China's Banking in Crisis: Massive Bank Run, Surging Complaints; The Next Domino to Fall!

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Chinese Consumer Downgrading Becomes a Trend – Fierce Price Wars Reflect Economic Downturn
Cangzhou Bank Run Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg
Large State-Owned Banks In China Is The Financial Institution With The Largest Number Of Consumer Complaints
Infrastructure Investment Could Be The Next Domino To Fall In China
#china #chinatruths #chinanews
Chinese consumer downgrading becomes a trend.
Fierce price wars reflect economic downturn.
Songzhou bank run is just the tip of the iceberg.
Large state-owned banks in China
is the financial institution
with the largest number of consumer complaints.
Infrastructure investment could be the next domino
to fall in China.
It's all covered in today's China Truths.
Chinese consumer downgrading becomes a trend.
Fierce price wars reflect economic downturn.
When mainland China finds itself in an economic crisis,
the population has minimized their consumption habits
marked by tightening their purse strings
and searching for simplified and practical solutions.
In this scenario, a fierce price war
has erupted across various sectors,
both online and offline,
encompassing large and small car manufacturers
as well as the food and snack industry.
In specific, an article from 21 Economic Net
published on October 10th
has provided a comprehensive account of the situation.
Firstly, the price war kicked off early this year
among the three major e-commerce platforms.
In March, JD.com introduced
the 100 billion subsidy strategy
marked by significant price reductions
which led to substantial growth
in the number of corporate merchants
on the JD.com platform during the second quarter.
In response, another e-commerce platform, Taobao,
swiftly initiated the five strategies,
including price power, thereby intensifying the price war.
Pinduoduo continued its approach of offering low prices.
Secondly, price reduction and sinking
have also become the dominant themes
for many offline brick-and-mortar retail businesses.
Notably, in the first half of this year,
the automobile whole vehicle retail industry
witnessed a significant price war.
In the first quarter, car manufacturers
like Oriental Citroën were the first
to announce price reductions for gasoline cars.
Shortly afterward, the price war extended rapidly
to the new energy vehicle sector.
Under the guidance of major car manufacturers,
dealers nationwide introduced various discount measures
to significantly lower prices,
even resorting to selling vehicles
at half price without hesitation.
In the restaurant industry, a fierce price war
has erupted within the freshly-brewed coffee sector.
In the restaurant industry, a fierce price war
has erupted within the freshly-brewed coffee sector.
It all began in April when Kutty Coffee
kicked off a campaign offering coffee at 9.9 yuan,
approximately $1.36 per cup,
setting the stage for this price battle.
Loopkin Coffee, a major rival of Koo Cafe,
quickly joined in by reducing prices
and committing to a two-year price freeze policy.
However, Kutty Coffee later dropped the price
of its lattes to 8.8 yuan per cup,
taking the competition to an extreme.
Lucky Coffee directly slashed the price of coffee
to 5 yuan per cup.
Additionally, snack brands have also been
significantly reducing prices this year.
For example, Nongfu Spring, typically priced at 2 yuan,
is now available for 1.2 yuan,
while Baixishun, usually priced at 3 yuan,
is now being sold for 1.8 yuan,
among other similar discounts.
Report indicates that the discount rates
for flagship products from well-known brands
are generally between 30% to 40%,
and these products are not close to their expiration dates.
Just a month ago, a trending topic emerged
on social media platforms like Weibo,
titled Say Something to Prove
You've Downgraded Your Consumption.
On Dubon, a Chinese social website,
the group Have You Downgraded Your Consumption Today?
has gathered over 360,000 members.
This shift toward consumer downgrading
and heightened internal competition
across various industries
is the prolonged economic downturn in China
and the persistently high unemployment rate.
Official data released by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP,
showed a brief resurgence in national retail sales
between January and May earlier this year
after the zero-COVID measures were eased.
However, it subsequently slowed down significantly
and has not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels.
