LIVE: Supreme Court Hears Arguments on 'Serious Drug Offense' Definition in Anti-Criminal Act

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Nov 27, 2023
The U.S. Supreme Court hears oral arguments for a case on the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act at 10:00 a.m. ET on Nov. 27.
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years should be added and Congress directs them to do so by looking at this person's rap sheet
and determining if there are, quote, serious drug offenses there.
What is hard for me is trying to understand why that classification is
in any way related to the time of the ACCA offense.
I get clearly Mr. Green's situation because he says you're doing that classification today
and so what counts as a serious drug offense should be made relative
to what we would think is serious now by looking at the schedules now.
And the government, I get, because they say, well, when you're looking back at that offense,
those offenses in the rap sheet, you should at least consider or it should be determined
by what was serious then, right, what was on the schedule at that time.
Your position, I'm trying to understand how it relates to the exercise
of classifying this as a serious drug offense.
Thank you, Your Honor.
So let me try to explain it this way.
This court has a long line of precedents about recidivist statutes and they all say the same thing,
that recidivist statutes punish the latest offense
of conviction which is here the 922G offense.
The government, by the way, ignores this line of precedent talking about Greiger versus Burke,
Nichols, Witt, Bryant, and Rodriguez which is an ACCA decision.
And so our point is that you're not looking at someone's culpability
at the time they commit the prior.
That, the state court has already sentenced them based on that understanding of culpability.
You're sentencing them for what they have done at the time they commit the 922G offense.
And the government's sort of contrary logic would prove too much because let's go back again
to the burglary hypothetical.
In that situation, someone commits.
Yes, I understand the government.
What about Mr. Green's point?
Again, we would have no problem if the court goes that way.
But I think we have, we are punishing the 922G offense
and this is how we always calculate statutory penalties in the law.
We're looking at what were the penalties at the time the person committed the crime.
Theoretically, those penalties are what's, could deter someone from committing that crime.
I understand but it's not relevant to the, this is an exercise that is embedded in a definition
of serious drug offense which is I think what is the ultimate goal.
We're assessing whether or not these prior things were a serious drug offense.
Your argument is just, you know, if we were sentencing without that sort
of definitional overlay then we would do so based on what happened with respect to the ACCA crime.
But I guess I'm just confused about the definition of serious drug offense
and how it has any bearing on your rationale.
So, Your Honor, I don't think there's any question that the statutory penalties
in ACCA are incurred the moment someone commits the crime.
That is the crime that we are punishing here, right?
So, we have to then view the, this is why the government agrees.
We look at the version of ACCA in effect at the time of the crime,
not at the time of sentencing, at the time of the crime.
And then the question again comes back to where we began which is, well,
why are we going to look to all of the criteria in ACCA in effect at the time of the crime,
not sentencing, at the time of the crime, but carve out this one exception?
Thank you.
Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Raynor.
Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.
To determine whether a prior state conviction qualifies as a predicate
under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
courts should consult the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of that conviction.
That rule flows from the ACCA's text.
As this court recognized in McNeil, the ACCA establishes a sentencing enhancement
for defendants with previous convictions involving drugs listed on the federal schedules.
That language dictates a backward looking inquiry that requires courts to assess the attributes
of a prior conviction at the time that it occurred.
Critically, the ACCA treats both federal and state convictions as predicates.
Under subclause one, which unambiguously requires courts to consult the federal drug schedules
in effect at the time of the prior conviction, there's no question about this.
Courts have to look to the past.
The same rule should apply to subclause two.
A prior federal conviction would not disappear for ACCA purposes simply
because the drug schedules were later amended to remove the relevant controlled substance.
And there's no reason to treat state crimes differently
when they involve the same culpable conduct and the same regulated drug.
Rather than engage with a statutory text, petitioners rely exclusively
on purported background rules of interpretation.
Jackson most significantly argues that courts should apply the federal criminal law in effect
at the time of the federal offense conduct.
But the government agrees.
The version of the ACCA in effect at the time
of the federal offense conduct is what controls here.
The question in this case is which version
of the federal drug schedules the ACCA's cross-reference specifies.
And Jackson's interpretive principle does not answer that question.
