Falklands Conflict in the Air | How British Harriers beat the odds

Pots and Pathways
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1 Video View·Oct 21, 2022
When the Falklands conflict began it seemed like Argentina had a massive advantage in the skies.
They had over a hundred aircraft of varying types. Some could operate from the Argentinian mainland
and others could operate from airstrips on the Falklands themselves. Meanwhile the British
task force was initially restricted to the just 20 sea harriers which could fit on its two aircraft
carriers. It was up to them to protect the task force at sea as well as the troops on the ground.
To many that seemed like an impossible task. In this third episode of our Falkland series
we're going to examine the conflict in the air. Just how big was the Argentinian advantage?
How did each side change their strategy? And how did British pilots beat the odds and take control
of the skies? On paper Argentina had air supremacy over the Falkland Islands. Britain would need a
if there was to be any attempt to counter the Argentine advantage. It was the aircraft behind me
the Harrier and its naval cousin the Sea Harrier upon which British hopes were placed but we'll
take a closer look at that later on. As the British task force made its way down to the
South Atlantic the Argentinians began setting up defences on the islands with men and supplies
constantly flown in. The main airport was at Stanley the Falklands capital with other smaller
airfields at Goose Green and Pebble Island. Stanley was the only hard all-weather runway on
the Falklands but it was still not long enough for Argentina's fast jets which remained on the
mainland. The Argentinian air force had Dassault Mirage 3s, IAI Daggers, Douglas A-4 Skyhawks and
even English electric Canberras purchased from Britain in the 1970s. The supersonic Mirages and
Daggers were a serious threat but flying from the Argentinian mainland put them at the limits of
their fuel range. The Argentinian navy had an aircraft carrier the 25 de Mayo which was also
equipped with Skyhawks while from the mainland they flew the Dassault Bruguet Super Etendard
which could be equipped with the feared Exocet anti-ship missile, five of which were known to
be in Argentina's armory. The Argentinians also had a number of smaller light attack aircraft based
on airfields on the Falklands as well as IA-58 Picaras like the one behind me. It was a two-seat
low-wing twin turboprop ground attack and counter-insurgency aircraft. It had two cannons,
four machine guns and bombs and rockets could be attached to the three external hard points.
It was low performance in comparison to the Mirage especially but it was manoeuvrable
and could take off from short rough airfields perfect for the Falklands. This aircraft joined
Grupo Aria Tres de Ataque or attack group three at Port Stanley on the 29th of May 1982 piloted
by First Lieutenant Iyerdi. It carried out various armed escort missions for Chinook helicopters
and on the 10th of June was involved in an attack on Mount Kent on East Falkland.
In the face of all of these Argentinian aircraft it was crucial that Britain established air
superiority before attempting to land troops on the Falklands. The first step was eliminating
the island's most important airfield at Stanley. Denying its use would not only demonstrate
Britain's will to fight for the Falklands but also force a change of strategy for the Argentinians.
But pulling off that raid would be a very difficult job. A bomber would have to fly over
3,800 miles from Ascension Island to Stanley with multiple air-to-air refuelling manoeuvres on the
way, damage the runway enough to deny its use and then fly all the way back to Ascension.
This was the aircraft they chose for the job, the Avro Vulcan B2, a jet-powered high altitude
strategic bomber designed to carry Britain's nuclear weapons during the Cold War.
The Vulcan had two defining characteristics which were suddenly in demand. Its long range
capability which could be extended through refuelling and its ability to carry 21,000 pound
bombs. This particular Vulcan was delivered to IWM Duxford just one month before the Falklands
conflict began by a pilot called Martin Withers. The Ministry of Defence actually asked if they
could have the Vulcan back but the museum managed to persuade them otherwise. One thing they probably
did take was the fuel probe and for very good reason. At the time the Vulcan raid on Port Stanley
would become the longest range bombing mission in the history of aerial warfare, codenamed the
Just before midnight on the 30th of April 1982 two Vulcan bombers and 11 Victor tankers took
off from Wideawake airfield on Ascension Island. Almost immediately the lead Vulcan suffered a
technical difficulty which meant the reserve Vulcan XM607 flown by Martin Withers had to take over
instead. Over the next eight hours the Victor tankers completed a complex sequence of fuel
transfers to the Vulcan and to each other. This process was not without its issues but on the
morning of May 1st they reached the target. Withers and his crew dropped the payload of 21,000 pound
bombs from 10,000 feet. One bomb cratered the runway and the others caused further damage to
the airfield. A few hours later Sea Harriers from HMS Hermes followed up with more attacks on the
airstrips at Stanley and Goose Green. Later still XM607 arrived back at Ascension Island after 16
hours in the air. The Black Book raid on the 1st of May would be the first of seven Black Book raids
over the course of May and June 1982. The short-term and long-term success of these raids is still
debated. There's contention as to whether the cost of resources in terms of the number of aircraft
and the amount of fuel used for instance alongside the risk involved for people whether that could
ever be justified with assessing the arguably limited impact of the missions. But while its
physical impact is debated its tactical impact is clear. The raid on the 1st of May demonstrated
that the Royal Air Force had the range to bomb airfields in the Falklands and therefore had the
potential to reach mainland Argentina. In response to that threat Argentina decided to hold more of
its fast jets back to protect the mainland. The following day things got worse when the Argentinian
cruiser General Belgrano was sunk by the submarine HMS Conqueror. This forced the Argentinian Navy
including the Vincenco de Mayo to largely withdraw to port. They would play no further role in the
conflict. In the first air-to-air battles over the Falklands the British refused to climb to the
Mirage's optimal altitude and vice versa. When they eventually engaged the Argentinians lost two
Mirages and a Canberra all shot down by British Sea Harriers. In addition to their fuel problems
Argentinian pilots also lacked experience. They were more prepared for a war with Chile than
fighting over the South Atlantic. Meanwhile on the ground Argentinian air crews struggled to
service their aircraft with spare parts hard to come by. That first day was absolutely crucial
in the extent that it was it almost set the pattern for all subsequent operations. It gave us
enormous confidence. Looked at from the other way around I think the demoralizing effect on the
Argentine air force must have been colossal. Now that pattern happily I'm glad to say continued.
