"Chevron, more so than any other doctrine out there, facilitates the most egregious power grabs. And, indeed, over the last 20 odd years, has facilitated an alarming growth in what is known as the administrative state."
Will Yeatman is senior fellow at the Pacific Legal Foundation's Center for the Separation of Powers. He recently filed an amicus brief in the case of Loper Bright Enterprise v. Raimondo, in which he argues for the Supreme Court to overturn Chevron deference, a legal doctrine that allows the government's interpretation to prevail when a law is unclear.
"The problem here is that all laws are rife with ambiguity. This means the upshot, in essence, is that the government always wins when it's able to invoke the Chevron Doctrine. Effectively, it puts a thumb on the scales of justice in favor of government," says Mr. Yeatman. "By, in essence, having the judiciary abdicate its law interpretation responsibilities to the executive branch and by having, at the same time, Congress abdicating its lawmaking responsibilities to the executive branch, we're seeing this unhealthy imbalance in our separated powers."
Mr. Yeatman claims the principle of Chevron deference has been effectively shelved by the Supreme Court, yet continues to thrive at the lower courts, largely because of the Justice Department's influence.
"The Supreme Court, as its composition has changed, has become evidently skeptical of Chevron deference. And how do we know that? We know that because the court hasn't referred to it and hasn't used this principle in more than six years," says Mr. Yeatman.
Chevron deference. Now, of course, that sounds a bit like legalese, but it's actually pretty simple in practice.
It stands for the proposition that where the law is unclear, the government's interpretation prevails.
The problem here is that all laws are rife with ambiguity.
This means the upshot, in essence, is that the government always wins when it's able to invoke this Chevron doctrine.
Effectively, it puts the thumb on the scales of justice in favor of government.
And this is, without a doubt, not just the most important administrative law principle,
it's one of the most important principles in all of law.
And by important, I'm not passing judgment. I oppose Chevron deference.
What I'm saying there is it's consequential.
This is something that is cited and used in thousands of cases,
and I believe 15,000 odd cases it's been cited and used in the 40 odd years since 1984 when this doctrine came into effect.
Well, yeah, so this has been in place for 40 years.
And effectively, I mean, just another way of putting it, I guess, would be that if there is if there isn't a specific congressional law,
if it isn't actually in a law, essentially, whatever administrative agency decides is the interpretation becomes the interpretation of the law.
In practice, yes, that which isn't forbidden is in essence condoned, is allowed.
So in colloquial terms, it allows the government to get away with murder.
That is to say that these regulators, they start with the premises of Chevron deference and their goal in mind,
and then they, in essence, reverse engineer old laws and fill them with new meaning in order to achieve all sorts of policies.
Chevron, more so than any other doctrine out there, facilitates the most egregious power grabs.
And indeed, over the last 20 odd years has facilitated an alarming growth in what is known as the administrative state.
This leviathan, this alphabet soup worth of domestic regulatory agencies, the SECs, the EPAs, the FDAs, etc.
Well, so why is this relevant?
Of course, so there's this case in front of the Supreme Court that's going to be coming up, as I understand it, in October, Loper Bright Enterprises vs.
V Raimondo.
And so tell me about this specific case and why suddenly there is an opportunity to challenge this Chevron deference.
Regarding the specific case, this is actually the rare legal issue, the rare fact pattern where many Americans are already up to speed.
That's because the crux of this case, the factual dispute, was featured in the Oscar award-winning film Coda, the Best Picture award-winning film.
So what am I talking about?
Here we're talking about fishing regulations.
So in the Atlantic Ocean and the law, it authorizes the regulatory agency to require monitors on these fishing vessels when they go out to get their quota, to get their catch.
Well, the statute leaves, I'm sorry, the law leaves silent who pays for these monitors.
And the agency, on the strength of Chevron deference, was able to fill this statutory silence with meaning and ultimately required the regulated entities, the boats themselves, the fishermen,
to pay for these regulatory monitors.
And it's a very steep cost.
By the agency's own estimate, by the government's own estimate, we're talking up to 20% of the revenues of each trip.
Again, a tremendous burden upon these fishermen.
Incredible. And so this case has been making its way through the system, and finally it's reached the Supreme Court.
Tell me a little bit about this.
And of course, you're here because you've written an amicus brief with regard to the case.
Indeed. So this is something our amicus alludes to.
Over the last six years, the Supreme Court, as its composition has changed, has become evidently skeptical of Chevron debts.
And how do we know that?
We know that because the court hasn't referred to it, hasn't used this principle in more than six years.
Well, on the one hand, that's a wonderful development.
I mean, that's a part, you know, we've got judges again saying what the law is, which is their responsibility, their constitutional duty.
The problem is in the lower courts, is in the U.S., the circuit courts and the district courts.
There, deference continues apace.
There, it remains a first resort for judges to reflexively give way, to defer, to allow the government to cede to the government.
So we called it in our brief, we call this a vertical split in the federal courts.
This notion that on this all important administrative law doctrine, we've got a gross disparity in how it operates at the Supreme Court, where it's essentially been shelved.
The justices are skeptical or a critical mass of justices are skeptical of this doctrine.
And the lower courts, where again, this doctrine continues to flourish.
So in granting certiorari for this case, in taking this case, we're perhaps seeing a Supreme Court intent, or at least certain members of the Supreme Court intent, on sending a message to the courts below that no more is reflexive deference.
No more is this obsequious respect for the regulatory agencies in contravention of what the high court is doing.
No more should that fly.
We often hear about the legislative branch kind of ceding its authority to the executive branch and to the judicial branch.
Well, this Chevron deference probably has played a significant role in this.
So before I get you to tell me more about the amicus, why don't you just tell me the impact that in your view this has had over the last 40 years on lawmaking?
Well, it's impossible to overstate the impact.
In essence, it allows lawmakers to escape accountability.
They can pass these ambiguous, open-ended laws and then claim to have done something.
And then when the regulators regulate, they can cry foul.
You know, that is to say they can pass the buck.
So Chevron deference, perhaps more so than any other legal principle, has resulted in the diminishment of our modern Congress.
And, you know, I should note here, it hasn't always been this way.
You know, our Congresses of the 20th century, to be sure, they had many flaws and values, if you will.
But when it came to knowledge of how the system worked, knowledge of policymaking, knowledge of lawmaking, engagement with regulation,
Congress was very much in the game.
I mean, it's only been in the last four decades when we've sort of had this Congress that really is failing to compete as it should with the executive branch.
And a major reason for that is this Chevron deference.
Maybe a quick reminder of us of how the separation of powers works.
Well, indeed.
So as we all learned in school, our American system, the genius here is that we've got these three branches of government,
the executive, the legislature, the judicial, and under our system of checks and balances, they're supposed to compete with one another.
That is to say they're supposed to check one another to ensure that none of them becomes ascendant over the others.
This is meant to rein in overbearing government and to be sure it has worked wonders.
You know, over two, two hundred and forty odd years of history and Chevron deference by, in essence, having the judiciary abdicate its lawmaking responsibilities.
I'm sorry, law interpretation responsibilities to the executive branch.
And by having at the same time Congress abdicating its lawmaking responsibilities to the executive branch.
We're seeing this unhealthy imbalance in our separated powers whereby the president, as the head of the executive branch, has become far more powerful than his peer branches or than the office's peer branches.
And that's a problem. That is something our founding fathers were very concerned about.