Justice McNeil, this court recognized that the ACCA points courts to the prior version
of state law in effect at the time of the state conviction.
So too it points courts to the version of the federal drug schedules in effect at that same time.
This court should affirm the judgments below.
If we, rather than looking at an underlying drug schedule,
if the statute itself was amended, would your analysis be the same?
No, Justice Thomas.
We acknowledge that if the ACCA included a static list of substances,
so if appended to this provision there was just a list
of substances, cocaine, marijuana, and so forth.
An amendment to that list would apply at the time of the federal offense conduct.
We think the cross-reference to an external body of law that is dynamic is critical here.
And in our view, the cross-reference raises a temporal question.
When Congress chooses to reference an external body of law, that raises the question,
which version of that body of law is Congress intending to reference?
And we think the temporal question is particularly.
I'm not sure why.
I'd like you to concentrate on Justice Thomas's point.
I think this is the most serious weakness in your argument
because it doesn't make much sense to me.
You take, when you're cross-referencing something, you're taking everything with it.
You're picking and choosing and now saying, I'm only going to take a piece of it, not all of it.
To be clear, Justice Sotomayor, we agree.
You're looking at all the federal schedules.
We're not only taking a piece of the schedules.
The question is simply, which version of the schedules?
And as the court discussed in J.M.
I think the question, though, is normally when we have a cross-reference,
we look at the contemporaneous version of the cross-reference.
I think that's Mr. Jackson's primary argument, and the statutory text here says, as defined in,
which suggests we look at both present law, just as we normally would.
Just as you can see, a moment ago, that we normally would.
What in the text suggests this backward-looking approach that you want to put into it?
In the text.
So in the text, we think the cross-reference raises the temporal question
and the context answers the temporal question.
As defined in.
Those are the only terms that we have to work with.
So as the court explained to McNeil, I don't think the present tense does a lot of work here
because this is a backward-looking statute.
I disagree that the background rule is that we always look
to the contemporaneous reference law.
As the court discussed in J.M., the reference canon actually supplies the background rule here,
and the reference canon has different temporal branches depending on context.
The reason the reference canon is structured that way is
because cross-references may refer to past law.
They may refer to present law.
Of course, and in fact, in H, we have such a thing.
We don't here.
We just have as defined in, not as was once defined or as at the time
of state conviction or as had been.
Lots of alternatives I can come up with that would accomplish exactly what you want
and in fact appear elsewhere in the statute, but not here.
I agree all of those formulations would answer the question dispositively
and argue there's three aspects of the text that dictate a backward-looking inquiry.
There's the term previous convictions.
There's the term involving, which we think refers to historical attributes of an offense.
And third, there is subclause one,
which unambiguously requires a backward-looking inquiry.
For sure, we ask backward-looking inquiry when we're saying,
do you have these things, these prior convictions?
But when we're asking what is a controlled, what is a serious drug offense, that's defined.
That's the section that we're not dealing with.
So what do we do with that?
It's true that subclause one is separate from this, but previous convictions is an umbrella term
that informs the meaning of everything that follows.
Involving is actually in the clause that's at issue here.
Involving is followed by a list of attributes of the prior state offense and as defined
in the federal schedules is part of that list.
I think both of those textual pieces still apply in this case.
And just shifting gears, your colleagues on the other side raised an ex post facto concern.
What is the government's analysis of that?
Is there an ex post facto concern?
If not, why not?
We agree that there's an ex post facto problem with Mr. Brown's interpretation
because any time a drug is added to the schedules after the federal offense conducts.
No, no. I'm just saying with respect to your interpretation,
if we accept the state offense time, there are going to be some drugs
that will be added later, inevitably.
That's just the way the world works these days.
And your colleagues on the other side say, well,
that poses a serious ex post facto concern with your interpretation.
And we're going to inevitably invite a number of ex post facto challenges.
And I'm sure the government's given that thought.
And I just want to know what you think the merits of that argument might be.
We do not think there is any merit to that argument.
And I actually don't understand them to be arguing
that our position would create an ex post facto violation because.
Let's suppose I understand that to be their argument.
Then what?
Then I still disagree that there would be such a problem because we agree that the ACCA in effect
at the time of the federal offense conduct governs, up until that point,
the defendant can choose to possess a firearm or not to possess a firearm.