Data from China's Ministry of Culture and Tourism
revealed that during the peak travel season
of the Dragon Boat Festival in June,
per capita spending by domestic Chinese tourists
increased by 8% compared to the same period
the previous year during the zero-COVID period.
Still, it declined by 14%
compared to the same period in 2019, pre-pandemic.
Given the CCP's inclination to present data favorably,
many believe that the actual purchasing power of the people
is even weaker than these figures suggest.
Songzhou bank run is just the tip of the iceberg.
The Evergrande crisis is escalating.
Following authorities' arrests actions against Su Jiayin,
an online list of Evergrande's outstanding bank loans
has surfaced,
exposing a debt of up to 3 billion Chinese yuan
to Songzhou bank.
As previously reported, starting from last week,
Songzhou bank experienced a bank run
with its branches becoming overcrowded.
People queued up to withdraw their money around the clock.
On October 10th, numerous videos circulated online
showing depositors waiting in long lines
at various Songzhou bank branches to withdraw their funds.
Some branches had lobbies filled with people.
In addition, depositors tried to transfer
their bank deposits online,
although online transfers were temporarily suspended.
Despite Songzhou bank's reassurance
that Evergrande owed the bank 346 million yuan,
not 3.4 billion yuan,
it didn't dissuade the depositors
who continued to seek withdrawals.
Three government financial departments in Songzhou
jointly released an urgent announcement
to dispel the concerns surrounding Songzhou bank,
urging the public not to believe or spread rumors.
Meanwhile, Songzhou's public security authorities
confirmed that they had detained a significant number
of people responsible for spreading false information.
When questioned about the sources of these rumors,
the police declined to disclose that information at this time.
Regarding this issue,
Chinese affairs expert Wang Yi analyzed on the 11th
that the CCP is currently taking extensive measures
to control the flow of information.
No one knows who leaked this information.
Only insiders have this knowledge.
It's virtually impossible to find this information online.
But the current challenge
is that Evergrande's bank borrowings amount
to approximately 7 to 800 billion yuan
spread across over 200 banks.
If widespread panic takes hold,
it may lead to significant problems.
Why the panic?
Independent commentator and writer Kaixin Kun analyzed
that the banking system primarily relies on confidence,
and when that confidence is lost,
depositors might rush to withdraw their funds,
potentially causing a significant crisis
even for large banks.
Moreover, local commercial banks themselves
have relatively small asset sizes
and are ill-equipped to handle extensive bank runs.
If the number of depositors seeking withdrawals
reaches a certain level,
it would undoubtedly paralyze the bank.
Reports have surfaced that the People's Bank of China,
a central bank,
provided overnight funding support to Sangzhou Bank,
and Sangzhou Bank has now restored online transfers.
However, it remains uncertain
whether the bank run situation has completely subsided.
Kaixin Kun believes that the bank run at Sangzhou Bank
is only the tip of the iceberg in the real estate crisis.
The more significant part of the iceberg
may revolve around trust and investment companies,
including Zhongrong Trust, Mincheng Trust,
Shandong Trust, and others,
all of which have also been reported
to have stepped on the thunder,
a colloquial phrase in Chinese
that means encountering an unforeseen crisis.
Analysis, China's financial crisis is inevitable.
Taking a historical perspective,
the CCP has effectively managed financial risks in the past.
According to Mr. Wang He,
due to the CCP government's control
over all of the country's resources and power in 1998,
the four major state-owned banks
were on the brink of bankruptcy.
However, the CCP divested these assets
and subsequently took them public.
Within a decade,
they emerged as the world's most significant
and profitable banks.
Yet, during that time,
China's economy was on an upward trajectory,
attracting substantial global investments,
and there was considerable optimism
about the entire Chinese economy.
Mr. Wang explains,
with various supporting factors in place,
the banking system managed to recover.
However, the current challenge lies in the fact
that the fundamental historical conditions have changed.
The international community is pessimistic
about the Chinese economy,
which is on a downward path.
Capital is leaving.
