Indian troops volunteered to fight in the British Indian Army during the Second World War. Why? And how effective were they? Well, today we're going to look at how they were recruited and trained, and how they performed in the North African Campaign and the Burma Campaign.
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ABOUT TIK 📝
History isn’t as boring as some people think, and my goal is to get people talking about it. I also want to dispel the myths and distortions that ruin our perception of the past by asking a simple question - “But is this really the case?”. I have a 2:1 Degree in History and a passion for early 20th Century conflicts (mainly WW2). I’m therefore approaching this like I would an academic essay. Lots of sources, quotes, references and so on. Only the truth will do.
This video is discussing events or concepts that are academic, educational and historical in nature. This video is for informational purposes and was created so we may better understand the past and learn from the mistakes others have made.Credit: TIKhistory
One of my Patrons was asking if I could go into more detail about Allied colonial forces
during the Second World War, and talk about where the troops came from, what battles they
fought in, the reputation of the units, and so on. But it's such a broad question that
there's no way I could cover all the different forces in just one video. So instead, I thought
I'd focus on the biggest colonial force that the British had, the British Indian Army,
and ask how effective was it? How good or bad were the troops within it? And were the
Indian soldiers as capable as the British soldiers they fought alongside? These are
the questions we're going to try and address today, so let's begin.
Out of all the levies, rifle corps, guides, rangers, camel corps, militias, military police,
defence forces, frontier forces, and other colonial armies, the Indian Army was the largest
of the imperial formations that helped the British Army protect the Empire. British officers
and NCOs recruited, trained, and led most of the colonial formations, but the manpower
in the units came from the local Indian population. Now yes, let's get the elephants in the
out of the way. Racism was an element of the process. In Ceylon, modern-day Sri Lanka,
Indian villagers watched African soldiers bathing in the hope of glimpsing their tails.
And people actually fled areas near to African camps for fear that they would eat their children,
convinced as many were that they had been brought in to eat the Japanese should they
land.
I decided to place this quote here because I wanted to show you that it wasn't just
the British who were racist at this time. The Indians were just as racist as the British
were. But you see, there's two competing narratives here, isn't there Whoopi? One
which says only white-skinned un-humans can be racists, and that the only reason these
whites conquered India and Africa was because they wanted to enslave non-whites, and that
this is all a racial war between social-racial groups.
While the other narrative is that the reason the British went to India was because they
wanted to be rich, and that when they got there, they decided to conquer the place because
that made economic sense, and then they governed the uncivilized natives whilst trying to civilize
lives, an attitude which came from Christianity and classical liberalism. Yes, things didn't
always run smoothly, and racism was a part of the process, but they didn't go there
to enslave non-whites, since Britain was the first nation in the history of humanity to
actually abolish slavery, and went around enforcing this abolishment on other nations.
I know which narrative I believe in, the one with the evidence that supports it, but you
can believe whichever you want to believe. Don't let a cis-gendered white male tell
you that you're wrong and make you run to your safe space. Emotions!
But yes, racism was a factor. So, while India wanted to fight against Axis aggression, many
in India also wanted freedom from British rule. And it wasn't just British rule, but
Indian rule as well, because as a consequence of the Great Depression, many nationalist
Indians were against the Indian capital and labour classes or races who had benefited
from British trade and industrial policies. So there was an intra-racial conflict going
on here as well.
In September 1939, Gandhi argued that Indians should cooperate with the British during the
Second World War, because he believed that the British could be negotiated with, and
believed that the war would destroy imperialism. Others though, believed a more militant stance
with Britain was in order. One Indian nationalist leader close to Gandhi in 1939, but split
with him a year later, was Subhash Chandra Bose, who refused to cooperate with the British.
He called for a synthesis between Fascism and Communism. Later in the war, Bose went
on to help found the Indian Legion in Germany, then led the Indian National Army in Japan
where he also founded the Provincial Government of India. And Bose was killed trying to escape
to the Soviet Union in 1945.
So, I'll let the Fascists and the Communists excuse their way out of that one. But all
this leads us to a question. Why would ordinary Indians want to fight for the racist British?
