I don’t think a break out of Stalingrad was EVER possible (Response to Anton Joly #2)

Anton Jolly has released a second response video over whether Paulus could have broken out of Stalingrad or not. If you haven't seen it, I'd recommend you go watch it, because it's a well put together video, great narration by Brad as always, and makes a lot of good points that I can't repeat in their entirety here. I've also made a playlist now for this discussion to keep things in order. Again, link in the description. It's obvious that this debate will continue into the future, so I'll update the playlist as we go on. But I'm going to go through Anton's and Brad's arguments, and actually say I agree with a lot of them, as they have agreed with many of my points. They've agreed that a breakout couldn't have occurred until roughly the 24th of November at the earliest, which was after the encirclement. This was my main argument in the previous video, because my initial video that prompted this debate was titled Could Paulus Have Abandoned Stalingrad before encirclement. I was trying to show that Paulus didn't have the opportunity to break out prior to the 24th of November. And Anton and Brad have agreed. Yep, it's not fair to say that Paulus should have retreated in the first few days of Operation Uranus, because he wouldn't have known the situation until after the encirclement had already happened. They also said that a breakout couldn't have occurred until the situation stabilised and the big picture became clear. And yes, I absolutely agree with that. However, we might need to debate exactly when that occurs, because while the 11th Army Corps finally got over the Don on the 27th of November, they didn't really stabilise the line until the 30th of November, when the Germans stopped on the ridgeline west of the Rzeszoszka River. So the argument Anton and Brad presented is that, well, they could have mounted a breakout in late November after their lines stabilised, but they didn't fully stabilise until the final day of November. This means that if they were going to mount an attack, it wouldn't be until the 1st of December-ish, which, by their own argument, might be too late, because they said that the Soviet lines solidified in December. Now, the counter-argument is, of course, that they could have launched a breakout between the 28th to 30th of November before the lines fully stabilised, rather than retreating back to the ridgeline. But is this actually possible? Yes, as you guys said in the video, the Soviet lines hadn't solidified yet, and there were only a number of severely depleted tank corps in the way, and that's including Butkov's 1st Tank Corps south of Kalach, which had just 20 tanks at this time. I'd also point out that they had the 293rd Rifle Division in the way too, but yes, overall, this line is pretty weak, and makes a tempting target for a breakthrough force. However, the Germans were very weak at this stage too. They had a bunch of divisions that had just retreated across the Don, but they weren't divisions anymore. Apart from the chaos of the withdrawal, and the desperate need to reorganise, these divisions were shells of their former selves. The 44th, 376th, and 384th Infantry Divisions had just lost 30% of their already depleted personnel, and half of their artillery and anti-tank guns. The 384th Infantry Division was so battered that it had to be disbanded. 24th Panzer Division was shifted east to the 94th Infantry Division's area because both of these divisions were in a desperate state, and both would be consolidated into the same division in the coming days. 3rd Motorized Division was pulled out from the northern blocking line and moved to the Mariinovka area, but this had been the weakest division of the 14th Panzer Corps, so wasn't much of a reinforcement. On the 27th of November, there were no more than 40 panzers left in the 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions, with 27 in the 103rd Panzer Battalion of 3rd Motorized Division on the 28th of November. Counting the 36 panzers in 29th Motorized Division, this would have been a grand total of 103 panzers available for the breakout. But that's assuming they could concentrate for a breakout, which they probably couldn't until after they had retreated to the ridgeline. Most of 16th Panzer Division ends up with the 24th Panzer Division on the northern blocking line because of the need to prevent its collapse, and the only reserve was the 14th Panzer Division once the western ridgeline was reached. The 3rd Motorized Division had to be stationed along the ridgeline near Il'harinovsky, and couldn't be used in its entirety for an attack in the Mariinovka and Kopovka region, which you correctly identified as being the best place to mount an attack. The point of all this is to say that I don't think they could have concentrated their full 103 panzers for the attack, nor enough of their other divisions as well. The 29th Motorized Division was the best division that Paulus had, but together with the weakened 295th Infantry Division, they were struggling to hold the line and plug the gaps, under relentless pressure by the Soviets at this point, as Jason De Mark's book, Panzer Krieg, shows. 