A Steppe Too Far BATTLESTORM STALINGRAD E22

At 0330 hours on the 18th of September 1942, the 2nd Kotluban Offensive began. For the next hour and a half, Soviet artillery and Katyushas fired at the German forward lines, with Soviet aircraft taken to the air as well. The problem was that the Germans had an in-depth defensive system, with most of their forces in the rear, so the shells and bombs landed on the lightly manned forward positions, resulting in few casualties for the Germans. Therefore, when the Soviet troops moved forwards, they were greeted by heavy machine gun fire, backed by mortars and artillery, all of which hammered them, causing their infantry to separate from their tanks. In addition, the 6th Army asked General Leutnant Fiebig to send everything he had in his 8th Fliegerkorps northwards to pound the 1st Guards and 24th Armies. Fighters and bombers scrambled from their airfields, devastating both the troops on the ground and the pathetic display of Soviet airpower. Within the first 35 minutes, 19 IL-2s and 8 Soviet fighters were shot down, and by the end of the day, the number of aircraft in 8th and 16th Air Armies was cut down by a third. Still, even under the scream of Stuka sirens, the Soviet attack did break through the German lines and did gain ground, at least in the area of the 1st Guards Army. 292nd Rifle Division, with 12th Tank Brigade in support, managed to reach a farm about 3 kilometers beyond the first set of German positions. And the 258th and 173rd Rifle Divisions pushed forwards as well. The 316th and 308th Rifle Divisions with the 62nd Tank Brigade moved up to Hill 154.2, which they took with the help of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade. Other elements of the 316th Rifle, supported by 87th Tank Brigade, took another hill to the east. But the 66th Army did nothing, and the 24th Army barely advanced at all, although the 233rd Rifle Division, with the 316th Rifle Division, supported by tanks from the 87th Tank Brigade, did manage to capture 564 Kilometer Station in the late morning. Still, from these initial positions, 62nd Tank Brigade rolled forwards and broke into Borodkin Farm. Unfortunately for the Soviets, they couldn't consolidate the farm because the regiment from 308th Rifle Division that was escorting them was weak. This gave part of the 160th Panzer Battalion a chance, and they took it. They sneaked up a gully, surprised the Soviets, and struck them hard. Only one Soviet tank, a T-60, remained after the fight, and 62nd Tank Brigade was effectively wiped out. And so, the western thrust of 7th Tank Corps ground to a halt. From the 564 Kilometer Station area though, the attack continued, with the 87th Tank Brigade driving on towards another farm. However, once again, their infantry fell behind the tanks, which were, in turn, greeted by a bunch of German anti-tank guns defending the farm itself. Due to a balka in the area, Shabarov's only option was to go north-eastwards to the railway line, then strike south to Konaya Station. Doing this, they managed to take the station, but then 160th Panzer Battalion and other elements of 60th Motorized Division counterattacked, wiping out the lead Soviet tank battalion. Yes, once again, Soviet tanks had become separated from the infantry as a result of German artillery and Stukas. The tanks then kept going, allowing the German anti-tank and panzer elements to pick off the Soviet tanks. So the same old problem that had plagued all Soviet attacks so far, haunted them again. A failure of combine arms tactics. Worse, Moskalenko mistakenly believed that his forces had broken through the lines. So, at 1400 hours, he ordered Kravchenko's 4th Tank Corps, as well as the 221st and 207th Rifle Divisions, to advance into 7th Tank Corps' penetration. All they did was reinforce a defeat. 45th Tank Brigade stalled along the railway, while the 102nd Tank Brigade rolled into the same area that the 87th Tank Brigade had moved through earlier. It was hit on all sides, and rapidly lost all its tanks. Worse, by this point, a Kampfgruppe had been formed by the 103rd Panzer Battalion, the 53rd Motorcycle Battalion, and other infantry and flak elements from the 8th Infantry Regiment. They, along with other German units, counterattacked into the sides of the Soviet offensive. 