They weren't drafted. The British Indian Army was a volunteer force, so Indians willingly
took up arms for the British. But why?
Well, there were several reasons. Some were unemployed looking for a job. Others joined
up for king and country. Others wanted to escape the inflation as well as the food shortages
that occurred in India during the war. More wanted to learn valuable skills, becoming
signalmen and mechanics, which would place them above the competition after the war.
But the general consensus is that most of these recruits joined up for personal gain
rather than for patriotism.
This was a bad thing, as it shows that the Indians weren't really passionate about
fighting for the British or against the Axis. There is evidence that the Nationalist movement
was more attractive to those Indians passionate about the political situation. Nonetheless,
the ratio of British officers in the Indian Army fell dramatically, going from 10 to 1
in October 1939, to 4.2 to 1 by January 1945.
The British, meanwhile, feared that the Soviets, initially allied with the Germans, might move
into and through Afghanistan, or send long-range bombers to strike targets in India. The northwest
frontier of India was therefore under threat. The British knew that they had to use Afghanistan
as a buffer state to protect India from Soviet aggression. And when the Axis and Soviets
carved up Europe, it looked like the British Empire was on its last legs. Italy entered
the war in 1940, so Britain had no choice but to pull out forces from Singapore as well
as India, fundamentally weakening her forces in the Far East.
The British mistakenly believed that the chance of war with Japan had receded, and that the
probability of war with the Soviet Union had increased. Seeing British weakness, the Afghans
also sided with the Soviets, refusing British arms while signing a trade agreement with
the Soviet Union in July 1940. This, ironically, actually confirmed to the British that the
Soviets weren't intending to invade India via Afghanistan.
But that didn't stop them agitating. The Communists in India were on the side of the
Axis-Soviet Pact, and they promoted civil disobedience, national strikes, and a policy
of no-rent and no-tax. This was all designed to impact British capitalism in India. But
then they completely changed their tune when the Axis invaded the Soviet Union. Overnight,
they suddenly became supporters of India's war with the Axis, proving that they have
no spine. Yes, Marxists now joined in to help capitalism. What a joke.
But going back a little bit, when the German Blitzkrieg overcame France, there was some
panic in India, with heavy withdrawals being made from the banks, and the general fear
was that India might be attacked. Gandhi had to make a statement telling Indians not
to withdraw their deposits.
"...your metal, buried on the ground or in your treasure chests, need not be considered
safer than in banks or in paper if anarchy overtakes us."
That's bad advice there by Gandhi. And most Indians seemed to ignore it. As the currency
began to inflate due to the Central Bank printing more rupees, people withdrew cash
from the banks, and even closed their bank accounts. Police had to be brought in to control
the crowds outside the banks, and people bought land, food, gold and silver to protect themselves,
fearing a hyperinflationary crisis. Later, people fled from Eastern India, thinking that
the Japanese were coming, leading to labour shortages, a fall in rental income in the
cities, and an increase in rental income in the smaller towns and villages, plus an outbreak
of cholera.
At the height of the panic in early April 1942, over 55,000 workers, almost 25% of the
total industrial workforce in Bombay, were reported absent. No fewer than six special
trains were running every day to cope with the exodus. Special buses with extra rations
of petrol were stationed at various places to facilitate the movement of people. Merchants
began moving their stocks out of Bombay to safer storehouses in the countryside.
Agitating peacefully, Gandhi was arrested by the Raj, spiking a massive rebellion which
destroyed 332 railway stations, 208 police stations, 749 government buildings, 66 trains,
hundreds of sabotaged railway and telephone lines, and impacted the supply of Allied troops.
The workers weren't happy, but neither were the Communists, who condemned the rebellion
because, workers of the world unite, but only when we tell you to. History repeats.
Now, there was a famine in India during the Second World War, but I don't really want
to get into that today because I intend to do a video on it in the future, which will
no doubt get suppressed, just like my Greek Famine video did. But arguably, the main cause
of the famine in India, just like in Greece and elsewhere, was the inflation policy of
the Central Bank.
