Why has the Turkish Lira Weakened? A Story of Turkey's Economy (2020)

Wealthy Bulls
66 followers
Oct 27, 2022
This is Turkey, the 17th largest economy in the world. A country and an economy which is no
stranger to controversy. Yet, its ongoing currency troubles with the Turkish Lira are arguably its
greatest macroeconomic headache at the moment. But why? Why has the Turkish Lira plummeted by
half versus the dollar since 2018? Ultimately, this is due to Turkey's vulnerability to capital
Though to truly unravel this complexity, I need to tell you a story. A story which involves the
credit crunch, cheap credit and an everyday economic instrument that the President of Turkey
has called the mother and father of all evil. So in order to tell this story, we'll be addressing
when Turkey's problems first started to appear, what Turkey's main macroeconomic problems actually
are, how Turkey has tried to solve its Lira crisis and why initial plans didn't work out.
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So when did Turkey's problems first start to appear? In the aftermath of Turkey's 2001 financial
crisis and IMF bailout, which was ironically due in part to high inflation and foreign capital
outflows, the economic good times rolled in. But, and there is a big but here, these good times
sowed the seeds for where Turkey finds itself today. Between 2002 and 2007, the economy grew
rapidly at an annual rate of 7.2%. Following a short recession in 2009, it bounced back strongly
in 2010 and 11 with growth over 8% a year. Such stellar growth made Turkey one of the
fastest growing economies in the G20. However, as time went on, this rapid growth became more
unbalanced, being driven mainly by fast capital accumulation. This capital accumulation was based
on rapid foreign capital inflows of so-called hot money, which was used to largely finance
construction activities. Which is highlighted by an interesting little fact that Istanbul
now possesses the second highest number of skyscrapers in Europe, after Moscow.
The majority of the capital accumulation was financed through foreign debt, as the country
had access to cheap credit in a world of low interest rates, a global economic recovery at
the time and significant quantitative easing. However, when you build your economy on the sand,
at some point or another it will come crashing down. For Turkey, this crash came about in 2018,
when rising inflation, concerns about an overextended banking system and the independence
of the central bank all coincided. You see, in most advanced economies, the independence of the
central bank from the government enables it to set interest rates and implement macroeconomic
policies which protect the economy. Unfortunately in Turkey's case, the government passed laws
giving it a say over elected positions and put the central bank under pressure to drop interest
rates and expand credit. In doing this, it was effectively planning for Turkey to borrow its
way out of the crisis, and this is a big part of its current problems. The point about interest
rates can't be emphasised enough. Contrary to conventional economics, President Erdogan
referred to interest rates as the mother and father of all evil. Arguing lower interest rates
would see them through the economic turmoil, an unconventional economic approach which goes
against the widely held view that low interest rates are an expansionary policy which tends to
lead to higher inflation, not to mention a weaker currency. Now, this all helps set the backdrop
to Turkey's current crisis, an economy which slid into recession in 2018, a currency which has fallen
by 60% and an inflation rate in the double digits. So given these events and factors, what are
Turkey's main economic problems? If we were to point to one thing, it would be Turkey's high
inflation rate. You see, inflation is like father time, slowly, or quickly in Turkey's case, eroding
the value of money. At the beginning of the video, I mentioned that Turkey has suffered from high
inflation in the past, and to put it in context, the country's inflation rate is a lot better than
it had been in the 90s, but has been above 15% since 2018. Typically, some inflation is expected,
and a sign that an economy is moving, with most central banks targeting 2%, whereas Turkey has
been targeting over 7% a year. From a currency perspective, the problem with inflation is that
if it is more than the inflation of other currencies, it can diminish the value of the
This is because currencies are constantly seeking to balance out with one another,
to find out how much one currency is worth than another. In Turkey's case,
high inflation was an important factor in the lira's decreasing relative value compared to
other currencies. Now, one way to counter higher inflation is to simply offer higher interest rates
on Turkish lira holdings. Yet as explained, Turkey has not been a fan of higher rates,
dropping them from 24% to 8.25%, a trend which was broken in September 2020 with a 2% rate hike.
Though most economists believe this 2% increase didn't go far enough, as Turkey's real return,
after offsetting any interest payments with inflation, is negative. Negative real returns
are a huge problem for a country dependent on capital inflows, or so-called hot money,
which follows opportunities across the globe. Yet we can take inflation to be as much a symptom
as an underlying cause. The core issue for the lira is excessive supply relative to demand.
