derived then you can
also get this expression this is for 2
or the followers profit maximizing
output level when the leader has already
set the output level Q 1 star in the
market
okay so we will draw a graph depicting
these linear reaction functions which
will also show the cournot equilibrium
and stackelberg equilibrium solutions
okay so now we have to first plot the
reaction functions as we know the
specific functional form we can draw and
this I say to be the form ones reaction
function R 1 R 1 prime now I am going to
superimpose form 2 3 action function on
this
r2 r2 prime is the form to reaction
function okay so we all know that at the
intersection of these two reaction
functions we find our cool new solution
now if we solve our cournot model which
I leave up to you you will see that we
get the output of the cournot duopoly
sperm from the axis and let me now note
down that output level so this is QC
once a depicting or denoting the cournot
equilibrium output level for farm 1 and
that is going to be a minus C divided by
3 B in this case ok fine so now what is
the stackelberg outcome now the
stackelberg I would come will come here
where this reaction function R 1 R 1
Prime Meats the quantity 1 axis and this
is basically the highest quantity that
the farm one or the leader firm can
produce given the situation and the
reaction functions so basically this is
my stackelberg output for farm 1 which
is also a leader farm and that you know
can be found as a minus C divided by 2 B
right ok so now we know what to do we
have to find out the followers output
level or supply in the market and we
know what to do we have to basically
move up from this Stackelberg solution
of
on to the reaction function of form to
and then from the reaction function form
too we can read the output level what it
must produce in order to maximize profit
so basically the form to which is a
follower form accepts these output level
Q base one and then produces this output
level Q is 2 and that is equal to if you
solve you can get that a minus C divided
by 4 B right okay so we can compare our
Stackelberg and cournot solutions here
so note that this is basically the
stackelberg solution so this is
Stackelberg equilibrium point okay so
basically leader form chooses a
particular point on the reaction
function of the follower form so as to
maximize its own profit and that has an
implication on the profit levels of
these competitor firms so now we are
going to compare our model outcomes so
here note that Q s 1 is greater than Q C
1 and same can be said for profit levels
right and then we can so this is
basically for the leader right this is
for the leader and then for the follower
we can write Q is 2 is less than Q C 2
and pi is 2 is less than pi C 1 so
basically in the Stackelberg case we see
that one of the uno duopolist form
suffers succumbs to the leader and it
receives lower level of profit so with
this we finish our discussion on
stackelberg duopoly model next time we
are going to study another type of
oligopoly model which is known as
collusive oligopoly model so we will
continue our discussion on the theory of
oligopoly markets even in the next
lecture
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