So there's nothing retroactively being imposed on prior conduct.
The prior convictions here are used to help ascertain the seriousness of the offense,
how dangerous this defendant is.
But ultimately, he's still being punished for the gun possession, which is the 922B violation.
Again, but the serious drug offense changes.
On your view, we set it at this time of state conviction.
But the schedules are dynamic, as you point out.
And it's going to lead some individuals to be punished under your reading
who would not otherwise be punished.
And I guess I'm just trying to understand, again,
do you think that's an ex post facto problem?
If not, why not?
I think the only way that there would be an ex post facto problem is
if they were being punished for additions to the schedules after their 922G offense.
That's what I'm asking.
And that's not the case under our interpretation.
Under our interpretation, you look to the schedules in effect at the time
of their prior state offense.
It's locked in at the earliest possible time of all the three.
It's only Brown's interpretation that would create an ex post facto problem.
Neither Jackson's nor yours would create any ex post facto issues, as I understood it.
Is that your understanding?
That is also my understanding.
Mr. Rainer, I'd like you to address the difficulty, you know,
the lack of access to the prior drug schedules, because I think that might be a problem
with your approach from an administrability point of view.
Yes. So Justice Barrett, if we're talking about defendants, I think they paint this sort
of artificial portrait that defendants at the time
of their state convictions will be totally unaware of the federal schedule.
I think that ignores an important part of how this statute works.
The statute picks up federal convictions in analogous state convictions.
So state convictions involving federally prohibited conduct like manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to do those things, a federally controlled substance.
If you're a defendant who has trafficked in a federally controlled substance,
you're going to be very interested in your federal exposure at the time,
even if you're being prosecuted by state authorities.
In fact, I think it would be more difficult for defendants who can't predict
if the schedules are going to change later
and not know whether their offense would be a predicate.
I understand that.
I'm just saying at the time of sentencing for everyone, for the prosecutor,
for the district judge, for the defendant who after the act of offense is committed has
to figure out does this predicate count, how do you find the schedules?
You know, so.
I think part of it is you rely on the attorneys.
Like, you know, the relevant scheduling changes are well known
to both sides of the bar in Florida.
It's Ioflupan and him.
I think they're overstating the degree to which this will be a practical problem.
But to the extent you were worried about it,
our position doesn't create any greater practical problems than McNeil already requires.
McNeil's going to require you to go back and look at the state code in effect at the time.
Well, the state code might be easier to find.
I mean, how often do the drug schedules change at the federal level?
Justice Barrett, I'm not sure that it will be easier to find because you won't just be able
to look at the conviction documents, right?
To conduct the categorical inquiry, you're often going to have
to pull old state drug schedules, which is going to be much harder
to find than old federal drug schedules.
You're also going to have to pull old versions of the state code
to determine what the maximum applicable punishment was because the punishment
to which you were sentenced might not answer the question.
Are the old federal drug schedules hard to find?
It depends on what type of, what you're looking for.
So here, if we're talking about cocaine, cocaine has been scheduled since the beginning.
If you look at the prior, the modern definition of cocaine, there's an exemption
for Ioflupane, you can discover that Ioflupane was descheduled in 2015 via a Google search.
So the argument presented here is difficult to-
Assuming I accept that there's a burden, I know you're saying there's not
and the chief suggested there might not be.
I accept it because I think every prosecution, probation officer,
and defense counsel in these various amicus tell us there's a problem.
Who bears the burden of proving this sentence?
I know that defense counsel says we have to figure it
out because we have to advise our client.
But at the end, they're just defending against a charge.
Doesn't the prosecutor bear the burden of proving it?
Correct, it's a sentence.
And if there's any doubt, you don't, are you conceding on behalf of the government
that if there's a doubt, it's in favor of the defendant
and the enhancement should not be given?
I don't concede that if there is any doubt, the defense automatically wins.
Why? In our view, this is a sentencing factor that can be found by the judge.
By a preponderance of the evidence?
That question is not presented here.
I don't want to get out ahead of- On a legal question?
No, Justice Sotomayor, I'm not suggesting that.
All I was taking issue with was your suggestion
that any doubt is enough to get the defendant off the hook.