They decided they would retain a number of aircraft in defense of their airfields ashore.
Had they actually committed more aircraft to deal with the combat air patrol over the landing area
perhaps it would have been different. From this point onwards Argentina essentially tried to avoid
air-to-air combat with the Harriers using Mirages as decoys to draw them off while the Daggers and
Skyhawks attacked the fleet. It seemed Argentina's air power wasn't all it was cracked up to be.
That was until the 4th of May when HMS Sheffield came under attack from a pair of Argentinian
It was hit by one of two Exocet missiles and later sank. For the British that was a stark
warning. The loss of an aircraft carrier to an Exocet would end any chance of success for the
British task force. As a consequence the British carriers predominantly remained well out of their
range to the east of the Falklands for the remainder of the conflict. However by increasing
the distance they had to fly this reduced the amount of time the Harriers could spend over the
islands leaving the ships and ground forces more exposed. On the 21st of May the first British
landings began on the Falklands. To minimise this still considerable air threat the British chose to
land at San Carlos on East Falkland. It was hoped that the hills around the bay would provide
sheltered waters from air attack but that didn't stop the Argentinians from trying. British ships
were attacked by Picaras, Skyhawks, Mirages and Daggers over the next few days but it was the
Skyhawks that would become the most feared silhouette as the British forces could see the
aircraft's impressive manoeuvrability against the sky from the ships below. Few Argentine pilots had
even been trained in low-level flying and fewer still to undertake attacks on ships in open water.
Having flown for hours for mainland Argentina they only had the chance to engage in a few attacks
before heading home again but despite all of that they still managed to achieve significant damage
all the while under fire themselves from the ships below and from sea Harriers. We persuaded the flight
commanders it'd be a good idea to stay on the ship of course we never realised that that was the
biggest mistake of our lives because everybody on shore was watching the ships getting hit. They used
to break the masts the aerials of the ship the pilots as they were flying so low. We thought
at first that the Argentinian air force were mad but as time went on we changed our views drastically
they were very professional and the way they conducted a business. They came down some cars
water the first one just glowing straight out the sky three missiles hitting their pilots were
possibly some of the bravest men over the whole campaign. I mean if everything they dropped had
gone off we'd still be down there fighting now. Fortunately for the British many of the
Argentine bombs failed to explode due to problems with the setting of their fuses. Essentially the
aircraft had flown at a height lower than the fuses had been set so the bombs hit their target
before they had the chance to explode. If there hadn't been this issue with the bomb fuses the
losses at San Carlos water would have been catastrophic. By the 25th of May 1982 three
ships had sunk and eight more were damaged however the Argentine decision to target the ships in the
sound meant that the ground forces were able to land unopposed. British troops were now just 13
miles from the Argentine garrison at Darwin and Goose Green and just 50 miles from Port Stanley.
Despite their successes at San Carlos the Argentinian air forces were sustaining losses
at an alarming rate. They couldn't keep up these kind of attacks for long however with a limited
number of British aircraft in the skies there were inevitably gaps in the Harriers combat air patrols.
That's exactly what happened on the 8th of June during the Fitzroy air attacks.
As British troops were moved forward for attacks from the mountains around Port Stanley
Royal Fleet auxiliary ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were attacked. Both ships were badly
damaged by Argentinian Skyhawks killing 50 men and wounding a further 150. The Argentinian air
attacks on the same day sank a British landing craft killing six and severely damaged HMS Plymouth.
