17. Constitutional Government: Locke's Second Treatise (13-19)

John Locke
3 followers
I want to look at two sets of issues.
I want to, in a way, conclude my interpretation,
my reading of the Second Treatise,
by focusing on the role of executive power
in Locke's theory of government, Locke's theory
of the constitutional state, particularly focusing
on the role of the executive vis-a-vis
the legislative branch of government.
And then I want to turn a little more speculatively
to thinking about Locke and the American regime
and the current state of political philosophy,
modern contemporary American political philosophy.
But let me start first by going back and sticking
with the Second Treatise by talking
a little bit about the role of legislative and executive
power.
The last time, I think, I was concluding
by arguing that Locke doesn't endorse, necessarily,
one particular form of government from any other.
He is an advocate of what we have
come to call limited government, of constitutional government.
There is that important passage where
he ridicules the Hobbesian sovereign as a lion
and tells we did not enter into the social compact
to be devoured by lions.
He says the form of government must be limited,
although he's relatively open, or at least non-committal,
agnostic, you might say, as to what particular form
that that government may take.
One feature of this form of government
that he thinks is very important is
that it must, in some sense, embody a separation of powers.
Powers must be made to check one another, what
he calls in the book the subordination of powers.
This is Locke's doctrine, and you will see it there.
We often associate it with Montesquieu
or sometimes with the Federalist authors.
But in fact, Locke himself is a strong advocate
of what he calls the subordination or separation
of powers.
Not exactly the same, as we'll see,
between our understanding of executive, legislative,
and judicial, but nevertheless, a separation nonetheless.
However, in the first instance, Locke emphasizes, and in fact,
he continually affirms, nevertheless,
the primacy of legislative authority.
In England, in the England of his time, and even today,
that means a doctrine of what is called parliamentary supremacy.
But he says that the first and fundamental positive law
of all constitutions is in establishing
that of the legislative power.
The first act after the completion
of the social contract, he says, is establishing
the legislative power.
It is the lawmaking authority of government that is supreme,
he wishes to emphasize.
This seems to push Locke, you might say,
more in the small d democratic direction.
It is not so much executive power, the power of a prince,
but rather the legislature, the parliament that is supreme.
There is nothing more important in Locke's theory
of constitutional government than the existence
of what he continually refers to as settled or known laws,
settled laws that serve against arbitrary rule.
In many ways, the purpose of government for Locke
is much less to offset the dangers of returning
to an anarchic state of nature, as it was for Hobbes,
than to prevent the possibility of the emergence
of tyrannical or despotic power, tyrannical or despotic
sovereignty.
And of course, Locke's writing is very much
bound up with the big and major constitutional crisis
of his time, leading to the overthrow and expulsion
of a king, James II.
Yet in many ways, even though Locke
is the great advocate of legislative supremacy,
he obviously cannot and does not wish
to dispense altogether with the role of executive power.
He often treats the executive, whether that
be in the form of a prince, a monarch, or perhaps even
a body, a cabinet of chief officers, as it were.
He treats them often simply as if they
were an agent of the legislative or of the legislature.
The purpose of the executive, he sometimes seems to write,
is merely that of carrying out the will of the legislature.
In Locke's language, the executive power
is ministerial and subordinate to the legislature.
Section 153, I believe.
The executive, again, on some aspects of Locke's writing,
seems to be little more than a cipher in comparison
to the doctrine of legislative supremacy.
And yet Locke here is not altogether consistent,
one has to say, because he understands
in every community there is a need
for a distinctive branch of government dealing
with matters of war and peace.
Locke calls this the federative power.
Every community, he says, like Hobbes,
is to every other community what every individual
is to every other individual in a state of nature.
And a distinctive federative or war-making power
within the government is necessary for dealing
with matters of international conflict,
conflict between states.
And in a remarkable passage, Locke
notes that this power, he says, cannot be bound
by antecedent standing positive laws,
but it must be left to, quote, the prudence and wisdom
of those whose hands it is in to be
managed for the public good.
In other words, Locke seems to suggest
that this particular kind of, this branch of government,
this federative branch, which falls to some degree
under the executive, must have a certain latitude,
even apart from the law, that relies,
he says, on the prudence and wisdom of those
whose hands it is in to manage it for the public good.
In other words, matters of war and peace
cannot be left to the legislature
or to standing laws, as he calls them, alone.
But requires the intervention of strong leaders.