3rd Guards Heavy Tank Brigade was thrown in to stabilize the situation, which it did initially, but lost more than half its tanks in the process. Its strength reduced, it was unable to stop the Germans overwhelming both the 308th and 316th Rifle Divisions, which were quickly overrun. Without their tanks, the Soviet infantry had to rely on anti-tank rifles and anti-tank guns, which were too few in number to stop the swarm of panzers and Stukas, although they did take some of them out. Ultimately though, their commanders lost control of their troops, their forces scattered, and the main hill in the area, Hill 154.2, was retaken by the Germans. Not only that, but this route seems to have unhinged the rest of the line, and the other units had no choice but to abandon most of the positions they'd taken. They fell back to the north before the day's actions came to an end. Out of the 86,000 men and 170 tanks that had been committed to Moskalenko's attack, 36,000 men became casualties, and at least 66 of the tanks were taken out, although the Germans later increased this estimate to 106, which is probably the more accurate figure. The 24th Army also suffered 32,000 casualties, with the 66th Army taking a further 20,000. Full German casualties for the day are not known, but the 76th Infantry Division lost 80 men killed, with another 371 wounded, and the 3rd Motorized Division lost just 7 men killed and 21 wounded. The 160th Panzer Battalion probably lost around 15 tanks, but many of these were repairable. If we assume that 60th Motorized Division and the 103rd Panzer Battalion suffered similar losses to the 76th Infantry Division and the 160th Panzer Battalion, then the total casualties would be somewhere around 1,000 men, and panzer losses would be about 30. So clearly, the first day of the 2nd Kotluban Offensive had been little more than a slaughter for the Soviets, meaning that Chuikov's 62nd Army wouldn't be getting relieved any time soon. This is, perhaps, a good time to assess what we've seen so far. Over the last four or so episodes, we've witnessed the first assault on the city of Stalingrad, the ending of the 1st Kotluban Offensive, and now the beginning of the 2nd. We've seen the confusing chaos of the battle unfold and the carnage it wrought, but we've also seen something else. We've seen the German advance slow, having previously been counted in miles on the steppe, to now being counted in yards in the city of Stalingrad. Yes, they had been struggling on and off since July, but at least they had been able to push forwards in stops and starts. Now though, they had basically stopped, and we need to ask ourselves why? What was the reason the German advance had stalled? Going right back to the beginning of the battle, in Episode 1, we saw how the 6th Army went from the area west of Serafimovich, broke through the Soviet lines near Kletskaya, and almost reached Kalach. For the 3rd Motorized Division, this was a distance of roughly 140 kilometers, or 85 miles, which they covered in four days. Yes, it did take them a month until episode 10 to clear the rest of the Don Bend, but in the process they had deflected numerous Soviet counter-offensives by entirely new tank armies, and had inflicted a lot of casualties on four Soviet armies. They had also forged a bridgehead across the Don, and this allowed them to race to the Volga on the 23rd of August, a distance of roughly 60 kilometers, or 37 miles, as the crow flies. Probably a bit more because they didn't go in a straight line. Then, over the next seven days, they resisted the Kotluban counter-offensive, with 14th Panzer Corps being in encirclement during most of this period. Hoth had also been stalled in the south, but they made up for lost time, and by the 2nd of September, episode 15, they had taken most of the area between the Don and the Volga, and were just a few miles from the city. But around this time is where things started to go wrong. On the 3rd of September, episode 15, the first Kotluban offensive began, and I actually called episode 16 the Turning Point, because this marked the end of the German Blitzkrieg or Bewegungskrieg style of warfare during the Stalingrad Campaign. From now on, it was going to be a painful grind into the city itself, which they still hadn't reached yet. It's very tempting to jump to some conclusions here. One conclusion could be, well, the first Kotluban offensive started on the 3rd, and the German attack stalled on the 3rd, therefore 1st Kotluban slowed the Germans and saved the city. Another could be, well, the Germans did fine until they entered the city, then everything went wrong, because you can't blitzkrieg a city. Or, the German divisions were depleted by this point, they didn't have the manpower to reinforce them, and fighting in a city drained them of their last reserves. Or simply, the 13th Guards Rifle Division saved the city. And while there is some truth to each of these statements, there's also some flaws. The 1st Kotluban Offensive did have an impact on the battle, but as I've mentioned numerous times, the Germans were already struggling before this point. It was the