UK’s First Sea Lord on the Royal Navy

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Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I want to give a particularly warm welcome to our guest today, Admiral Sir Ben Key, who assumed his post as First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff in November of 2021.
He joined the Royal Navy in 1984 as a university cadet, subsequently graduating in physics from Royal Holloway University of London.
He qualified as both helicopter aircrew and as a principal warfare officer and as a junior officer, saw service around the world in a wide range of frigates and destroyers.
He's commanded four ships, the mine hunter HMS Sandown, the frigate HMS Iron Duke, and the HMS Lancaster, and the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious.
Among his many noteworthy credentials, I wanted to read one from the Ministry of Defence biography, now much better at talking about sport than actually playing any.
He is also president of a number of Royal Navy and UK Armed Forces sports. So congratulations on a wide range of talents.
Thank you very much, Seth.
Well, welcome to CSIS. I wanted to begin by highlighting that this is the anniversary week of Admiral Horatio Nelson's victory at Trafalgar in 1805 against the combined fleets of the French and Spanish navies.
How are you celebrating the Royal Navy victory?
Well, obviously, we'll be doing it modestly, quietly, as we do every year, but actually recalling not just one of the greatest admirals, I think, that ever applied our trade and recognised as such around the world,
We're not shackled by our history in the Royal Navy. We're very proud of it. We continue to kind of evolve and move on.
and was another great naval leader of a different generation, but shared many of that same commitment to deep professionalism, a drive, a strategic vision. So those are the sort of things we'll be doing.
That's great. And welcome again to Washington. It's great to see you here. I wanted to start also with the Prime Minister's recent talk publicly about stepping up the UK's presence in Northern Europe.
Yeah, of course. So the JEF, the Joint Expeditionary Force, which has really been in existence since 2014, had a political leaders gathering recently co-hosted by the Swedish Prime Minister and the British Prime Minister on the island of Gotland.
I think is very important, as well as providing agility and something that can ultimately operate within the NATO framework.
What's your general assessment of the threat from these kinds of attacks and how in other ways are you looking at dealing with them?
Because when you consider some of the challenges we face, you're going to be taken into the gray zone because the power of the Western nations acting as a collective in traditional security sense is still really quite impressive.
When I look at how Norway has developed some of its sort of both state and commercial intersections to better understand what's going on in its huge energy pipelines that are just off its coastline, a Jeff member now sharing his thoughts with us.
And I know for a fact that he thoroughly enjoyed himself because his military assistant rang me the following morning to say it was, you know, it was a home run.
What capabilities from the Royal Navy perspective have been deployed? What can you tell us about what kinds of actions you're up to?
So the prime minister has been absolutely clear. And I just want to echo his words that Israel has suffered an outrageous terrorist attack by Hamas. And we are unequivocal in our support for their right to defend themselves.
Probably P-8s there too.
No, of course. So the Pacific is a fundamental part of our economic lifeblood. And we've got a long history in the United Kingdom of interests across the Pacific region. And those interests haven't gone away at all.
So that people can go about their lawful business, which in our case is prosperity and economic trade, because that's what we all, in our interconnected world, that's really important.
How are you thinking about juggling both the European, which is probably your primary theater, it's what the Integrated Review says, and the Pacific theater?
It seems to me an entirely natural thing. And the joy of the NATO framework is we've got a common currency that we can operate within. And we also know that we can dock alongside our key American partners when that's required.
I mean, if that's not a demonstration of being able to cover a range of bases, I don't know what is.
So one follow up there, and this was certainly a concern on my recent visit to Seventh Fleet after Taiwan, which is the evolution of the Chinese Navy and the industrial base that has come with that.
But what is your general assessment of where the Chinese are headed? And how big of a challenge that they may be in the future in the Indo-Pacific?
So clearly, they're making a huge investment in this. That's entirely consistent with the sort of statements that Xi Jinping has been making about restoring Chinese confidence.
whilst also understanding that the best way for the global order to work together is to cooperate around a common rule set that we all understand.