What he calls, in an absolutely stunning passage,
godlike princes, if you don't believe me, section 166.
Locke's reference here to godlike princes
seems to recall Machiavelli in many ways.
Machiavelli's talk of armed prophets.
It is necessary in extreme situations for such princes
to call on their prerogative power.
It is impossible, Locke writes, to foresee.
And so by laws, to provide for all the accidents
and necessities that may concern the public.
And that during, in other words, contingencies or emergency
situations, the executive must be empowered
with this prerogative power to act
for the good of the community.
For this reason, it seems the executive is not simply
a tool or an agent of the legislature.
But he says, again, must have the power
to act according to discretion.
That is to say, according to his own discretion
for the public good without the prescription of law.
Those are Locke's own words.
How to balance his argument for constitutional government
and legislative supremacy with this doctrine
of prerogative power and what seems
to be a kind of power of what he calls, in no uncertain term,
the godlike princes and their need to exercise this power.
Locke's prerogative is in many ways
the result of simply the inability of law
to foresee all possible circumstances,
all possible contingencies.
That's an argument that goes as far back
as Aristotle we've seen.
Our inability to make rules that can
apply to all possible events makes
it necessary to leave some discretionary power
in the hands of the executive to act for the public safety.
Locke's one of the examples that Locke
gives of the use of this power is, in fact, a domestic,
not an international issue, which
is to say, in the case of a fire in a city,
it is sometimes necessary for the, as he says in his day,
for the fire department to tear down
the house of an innocent person to prevent the fire
from spreading to other houses.
This is acting for the public good of the community,
even while in some ways it's clearly
a violation of rights of property and so on.
He understands this as a piece of prerogative power
acting for the public good.
In fact, the example is not so far-fetched.
Think today, for example, about arguments we have today.
Even in Connecticut, there's a big argument
going on about the right of what's
called eminent domain, the right of the government
to absorb or to take over private properties,
usually for things like schools or airports,
but also for general improvement when
it is thought it will enhance the public good.
There's a big debate going on that now out in New London
and in Brooklyn, also, with the argument
about the creation of some civic center, some sports
arena that will require the demolition of certain
neighborhood houses.
And there's a big debate about this eminent domain.
What is that but, in a way, Locke's example
of prerogative power, acting, doing something
that is somehow said to be for the public good,
but that represents some kind of extra constitutional power?
But the question for Locke, as for any constitutional lawyer,
is what are the limits of this prerogative power?
What check, if any, is there on this power
to prevent their abuse?
Well, Locke doesn't exactly say, yes, yes, right.
He doesn't exactly say.
He raises this question, to be sure,
of fundamental importance for constitutional government.
Does executive authority, he asks,
extend to all things, even or especially in times of war?
Think about the debates that are going on now
about detainees at Guantanamo or the issues of domestic spying
when it comes to issues of the war on terror.
Are these examples of prerogative power,
that is to say, the executive acting outside the limits
or the bounds of constitutional authority
for the sake of protecting the public good?
Or are these examples of political absolutism?
Is the invocation of this power, in some ways,
going down the slippery slope to despotism and absolutism?
I will leave it to you or your sections
to try to discuss these matters.
But Locke himself praises those who
he calls the wisest and best princes of England
as being those who have exercised
the largest prerogative on behalf of the public good.
This is beginning to sound more and more, in some respects,
like Machiavelli than the advocates of, again,
limited government.
This power comes into play, he says,
especially during times of national crisis or emergency
when it is necessary to act for the public safety in some way.
And again, this seems to have special resonance for us
today as we face issues like states of emergency
and states of exception.
There are, in fact, political theorists.
One name comes to mind, a 20th century German legal
philosopher by the name of Karl Schmitt,
who argued that the state of emergency
or the exceptional situation is the essence of politics.
And that the person or body who has
the power to declare the exception
is none other than the sovereign.
So from Schmitt's point of view, you
might say this idea of prerogative
is a kind of extra constitutional power
that the statesman must of necessity
utilize when ordinary constitutional operations,
like the rule of law, prove to be inadequate.
But consider another example, if you like,
that prerogative power, about prerogative powers,
may be granted by the Constitution.
Consider Lincoln's famous suspension
of habeas corpus during the Civil War.
Lincoln, interestingly, did not take this extraordinary step
by appealing to an extra constitutional power that
obtains in times of crisis.
Rather, Lincoln argued quite forcefully
that this prerogative power is already
deeply embedded within the structure
of constitutional government.