This is occurring at a time
when the colossal debt within the real estate sector,
including companies like Country Garden,
is alarming and many are confronting a financial crisis.
Mr. Wang points out that in this scenario,
the CCP's control over the national financial system,
regardless of its strictness,
is no longer effective.
The system has been hollowed out internally
with capital outflows,
resulting in an empty facade.
Over the past couple of decades,
starting from as far back as 1998,
there has been a fundamental shift
in historical conditions.
At this juncture,
despite the CCP's enhanced political power
and tightened control,
the foundation has been eroded.
Hence, the eruption of a financial crisis in China is,
one might argue,
unavoidable and cannot be averted.
Large state-owned banks in China
is the financial institution
with the largest number of consumer complaints.
The State Administration of Financial Supervision
of the Communist Party of China
recently released the situation of consumer complaints
in the banking industry in the first half of 2023.
Consumer complaints data show
that starting from the first quarter of this year,
the number of consumer complaints
from large state-owned commercial banks
has exceeded that of joint-stock commercial banks.
The number of complaints in the second quarter
continued the trend in the first quarter,
and large state-owned banks have become the institutions
with the largest number of complaints.
Take the Notice on Consumption Complaints
in the Banking Industry in the Jurisdiction
in the first half of 2023
issued by the Shandong Supervision Bureau
of the State Administration of Financial Supervision
and Administration of the Communist Party of China
as an example.
In the first half of 2023,
there were a total of 1,882 consumer complaints
in the banking industry
within the jurisdiction of the Shandong Supervision Bureau,
a year-on-year increase of 75.07%.
Among them, 447 cases
involving large state-owned commercial banks,
accounting for 23.75% of the total complaints,
295 cases involving joint-stock commercial banks,
accounting for 15.67% of the total complaints.
Specifically, the total number of consumer complaints
in the banking industry within the jurisdiction
increased by 807,
of which the number of complaints
involving large state-owned commercial banks
increased by 305,
an increase of 214.79%.
In addition, judging from the banking consumer complaints
in each jurisdiction announced
by the Shanghai Supervision Bureau,
Shenzhen Supervision Bureau,
Hebei Supervision Bureau,
Inner Mongolia Supervision Bureau,
and Tianjin Supervision Bureau
of the State Administration of Financial Supervision
and Administration,
the number of consumer complaints
against large state-owned banks
in the above jurisdictions has increased year-on-year.
They are 201.96%,
334.22%,
263.62%,
126.37%,
and 395.83%, respectively.
Judging from the types of complaints,
in the first quarter of 2023,
there were 59,827 complaints
involving personal loan business,
accounting for 57% of the total complaints,
and 32,142 complaints
involving the credit card business,
accounting for 30.6% of the total complaints.
The number of complaints about the personal loan business
exceeded that of the credit card business
for the first time.
China's state-owned banks include
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
Agricultural Bank of China,
Bank of China,
China Construction Bank,
Bank of Communications,
Postal Savings Bank of China,
China Development Bank,
Export-Import Bank of China,
and Agricultural Development Bank of China.
The six major state-owned banks
generally include Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
Agricultural Bank of China,
Bank of China,
China Construction Bank,
Bank of Communications,
and Postal Savings Bank of China.
Infrastructure investment could be the next domino
to fall in China.
A slowing economy,
crackdowns on shadow financing,
and plummeting earnings from land sales
are crimping China's local government spending power
that could likely force them
to slash their infrastructure spending, experts fear.
But worse, after the property sector,
investments in China's infrastructure
are seen as a potential second domino to fall.
Andrew Colliers is a China analyst and managing director
at the Hong Kong-based Orient Capital Research.
He said,
China's local governments
are running increasingly higher deficits
that will limit their ability
to spend their way into growth.
The central government, he added,
has been cracking down on off-balance sheet
or shadow financing due to concerns about financial risk.
And because the property market
is unlikely to rebound strongly in near future,
their revenue from land sales will be limited.
Gary Dugan, a chief investment officer at Dalma Capital
and a foreign investor in China,
said land sales alone are estimated
to have funded 40% of their spending.
