Aristotle (2/8) Di Anima

Aristotle (384BC – 322BC)
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CHAPTER IV
There is yet another opinion concerning Sol which has come down to us, commending itself
to many minds as readily as any that is put forward, although it has been severely criticized,
even in the popular discussions of the present day.
The Sol is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or
combining of opposites, and the components of the body are opposites, and yet this harmony
must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them,
and the Sol cannot possibly be either of these.
Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of a harmony, yet this function, more than
any other, is all but universally assigned to Sol.
Again, it is more in harmony with the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily
excellence generally than to Sol, as is very clearly seen when we try to assign to a harmony
of whatever kind the affections or functions of the Sol, it is difficult to harmonize them.
Further, if we use the word harmony with a twofold application, first, and in its most
natural sense, of those magnitudes which have motion and position, to denote the combining
of them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted together that they do not admit between
them anything of the same kind, and then, in a secondary sense, to denote the proportion
subsisting between the components of a mixture, in neither sense is it reasonable to call
Sol a harmony.
The view which regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly open to
criticism, for there are many combinings of the parts, and they combine in many ways.
What part, then, is that whose combining, with the rest, we must assume to be the intellect,
and in what way does it combine?
Or again, what of the sensitive and appetitive faculties?
But it is equally absurd to regard the Sol as the proportion determining the mixture,
for the elements are not mixed in the same proportion in flesh as in bone.
Thus it will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the body, if we assume
that all members consist of the elements variously commingled, and that the proportion determining
the mixture is a harmony, that is, Sol.
This is a question we might ask Empedocles, who says that each of the parts is determined
by a certain proportion.
Is the Sol, then, this proportion, or is it rather developed in the frame as something
distinct?
And further, is it a mixture at random, or a mixture in the right proportion, which he
ascribes to love?
And if the latter, is love the proportion itself, or something other than the proportion,
and distinct from it?
Such then are the difficulties involved in this view.
On the other hand, if Sol is something distinct from the mixture, how comes it that it is
destroyed simultaneously with the disappearance of the quiddity of the flesh, and of the other
parts of the animal?
And further, assuming that each of the separate parts has not a soul of its own, unless the
Sol be the proportion of their admixture, what is it that perishes when the soul quits
the body?
From what has been said, it is clear that the soul cannot be a harmony, and cannot revolve
in a circle, but, incidentally, it can, as we have seen, move and set itself in motion.
For instance, the body in which it is may move, and be set in motion by the soul, otherwise
it cannot possibly move from place to place.
The question, whether the soul is moved, would more naturally arise in view of such facts
as the following.
The soul is said to feel pain and joy, confidence and fear, and again to be angry, to perceive
and to think.
And all these states are held to be movements, which might lead one to infer that Sol itself
is moved.
But this is no necessary inference, for suppose it ever so true that to feel pain, or joy,
are movements, that to experience each of these is to be moved, and that the movement
is due to the soul.
Suppose that to be angry, for instance, or to be afraid, means a particular movement
of the heart, and that to think means a movement of this, or of some other part, some of these
movements being movements of locomotion, others of qualitative change, of what sort and how
produced, does not concern us here.
Yet even then, to speak of the soul as feeling anger is as if one should say that the soul
weaves or builds.
Doubtless, it would be better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but
that the man does so with the soul, and this too, not in the sense that the motion occurs
in the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches to, sometimes starts from,
the soul.
Thus sensation originates in particular objects, while recollection, starting from the soul,
is directed towards the movements or traces of movements in the sense organs.
But intellect would seem to be developed in us as a self-existing substance, and to be
imperishable, for if anything could destroy it, it would be the feebleness of age.
But as things are, no doubt, what occurs is the same, as in the case of the sense organs.
If an aged man could procure an eye of the right sort, he would see just as well as a
young man.
Hence old age must be due to an affection, or state, not of the soul as such, but of
that in which the soul resides, just as is the case in intoxication and disease.