I agree the government is going to have to bear the burden on this and prove it.
So how would you want me to phrase that?
It seems to me that if it's as difficult as it's being suggested,
if there is doubt, quantify how much doubt is enough to favor the defendant.
Justice Sotomayor, as I said,
the Sixth Amendment question is coming before the court soon.
I don't want to get out ahead of our briefing on that.
I do think that under Almendrez-Torres,
this could be found along with the fact of the prior conviction.
But I agree with you that this is something
that the government must carry its burden on.
And to get back to the burden question- By a preponderance
of the evidence on a legal question?
No, Justice Sotomayor, I think it's likely that it's beyond a reasonable doubt,
but I'm not prepared to take a position on that today.
Can I just direct your attention to the kind of overall theory of this?
Because I'm, as usual, struggling with that.
Do you concede that a change in the drug schedules reflects a change
in what is considered to be a serious drug offense?
In other words, to take a drug off the schedule, Congress has made a determination
that that's no longer a controlled substance.
It's not going to be something that we consider to be a crime.
Justice Jackson, I certainly agree that going forward,
that means someone can't be punished for that.
And a state conviction going forward also would not be treated as serious.
All right, so then my question, I guess, is why would Congress want
to incapacitate defendants who have committed crimes
that federal law no longer regards as serious?
I mean, I thought the point of this was we're doing ACCA because we think,
as Congress says, that certain people need to be taken off the streets for long periods
of time, and in order to identify those people, we look at their histories
and determine whether they have committed certain kinds of crimes.
If we today, as we undertake sentencing, have an understanding that these certain kinds
of prior crimes are no longer considered serious because the schedules have changed,
I guess I'm trying to understand why the government's position is
that they should still be ACCA predicates.
Right, the reason, Justice Jackson, is because we think in terms
of assessing the seriousness of the prior offense, it makes sense to look
at the legal landscape at the time the offense occurred.
Why? We're doing the sentencing today and we're trying
to determine whether this person today needs to be put in jail for 15 more years.
So why does the seriousness or the label or the perception of the past as to what he did matter?
Why wouldn't the criteria for determining that be what we think about his prior crimes today?
It's relevant to his willingness to disregard the law, so to take Jackson as an example.
He trafficked cocaine in 1998 and 2004.
That was considered a very serious crime at the time.
The fact that there was later a medical use discovered for a derivative of cocaine.
Yes, no, I understand how it turns into a technicality in the particulars of this case,
but what I'm saying is ACCA is not about punishing the person for the past offense.
He's already, you know, been held responsible, culpable, sentenced for the past offense.
I thought it was about incapacitating people who we can identify as particularly dangerous based
on the nature of their past offenses.
So it's not really about his willingness to commit a crime.
I mean, he has these criminal offenses.
Congress would have just said, do you have an offense?
Instead, they say, do you have a serious drug offense?
And what I am struggling with and trying to get beyond is why we are evaluating the seriousness
of that offense based on past standards as opposed to the standards that would apply today
as we are making this 15-year determination.
Justice Jackson, I think another way to come at this is,
this is unambiguously what subclause one does.
It cares about the seriousness of the offense at the time.
It cares about whether you had a federal conviction.
Well, I'm not so sure about that.
I mean, it doesn't, it too doesn't necessarily, I'm trying to find the statute.
You know, it says an offense.
It doesn't say a conviction under the Controlled Substances Act.
And I appreciate that the previous thing says you have to have three previous convictions, right?
But for a serious drug offense, and then it says an offense under the Controlled Substances Act.
I mean, one could interpret that also with respect to modern standards
because the exercise is trying to identify what is a serious drug offense.
And if today we would say this is not an offense under the Controlled Substances Act,
I suppose we could interpret the federal statute differently than what you're articulating, right?
I don't think so, Justice Jackson.
I think the text says, do you have a previous conviction
for an offense under the Controlled Substances Act?
If you have a conviction for an offense under the Controlled Substances Act,
that's just the end of the analysis.
Why couldn't it be today's Controlled Substances?
That's what I'm asking you.
It wouldn't be an offense for the Controlled Substances Act as it exists today.
No, but it would be literally a conviction under the Controlled Substances Act.