Turkey consistently spends more on imports than exports, leading to a large current account
deficit. Now you may be thinking, but so does the US or the Euro and they don't experience the same
issues. Well, that's another story, partly to do with reserve currency status, which I explained
in a previous video, the link to which should be appearing on your screen now and in the description
below. In Turkey's case, a big problem is that demand for the lira through Turkish exports
is less than the supply of lira through paying for imports. A problem made a lot worse by the
complete collapse of tourism in 2020. You see, tourism is a key economic sector for Turkey,
and crucially a usually reliable source of foreign currency. About 45 million overseas tourists
visited Turkey in 2019, equivalent to 60% of the population, and all those tourists brought with
them a combined $35 billion. But that was in the good times, with arrivals in the first half of
2020 down by three quarters, a big shock to the system. Like any currency whose currency quickly
loses value, this has forced households to swap their quickly diminishing liras for a more stable
foreign currency, a trend known as dollarization. Why dollars? Well, because as the world's main
reserve currency, it is considered a safe store of value. As such, Turkey's dollarization has been
high, with the share of Turkish deposits held in foreign currencies reaching 50%. Whilst dollarization
may help protect household savings, it can actually make a currency's decline worse,
as more of the population sell more liras for less dollars. It also restricts the effectiveness
of economic interventions, as there are less liras being held by Turkish households to be impacted
by government policies. At this stage, things appear pretty bad, especially for households,
though the country's financial companies are also facing challenges which are contributing to the
crisis. Chief among them is looming repayment deadlines. If you remember earlier, I mentioned
that during the good times, Turkish companies borrowed heavily externally. Well, yeah, this
was largely done in dollars, and now an estimated $170 billion of debt is coming up for repayment.
The trouble is that whilst the debt is in dollars, Turkish companies earn mainly in liras,
so the size of the debt grows as the lira plummets relative to the dollar. A key risk
to the financial system if the companies can't refinance their dollar denominated debts.
So after all of this, what has Turkey tried to do to resolve the issues? The central bank
has been trying to meet a number of mutually exclusive goals. Maintain low interest rates,
reduce inflation, promote economic growth, and keep the lira stable. How it has tried to achieve
this reveals the catch-22 Turkey finds itself in. Earlier in the video, I mentioned Turkey's
This has been made evident in its low interest rates, done in an attempt to keep the economy
moving through easy access to cheap credit. Credit which has fuelled Turkey's stellar economic
performance in the past. The problem is that low interest rates have been a significant factor
in high inflation and the lira's devaluation. So to address this currency slide, the Turkish
Central Bank has been propping up the value of the lira through buying it up on the open market.
Whilst the lira is meant to be a free-floating currency, in a bid to maintain price stability,
the Turkish Central Bank has spent a considerable portion of its foreign reserves
buying liras on the open market. To boost its ability to do this, Turkey tripled a foreign
currency swap deal with close ally Qatar to $15 billion. In addition to buying dollar reserves,
the Central Bank has been hedging its bets by buying up the world's ultimate reserve currency,
gold. In fact, Turkey has been doing this to such an extent that in July 2020,
it became the world's largest buyer of gold, overtaking Russia. Why? Well, the jury is still
out on this one, but commentators suggest it's to do with rising concerns over its ability to access
dollars, with a direct dollar swap with the US on a similar basis to the Qatar deal being turned
down by the US government in the recent past. The country also took the rather unconventional step
of temporarily banning six large currency trading banks from trading the lira, in the hope of
stopping speculation on its weakening currency, a move considered to be a step away from an open
liberalised market. So why haven't these plans worked out for Turkey so far? Well, basically
these plans are underpinned by the assumption that the lira's crisis will be over in the short
term. As you can imagine, selling your foreign currency reserves to support a currency is only
a viable option for as long as you have reserves to sell. Unfortunately for Turkey, it is quickly
burning through these reserves. Goldman Sachs estimates that the Central Bank has spent $65
billion on supporting the currency this year alone, with gross foreign reserves having fallen
to $93 billion. This may sound like a substantial amount, but over half of these reserves are
borrowed, with the bank relying on an elaborate system which borrows from the foreign currency
savings held by Turkish citizens in Turkey's bank vaults. A way to capitalise on the high
dollarisation rate we mentioned earlier. In fact, a deeper dive into the accounts suggests that the
raising concerns that the bank is robbing Peter to pay Paul, leaving some wondering how long this
can go on for. Well, some analysts think this will go on for as long as there isn't a run on
Turkey's banks by local savers wanting to withdraw their foreign holdings. So not a sustainable
strategy. As alluded to earlier, the country's efforts have been significantly hampered by
negative real returns, demonstrated through high inflation compared to low interest rates.
These are keeping foreign capital, or hot money, out and investors away. Economists are in general
agreement that Turkey will need to increase its rates substantially if it is to get the
situation under control, something it has been reluctant to do given its reliance on credit
links growth and questions over the independence of its central bank. Nonetheless, the Turkish
central bank's 2% September 2020 rate hike has been welcomed by analysts, but whether this is
too little too late remains to be seen. So overall, we've seen Turkey's growth was largely funded by
hot money inflows, which can leave an economy just as quickly as it enters. Growth was underpinned by
borrowing on construction related activities. The cracks really started to appear in 2018,
when the related concepts of high inflation, low interest rates, looming foreign debt repayments,
and negative real rates all combined to depreciate the lira. Turkey has followed an unconventional
approach to address the crisis, not really addressing its low interest rates and propping
up the lira through dwindling foreign reserves. This strategy assumes a quick recovery as it only
works for as long as foreign reserves hold out. Recent moves to raise interest rates are widely
believed to be positive, but perhaps too little too late to prevent a full-blown currency crisis.
As we come to the end of this video, we at Alt Simplified really hope that you've enjoyed it.
We're interested to hear what you think about Turkey's currency crisis in the comments below.
Do you think it's a result of inflation, an independent central bank, or something else?
Let us know in the comments. And as always, if you've enjoyed this video,
please do give it a like and consider hitting the subscribe button. See you in the next video.