4th Army Corps' commander, Jänecke, constantly used the 129th Panzer Battalion to counterattack along his entire front, not only using up precious fuel supplies, but showing that the battalion or division couldn't be used for offensive operations at this moment. And even if they had mounted a breakout in late November or early December, the 29th Motorized and 295th Infantry Divisions, with elements of the 3rd Motorized Division and the remnants of the 14th Panzer Division, would have had to face all of Tanaschishin's 13th Tank and Voltsky's 4th Mechanized Corps, the 15th Guards Rifle Division, plus the 422nd and 169th Rifle Divisions. The Germans didn't have an overwhelming force, given what they faced, even if the Soviets were weak and hadn't dug in properly yet. Worse, they had very little in the way of supplies. I'm revealing parts of my script here for the next episode of Stalingrad, episode 40, but General Pickert explained to Manstein that the entire 6th Army only had enough ammunition to fight for one day of intense action, and said there simply wasn't enough fuel for a breakout. And, as Anton Jolly's own book points out, the 6th Army was reporting that they had no fuel at all, with only small reserves available for individual tank movements. With so little fuel and ammunition, Manstein himself questions whether an independent breakout by the 6th Army was even feasible. And that's saying something. Would they have been able to break out with just one day's worth of intense ammunition consumption? And even if they managed to stretch that amount out for a couple of days, would that have been enough to get them to their destination? Manstein was doubtful, and so am I. The weather was also not great. On the 29th of November, the 129th Panzer Battalion was heading east to help the 297th Infantry Division, but got bogged down in a snowstorm, arriving late at their destination. Then, when they were employed, the weather and Soviet resistance ended up causing their counterattack to falter. On the 2nd of December, they became immobilized because they didn't have the required special metal cleats for their tracks, and these had to be flown in and weren't installed until the next morning. So, if the panzers struggled to maneuver behind their own lines, and then couldn't even counterattack, what hope did they have of breaking through the Soviet lines? But even if they did mount an attack, and even if they somehow had enough ammunition and fuel to actually pierce the Soviet lines, they weren't out of the woods yet. In Anton's video, the argument was that once they break through the lines, that was it. It's smooth sailing. But is that really the case? The Soviets actually had some reserves nearby. The 4th and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions were at Kalach on the 30th of November, and Pleve's 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps had been pulled out of the line and sent to Butkov's forces prior to this point too. It's reasonable to assume that one, two, or even all three of his cavalry divisions could have galloped east to either block or counterattack the breakout force. Voltsky had sent the 158th Tank Regiment and the 60th Motorized Brigade to Lugovsky to tackle some small German kampfgruppen there, along with the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade coming from the south. But at least some of these forces could have turned around and counterattacked Paulus's fleeing men. And while not ideal, Shumilov did have some weak reserves at this time too, so some of his forces could have been used to form a blocking line to the west. Outside of this, there were additional divisions in the west which were moving south to the Shur line at this time, and one or two of these could have been diverted eastwards if Paulus had broken out. In addition, had Paulus started to break out, some or all of his infantry formations would have been taken from the lines inside the pocket. Thus, this would have freed a load of Soviet formations, which could have been shifted to the breakout area. The 6th Army, having now depleted its final reserve of ammunition, would have been in a dire situation, with its men getting counterattacked by Soviet cavalry and tank forces, while motorized and foot infantry struck at its flanks. So I don't think it's as clear-cut as, once they got through the line, it's all good. I think the Soviets would have found units to block the escape. Also, I should point out that we know that the Soviet line was thin, and we know that the Soviets didn't have a great deal of reserves, even though they had some. But Paulus wouldn't have known this. For all he knew, they may have had twenty divisions blocking his escape. Therefore, Paulus has to make a decision to break out at this stage, knowing that his forces weren't sufficient to guarantee success, while not knowing the full extent of the enemy's reserves. And this leads us to the next consideration. The airlift. In the first weeks of the airlift, they weren't shipping in food. They were shipping in fuel and ammunition. For example, on the 30th of November, they shipped in 161 tons, of which 131 were fuel, and the other 30 was ammunition, although alternate numbers do exist saying it was only 129 tons in total. But regardless, they were shipping in fuel and ammunition for Paulus to launch his breakout operation. And with his ammunition