And to be clear, I am not aware of any court entertaining this argument before, much less adopting it.
But it's also not an issue in this case, right?
We're doing the other thing.
Mr. Rayner, I'm sorry.
Go ahead.
No, you were first.
Go ahead.
Justice Kagan.
Can I take you back to the conversation that you started having with Justice Thomas?
If I understand your responses to those questions, you agree with Mr. Adler
that if ACCA were amended so that burglary was not a predicate, you would go with the new version.
Is that right?
The version in effect at the time of the offense conduct, correct.
Correct.
And same if instead of this language, you had a list of five controlled substances,
and those five controlled substances were amended, again, the same result would follow, correct?
Yes.
So your whole argument rests on treating differently a list of five substances or any other attribute of ACCA,
treating it differently from a controlled substance as defined in section 102.
And that seems a little bit mysterious to me.
I mean, if you ask why it is that Congress put in this language,
a controlled substance as defined in section 102, it's, well, number one,
there are lots of controlled substances, and you don't want to have to list all, however many there are.
And number two, we expect them to change.
So what's going to be a controlled substance next year is not necessarily the same as this year.
And so on both of those theories of why Congress used this language,
it seems perplexing as to why you would have a different rule than you would if Congress had just listed the substances.
Right.
Justice Kagan, I think one way to think about this is if it had listed the substances,
that would reflect a static concern with particular substances.
But by referencing an external body of law, Congress evinced its concern with the drug's status under federal law.
And for the reasons I was discussing with Justice Jackson, it makes a lot more sense to look at the drug's status
under federal law at the time of the prior conviction.
I mean, I would think quite the opposite, that what Congress is saying when it does,
when it uses this kind of language, is we know this is going to be in flux.
So keep on updating, you know.
And that's an argument in Mr. Adler's favor, not in yours.
Right. So Justice Kagan, another way to come at this is that we think the cross-reference,
as I mentioned to Justice Gorsuch, it raises the temporal question.
When Congress puts in a cross-reference, we know from the reference canon,
there's multiple points in time it could be referencing.
There's no background rule that it's always referencing current law.
So in our view, the cross-reference, it only raises the question.
It doesn't answer the question.
We think what answers the temporal question is subclause one, the term previous convictions,
the term involving Anne McNeil in this court's precedent.
It's that text and context that, in our view,
answers the question in favor of the prior state conviction.
Can I ask about, following up on Justice Jackson's questions, how to think about this statute?
Because I think about it not as a purely recidivist statute for recidivist drug offenses,
but as a gun statute.
Once you have the three prior offenses for serious drug offenses or violent felonies,
you know don't possess a firearm.
In fact, if you have one, you know don't possess a firearm.
But once you have three, don't possess a firearm or you're getting a mandatory minimum.
Because Congress was concerned about guns with drugs.
Not about drugs alone in this statute.
About guns with drugs.
And that's why you look, that's what Congress was concerned about.
Yes, Justice Kavanaugh.
I think that's an important response.
So without, it's not just the drugs.
It's the gun.
Right, exactly.
And I think that's an important response to their notice argument.
As you mentioned earlier in your questioning of my friend,
as soon as the defendant receives that third conviction, he's going to know.
He cannot possess a gun going forward.
That's not an inquiry for him to undertake ten years later when he decides to possess a gun.
Now the response to that, so I want you to respond to what counsel said, was not really.
They don't really pay attention to that.
They're not advised to that.
So will you respond to that?
Yes, I think there's two responses to that.
The first is what I just said to you.
It inhibits their behavior going forward.
Because they know one minute after that third conviction,
if they possess a gun, they're subject to the act of enhancement.
And the other response, I think, is what I mentioned to Justice Barrett earlier,
which is this statute picks up federal convictions and analogous state convictions.
And if you trafficked in a federally controlled substance, you're going to be highly aware
at the time of what your federal exposure is,
even if you end up being prosecuted under state law.
So that's the second reason the defendants will care at the time.
All that being said, we think even if this is something that they research later,
the burden is they'll have to do that research before possessing a firearm.
We don't think there's a problem even then.
But we think the other side overstates the degree to which the defendant will be ignorant
of federal schedules at the time of the state conviction.