He cites the Constitution when it
came to the suspension of habeas corpus.
The Constitution writes, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
In other words, the Constitution itself
seems to allow for this extraordinary kind of action,
at least in cases of rebellion or invasion,
when it says the public safety requires it.
The Constitution seems to embody within itself,
our Constitution, that is, this Lockean power of prerogative
that comes into effect or can be legitimately
exercised in times of rebellion or invasion.
Are we living in that kind of age now?
Not rebellion, perhaps, but invasion.
Well, think about that again.
Are these arguments applicable to our situation
today, in some sense, when it comes
to debates about the extent of executive power
to embark on these extraordinary measures?
And yet, at the same time, Locke is aware, clearly,
of the abuse of these kinds of, or the potential abuse
of this kind of prerogative.
He asks, who will judge?
Who can judge whether the discretion of the executive
is being used for the public safety, or the public good,
or whether it is simply a kind of usurpation of power?
In these moments of high constitutional crisis
between conflicting powers of government, in such cases,
Locke says, there shall be no judge on earth.
He says, the people have no other remedy in this
but to appeal to heaven.
This is in section 168.
How much is contained in that term, appeal to heaven?
What does Locke mean in terms of high constitutional crisis,
when he says, there is no judge on earth.
The people must appeal to heaven.
Does that mean they should fall down on their knees
and begin to pray?
What they should do?
Unlikely.
By an appeal to heaven, Locke means the people's right
to dissolve their government.
He raises this question at the very end of the book,
when a conflict between the people,
or their representatives, and the executive
becomes so great that the very conditions of social trust
have been dissolved.
Who will be judged?
And he answers emphatically, the people will be judged.
Locke affirms here a right of revolution.
An appeal to heaven, or what he calls an appeal to heaven,
really refers to an appeal to arms,
to rebellion, and the need to create a new social covenant.
Locke, you can see, is attempting
to hold together a belief in the sanctity of law
and the necessity for prerogative
that may sometimes have to circumvent the rules of law.
Are these two doctrines incompatible?
I think in many respects, or at least in some respects,
they are.
Can the prerogative power of the executive
be in a way constitutionalized, so that it does not
threaten the liberty of its own citizens?
Locke alerts us to this timeless,
as well as this very timely, problem.
One of the best sources for thinking
about many of these constitutional issues
today regarding privacy rights and other kinds of citizen
rights can be found in, oh, I would
say the last five chapters or so of Locke's Second Treatise.
I can't think of a better source.
So in the end, Locke's appeal to heaven,
or Locke says that the people have an appeal to heaven,
that is to say, an appeal to arms, an appeal to revolution,
suggests that at the end of the day, Locke was a revolutionary.
But I would say also a sort of cautious and moderate one,
if this is not a complete contradiction in terms.
I won't go through chapter 19, the famous chapter
on revolution, in full, to talk about the conditions
under which he believed the people can rightfully
appeal to heaven, as it were.
But Locke's doctrine of consent and legislative supremacy,
this should make him, in many ways,
a hero to Democrats, to radical Democrats.
His beliefs about limited government,
the rights of property, should make him
a hero to, in some ways, constitutional conservatives
and even libertarians.
In the end, I think Locke was neither or both.
Like all of the great thinkers, in some ways,
he defies, excuse me, simple classification.
But there is no doubt that Locke gave
the modern constitutional state its definitive form
of expression.
And the problems of our state, the problems,
the legal, the constitutional, and political problems
that we experience, are very much
problems rooted in the philosophy of John Locke,
and are unthinkable without the influence of Locke.
So that takes me to a theme that I
want to talk about for a little while, which
is Locke's America, John Locke's America.
No one who reads Locke, even superficial,
and I would not accuse anyone here
of being a superficial reader, after all.
But no one can fail to be impressed
of the harmony, in many ways, between Locke's writings
and those of the American republic
that he helped to found.
His conception of natural law, rights,
government by consent, the right to revolution,
are all part of the cornerstone of our founding documents.
To some degree, as I've just been suggesting,
a judgment on America is very much a judgment
on the philosophy of Locke, and vice versa.
In many ways, to the extent, or if anyone is,
I think Locke has the title to be considered
America's philosopher king.
So how should we think of Locke, after more or less
three centuries of consistent Lockean rule?
How should we think of Locke?