When talking about the Pacific, I think we have to still touch on AUKUS. Some have argued that the process has been slow. Some even have used terms like glacial. How do you measure progress in AUKUS so far?
It certainly started off with an important programme and statements by the three leaders of Australia, the US and the UK. Where do you see it right now, the various pillars? How do you measure progress for AUKUS?
It's a fascinating thing that in this modern world of instant gratification, something as strategic and as profound and multi-decade as AUKUS then suddenly has to deliver within six months of the leader's statement made in San Diego.
Or less.
Building a nuclear submarine takes many years. Creating the capability to build your own nuclear submarine from scratch, not surprisingly, takes a bit longer.
When you look at those sorts of timescales and yet some of the additional complexity that is now involved, I don't think progress is glacial at all.
So under the bonnet, a lot of work is going on and I think that people need to be really careful about what it is that they're trying to judge.
Meanwhile, the pillar two work, which is looking at hypersonics, electronic warfare, the implications of artificial intelligence, other investments in the underwater battle space, is piling on apace.
But of course, because that hasn't got a good snappy photograph, I mean, how do you take a photograph of AI? You can't. Those sorts of things get missed in the narrative.
So I think AUKUS is a real strategic game changer. It is a phenomenal investment that is going to create a very different and positive strategic effect.
And alongside Admiral Frank Ketty as the Acting Chief of Naval Operations here and Admiral Mark Hammond, the Aussie Navy boss, we've got our orders and along with our broader nuclear community and colleagues, we're marching hard.
The speed with which sharing of technology happens is still far too slow. Between the US and the UK, these are five eyes countries, same with the Australians. We share exquisite intelligence, I know from my time in government.
Compare that, you began your session here, by how do we celebrate Trafalgar.
Because the intent is very clear, we want a safe and secure world that underpins the rules-based international system, that people, that nations can freely and comfortably live and work and trade alongside each other.
And just to add to this, it is worth noting, going back to your point on partnerships in the Pacific, I can't see a single example, whether it's in Europe or in the Indo-Pacific, of any contingency where it's not a multilateral effort right now.
And I think this is why this issue is critically important, to get right and to get right relatively quickly.
And I can understand there will be some things that the United States, information that it has that it wishes to protect. Every nation has this kind of, every person's got their core secrets, every nation. I've got that.
But it's lowering the barriers. So the moment comes and you really need to move this information around, then we're really clear that we can exchange the things that really matter in order to achieve our shared objectives and aims.
And that's what I would encourage it all. And it's the same for all of us. There is work going on in the UK, just as much as I know there is in the US, to ensure that that's the case.
So one of the areas that we've kind of danced around a little bit is the war in Ukraine. As we start to head towards the second anniversary of the Russian invasion, what are the lessons from a Royal Navy perspective you're continuing to identify?
Just even watching somewhat recently, much of the focus has been on the land war, but we've seen a lot of activity, including on the Ukrainian side of striking Russian naval targets in and around Crimea and Sevastopol.
But more broadly, whether it's activity in the Black Sea or other locations, what are some of the lessons you're looking at right now coming from Ukraine?
So I think there's stuff in the tactical space and there's stuff in the strategic. So in the tactical space, look at the innovation that they're doing in Ukraine.
We're looking at the way that they're thinking differently about how you achieve sea control, sea denial.
The classic doctrinal terms still have huge relevance in what's going on. And in a kind of an asymmetric sense, the Ukrainians are finding ways of ensuring that their own seas are not a threat by the Russians.
They're pushing the Russians back all the time, as we've seen with a lot of the last ships of the Black Sea fleet being pulled right back now, even in some cases out of Sevastopol.
So that's really good. What does that mean for us, both in terms of how we achieve effect, but also what could be played against us and how do we defend?
And then there's the strategic lesson, which is a sort of reconfirming a truth, which is that a maritime blockade successfully enacted can have a strangulation effect on a nation's economy.
And equally, a maritime blockade, when enacted by another, can have far-reaching impacts on nations that are somewhere away from the action.
So if you look at the sadness of Russia withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and when they were imposing that blockade on Ukraine, then food is not getting to other people around the world who need it.