Kotluban counter-offensive, not the 1st Kotluban Offensive, that had prevented 14th Panzer Corps from striking into the city. They'd had to keep their units facing northwards from all the way back in Episode 14 onwards. The 1st Kotluban Offensive just reinforced this reality. And at that point, Kempf and Seydlitz's attacks were coming to an end anyway. Maybe they stopped a day or two earlier because of the 1st Kotluban Offensive, but the city certainly wouldn't have fallen in early September if Kotluban hadn't have happened. Seydlitz and Kempf's forces were not in a position to even enter the city in early September, and Wietersheim never had the chance of entering the city at all because of the events in August, let alone September. That's not to say that the 1st Kotluban Offensive didn't have an impact, or was a waste of time, manpower and resources. Yes, the 1st Kotluban Offensive, just like the first day of the 2nd Kotluban Offensive, ended in disaster for the Soviets. 80,000 casualties and the loss of 300 tanks is a high price to pay for little more than a slight delay to Seydlitz and Kempf. Yes, the Germans took around 4,000 casualties, and it reinforced the idea that Wietersheim couldn't strike into Stalingrad. But that had been decided before this point anyway. Really, it can't be said that 1st Kotluban saved the city by itself, or was the only reason for the slowdown in the German attack. So if it wasn't just 1st Kotluban that slowed the Germans to a crawl, was it due to the fact that the Germans entered the city, and the city fighting itself slowed them down? Well, not entirely. Their advance slowed to a crawl after the 2nd of September, even though they only entered the city on the 14th. Plus, they hadn't had an easy ride before they got to this point anyway. Their drive on Stalingrad had been a stop-start affair. So while entering the city certainly had a further impact, they were already struggling outside the city. Therefore, it is wrong to conclude that the city terrain alone was what caused them to slow down. It certainly played its part, but wasn't the only factor. Was it because German divisions were depleted? Well, we're going to look at the losses and the reinforcement problem next episode, so I don't want to bog us down with the numbers here. But German divisions weren't at full strength prior to the city-fight either, and yet they did relatively well out on the steppe. There wasn't a significant change of manpower in and around the beginning of the city-fight. And while German forces were depleted, the Soviet divisions were even more depleted. So by itself, it's hard to say that depleted divisions were the only reason for the slowdown. Was it because the 13th Guards Rifle Division saved the city? Again, the slowdown happened before they had even entered combat. And while they certainly did their part in alleviating the crisis in the city centre, 13th Guards' actions don't explain why the 48th Panzer Corps was having a hard time. 13th Guards only really stopped the 71st and 295th Infantry Divisions, and didn't really have an impact outside of them. And I'm not dismissing their contribution or downplaying it. I'm merely pointing out that their importance is limited to the centre of the city from the 14th onwards. Clearly, by themselves, they didn't cause the German slowdown, nor save the city in its entirety. We can't even say it was German logistics, because again, they had been struggling before this point. Plus, both sides had problems with their logistics. Yes, the Germans were having trouble bringing up ammunition, especially artillery shells. But we also have several reports of Soviet formations going days without receiving food, ammunition, or medical supplies. And, according to the German official history, the logistics issues wouldn't be a major problem for the 6th Army until October, or maybe the end of September. And you can't even say Chuikov was the reason for the slowdown, since Chuikov only took command on the 12th of September, Episode 18. And the slowdown happened before then. And Order 227 had been implemented ages ago, so it's not that either. All these other points are important, but I'm not dismissing them. But I think the main reason for the slowdown in early September was something much more obvious. Let's look at the map. When the 6th Army was behind the Don, they had most of their divisions fighting on the front line. When they got across the Don, and reached the Volga, a significant portion of their divisions were now covering the northern flank. 