Counsel, you, in response to Justice Kagan, talking about the reference canon,
noted that sometimes it can refer to the past rather than present law.
But do you agree with the court in JAM that a general reference to an external body of law takes
that body of law as it evolves over time?
Justice Gorsuch, I agree with that insofar as it's not fixed at the time
that the referring statute was enacted.
We don't think that the JAM court had occasion to get
to the level of specificity required to resolve this case.
So every party in here agrees.
Let me just interrupt you there.
I'm sorry.
When a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject
as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.
There's other language, too.
I mean, the reference is to an external body of potentially evolving law.
So that's the general rule this court has adopted.
And it's for you to overcome that general presumption, isn't it?
I don't think so, Justice Gorsuch.
The court actually articulated two branches of the canon.
It said if there's a reference to a general body of law, it evolves.
If there's a reference to a specific provision, it's fixed.
It can sometimes be fixed, sometimes.
But generally, if there's reference to a general body of law,
the rule is always an exception that it takes it as it finds it.
Yes. I think on its face, the canon here would suggest it's fixed
because this is a specific reference.
All the parties agree that that is overcome here.
I think once the implication of the canon is overcome, the court should just look
to Congress' intent without further reference to the canon.
They should just ask, what did Congress intend here?
And for the textual reasons you and I discussed earlier.
And I will say, even if you think that this falls
within the dynamic prong of the reference canon, all of the parties agree
that the schedules evolve and that this statute does not reference the schedules
as they existed at the time of the ACCA's enactment.
The question is, which of our dynamic reference points is correct?
And I don't think.
I don't think.
So you can see that it's dynamic too, but just it stops at a certain point.
We can see it's not fixed at the time.
Correct. I don't concede that that branch of the canon necessarily applies,
but if you thought that it did, I don't think it supplies the requisite granularity
to figure out which of the dynamic points that we're arguing about is correct.
And this is evidenced by the fact that both Mr. Jackson and Mr. Brown claim
that the reference canon supports their position,
even though they have different positions.
Thank you.
What do I do?
I found it curious that the government argued for a time of federal offense approach
in the Court of Appeals in Brown.
It's now changed its position.
It wasn't the Solicitor General making the argument down there.
You're entitled to raise any argument you want.
But it does suggest to me that there is a reading of this statute
that comports with Mr. Jackson's approach.
Justice Sotomayor, just to clarify, the Brown briefs were filed at a time
when this issue was just arising.
It was very much in flux.
And the government offered the Third Circuit the saving statute approach as a narrow way
to resolve the case because Mr. Brown would lose under either time
of federal offense rule or time of state crime rule.
He only wins under his current rule, yeah.
And we could footnote three of our Court of Appeals brief reserves the time
of state crime rule for cases where it might matter.
Why is this issue only arising now?
That's a good question, Justice Barrett.
I'm not sure about the answer.
It may be that we've had more major descheduling recently than we did in the first, you know,
20 or 30 years of the ACCA's existence.
But to my knowledge, this has really only started to arisen in the past two or three years.
If I may for a moment just talk about Mr. Jackson's background rule.
He says, courts always apply current federal criminal law
at the time of the offense conduct.
It's important to note that that rule doesn't exist in the abstract.
He draws it from three separate bodies of law.
He amalgamates it first from the ex post facto clause,
which says that post-defense changes
that make the offense more culpable don't apply retroactively.
That rule obviously doesn't implicate our position here.
Second, he draws it from the saving statute,
which says that post-defense changes
that make the conduct less culpable also don't apply retroactively.
Again, that sets no light on our position here.
And third, he draws it from the logical point that if you commit an act that's not a crime
at the time, you haven't committed a crime.
So if Congress passes a law that says you shall not murder, they repeal that law
and two days later you commit a murder, you simply have not violated any law.
Again, that doesn't shed any light on our position here,
which depends on ascertaining the seriousness of a predicate conviction.
So in that situation, Congress repeals a federal statute.
Let's say we're looking at the federal prong and you commit federal crimes
under the Controlled Substances Act at the time and then Congress repeals that portion
of the Controlled Substances Act, is the government's position
that it would still be ACCA predicates?