And so ensuring, again, the security of the high seas and the movement to this prosperity and economic trade is a really important thing to do.
And we need to be sure that we have got the wherewithal within our armory.
There's a lot of conversations across NATO about just understanding, just in the same way that the convoys of the First and Second World War across the Atlantic,
something I know that the US were closely involved in, these were really important economic lifebloods.
And that is true still today.
And that's been proved, just as in the same way that when the evergreen got stuck in the Suez Canal, it suddenly had an impact on global supply chains.
So it's underpinning the importance of the maritime to maintain those economic lifeblood.
And it's looking at what does innovation look like when war is the mother of your invention.
And we're seeing as much of that in the maritime as we are on the land as well.
When you look over the next five to 10 years, what is your sense of where the Russian Navy along these lines is headed?
Much of the Russian Navy is still largely intact, even though the army has certainly suffered some significant attrition in the war.
When we've done some analysis recently on some of the Russian military journals and looking out into the future on the Russian Navy,
they are looking at various ways to strengthen, including the continuing use and expansion of submarines and anti-submarine warfare.
NATO continually, in Russian documents, is the major threat that the Russians lay out in the foreseeable future.
They've announced a desire to create five naval infantry brigades for naval coastal troops based on existing naval infantry brigades.
I'm just wondering, there are some in the U.S. that will axiomatically look at the Indo-Pacific and China as really the only theater that matters,
even though there's a war right now.
How concerned should people here be aware of where the Russians may be headed?
Is it important not to take our eye off the ball here to maximize deterrence in the European theater?
I couldn't agree more.
I see nothing that's going on in the Russian naval maritime forces at the moment that tells me that they have significantly had degraded their major capabilities.
Their nuclear submarine fleet has not been affected by what's gone on in the war in Ukraine.
The long-range aviation squadrons have not been affected by the war that's going on in Ukraine.
When you look at their strategic nuclear forces, they have not been affected by what's going on in the war in Ukraine.
And so their ability to offer a very real threat to NATO, to Western forces, is absolutely there.
And of course, if you're Russia and you now look at what's happened to your army, the length of the border with NATO that you've created because of the accession of Finland in to join,
the way Putin, rather than dividing NATO, has kind of strengthened and brought it together,
then you're not going to try, I don't think, in the next few years, anything that looks like a sort of territorial push across the border into Europe.
But what you are going to try is to continue to try to threaten us and hold us at risk in a number of hybrid, deniable or sort of phase-naught areas
where very quickly you can deliver some sort of impact that destabilises our confidence in ourselves.
And you can think through all end of that.
The Russian underwater research programme, GUGI, is still alive and well.
And we talked earlier in this about the importance of those pipelines.
So if you want to achieve some sort of asymmetric effect, then Russia's got a considerable number of tools that are available to do so.
And I think we've got to be very careful that we don't spend a lot of our time talking about the importance of grey zone activity, asymmetric threat, hybrid attacks and all the rest of it,
and then suddenly go back to a straight conventional conversation where you just count up everything and say, well, look at the mismatch, therefore it's over.
Because you're kind of ignoring how the things that exist, what it is that they actually offer.
And so I think we would be negligently complacent if we determined that there was not risk being applied to us into the future from what is still very capable parts of the Russian inventory,
even if their holistic capabilities have been so significantly degraded by Putin's actions.
So where does the Arctic sit for you along these lines?
We've seen the Russians recently send crude oil on non-ice class tankers through the Arctic.
We've seen them recently in the last few days ship nuclear fuel across the northern sea route on a cargo ship that's not even specialised in the transport of nuclear fuel.
So some risks involved, including environmental risks in taking some of these steps.
How would you characterise both climate change here and kind of where competition is evolving in the Arctic?
So I find it very interesting that as we see the northern sea routes opening up for much, much greater parts of the year than we've traditionally seen.
And depending upon the kind of documentation you read and the scientific predictions, you could find those routes being open for half the year quite soon, which would be fascinating.