4th Panzer Army was also not a large army, and actually had difficulties throughout the campaign. But when they got to Stalingrad, half of their army was to the south, facing Shumilov's 64th Army. So, by the time we get to early September, most of the Axis divisions were on the flanks, not directed at Stalingrad. This is the crucial issue. Out of roughly 26 divisions in 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army, just six or so were facing the city. For the first time in the campaign, the Germans had most of their divisions facing away from their target, significantly slowing down the advance. This is why the 6th Army only started having trouble once they crossed the Don, and why 4th Panzer Army started having trouble once they failed to cut off Shumilov's 64th Army. Yes, the losses played a part in all of this, as did the Kotluban Offensives, and the logistics, and so on. But it was the necessity of guarding the flanks, especially the northern one, which compelled Paulus to deploy most of its divisions to the north. And the failure of Hoth to break through to the Volga and cut off 64th Army in the August period meant that 4th Panzer Army had most of its divisions guarding the southern flank. This depleted the German focus point, their Schwerpunkt or concentration point, preventing it from taking Stalingrad. In effect, this was a mini-Faublau, in the sense that the necessity of splitting forces away from the main effort to guard the northern flank caused the failure of the campaign. Ultimately, the axis was stretched too thin, and this goes right back to Führer-Ordnung No. 45 in July. If the entirety of Army Group South had aimed eastwards first before heading into the Caucasus, then it's likely that the number of divisions in the Stalingrad region would have been significantly higher, and the city would have simply been overwhelmed. Logistically, this may have been a problem, but in theory there would have been more men in the area, and this was the original plan anyway, so I'm sure Halder had determined that it was logistically viable. Right? But by splitting Army Group South into two, sending a good portion south, Army Group B simply didn't have enough troops to cover the northern flank, and take Stalingrad, or have a hope of advancing to Astrakhan. And as soon as they got over the Don, having left a good chunk of their infantry divisions behind, they weren't able to concentrate enough of their forces on Stalingrad itself. This forced them to assault the city with a few weak divisions which weren't capable of completing their task. So, although there were a lot of reasons for the slowdown, the main problem causing the German advance on Stalingrad to stall in early to mid-September was because they had gone too far with too little doing too much in too short a time. To put it simply, they'd gone a step too far. Overnight on the 17th to the 18th of September 1942, a naval rifle platoon from 92nd Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Zazuli, and a machine gun company commanded by Lieutenant Andrei Kazanov, were ordered to reinforce the men holding onto the grain elevator. When they reached the position that evening, there were about 35 men left in the garrison, and a lot of wounded. Now, Kazanov's reinforcements, which were reported as 19 or 20 men, set up inside the silo. The 50-plus man unit had two Maxim machine guns, one light machine gun, two anti-tank rifles, three submachine guns, some rifles, and a radio. In addition, and actually prior to this reinforcement, the Germans holding out in the second floor of the grain elevator had been wiped out by Polyakov's group early in the morning. And with the building in their hands, Polyakov now had a garrison of about 130 men and a lot of ammunition. Yes, I did just contradict myself. We have one account saying 130 men were in the elevator, and several others, all based off Kozyakov's account, saying that there were just over 50 men in the elevator. More on this shortly. In addition, 62nd Army's diary contradicts all of this by saying that the Germans were holding the elevator, somewhat confirming that the Germans had been holding it previously. But with the elevator proving to be a stubborn nut to crack, Kempf decided it was time to use the artillery of both 24th Panzer and 94th Infantry Divisions against it. 94th Infantry brought up its pack anti-tank guns to pound the grain elevator from near and afar. However, their shells had little effect, and the massive structure just shrugged them off. So Kempf asked 24th Panzer Division if they could shell the building with their 88mm anti-aircraft guns before 94th Infantry Division assaulted the structure once more. I immediately want 50 shots of 88mm FlaK fired into the grain elevator. There was some confusion and debate amongst the Germans about this, because 94th Infantry apparently didn't want the help