Justice Jackson, if I'm understanding you correctly,
if you were convicted of a CSA offense.
Yes.
Congress later repealed that aspect of the CSA,
but it didn't make the change retroactive.
So your conviction is still in the books.
Yes.
Yes, that would qualify as an ACCA predicate.
My point in discussing the sources of this background rule is to show that when you reduce it
to these sources, none of them shed any light on the question in this case.
To say that courts apply current federal law and therefore the cross-reference points
to the current federal schedules is entirely question begging.
It assumes the conclusion.
Thank you, counsel.
Justice Thomas?
Mr. Rayner, just so I'm clear, you do take the position that if the statute itself had been,
if ACCA had been amended to change the schedule, if it was more dynamic,
that it would, petitioners would win.
Justice Thomas, we agree that if the drugs were listed in the text of ACCA
and that drug list was modified, Mr. Jackson's rule would apply.
Now, this seems to be, in effect, an amendment.
So if, in effect, it's an amendment of ACCA, why is it treated differently
or less exactingly than an actual amendment of ACCA?
Justice Thomas, we disagree that this is equivalent to an amendment of ACCA.
The way to think about this is there's the text of the ACCA and then there's the external bodies
of law that the ACCA requires courts to consult.
And it's referring courts to external bodies of law because it cares about the legal landscape
in existence at the time of the prior conviction.
The external bodies of law include both the schedules and state law.
So just as in McNeil, the court said you have to look at state law at the time
of the prior conviction, so too here.
Justice Alito?
Justice Sotomayor?
Justice Kagan?
Justice Gorsuch?
Just to follow up on Justice Thomas's question and not to belabor the point,
but let's suppose that the language of E1 was exactly as it is.
So all of your textual clues are exactly as they are.
But in A1, instead of referencing the schedules, it listed drugs.
You concede, I think, that despite all of your textual clues
that you pointed to, that that would be dynamic.
Justice Gorsuch, just to clarify, if in A1 it listed drugs?
Yeah, if in A1 it said a serious drug offense means conviction
for the following substances, cocaine, da-da-da,
whatever the crazy drug is, was added in or whatever, okay?
But if it listed those drugs, I think you conceded multiple times
that that would be dynamic.
Correct.
Despite all of the textual clues that you hang your hat
on in the preceding paragraph.
Right. And Justice Gorsuch, just to be clear about our analytical framework,
if there's no cross-reference, there's no temporal question.
So we think the cross-reference raises the temporal question.
I understand that.
And then the clues answer.
All of the clues wouldn't overcome the dynamic nature
of the statute in those circumstances, right?
I agree.
It would not overcome the actual text of the act, if the act was.
Well, the only change I'm positing is the definition
of a serious drug offense means an offense
under the Controlled Substances Act, yada, yada, yada.
Instead of that, it's just a list.
Right. And I'm assuming the list also applies
to Subclause 2 in your hypothetical.
Well, yeah, whatever.
Okay. It does.
Yeah. Yeah.
So if Congress actually listed drugs in both Subclause 1 and Subclause 2, we agree that effect.
All the textual clues that you otherwise think so important wouldn't overcome it.
Correct, Justice Gorsuch.
And the reason is that we think those clues answer the temporal question raised
by the cross-reference.
If you eliminate the cross-reference,
there's just no temporal question in the first place.
Justice Kavanaugh?
Justice Barrett?
Justice Jackson?
So can I just ask you again about the point of the legislation?
Because you had a back-and-forth with Justice Kavanaugh, and it seems to,
does the government concede that incapacitation
of certain serious offenders is what ACCA is about?
At a high level of generality, yes.
Because that's what the legislative history shows.
I mean, we have House reports, we have Senate reports that say the purpose
of this legislation is to curb armed habitual career criminals,
and then has a big discussion of how we identify those people.
So that's what this is about, right?
Yes, Justice Jackson.
At a high level of generality, we agree this is
about incapacitating dangerous offenders.
And so with Justice Gorsuch's point of the, and Justice Kagan's point, I just want to be clear.
If burglary is, sorry, if other elements of this definition are changed, like possession,
for example, hypothetically, you would agree that we'd be looking at the current definition
and not the definition of serious drug offense at the time of the state conviction?