Russia is clearly both very interested and very concerned because it's trying to invoke a whole bunch of domestic law that says nobody else can go through there, even though the high seas rules are really clear.
And I also look at the investment China, which is not an Arctic facing country, is making in icebreakers and the like.
And when they open up, what does that mean, say, for the movement of mass fishing fleets? What does that say for how people may start to run export routes, which are less well known?
It brings a different sort of sense of some of the choke points of the world into it. And we need to pay attention to that, very much so.
And we need to be really clear that if we were to just sort of sit there and think this is how it has always been, then we're missing one of the more rapidly changing aspects of maritime movement, I think.
One final question that comes from one of the individuals who has written in is, and I think we'll make this the last question, is looking towards the future, what role do you see advanced technologies playing?
We talked a little bit about this, but when it comes to the role of artificial intelligence, for example, or unmanned or uncrewed systems, could be air, could be surface, could be subsurface in the evolution of maritime operations.
How do you see the future technology and systems evolving in the Royal Navy?
And then we've got another group thinking about, OK, if we spot something good, how do we scale that up and actually bring it properly into service?
We've just commissioned or brought into service an experimental vessel, the Patrick Blackett, named after the only naval officer in the world to win a Nobel Prize for physics.
And that's very much designed to explore the autonomous opportunities that we can pull together.
HMS Prince of Wales operating here, just off Washington at the moment, doing development test flying with the F-35, but also with a number of uncrewed air systems on board that we want to test and trial ourselves.
So to us, it's really important that we are understanding what's at the cutting edge, what are the opportunities, and that we've kind of got a fail fast mentality into some of these ideas.
And I know that in this we're exactly the same as the US Navy. The scale of purchasing power might be slightly different, but the kind of intellectual curiosity is absolutely the same.
But I caution against someone thinking that all of this will very quickly become kind of a robot war.
It's very difficult for me to understand when people sit there. I mean, this might happen in many decades. We don't know.
Anyone who can forecast that far ahead, I think, is probably more in astrology than astronomy in the way that they're forecasting the movement of the heavens.
But I would just observe that ultimately conflict, tension is resolved in the minds of humans.
And so for it to be resolved in the minds of humans very often is when humans are also involved physically in the contest that goes on, because otherwise the jeopardy just isn't there.
And consequently, a lot of the decision making, a lot of that visceral experience will still be experienced by people.
But it's where the technology, the uncrewed systems, allow you to multiply the effects you're having to understand very fast what's going on, to get long range persistence of information.
But decision making will still, for all the AI that's available, those judgments about do we or do we not and the like takes place in the mind.
And we saw that there was that excellent film not long ago, Eye in the Sky, which explored some of these really complex topics.
And when you think about some of the, as all our prime ministers and presidents have been talking about recently, about what's going on in Israel, a highly technically advanced defense force.
But it's being encouraged to operate within the law.
It's struggling to understand.
It's really been very deliberate in understanding what's going on.
It's been posed a number of very, very difficult problem sets by the way Hamas has decided to hide in amongst civilians and put that at risk.
With hostages too.
And hostages.
That is not going to be solved by technology alone.
And it is very difficult for me, and maybe I'm just a bit of a Luddite, to be able to cast my mind that far ahead and say that we'll have cleaned that into an entirely robot war.
War will feel very different.
Conflict will feel very different.
It's impossible to predict how the technologies will emerge.
We have an obligation to create an environment as service leaders to make sure that we can exploit those opportunities there, right, and to give the talent of our young men and women a chance to really kind of be intellectually curious about it.
But this is complementary stuff.
This isn't replacement.
Well, thank you very much for taking the time to be here.
Before I conclude this, I have to say that I did not ask you some particularly difficult questions.
I stayed away from predictions on English rugby, for example.
But in all sincerity, thank you so much for coming again to the Center for Strategic International Studies.
Thanks also for the strong U.S.-UK partnership on the high seas in general in the Houses of Commons and Congress here just across the board in our executive and legislative branches.
Really appreciate the special relationship.
So thank you for coming here again.
Thank you very much.
It's a pleasure and a privilege to be here.
Great.
Great to have you.