The famine in Bengal of 1943-44, which resulted in perhaps three million deaths owing to starvation
and disease, was the extreme manifestation of the problems triggered by inflation. It
is also the best studied. As Amartya Sen has famously argued, the famine was caused not
by a shortage in the availability of food in the province, but by the drastic reduction
in the entitlements, the overall ability to obtain food, of the Bengali people. This,
in turn, was primarily due to the war-induced inflation."
Sounds similar to what happened in Weimar Germany. Anyway, Indian sympathy to the British
cause was heightened after the fall of France and the Low Countries. It was felt that the
Axis and the Soviet menace were as much a concern for India as they were for the British.
The political situation came to a head in 1940 after Churchill gained power. Upon setting
up a War Advisory Council in India, the offer was made to the Indians that a constitution
could be drawn up after the war. And so, the British invited the Indian leaders to confer
amongst themselves about who would be the representatives of the Indian people, who
would then write up this future constitution. That kept them busy for a while, allowing
the army to get on with the war.
Now at the beginning of the war, India's army wasn't prepared for it. There were
only 194,373 men in the entire force in October 1939, mostly trained for internal policing
work, plus the Indian general staff were believers of outdated concepts of warfare. The Indian
army had been 573,484 men strong in 1918, and would end up growing to 2 million men
by the end of the Second World War. Therefore, massive expansion was about to be underway.
General Auchinleck and others started to modernize the Indian army, which was given three tasks
internal security, external defense, and imperial duties.
Thus, not all of India's army could be deployed outside of India. In December 1941, when there
were 600,000 men in the Indian army in India, including British commanders, half of these
were still in training, and half of the remainder were for internal security. So there were
only six Indian army divisions at the time inside India that were capable of being deployed
in combat. And three of them weren't ready yet. And really, only the 17th Indian Division
was actually fully prepared to fight.
There were another 300,000 men elsewhere though. Two Indian divisions were in the Middle East
at this time, three in Iraq, which was counted as separate to the Middle East for some reason,
and more besides. But India itself was barren of troops.
At the start of the war, there were only eight anti-aircraft guns in the whole of India,
and no fighter aircraft at all. Signal's equipment was scarce, and while India did
supply the men, its relatively small industrial base was incapable of supplying the equipment
for them. So Britain had to supply the equipment, which wasn't great because Britain itself
didn't have much equipment to spare. Plus, getting that equipment to India wasn't easy.
As a consequence, the forces raised in India and sent abroad were chronically under-equipped
and reliant on all manner of patchwork solutions. Thus, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions deployed
in the Middle East, tank country par excellence, did not have the requisite complement of anti-tank
regiments.
Even in March 1942, there were only two fighter squadrons in eastern India, equipped with
Hawker Audax biplanes. Calcutta was completely defenceless. But reinforcements were being
moved to India, including the 70th British Division, which barely arrived in time to
plug the gap after Burma fell to the Japanese. By September 1942, the Eastern Army had one
British and five Indian Divisions, and a tank brigade equipped with Valentine tanks.
But the British were running out of Indians to recruit. India was divided into classes
or races, and the marshal class or marshal race was rapidly depleted thanks to the expansion
of the army, so the British had no choice but to recruit from other classes.
Even though the Punjab and the Panthans of the northwest frontier province were just
7% of the total population, they'd been over 48% of the army prior to 1939, with the
Punjab accounting for the vast majority of that. Sikhs provided 17.5% of the army, despite
only being 1.4% of the population, and the Muslims provided 34% of the army from 23.5%
of the population. The other 32% of the population, all of which was Hindu, provided just 3.7%
of the manpower for the army. This, of course, changed during the Second World War. Massive
new numbers came from southern India and from Bengal, which hadn't had any representation
in the army prior to 1939. The traditional recruiting classes still contributed the most,
and had the highest proportion for the size of their populations, with the British continuing
to use the marshal classes on the front line, relegating the non-marshal classes to support
and rear services roles. But a shift had occurred. Expansion meant that a large number
of the new Indian troops had little basic training, in direct contrast to the professional
Indian army of the pre-1939 period.