If Congress actually amended in the text of the ACCA a definition of burglary,
we agree that definition would apply to federal offense conduct occurring thereafter.
And why is that, why isn't that inconsistent with your argument
that we should be applying the law at the time of the state offense?
The reason, Justice Jackson, is we agree that what he's being punished
for is his federal firearm offense.
That's what this is punishing him for.
But it's looking to prior convictions to ascertain his dangerousness,
to ask is this the sort of person we really don't want possessing a gun?
Is this a drug dealer who we really don't want possessing a gun?
And in ascertaining the seriousness of the prior convictions,
it makes sense to look to the legal landscape at the time.
And.
No, no, no, I'm saying, so we have a definition.
We have a definition of serious drug offense.
And the definition says manufacturing, distributing, or possessing a controlled substance.
You seem to be saying that if Congress changed that definition to drop possession out,
you would not consider or you would apply the new definition, right?
Even if it previously included possession and it was a categorical match before
at the time of the state conviction.
I don't understand why the same argument doesn't apply to a change in controlled substance.
It's just another element of the definition.
Congress changes it.
So why would you be saying that it has to be a categorical match only back
at the time and not today?
Right. Justice Jackson, we agree that the statute of conviction, the ACCA,
in effect at the time of the federal offense is the one that applies.
Because if you don't violate the version of the ACCA at the time
of your federal offense conduct, you haven't violated the law.
But the ACCA references external bodies of law.
And so just as in McNeil, the court looked at the state law in effect at the time
of the previous conviction, so do here.
We think this is an analogous inquiry.
Thank you.
Thank you, counsel.
Mr. Adler, rebuttal.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
The colloquies between Justice Jackson, Justice Kagan,
Justice Thomas illustrate why the government's position fails in this case.
I'd like to read you a quote from this court's decision in Engel versus Davenport from 1926.
It's on page 8 of our reply brief.
And it says that the adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much a part
of the later act as though it had been incorporated at full length.
That is exactly what ACCA is doing with the controlled substances schedules.
There's no legal basis to say that ACCA, that we would win this case had Congress enumerated all
of the substances, but we lose this case just because Congress incorporated them by reference.
But as Mr. Rayner repeatedly said at the podium today,
that is the government's position in this case.
We submit there is simply no legal basis to draw that sort of distinction.
And we think that is simply the end of the case.
The government's remaining arguments based on McNeil, culpability, backward looking,
all of that prove too much because it would apply to all of the criteria in ACCA.
Burglary, possession, everything in ACCA.
And the government agrees that cannot be right.
So that argument fails too.
I want to address briefly the reference canon because it came up a bunch.
I'm not sure why the government is referring to it because there's no dispute
in this case that the reference canon, it's not,
the government's position is not even one of the options.
There's two options.
There's 1986, which would be for static reference, which no one thinks applies here.
And there's a dynamic general law, which is everyone agrees this is dynamic.
And so the question when you have a general reference is when does the question arise
under ACCA, the question arises when the person commits the 922G offense.
That's it.
Finally, I want to address notice to address Justice Kavanaugh's earlier concerns
and Justice Gorsuch's concerns about ex post facto.
Our position on that is that if you think about a recidivist statute,
a newly enacted one, let's say, it would have to apply
to prior convictions that predated it.
That's the whole point of the recidivist statute.
But if you analyze notice at the time of the prior conviction, you couldn't do that.
It would violate the ex post facto clause in that situation.
That's why ACCA covers pre-ACCA predicates.
Greiger versus Burke held that in the exact same situation.
And this is not something of the past.
Congress revises recidivist statutes all the time.
It just did that in the first step act.
The NAF debrief talks about this.
841 is the federal drug statute.
It has enhanced mandatory minimums based on prior convictions
for serious drug felonies, serious violent felonies.
Those are brand new terms.
So under the government's view of notice, those terms don't, that statute doesn't apply
to any conviction that predates the first step act of December 2018.
That would be the logical implication of the government's argument.
And nobody thinks that Congress could have intended that.
We ask that the court reverse the judgment of the 11th circuit.
Thank you.
Thank you, counsel.
Case is submitted.
The honorable court is now adjourned until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