In like manner, then, thought and the exercise of knowledge are enfeebled through the loss
of something else within, but are in themselves impassive.
But reasoning, love, and hatred are not attributes of the thinking faculty, but of its individual
possessor, insofar as he possesses it.
Hence when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory nor love, for these never
did belong to the thinking faculty, but to the composite whole, which has perished, while
the intellect is doubtless a thing more divine and is impassive.
From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is incapable of motion, and if it is not moved
at all, clearly it does not move itself.
Now of all the views that have been put forward, by far the most irrational is that which makes
the soul a self-moving number.
Its supporters are involved in many impossibilities, not only in those which arise from attributing
motion to the soul, but also in others of a special character, due to calling it a number.
For how are we to conceive of a unit, a thing which is without parts or differences, as
in motion?
By what would it be moved, and in what way?
For if it is capable of imparting motion, as well as of being moved, it must admit differences.
Further, since they say that a line by its motion generates a surface, and that a point
by its motion generates a line, the movements of the units will also be lines, for a point
is a unit having position.
But the number of the soul must, from the nature of the case, be somewhere, and have
position.
Again, if you subtract a number or unit from a number, a different number remains, whereas
plants and many animals continue to live when divided, and seem to have specifically the
same soul in each segment.
Besides, it would seem to make no difference whether we say units or tiny particles.
For if the little round atoms of Democritus be converted into points, and only their sum
total be retained, in such sum total there will still be a part which moves and a part
which is moved, just as there is in that which is extended.
The truth of this statement does not depend upon the size of the atoms, whether great
or small, but upon the fact that there is a sum total or quantity of them.
Hence there must be something to set the units in motion.
But if in the animal the part which causes motion is the soul, then it is so likewise
in the number, so that it will not be both that which causes motion, and that which is
moved, which is the soul, but that which causes motion only.
How then can this cause of motion be a unit?
For if it were so, there must be some difference between it and the other units.
But what is there to differentiate points which are units except position?
If then the units, that is, the points, in the body, are distinct from the units of soul,
the units of soul will be in the same place as the points, for each unit will occupy the
space of a point.
And yet, if two things can be in the same place, why not an infinite number?
When the place which things occupy is indivisible, the things themselves are also indivisible.
If on the other hand the number of the soul consists of the points in the body, or if
the soul is the number of such points, why are not all bodies possessed of soul?
For in all bodies there would seem to be points, nay, an infinity of points.
And further, how can the points be separated and set free from the bodies to which they
belong, unless indeed we are prepared to resolve lines into points?
CHAPTER V.
It comes to this, then, as we have said, first, that this view coincides with that which makes
of the soul a body composed of fine particles, next, that its agreement with Democritus as
to the manner in which he makes the body to be moved by the soul gives it an especial
absurdity of its own.
If the soul resides in the whole sentient body, on the assumption that the soul is a
sort of body, it necessarily follows that two bodies occupy the same space.
Those who call the soul a number have to assume many points in the one point, or else that
everything corporeal has a soul, unless the number that comes to exist in the body is
a different number, quite distinct from the sum of the points already present in the body.
Hence it follows that the animal is moved by the number in the same way precisely as
we said Democritus moved it.
For, what difference does it make whether we speak of small round atoms, or large units,
or indeed of units in spatial motion at all ? Either way it is necessary to make the motion
of the animal depend on the motion of these atoms or units.
Such then are some of the difficulties confronting those who join motion and number.
And there are many others, since it is impossible that the conjunction of motion with number
should form even an attribute, much less the definition of soul.
This will be evident if we try to deduce from this definition the affections and functions
of the soul, its reasonings, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so forth.
For, as we said above, from the account given it is difficult even to divine what these
functions are.
Three modes of defining the soul have come down to us.
Some defined it as that which, in virtue of its self-motion, is most capable of causing
motion, others as the body which consists of the finest particles, or which is more
nearly incorporeal than anything else.