For many years, and for many people,
even today, the affinity, the affiliation,
between Locke and America has been
regarded in a largely, although not wholly, largely
positive light.
For many historians and political theorists,
our stability, our system of limited government,
our market economy has been the result
of a sort of broad consensus over Lockean principles,
over Lockean first principles.
But for many other readers of American history,
this relationship has been seen as more problematic.
In the 1950s, a book written by a famous political theorist
and historian named Louis Hartz, a book
called The Liberal Tradition in America,
complained of America's, what he called,
irrational Lockeanism.
That was Hartz's line.
That was Hartz's quote, our irrational Lockeanism,
by which he meant a kind of closed commitment
to Lockean principles and ideals that shut off
all other political alternatives and possibilities.
Hartz was someone very much interested in the question,
as many political theorists have been since,
why has there been no socialism in America?
Why did America not evolve or develop along European lines
with social democratic parties and socialist parties,
like the English Labor Party and other kinds of labor movement?
And Hartz's argument was that we were sort of arrested
in this Lockean phase of development, what
he called our irrational Lockeanism, that closed off,
in many ways, other principles.
And for still other thinkers, more or less on the left,
Locke legitimized what was called a theory or an ethic
of what was called possessive individualism,
particularly Locke's focus on property and the rights
of private property that focuses entirely on market relations
or puts the market values ahead of all other things.
And for still others, in many ways,
more recently, thinkers of a more sort
of communitarian direction or bent,
Locke's emphasis upon rights and the protection
that government should protect natural or certain unalienable
rights suggests a purely or overly legalistic conception
of politics that has no language for talking
about the common good, the public good,
or other sort of collective goods or benefits.
So my point is that Locke's influence has not
been altogether accepted by everyone.
There has been much ground for criticism
of this peculiar affinity between Lockeanism in America.
But today, I would say that Locke's theory of liberalism
or Locke's theory of limited government,
constitutional government, is confronted
by another alternative that, in many ways,
has deep roots in the very tradition which Locke himself,
the very liberal tradition, in many ways,
of which Locke himself is the founder.
And I am referring, in particular,
to a book that many of you will read at some point
in your Yale experience, a book, a widely read and widely
acclaimed book by a recently deceased political philosopher
by the name of John Rawls, who wrote a book in 1973
called The Theory of Justice.
In many ways, Rawls's book was an attempt
to update the liberal theory of the state.
He invokes the idea of a state of nature,
an original condition, as he called it, the theory of rights,
although he does so in many ways through the techniques
of contemporary philosophy and game theory.
And Rawls's book is probably the single most important
contribution to Anglo-American political philosophy
in the last generation.
It is a book that situates itself
within the liberal tradition, beginning with Locke,
developed by people like Immanuel Kant and John Stuart
Mill, and which Rawls himself hoped to, in many ways,
bring to completion in his book.
The theory of justice, as he calls it,
stands or falls on its theory of rights,
from which all else is derived.
And what I want to do for a few minutes
is to contrast Rawls's general theory,
so powerful and influential today,
from that of John Locke, the original founder
of the liberal theory of the state,
and see how they have diverged.
Consider the following propositions, if you will.
Here is John Locke, section 27 of the Second Truths.
Every man has property in his own person.
This nobody has any right to but himself.
And where there is property, he writes,
there can be justice and injustice.
Here is John Rawls, one of the opening pages
of his theory of justice.
Each person, Rawls writes, possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override.
For this reason, he continues, justice
denies that the loss of freedom for some
is made right by a greater good shared to others.
OK, so far, so good, in other words.
Both of them present their theories of justice
as justified in terms of the liberal principles
of equality, freedom, and the sanctity of the individual
and individual rights.
Both regard the purpose of government, in many ways,
as securing the conditions of justice,
as deriving from the consent or the informed consent
of the governed.
But both, it seems to me, go on to differ profoundly
about the source of rights and, therefore,
the role that government has in securing
the conditions of justice.
Let me explain a little bit more what I mean.
For Locke, going back to chapter 5 of the Second Truth,
rights derive from a theory of self-ownership.
According to his view, you will remember,
everybody has a property in his or her own person.
That is to say, no one has a claim on our bodies
other than ourselves.
It is on the rock of self-ownership,
the fact that we have property in ourselves,
it is on the rock of self-ownership
that Locke builds his edifice of natural rights, justice,
and limited government.
To put it in a slightly different way,
perhaps, a person has an identity,
what we might call today a moral,
what we have moral personality or an identity by the fact
that we alone are responsible for making ourselves.