By December 1942, there were two British and six Indian divisions, while one Indian armoured
division and five Indian infantry divisions were in the Middle East. More divisions were
being recruited though, and at the end of 1942, the Indian army stood at 1,550,000 men
strong. It was then decided to sort out the equipment shortage, and from early 1943, shipments
were increased, so that by the end of the year, and certainly by mid-1944, they had
made up for their shortfall.
Most British officers in the Indian army started their career by attending the Royal Military
College at Sandhurst. Thus, they were as well trained as any other officer in the British
army. Many wanted to go to India for adventure or more responsibility, but only the top 60
officers who passed at Sandhurst could apply to go to India, so competition was fierce
and only the best officers got to go. In addition, Indian officers were trained at the Indian
Military Academy at Dehradun, and were considered to be better trained officers than their British
contemporaries because the British put their best officers in charge of that school. Again,
this was due to Indianization and the idea of civilizing the colonies.
The 4th Indian Division ended up in Africa in 1940, fighting the Italians along with
the British. I've already done a documentary on Operation Compass, so it's probably best
just to watch that if you want to get the details. But the British force under General
O'Connor had just two divisions. The first was the 7th Armoured Division, the Desert
Rats, and the other was the 4th Indian Division. These two divisions, totaling 31,000 men,
immediately faced six Italian divisions, and then more divisions behind the lines, for
a total of 150,000 men. Now, the Indian Division ended up being pulled out halfway through
the operation to be sent to fight the Italians in East Africa. And this sort of makes sense,
because the Indian Army was well-versed in mountain warfare as a result of the fighting
it had done previously on the north-west frontier, and there were mountainous regions in East
Africa. But it was also a controversial decision because General O'Connor hadn't been informed
beforehand, and it robbed him of a division right in the middle of the battle. He later
said that this decision cost him three weeks or more because the Australian division that
was to replace the Indian Division wasn't ready. Nevertheless, the 4th Indian Division
worked well with the British Matilda tanks in the initial stages of Operation Compass,
and had contributed significantly to the best British victory of the war. The results of
the battle speak for themselves.
A British force of never more than two divisions, one of them armoured, with a proportion of
corps troops, advanced 500 strenuous miles and totally destroyed an army of 10 divisions
for a loss of 500 killed, 1,373 wounded and 55 missing. The captures were 130,000 prisoners,
180 medium tanks and more than 200 light and 845 guns of the size of field guns and above.
This was the best victory of the war for the British, and wouldn't have been possible
without the 4th Indian Division.
Then the East African Campaign, and the Battle of Keren especially, showed the strength and
skill of the Indian formations. The 4th and 5th Indian Divisions moved across mountainous
terrain and crushed the Italian units that were of better quality than the ones the 4th
Indian Division had faced in North Africa. The Italians did put up a spirited defence,
but the Indians overcame it. The Battle of Keren showed the importance of the pre-war
training of the Indian Army, particularly in mountain warfare and night attacks, that
helped defeat a numerically superior force, even though it was equipped as a mechanized
force rather than for mountain warfare.
I've actually been reading into the East African Campaign in preparation for a future
Battlestorm documentary on it, so I'll leave the details until then. Same applies to the
rest of the North African Campaign, since the last video I did on that campaign was
Operation Crusader, before I got bogged down in Stalingrad.
Well, when we pick up and go further through the North African Campaign, we'll see more
battles where the Indians took part. But as an overview, the 5th Indian Infantry Division
didn't perform too well during Rommel's 2nd Offensive, or at Gazala, and to be fair,
most of the British units didn't do well during those battles either. However, about
95% of the total casualties among the Indian units during the withdrawal from Gazala to
El Alamein were due to being missing or having surrendered. This suggests that their morale
and will to fight for the British cause had collapsed.