of the 88mm guns. 94th Infantry Division's Chief of Staff said this. We have great hesitation. Our people ought to dig themselves in. It is also unclear who has overall control of the elevator operation. We seem to have been given half an explanation here. Why would they just want to dig in? Don't they want to at least surround the elevator and cut it off? Don't they want to storm it? Or do they mean we should dig into the elevator itself rather than just fire at it? It's not clear. It also seems odd that they're complaining about who is in overall control of the elevator operation. We do know that 29th Motorcycle Battalion was moving to the area, so perhaps this was what they were referring to. And why the firing of the 88mm guns would be of concern to them is also not certain. Unless they believed that some of their men were still inside the elevator, then it would make more sense. We know that the 94th Infantry Division also tried to storm the building in the morning of the 18th. At 0300 hours, two assault groups of 94th Infantry Division's 274th Infantry Regiment attacked the elevator. Despite the use of hand grenades and concentrated explosives, it was not possible to penetrate the cellar of the elevator. Even if the Germans hadn't taken it previously, it could be the case that the 94th Infantry Division's men were trying to break into it now, which would explain the hesitancy of accepting the help of the 88mm guns for fear of hitting their own troops. Either way, Kempf insisted that they use 88mm guns against the silo, and 44 of the 50 shots fired hit their target. But even with the heavier shot, the shells had a relatively minor effect on the building itself, as you can see by the small holes in the side of the picture here. Therefore, 105mm guns from the 89th Panzer Artillery Regiment were brought up, and they did a lot more damage. The men sheltering inside were hit by flying pieces of concrete, killing some, and others were choked by the dust. Part of the first floor collapsed, but still the Soviets held on. 94th Infantry Division reported that the Soviets had barricaded themselves upstairs on the second and third floors, and held onto the stairwell itself, while others were in the basement. When the shelling was over, and the German infantry tried to approach the building, rifle shots rang out from the windows of the second and third floors, while grenades flew. The attack died down, and the assault groups had to retreat once more. September 18th. Fighting is going on inside the elevator. The Russians inside are condemned men. The battalion commander says, the commissars have ordered those men to die in the elevator. If all the buildings of Stalingrad are defended like this, then none of our soldiers will get back to Germany. I had a letter from Elsa today. She's expecting me home when victory is won. Some of the Soviet accounts say that German panzers, most likely from 129th Panzer Battalion, participated in the attack on the Grain Elevator on this day. It's entirely possible, but Jason D. Mark in his book, Panzer Krieg, says that the German accounts don't mention their presence, which I'm inclined to believe. Unlike Dragan's more down-to-earth accounts of the fighting in the Central Train Station, the account by Kazyanov sounds too boastful to be accurate, and there's other problems with it too. At dawn on the 18th, a German tank carrying a white flag approached from the south. Two men showed themselves from inside the tank, and tried to persuade us to surrender. "'Get out of the elevator now!' insisted the German officer. "'If not, we will show you no mercy. In one hour's time we will bomb you all flat!' "'What a cheek!' we thought, and gave the Nazi lieutenant a curt reply. "'Tell all your fascists they can go to hell in an open boat!' The German tank tried to back away, but a volley from our two anti-tank rifles stopped it." This is doubtful, because the Germans didn't have tanks in the area. However, Igor Kopyakov has informed me that, rather than the word tank, which my sources say, Kazyanov actually used the word tankette, which is a small tank. Now, the Germans didn't have tankettes, and there were no StuGs in the area, so Igor Kopyakov believes that Kazyanov was referring to a German half-track. This is more likely to be the case, since the 94th Infantry Division may have had half-tracks in their so-called Schnelle or Fast Battalion, which gives some credence to Kazyanov's account. But then again, this next bit is doubtful. Soon after that, enemy tanks and infantry about ten times our strength attacked from south and west. Ten attacks were beaten off just on September 18th. The problem here is that we have another Soviet soldier who was