He uses this metaphor of the work of the body
and the labor of our hands.
But we are literally the product of our own making.
We create ourselves through our activity.
And our most characteristic activity is our work.
Locke's fundamental doctrine is that the world
is the product of our own free creativity.
Not nature, but the self.
The individual is the source of all value for Locke.
It is this self, the I, the me, the ego that
is the unique source of rights.
And the task of government is to secure
the conditions of our property in the broadest
sense of the term, namely everything
that is proper to us.
Now, using that as a sort of shorthand,
contrast this to Rawls's idea.
Rawls adds to his idea of justice
something that he calls the difference principle, the DP,
as it's sometimes referred to in the literature on Rawls.
What is the difference principle?
This principle maintains that our natural endowments,
our talents, our abilities, our family backgrounds,
our history, our unique histories,
our place, so to speak, in the social hierarchy,
all of these things are, from a moral point of view,
something completely arbitrary.
None of these are ours in any strong sense of the term.
They do not belong to us, but are
the result of a more or less kind
of random or arbitrary genetic lottery or social lottery
of which I or you happen to be the unique beneficiaries.
The result of this, in other words,
is that no longer can I be regarded
as the sole proprietor of my assets
or the unique recipient of the advantages or disadvantages
I may accrue from them.
Fortune, luck, Machiavelli and Fortuna in that way
is utterly arbitrary.
And therefore, Rawls concludes, I
should not be regarded as the possessor, but merely
the recipient of what talents, capacities, and abilities
that I may, again, purely arbitrarily
happen to possess.
So what does that mean in terms of social policy
or theory of government?
The result of Rawls's difference principle
and its fundamental difference with that of John Locke
could not be more striking from this point of view.
The Lockean theory of justice, broadly speaking,
supports a meritocracy, sometimes referred
to as equality of opportunity.
That is, what a person does with his or her natural assets
belongs exclusively to them.
The right to rise or fall belongs exclusively to them.
No one has the moral right to interfere
with the products of our labor, which may also include,
not just in a primitive sense, what
we do with our hands and bodies, but what
we do with our intelligence and our natural endowments.
For Rawls, again, on the other hand,
our endowments are never really our own to begin with.
They are part of a common or collective possession
to be shared by society as a whole.
The capacities of hard work, ambition, and intelligence,
and just good luck that, for example,
got you to a place like Yale, on Rawls's account,
do not really belong to you.
Or at least the fruits of those ambitions and intelligence
and good luck do not belong to you.
Again, they are somewhat arbitrary
as a result of upbringing and genetics.
They're not yours or mine in any strong sense of the term,
but rather a collective possession
that can be or should be distributed,
the fruits of which distributed to society as a whole.
Consider the following passage from Rawls.
The difference principle, he writes,
represents, in effect, an agreement
to regard the distribution of natural talents
as a common asset and to share in the benefits
of this distribution, whatever it turns out to be.
Whatever it turns out to be.
Your intelligence or your drive or your endowments
are, again, what he calls a collective asset.
Think about that.
And it is this conception of common assets
that underwrites Rawls's theory of distributive justice
and the welfare state.
Justice Locke's theory of self-ownership
justifies his conception of limited government
in the constitutional state.
According to Rawls, again, justice
requires that social arrangements be
structured for the benefits of the least
advantaged in the genetic lottery of society.
His thought experiment that he calls the original condition
specifies that nobody would know in advance,
in this condition, what their particular endowment
intellectually, in many other ways, would be.
Therefore, every individual would,
in contracting with the whole, would
agree to share equally in the benefits of this,
as it were, genetic lottery.
So redistributing our common assets
does not violate, on Rawls's account,
the sanctity of the individual.
Because, again, the fruits of our labor
were never really ours to begin with.
Unlike Locke, whose theory of self-ownership
provides a moral justification for the individual,
for the self, for our moral personality,
Rawls's difference principle maintains that we never, again,
belong to ourselves at all.
We never really have ownership in ourselves,
but are always part of a larger social we,
a social collective, a collective consciousness whose
common assets can be redistributed
for the benefit of the whole.
Locke and Rawls, the point I'm trying to make,
is they represent two radically different visions
of the liberal state, one broadly libertarian,
the other broadly welfarist, one emphasizing liberty,
the other emphasizing equality.
Interestingly, again, this transition, this evolution,
represents a change which has gone on within, in many ways,
the liberal tradition itself.