reserves barely able to last for one day of intense action, and with his fuel situation at the point where he can't even move major mobile formations, it's no wonder he decided to wait for more fuel and ammunition to be brought in before he launched his breakout attempt. Now obviously, we know for certain that the airlift failed. But in the final days of November, that wasn't so clear. Yes, they had failed to deliver enough supplies so far, but it was early days, and the daily numbers were increasing. They hit over 100 tons, 101 to be precise, for the first time on the 28th of November, and then delivered 129 on the 30th, if you believe one set of numbers. What's to say that the airlift wouldn't have picked up and started delivering sufficient supplies by, say, the first week of December? Paulus wouldn't have known with absolute certainty that the airlift wouldn't have worked. It's only with the benefit of hindsight that we know it didn't. So, sat in Stalingrad and in desperate need of fuel and ammunition, and facing all the problems we mentioned previously, it makes sense for him to wait for enough fuel and ammunition to be brought in, and for Manstein to launch a relief operation, before he mounted his own breakout attempt. And this is why Anton and Brad acknowledge in their own video that a breakout in November would probably have required the benefit of hindsight. Well, Paulus didn't have the benefit of hindsight, and so I think that's why he chose to not mount a breakout at that point. With the benefit of hindsight, he may have decided to launch a breakout in November, even with all the problems we've just stated, simply because this was his best opportunity, as Anton and Brad argue. And that's absolutely right. Despite the difficulties, late November is the best time for Paulus to escape. But Paulus didn't have the benefit of hindsight, and so chose to wait for more supplies, and to me, this makes sense. Which leads me to address a point raised by one of your viewers. Randy Harvard said, "...I don't think Tick is trying to say they should or shouldn't have done something different. He's trying to explain why they made the decisions they did at the time." And yes, this is my point. The old narrative was that Madman Hitler ordered Paulus to stay where he was because of prestige reasons, and stupid Paulus was a coward and stayed there, being unwilling to defy Hitler's orders, even though it was obvious that a retreat was his only option. Also, it's obvious that a retreat could have succeeded had Paulus just had the courage to defy Hitler's orders, which he didn't, proving that Paulus was a coward. Well, I disagree. I think the old narrative is way too simple. I think it doesn't take into account the difficulties that Paulus and his men faced. And I think it just doesn't explain Paulus' or Hitler's decisions very well, and paints them as idiots. Once we really dive into the details and see the battle play out step by step, we can see that this decision to break out wasn't as clear-cut as has often been made out to be. We can understand why Paulus decided to sit in Stalingrad. It's not as stupid as a decision has been previously argued. And that's my overarching point. Now, Anton and Brad say that, once December rolled around, the Soviet lines solidified, and Paulus had no choice but to sit and wait. They say that the next opportunity for a breakout would have been on or around the 23rd of December, at the peak of Manstein's relief operation Winter Storm. Again, I agree with their assessment. If Paulus wasn't able to launch a breakout in late November, it makes sense that he'd have to wait for Manstein, which is exactly the conclusion Manstein came to as well. They argue that, unlike in November, a breakout in late December doesn't require the benefit of hindsight. They say it should have been obvious for Paulus that something had to be done. Therefore, a breakout during Winter Storm was far more logical than during or after Operation Uranus. To quote you guys exactly. "...we think that the best remaining option for Paulus at this stage was to order a general retreat on December 23rd, when it was obvious that Manstein was stuck on the Myshkova River and as Malinovsky's powerful 2nd Guards Army had not yet arrived to solidly seal the gap. The German infantry would have had to cross on foot the 40 kilometers or so that separated the southern face of the pocket from 4th Panzer Army. This would have been a dire choice, but still a reasonable one since no other chance remained." They do say that a breakout at this stage was the second best option, with a breakout in November being ideal. But with the situation so dire, it should have been obvious to Paulus that a breakout on the 23rd of December was his only option now. And I agree with all of this, but that doesn't mean a breakout was possible. Let's just leave aside the did Manstein give the order debate. I'll go over that in detail in the series. Let's just pretend that Paulus was eager to break out, and was just waiting for the right opportunity to do so. Well, I'm not sure he could have actually done it. On the 23rd of December, Manstein had barely reached the Myshkova River, as you pointed out 40 kilometers from the 6th Army. He had only gone about 70 kilometers, and that was with two, and later three, fresh panzer divisions. Somehow, Paulus was meant to march his weakened and half-starved army 40 kilometers, mostly on foot. So my question is, how? If he was doubtful he'd be able to do it in November, there's no chance he can do it in December. The men are half-starved at this point. Their ammunition and fuel situation was even worse than it had been before. 