there, contradicting what Kazyanov says. Every day we fended off three to four attacks. It's telling when some of the other Soviet veterans who fought at Stalingrad also say that elements of the Grain Elevator story are nothing more than propaganda myth. Did they really beat off ten enemy attacks when the Germans spent half the day debating who should or should not attack the elevator? There's also no mention of the 88mm guns or artillery fire in Kazyanov's account. And coupled with the knowledge that, later on, Kazyanov and another soldier, Pavlenko from 35th Guards Rifle Division, claimed they surrendered to Romanian forces, who, as far as we know, didn't have units inside Stalingrad. All this makes these accounts highly suspect. Anton Jolly has informed me that other Soviet veterans, including the Chief of Staff of 92nd Brigade, Emelianenko, said Pavlenko was lying about there being Romanians near the elevator, and that there were disagreements between veterans after the war about who even defended the elevator. Overall, it's clear that some of the veterans weren't telling the truth. Which is a shame, because now the story of the Grain Elevator is tarnished with myths and lies, and it's hard to tell exactly what happened. For now then, the only thing we do know is this. A handful of Soviet soldiers did hold out in the elevator, with their ammunition and water running out, whilst getting pounded by German artillery and attacked by infantry from the 94th Infantry Division. Beyond that, it's probably best to be cautious about believing some of the details of the fighting at the Grain Elevator. Meanwhile, outside and near the building, the 92nd Rifle Brigade pushed westwards, forcing the Germans back to the railroad line. Part of 3rd Battalion managed to capture the southern station for about half an hour, but the small unit that had captured it was wiped out, probably with the help of 29th Motorcycle Battalion, which was moved to the area. And the rest of the battalion was forced back. The 94th Infantry and 29th Motorized Divisions were also preparing to advance eastwards, and clear the Soviets from their bridgehead. So they launched their own attack shortly after. Would the elevator survive this attack? And could Bakhtrakov's remnants break out of their trap to the north? Let's find out. 94th Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions attacked eastwards. But their forces were stretched thin and couldn't concentrate their assault units into one schwerpunkt. The result was that the advance became dispersed over a wide area, dissolving the strength of their attack. The fight boiled down into lots of small battles for individual buildings or positions, from the cannery, to the Grain Elevator, the fire department, and the buildings beside the railway lines, and more beyond them. Close combat skirmishes broke out between small groups of soldiers, sometimes even fireteams of just two or so men. The odd mortar or field gun offered support for the infantry, who fought with rifles, machine guns, submachine guns, bayonets, and Molotov cocktails. Box of buildings and separate structures became the battlefields, in which individual floors and even rooms changed hands repeatedly. Nonetheless, they did take the cannery buildings and nearby areas, forcing the units rallying around Dubiansky to fall back. As this happened, to their northwest, Baktrakov's combined group, now less than a thousand men strong, were trying to avoid destruction. Being almost surrounded, they had only one option left open to them, and that was to escape the trap by moving down the Tsaritsa Balka towards the Volga. It's not clear if they fought as one coordinated unit, or simply panicked and fled in small groups, but either way, they weaved through the Borush, suffering many losses in the deadly crossfire between the guns of 24th Panzer and 71st Infantry Divisions. Some managed to slip under the bridge. Others infiltrated through the German lines, reaching the city garden area and linking up with NKVD and local militia forces. Here, the wounded commissar of 42nd Brigade succumbed to his wounds. But Baktrakov himself had made it out, and Isaev reports that the losses of 42nd Naval Rifle Brigade were only moderate, and the brigade was still combat-capable. The story was significantly different for the 244th Rifle Division though, whose combat element numbered just 195 men, with a handful of small arms weaponry, and just two artillery pieces. Effectively, the division was wiped out. In the city centre, 71st Infantry and 13th Guards Rifle Divisions continued their brawl, with numerous buildings changing hands several times or being contested. Dragan's few remaining troops continued to