Unlike some of these other critics,
Rawls does not come to be claiming from a tradition
outside of liberalism, but to be developing certain arguments
from within the liberal tradition,
and yet has moved in a way clearly
very different from its Lockean formulation.
Both of these views, again, they begin from common premises,
but move in very different directions.
Locke's theory of self-ownership regards the political community
in largely negative terms, as protecting
our antecedent individual selves and individual rights.
Rawls's theory of common assets regards the community
in a far more positive sense, as taking an active role
in reshaping and redistributing the product
of our individual endeavors for the common interests.
The question for you, just like the question for any of us,
is which of these two views is more valid,
or which of the two strikes you as more powerful or plausible?
My own view, and I loathe to editorialize,
but my own view is far closer to American theory,
to Locke's theory, which I think than Rawls.
The Declaration of Independence, the Charter of American Liberty
states that each individual is endowed
with unalienable rights, among which
are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness.
The very indeterminacy of the last phrase,
the pursuit of happiness, with its emphasis
upon the individual's right to determine happiness
for themselves, suggests the form of government
that allows for ample diversity for our natural talents
and abilities.
And although the Declaration certainly
intends that the establishment of justice
is one of the first tasks of government,
nowhere does it imply that this requires
the wholesale redistribution of our individual goods
and assets.
And second, although Rawls is clearly attentive
to the moral ills of inequality, and we
will turn to that problem emphatically on Wednesday
when we look at Jean-Jacques Rousseau's essay
on inequality.
There has never been a more powerful, passionate,
and persuasive critic of the ills of inequality
than Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
But while Rawls is certainly attentive to the moral ills
of inequality, he seems very naive about the mechanisms,
the actual political mechanisms by which inequalities
will be rectified.
Rawls wants government to work for the benefit
of the least advantage, but this will
require the extensive and often arbitrary use
of judicial power to determine who has a right to what,
far in excess of the powers of the court.
The result would be, I think if we follow Rawls' teachings
to their letter, the result would
be not a class of philosopher kings,
but rather a class of chief justices
endowed with the power to rearrange and redistribute
our collective assets for the sake of achieving
the maximum degree of social equality.
It is no surprise that the warmest reception
that Rawls' writing gets today is in the school of law,
is in the law school, where he has had an enormous influence
on shaping the education of the current
and the next generation of lawyers, judges, and possibly
chief justices who may be looking to, again,
looking not to the Constitution, but to Rawls' theory
of justice as, again, a litmus or a tool for bringing
about social redistribution.
So I leave you on that sobering note.
But a return to Locke, such as it is,
even if such a return were possible,
is by no means a panacea to what ails us.
I am not suggesting for a moment that Locke
is some kind of cure-all.
Some historians, let me just mention again,
Louis Hart, who is but the most famous,
treat America as a nation uniquely built
upon Lockean foundations.
America, he believed, remained something
of a Lockean remnant, a Lockean, yeah, remnant,
fossil in some ways, in a world increasingly
governed by more radical forms of modernity.
In fact, it has been our sort of stubborn Lockeanism
that has, in many ways, prevented
the kinds of extreme ideological polarization and conflict
that one sees throughout much of the 19th and 20th century.
But Locke's effort to build a kind
of modern Republican government on the low but solid
foundations of self-interest and self-ownership
and the desire for comfortable preservation
could not help but generate its own forms of dissatisfaction.
Can a regime dedicated to the pursuit of happiness
or to the protection of property ever
satisfy the deepest longings of the human soul?
Can a regime devoted to the rational accumulation
of property answer those higher order
needs or higher order virtues like honor, nobility,
and sacrifice?
Can a regime devoted to the avoidance of pain, discomfort,
and anxiety produce anything more
than contemporary forms of Epicureanism and nihilism?
In any case, I'm suggesting, no more than any other land
could America insulate itself from the great heights
as well as the great depths of later forms of modernity.
America, as a former teacher of mine once said,
is the land where the many facets,
the many faces of modernity are working themselves out.
We are but a moment, a moment in the kind
of comprehensive self-dissatisfaction
that is modernity.
So that a return to Lockeanism, in many ways,
is not so much a cure for the pathologies of modernity.
I would suggest that those pathologies are themselves
already rooted in the pathologies of Locke.
I will end on that sober note and encourage
you to take Rousseau's advice about loving one's country
seriously on Tuesday.