In the absence of a significant transfer
of funding from central government to local government,
China's growth could stall.
Although local governments have historically
been a key driver of China's economic expansion,
this year's weak growth, low tax revenue,
and crippling COVID restrictions
severely weakened their financial footing.
Yet, while the decline in state land sales revenue
follows a nationwide crackdown on debt in the sector,
risks of default are expanding as well
for local government financing vehicles,
LGF fees, and shadow banks
since the property industry accounts
for around 20 to 30% of the Chinese economy,
including linked sectors.
Chinese financial institutions provide loans
to real estate developers who typically lease
or purchase land from municipal governments.
Local governments utilize revenue from diverse sources,
such as the sale of land,
to fund infrastructure and public projects through LGF fees.
That aside, more financial hardship is on the horizon
as local governments must make debt payments
in the coming month,
reducing their flexibility to comply
with Beijing's requirements to increase spending.
Many of them have already resorted to salary cuts,
staff reductions, subsidy cuts,
and even the imposition of unreasonably large fines
to balance their budgets.
Mr. Collier said,
therefore, unless Beijing is willing
to institute a new tax system,
local governments are going to struggle
to pay their basic bills.
So, about the situation of infrastructure investment,
Adam Wolf, an emerging market economist
at the London-based Absolute Strategy Research Limited,
wrote, the next domino to fall
will likely be infrastructure investment.
And it's likely to happen soon based
on our estimate of the broad, budget, deficit,
which includes LGF fee borrowing.
End of land finance era?
For more than a decade,
China's authorities have been grappling
with the dilemma of how to move domestic demand away
from real estate without triggering a financial crisis
or damaging to the economy.
They believed they found a solution in 2020.
The three red lines, financial regulatory guidelines,
were supposed to carefully regulate developer leverage
and compel them to sell down their inventory,
example, undeveloped land, projects under construction,
and completed but unsold apartments,
and stop utilizing presales from one project
to fund the start of their next.
But things didn't go as planned.
As Evergrande flirted with default in mid-2021,
buyers became wary of buying pre-sold flats
from other private developers.
Property sales plummeted,
and more developers fell into financial difficulties,
compounding the problem.
But up until now,
officials have been unable to break
this cyclical pattern of failure, say analysts.
Adam Wolf wrote, country gardens was just one
of many developers that hit hard times
after a continued decline in sales in April.
While the prospects for financial stability
and the real economy could reverse eventually,
he added, it is not going to be possible
to shrink the real estate sector
without also breaking the broader growth model
that has underpinned China's urbanization
and industrialization for the past 20 years.
So the real estate crisis will have a profound effect,
and the use of land as a source of finance
is no longer viable.
A daring highwire act with a high probability of failure.
For the time being, though,
local governments have been generating funding
for infrastructure projects
through special purpose bond, SPBs,
which are backed by the central government
and have been a source of financing
for several infrastructure projects.
For instance, Mr. Dugan estimates
that in the first seven months,
the total bond issuance was up 130%.
He said, as long as there is an investor appetite
for the SPBs, the local authorities
should be able to fund their infrastructure plans.
But the only concern is that some of the cash flow
from SPBs has been directed
towards propping up the financial sector
that has been hit hard by the setback
in the real estate sector.
Besides, much of the criticism of the infrastructure projects
is whether they have been in the right sectors.
Nevertheless, with many provinces
facing higher debt pressures and refinancing risks
due to their weakened fiscal conditions
and the central government introducing new rules
and regulations, such as allowing swapping
of their hidden debt into bonds,
Mr. Wolf believes infrastructure investment bond issuance
will certainly crash.
Mr. Wolf wrote, China's policy makers
are engaged in a daring high wire act
with a high probability of failure.
They're attempting to dismantle the financing structures
that have underpinned the country's growth model
for the past 20 years.
Even if they succeed in the longer run,
growth may slump toward 3% or less over the next few years
as the land finance model collapses.
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