resist inside the nail factory, supported by the 20 or so riflemen from Kolyganov's 3rd Company, which had been sent to reinforce them. Kolyganov himself was wounded on this day, but continued to fight with his troops, whose ammunition was running short. "...on the night of the 18th, the Nazis blew up the walls separating our room from the rest of the nail factory, and started lobbing grenades through. Our guardsmen tried to throw the grenades back through the windows." Nearby, in the area of the 9th of January Square, a German machine gunner in a school had been giving the Soviets trouble suppressing them and stopping them over the course of the previous few days. Well, now the school was stormed by the 9th Company of 3rd Battalion from the 42nd Guards Regiment. In my original script for this video, I was going to say, here is a picture of the men storming the school building. And then I was going to talk about how remarkable it is that we actually have a picture of the event in question. But Igor Kobyakov has corrected me and says that this picture wasn't taken on the 18th of September 1942. This picture was a recreation taken after the battle, probably in early 1943. But it is showing the veterans of Stalingrad storming the school building, so it's not hard to imagine that something similar to this picture would have happened in September. And here's another famous photo from Stalingrad. And again, yes, it's a recreation of the men storming school building number 6, rather than being a real photo of the event. However, the nurse attending to the soldier in the foreground is Natalia Ivanovna Pashushnik, who was later praised for her actions within Stalingrad. Therefore, while it is a dramatized recreation, it does contain some of the veterans of Stalingrad. 7th Company also occupied the house of metal workers, which was nearby. Further north, the fighting continued for the two ravines, where, overnight on the 17th to the 18th of September, the Germans launched an armoured assault along Nekrasovskaya Street, north of the L-shaped house. They apparently reached the Volga. So seeing this, the 133rd Tank Brigade decided to send three KV tanks to counter-attack from the central train station area. Passing through German lines, they overran two Pak 36 anti-tank guns and somehow reached the Nekrasovskaya Street area, compelling the Germans to fall back. During this fighting, the 112th Rifle Division's southern regiments tried to move forwards, took heavy losses perhaps a third of their number, and achieved no success. And the battle continued on Mamayev Kurgan. Unfortunately, there's no way to really tell what was happening, because both sides had locked horns and were in a fierce struggle for the mound. Much further north, and in line with the 2nd Kotluban Offensive, Chuikov ordered Group Gorokhov to attack the 16th Panzer Division. Gorokhov had no hope of doing anything substantial, but that was fine. His attack was only meant to be a diversion to draw German units away from the Kotluban area to the north. Well, Gorokhov struck northwards against two hills, but barely went anywhere, and this pathetic show of force certainly didn't distract the Germans at all from the Kotluban Offensive. Still, the first four days of the attack into Stalingrad between the 14th and 18th of September had been eventful. German forces were firmly in the centre of the city, and had taken a substantial amount of ground. Here was their lines at the beginning of the 14th, and here's their lines at the end of the 18th. So, on the surface at least, it looks like the Germans were making progress. However, most of the ground taken in the centre had been taken on the 14th itself, and the front there had largely remained static for the remaining three days. And, while progress had been made in the south, the Germans had failed to surround both the forces around Dubiansky, along the Volga, or back Chukov's group at the Tsaritsa Balka. This failure meant that there were still substantial forces in the south that needed to be cleared out, including the 92nd Naval Rifle Brigade, which had been sent in as reinforcements. Yet, despite this, Paulus now believed that Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps had been successful, and he thought Kempf would complete his objectives, clearing the area south of the Tsaritsa, within a few hours. He also thought that Seydlitz's 51st Army Corps needed reinforcing if it was going to have a chance of winning the centre or the north of the city. Therefore, Paulus now decided to change tactics. At 1815 hours, 6th Army's Chief of Staff, General Arthur Schmidt, called 48th Panzer Corps and informed them that the 94th Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions were going to be transferred from the 48th Panzer Corps to the 51st Army Corps, and Lenski was ordered to pull his division back from the fighting and move northwards after dawn the next day. In addition, Paulus seems to have realized that his forces in and around Stalingrad had been struggling, and that they needed reinforcing. And because Romanian troops had arrived on the Don flank, this would allow some German forces to be relieved. So, the 376th Infantry Division was ordered to take over the 100th Jäger Division's front, which would then allow the 100th Jäger Division to pull out of the line. It would then march eastwards towards Stalingrad, although Paulus hadn't yet decided whether to commit it to the city fight or elsewhere, perhaps even the Caucasus. Either way, as a result of these orders, Glantz argues that this, in and of itself, was a tacit omission that 6th Army's assault on Stalingrad was not going as well as planned. It's not clear if this was the case, or if Paulus had just misjudged the situation in the south. As Glantz himself points out, undermining his own argument, Paulus had not realized that Soviet forces in the south hadn't been liquidated. So, although he had stopped the attack and was pulling 24th Panzer Division out of the line, Paulus may have believed that 94th Infantry Division would be able to mop up the last few bits of Soviet resistance in the area, and therefore it wasn't worth keeping the 24th Panzer Division there. But this seems to be a repeat of the same mistake made previously, where German forces in the south failed to cut off and destroy Soviet forces along the Volga. Instead of striking towards the Volga via the Cannery, and cutting off Soviet forces south of the Yeltshanka, 24th Panzer had been told to go north to surround Soviet forces in the Tsaritsa instead. Well, now they were doing the same thing. Instead of sending 24th Panzer Division to strike down the Tsaritsa-Balka area to the Volga, and then cut off Soviet forces between there and the Yeltshanka, they were pulling them out of the line, and once again leaving open an escape route for Soviet forces in the south. Maybe this was because the terrain didn't suit the panzers, but even so, surely it was worth a go, because destroying these units in the south would free up 94th Infantry and 24th Panzer Divisions much quicker than if they'd just left 94th Infantry Division to struggle against the Soviet forces in the area, who could then retreat north. This definitely looks like a tactical mistake. Of course, we have to factor in the 2nd Kotluban Offensive, which no doubt affected Paulus's judgement here. The threat of the Soviets breaking through in the north probably spurred him on to the decision of taking out Soviet resistance in the centre, and then the north especially the Orlovka salient. Doing this would then lessen the threat of the Soviet armies at Kotluban, linking up with Chuikov's army, and relieve pressure on 14th Panzer Corps. Maybe Paulus thought that the situation in the north was clearly a bigger issue than a few Soviet stragglers in the south, so it's understandable why Paulus made the decision to prioritize the centre and north. That said, we know that the 2nd Kotluban Offensive was failing, even by the afternoon of the 18th. In fact, the 6th Army's diary indicates this, calling the offensive a distractive manoeuvre. So clearly, Paulus knew that it was failing. Therefore, while Paulus may have been worried about it, really he didn't need to be, and he certainly didn't need to rush and pull 24th Panzer Division out of the line. He had plenty of time to finish off the south before doing that, and this would have freed the 94th Infantry for other operations as well. So it's hard not to conclude that this was a tactical mistake, with or without hindsight. What's also interesting is that this is one of the first real mistakes Paulus has made that can be blamed squarely on him. A lot of the other mistakes so far weren't actually made by him alone, or haven't actually been mistakes as such, but this was definitely a mistake. Yet, this mistake wasn't made because he was cautious, as many accounts claim he was, but the opposite. Rather than cautiously finishing off the units in the south, he threw caution to the wind and was over-eager to send his units north. So once again, the old narrative is thrown into question, and once again we have a shifting of units by the Germans in an attempt to get the attack going again. The question is, would this be successful? Would abandoning the south lead to problems later on? And would the Soviets be able to hold on against a new attack? We'll have to wait and see. Thanks for watching, bye for now.