The lacklustre record of Auchinleck, the senior-most Indian Army officer, as well as the Indian
formations that had been plucked out of the Middle East, cast a long shadow on Indian
forces in North Africa. Francis Tucker, 4th Indian Division's commander, felt that their
performance had been so disastrous, and had so shattered the prestige of the Indian Army
that it can never recover in this war. Even though the 4th Indian Infantry Division was
moved back to the front line after having been sent to the rear in early 1942, this
may have been why they were subsequently relegated to a minor role thanks to Montgomery.
Montgomery expressed the view that the British officers in India weren't very good. But
this might have more to do with the fact that Monty had applied to the Indian Army and had
been rejected because he wasn't good enough. So bitterness soured his view. Monty only
gave the 4th Indian Division a minor role at El Alamein because he believed it was only
capable of holding the line. The exception was the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, which
was given to 51st Highland Division, and contributed significantly to Operation Supercharge. General
Tucker though, knew that he had to restore the name of the 4th Indian Division, and told
I've told my chaps that a fight as if 4th Division had no name at all, and was starting
now to make it. I've absolute faith in them."
It appeared to those at the time that Monty only viewed the Indian troops as worthy of
garrison duty, or second-line troops, which is why he left them behind at El Alamein to
clear up the battlefield once the battle was over. I'm not sure if this was purely because
of his perception of the failure of Auchinleck and the 5th Indian Division's poor performance
previously, and his inability to get into the British Indian Army in the first place,
or if this has to do with prejudice and racism. This is something I need to look into in the
future when I get to it in the Battlestorm series. But the fact is that the 4th Indian
Division was a very experienced division, and was well-suited for desert warfare. So
after his men were left to clear the battlefield of debris, Tucker complained to Brian Horrocks,
his corps commander, saying that his men weren't being given the proper role they deserved.
Horrocks passed up the complaints to Monty, who ignored them.
Later in March 1943, when the Axis decided to hold the Marath line, 4th Indian Division
was finally given a major role in a battle under Montgomery. But at first, its two brigades
– the 5th and 7th, since the 11th had been previously destroyed – were split up and
sent to different units. So Tucker complained to Horrocks again, offering his resignation
and stating that it was pointless having a division commander if there was no division
to command. Tucker ended up having tea with Montgomery himself, who finally allowed the
mountain-trained 4th Infantry Indian Division a chance to concentrate for an attack.
The Marath line was the first time since El Alamein that the British would have to face
a determined enemy force. After one initial engagement, the Axis line fell back to the
Wadi Akharit line. This was a natural defensive position, but wasn't fully prepared by the
Axis at this point, so there was a chance for the British to take it. Monty drew up
the attack plans, but Tucker and Wimbley, 51st Highland Division's commander, weren't
impressed by the plans at all. So Tucker suggested a different plan, which Monty accepted, although
stated to a staff officer that he didn't like it when people disagreed with him.
Monty has got a bad reputation in the eyes of many, while others hold him up in high
regard. I'm reserving my judgement of him until I've gotten further into the Battlestorm
North African campaign series. But I think it's worth remembering that the British
had previously suffered major defeats when facing the Axis in North Africa, and Monty's
tactics had seemingly changed things around. The 4th Indian Division though, and its commander,
weren't in agreement with the new ideas.
"...Montgomery had transformed the Eighth Army from a shaken and dejected force into
one with strong cohesion and morale. This was because it had begun to win its battles.
Montgomery had achieved this by adopting the methodical set-piece battle, relying on attritional
firepower and careful movement rather than dashing manoeuvre. This, more or less, served
the Eighth Army well, as the string of defeats had ceased for good. Most of its formations
adopted and adapted to this approach and largely prospered. However, Montgomery's approach
never really sat well with 4th Indian Division."
The 4th Indian Division was trained for mountain and manoeuvre warfare, as well as night-time
attacks. So even though this was meant to have been a set-piece battle, the 4th Indian
Division attacked earlier than the other units, moving under the cover of darkness to surprise
the enemy. Lovett's 7th Indian Infantry Brigade snuck up to the Italian Pistoria divisions
lines and the Gurkhas charged. Numerous positions and prisoners were taken, a Victoria Cross
was won, and a five-mile gap had opened up in the Axis lines. The rest of the British
infantry forces then attacked later, but the British armour failed to bring up their armour,
and thus the victory that the Indians had won was lost.