And we have pretty fully explained what difficulties and inconsistencies these views present.
It remains to consider what is meant by saying that the soul is composed of the elements.
Soul, we are told, is composed of the elements in order that it may perceive and know each
several thing.
But this theory necessarily involves many impossibilities.
For it is assumed that like is known by like, which implies that soul is identical with
the things that it knows.
These elements, however, are not all that exist.
There are a great, or perhaps we should say rather, an infinite number of other things
as well, namely, those which are compounded of the elements.
Granted then, that it is possible for the soul to know, and to perceive the constituent
elements of all these composite things, with what will it know, or perceive the compound
itself?
I mean, what God or man is, what flesh or bone is, and so likewise with regard to any
other composite thing?
For it is not elements taken anyhow which constitute this, or that thing, but only those
which are united in a given proportion, or combination, as Empedocles says, of bone.
Then did the bounteous earth, in broad-bosomed crucibles, win out of eight parts, two from
the sheen of moisture, and four from the fire-god, and the bones came into being all white.
It is therefore of no use for the elements to be in the soul, unless it also contains
their proportions, and the mode of combining them.
For each element will know its like, but there will be nothing to know bone or man, unless
these also are to be present in the soul, which, I need hardly say, is impossible.
Who would ask if stone or man resides in the soul?
And similarly with that which is good, and that which is not good, and so for all the
rest.
Being again is a term which has various meanings, signifying sometimes the particular thing,
sometimes quantity, or quality, or any other of the categories which have been already
determined.
Is the soul to be derived from all of these, or not?
It cannot be.
The general opinion is that there are no elements common to all the categories.
Does the soul then consist of those elements alone, which are the elements of substances?
How then does it know each of the other categories?
Or will they say that each sumum genus has special elements, and principles of its own,
and that the soul is composed of these?
Then soul will be at once quantity, quality, and substance.
But it is impossible from the elements of quantity to derive substance, or anything
but quantity.
These then, and others like them, are the difficulties which confront those who derive
soul from all the elements.
There is a further inconsistency in maintaining that like is unaffected by like, and yet at
the same time that like perceives like, and knows like by like.
But they assume that perceiving is a sort of being acted upon, or moved, and the same
holds of thinking and knowing.
Of the many problems and difficulties involved in holding, with Empedocles, that each thing
is known through corporeal elements, and by reference to its like, what has just been
said is evidence.
For it would seem, whatever within the bodies of animals consists entirely of earth, such
as bones, sinews, hair, perceives nothing at all, and consequently cannot perceive its
like, as in consistency it should.
Moreover, each one of the elemental principles will have a far larger share of ignorance
than of intelligence, there being many things of which it will be ignorant, and only one
which it will know.
In fact, it will be ignorant of all besides that one.
It follows, or Empedocles at any rate, that God is quite the most unintelligent of beings.
There is one of the elements, viz., strife, which he and he alone will not know, while
mortal things, being composed of all the elements, will know them all.
And in general, seeing that everything is either an element or derived from one or more
or all elements, why should not all things that exist have soul?
For they must certainly know one thing, or some things, or all.
It might further be asked what it is that gives them unity, for the elements at all
events correspond to matter.
That other principle, whatever it be, which holds them together is supreme.
Yet it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul, and overrule it,
and still more impossible that anything should overrule intelligence.
This it may reasonably be held has a natural priority and authority, yet we are told that
the elements are prior to all other things that exist.
And it is characteristic, alike of those who derive the soul from the elements, on the
ground of perception and knowledge, and of those who define it as the thing most capable
of causing motion, that their assertions do not apply to soul in every form.
For not all sentient beings can cause motion.
Some animals are seen to be stationary in one place.
And yet it is at all events a received view that this, namely, change of place, is the
one form of motion which the soul imparts to the animal, similarly with those who derive
intelligence and the faculty of sense from the elements.
For plants are found to live without any share in locomotion or sensation, and many animals
to be destitute of thought.