It was in moments like this that British helicopters became crucial ferrying casualties
to field hospitals or aboard ships. Since the sinking of the SS Atlantic Conveyor and the heavy
lifting helicopters it was carrying the remaining helicopters and their crews were operating at the
limit of their capacity. British forces were supported by a range of helicopters including
the single surviving Boeing Chinook and the Westland Gazelle, Sea King, Lynx, Wasp, Scout and Wessex.
Helicopters were the workhorses for the British forces during the Falklands conflict.
This Wessex helicopter behind me last flew on the 8th of December 1980 so did not serve during the
Falklands conflict but the Wessex type of helicopter is probably best known for its
exploits in the Falklands. At the beginning of the conflict they helped sink the Argentine submarine
Santa Fe and recapture South Georgia from Argentine forces in April 1982. Towards the end of the
conflict in June a Wessex 5 fired two AS-12 missiles at the town hall in Port Stanley
with the aim of killing senior Argentine commanders inside but missed, hitting the police station
instead. So the Wessex helicopter had a crucial role that bookended the conflict. A week on from
the disaster at Fitzroy British troops would enter Stanley as the Argentinians surrendered.
So just how did the British prevail? How did they overcome the odds in the air? The answer at least
in part is the Harrier. One of the Harrier's key features was its VSTOL capability which stands for
vertical and short takeoff and landing. This essentially means being able to take off from
the ground vertically so straight upwards and to take off within a short amount of runway.
GR3s are fitted with a Rolls-Royce Pegasus 103 turbofan engine and four nozzles to either side
of the aircraft. To achieve VSTOL the pilot would switch the direction of the aircraft's thrust by
rotating its nozzles. The ability to take off and land vertically would prove invaluable when
operating from aircraft carriers especially when the flight decks were already packed with other
aircraft. The Harrier's benefits were not just logistical, it was also an excellent combat
aircraft. The Sea Harriers were primarily employed in air-to-air combat protecting the task force
and ground troops. While the Harriers were slower than the Argentinian Mirages and Daggers,
they had an important trick up their sleeve, the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile.
While previous air-to-air missiles could only be fired from directly behind the enemy,
the Sidewinder worked regardless of their position giving British pilots a major advantage.
Those pilots had been testing their dogfighting skills against the best NATO had to offer
for many years, making them a formidable fighting force. Together their equipment and training
allowed the British to dominate the air-to-air battle. Of the 10 Harriers lost during the
conflict, none came due to enemy aircraft, while Argentina lost at least 20 in air combat alone.
I saw these two delta wing shapes, low, I flew through them head on thinking right we've got a
fight here now at last. As I got through the turn there was in the sky in front of me Steve firing
the first missile as it exploded. A big gout of flame obscured the whole aircraft but at that
stage Steve had already switched attention to a second Mirage which was some distance ahead,
fired the second Sidewinder and this was really driving my mind crazy at the time because it's a
wonderful thing to see you know this is it's happening it's terrific. But while I was thinking
like that there was a third dagger who was behind me was firing his cannons at me. I then thought
Christ you know watch a six o'clock shot and I was still in the hard turn the whole time.
When I looked around and there was this Mirage passing underneath me, beautiful colours in
camouflage, all I had to do really was pull down hard and he didn't stand a chance because I got
in behind him and fired my missile. The initial 20 British Sea Harriers were joined by further Sea Harriers
and Harrier GR3s, the latter operated by number one fighter squadron RAF from the very unfamiliar
surroundings of an aircraft carrier. It was thought that the GR3s would be used as replacements for
Sea Harrier losses but those losses were so few that they ended up being tasked primarily with
striking Argentinian positions around Darwin and Goose Green and supporting British forces around
Mount Kent and in the assault on Port Stanley. So that the GR3s could operate from aircraft carriers
modifications were required and fast. Alterations were made to the GR3 airframe and systems
including radar and navigation. It was even reported that holes were drilled in the airframe
to allow seawater to run out. This particular Harrier GR3 operated from a temporary landing
strip established at San Carlos. This allowed it to respond more rapidly to attack missions if required
and also freed up space on the aircraft carriers. This Harrier carried out attacks around Port
Stanley and undertook a reconnaissance mission looking for ground-launched Exocet missiles.
It attacked positions on Mount Harriet and narrowly escaped an Argentine surface-to-air missile over
Mount Longdon which exploded only 100 feet or 30 meters above the cockpit. After the conflict
it was transferred back to the UK and it has been at IWM Duxford since 1992. Wars aren't fought on
paper. Argentina appeared to have an advantage in the skies over the Falklands with superior numbers
and closer supply lines but in reality the British advantage in training and technology made the fight
far more even. Things could have gone much worse for the British had a carrier been lost or if
landing forces had been hit at San Carlos but instead by the final weeks of the conflict
British Harriers and helicopters dominated the skies over the Falklands. Of course the final
battle for control would have to be waged on land. Make sure you subscribe so you don't miss
out on our penultimate episode exploring the land battles for the Falklands.