6th Army's breakout force had eroded to, at best, 8 to 10 battalions, and about 50 tanks, provided the Luftwaffe could supply the necessary fuel, meaning that they hadn't yet, and probably wouldn't. The 6th Army was rapidly becoming both unarmed and immobile, and was unprepared to assist in its rescue. By this time, the army was expending ammunition at twice the rate of its resupply by air, making it impossible to conduct a breakout. The defenders were also short of gasoline, and the heavy draft horses necessary to move artillery pieces and supply wagons." Glantz actually argues that the 6th Army wasn't capable of offensive action at all, and its infantry wouldn't have gotten through. And these sentiments are echoed by another viewer on Anton's video, Chaptermaster Pedro Cantor, obviously communicating to us from the 41st millennium through the psychic power of the Emperor. Cantor has said… Having just read Glantz's second Stalingrad book, he states that by the time Uranus happened, 6th Army's offensive power was virtually non-existent. They were hard-pressed to push Chuikov's battered and bruised 62nd Army into the Volga. That was when 6th Army had the advantages of artillery and local support infrastructure in place to support those attacks. I just don't see themselves turn about a face like Patton and the Battle of the Bulge and organize a breakout when its infantry battalions are down to company strength or less in most of its divisions. You don't simply turn an exhausted army around, especially one that has limited means of transport due to low fuel and not enough horses. So, I don't actually think that the 6th Army could have broken through the Soviet lines during Operation Winter Storm, even if a breakout attempt had been made. I just can't see it. Anton and Brad said that Paulus should have launched the breakout on the 23rd, and could have broken out before the 2nd Guards Army arrived. But the 2nd Guards Army had already arrived by this point. I know this German map doesn't show it, but the 2nd Guards Army started taking up positions facing 4th Panzer Army from the 19th of December. So a breakout would have had to be completed before this point in order for the 6th Army to have escaped. Therefore, Paulus would have had to launch his own breakout a few days earlier, and gone slightly further than 40 kilometers, since Manstein had only just reached the Myshkova River at this point. It had taken Manstein 8 days to go 70 kilometers. So how many days would it have taken Paulus's starved army to go 40 or more? Roughly the same amount of time? Did they have the food, fuel and ammunition to sustain themselves in the open for several days as they battled to reach friendly lines? I just don't see it. Had Manstein been a few kilometers away, like he had been at Kursan in 1944, then maybe. But he was too far away in 1942. Manstein had barely reached the same distance away from Paulus as the forces in the Shire area, who had been sat there since November. So the question then becomes, why wait for Manstein when you could have just gone to the Shire a couple of weeks before? But obviously, we know the answer. They couldn't, as stated earlier. But you might then argue that Paulus should have taken the gamble, since there was now no hope of getting the 6th Army out of the pocket. And while it's true that sitting in the pocket, and not even attempting the breakout, doomed the 6th Army, it still served a purpose. It was receiving some supplies, enough to keep it in position for the next few weeks. They tied down huge Soviet forces at a time when the rest of the Axis front in the south was collapsing. And surrender and or breakout would free up seven Soviet armies, which could then be used against the fragile and already collapsing Axis lines. So now we can understand why Hitler and Paulus made the decision to keep fighting, keep the going, and not surrender the 6th Army. As another of your viewers, Tanju, said, a retreat might have a domino effect on the other fragile part of the front. Absolutely. So, in summary, even with the benefit of hindsight, I'm not sure a breakout was physically possible. The best opportunity, which may have succeeded although it's doubtful, was in late November. The problem was that this decision would have required the benefit of hindsight, which Paulus didn't have. And even still, it would have required a lot of luck. So, I think it's understandable why Paulus stayed where he was, and I don't think attempting a breakout in late December would have worked, and probably would have resulted in a quicker defeat, plus a destabilizing effect over the entire southern Axis front. I'm sure Anton, Brad, and many others will disagree, so I look forward to the response Guys, if you haven't already, head over to Anton's channel and check out his videos. He does a great job, and Brad's narration is excellent. I'll leave a couple links here. Thanks for watching, bye for now.