If we waive this point, and assume intellect to be a part of the soul, and the faculty
of sense likewise, even then their statements would not apply generally to all soul, nor
to the whole of any one soul.
The account given in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same strictures.
For the soul, it is there asserted, enters from the universe in the process of respiration,
being born upon the winds.
Now it is impossible that this should be so with plants, or even with some animals, seeing
that they do not all respire, a point which the upholders of this theory have overlooked.
And if the soul is to be constructed out of the elements, there is no need to employ them
the one of a pair of contraries being sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite.
For by that which is straight we discern both the straight and the crooked, the carpenter's
rule being the test of both.
On the other hand, that which is crooked is not a test of itself or of that which is straight.
There are some, too, who say that soul is inter- fused throughout the universe, which
is perhaps why Thales supposed all things to be full of gods.
But this view presents some difficulties.
For why should the soul not produce an animal, when present in air or fire, and yet do so
when present in the compounds of these elements ? And that, too, though in the former case
it is believed to be purer.
One might also inquire why the soul present in air is purer and more immortal than soul
in animals.
Whichever of the two suppositions open to us we adopt is absurd and irrational.
To speak of fire or air as an animal is very irrational, and, on the other hand, not to
call them animals if they contain soul is absurd.
But it would seem that the reason why they suppose soul to be in these elements is that
the whole is homogenous with its parts, so that they cannot help regarding universal
soul as also homogenous with the parts of it in animals, since it is through something
of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed in animals that the animals become
endowed with soul.
But if the air, when split up, remains homogenous, and yet soul is divisible into non-homogenous
parts, it is clear that, although one part of soul may be present in the air, there is
another part which is not.
Either then soul must be homogenous, or else it cannot be present in every part of the
universe.
From what has been said it is evident that it is not because the soul is compounded of
the elements that knowledge belongs to it, nor is it correct or true to say that the
soul is moved.
Knowledge however is an attribute of the soul, and so are perception, opinion, desire, wish,
and appetency generally.
Animal locomotion also is produced by the soul, and likewise growth, maturity, and decay.
Shall we then say that each of these belongs to the whole soul, that we think that is,
and perceive, and are moved, and in each of the other operations act, and are acted upon
with the whole soul?
Or that the different operations are to be assigned two different parts?
And what of life itself?
Does it reside in any single one, or more, or all of these parts?
Or has it a cause entirely distinct?
Now some say that the soul is divisible, and that one part of it thinks, another desires.
What is it then which holds the soul together, if naturally divisible?
Assuredly it is not the body.
On the contrary, the soul seems rather to hold the body together.
At all events, when it has departed, the body disperses in air, and rots away.
If then the unity of soul is due to some other thing, that other thing would be properly
speaking soul.
We shall need then to repeat the inquiry, respecting it also, whether it is one or manifold.
For, if it has unity, why not attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset?
If, however, it be divisible, then again reason will go on to ask, what it is that holds it
together?
And, so the inquiry will go on to infinity.
It might also be asked, what power each of the parts of the soul exercises in the body?
For, if the entire soul holds together the whole body, then each of its parts ought properly
to hold together some part of the body.
But this seems impossible.
For it is difficult even to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together, or
how it can hold any part together.
It is found, that plants, and among animals certain insects, or analyta, live when divided,
which implies that the soul in their segments is specifically, though not numerically, the
same.
At any rate, each of the two segments retains sentience, and the power of locomotion for
some time.
That they do not continue to do so is not surprising, as they lack the organs requisite
to maintain their nature.
But none the less, all the parts of the soul are contained in each of the two segments,
and the two halves of the soul are homogenous alike with one another, and with the whole,
a fact which implies that, while the parts of the soul are inseparable from one another,
the soul as a whole is divisible.
It would seem that the vital principle in plants also is a sort of soul, for this principle
is the only one common to plants and animals, and while it can be separated from the sensitive
principle, no being which has sensation is without it.