There's a debate as to why the British armour didn't materialise. It could have been because
of Axis attacks, miscommunications, congestion on the poor roads in the area, a few 88mm
guns that prevented the tanks from moving forward, or Montgomery wanting to fight a
set-piece battle the next day rather than exploit the gap now. Whatever the reason though,
the point is that the Indian 4th Division's troops had performed exceptionally well, and
were well-versed in both night-time attacks and mountainous warfare.
The Battle of Wadi Akharit of 6th April 1943 was probably 4th Indian Division's finest
hour. Using bold and, by Eighth Army standards, innovative tactics, they smashed the Italian
division in front of them, tearing a five-mile hole in the Axis line. For a moment, it looked
– at least to 4th Indian Division – that the whole 1st Italian Army was there for the
taking if the Eighth Army's exploitation formation, 10th Corps, could pass through
the gap that they had cleared. 10th Corps never did, and therefore the Italian-slash-German
army withdrew from the Akharit's position in good order to fight another day. Thus,
the battle is little known.
The same principles about mountain warfare and night attacks apply to the Gothic Line
in Italy, where the 4th, 8th and 10th Indian Divisions, along with the 43rd Gurkha Lorried
Brigade, assaulted the Axis defences. But the Indians lacked experience in fighting
in jungles, which is why they suffered heavily in Malaya, Burma, and at the First Battle
of Arakat.
In the jungles of the far east, the British and Indians found themselves getting outflanked
and surrounded by the Japanese, who seemed to move through supposedly impenetrable jungle
terrain, forcing British units to fight their way out of encirclement. Then, in early 1943,
they came up against Japanese defensive positions at Donbek. At first, the British repeatedly
threw their men into battle six times, and got beaten back each and every time. After
the guns fell silent 50 days later, the battlefield looked like the First World War Western Front,
with two sets of trenches, a no-man's land, and lots of mud and destruction in between.
So, during the monsoon period of 1943, the Indian commanders came up with solutions to
the problem. It was only now, in June of 1943, that jungle warfare became a formal part of
their training, which was described as a revolution due to its effectiveness. But even the trainers
had little experience with jungle warfare, and had to recruit Jim Corbett, a 68 year
old big-game hunter who had hunted numerous tigers and other animals in the early 1900's
in order to train the trainers. A book on jungle warfare doctrine was published for
the 14th Army called The Jungle Book, which obviously gave the soldiers the bare necessities
to fight in jungle terrain.
Frank Masservy, someone you might recognize from my North African Campaign series, had
been transferred to the Far East to take command of the 7th Indian Division. With the training
he had received, he now ordered his men to infiltrate and encircle the Japanese positions
rather than assault them head-on. His patrols managed to do just that, cutting off the Japanese
from their supplies and forcing them to withdraw. After this success, Harold Briggs of 5th Indian
Division ordered his men to do the same, and sure enough, they overcame the Dombeik positions.
A similar situation occurred at the Battle of Razabil in January 1944. The British attempted
frontal attacks, failed, then decided to use a more indirect approach. At the Second Battle
of Razabil in March 1944, the 5th Indian Division sent one brigade to simulate another frontal
assault, but sent the other through the jungle and outflanked the Japanese positions, capturing
Razabil Fortress.
Overall then, the British Indian Army went from being little more than an imperial police
force in 1939, to a very successful professional army by 1945. Their training and development
of tactics led them to excel at mountain, and eventually jungle warfare, as well as
night-time and manoeuvre attacks. They fought and helped to overcome the Italians, the Germans
and the Japanese. So, while some might class this as a colonial army, the front-line Indian
infantry divisions proved themselves equal to, or indeed better than, many of the British
divisions at the time. And Indian soldiers were as capable as any other British or Commonwealth
soldiers of the war.
Thanks for watching, bye for now.