15. Constitutional Government: Locke's Second Treatise (1-5)

John Locke
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Well, good morning.
It's so nice to see you again on this gorgeous autumn day.
And we had a wonderful, wonderful weekend, didn't we?
Yes, we did.
OK, today I want us to begin.
We move ahead.
We're moving ahead.
Today we begin with Mr. John Locke for the next three
classes, Mr. Locke.
It is hard to believe that a little book like this,
in this not terribly distinguished edition,
mind you, but nevertheless, in this edition of just over
100 pages, that a book of this length
could have such a world-shaping effect.
If anyone would ever doubt the importance
of political ideas in history, I would only
say to you to consult the history and the influence
of John Locke.
Remarkable.
I want to talk today a little bit about Mr. Locke.
John Locke is, for our purposes today,
I mean, there are many reasons why one would read him
in different kinds of classes.
But for our purposes, John Locke gives the modern state
the expression that is most familiar to us.
His writings seem to have been so completely absorbed
and adopted by Thomas Jefferson when
he wrote the Declaration of Independence
that Locke seems to have become virtually
a kind of honorary founding father, as it were,
of America.
Among other things, John Locke advocates the natural liberty
and equality of human beings, our natural rights
to such things as life, liberty, and what
he calls estate or property.
The idea that government, at least legitimate government,
is government by consent, that legitimate government is
necessarily limited and limited government constituted
by a separation of powers, and that when governments become
repressive or that when governments become
abusive of natural rights, that the people have
a right to revolution.
In addition to this, John Locke was a famous advocate
of religious toleration.
His name is forever linked with our ideas
today of what we might call liberal or constitutional
democracy.
He gives the modern constitutional state.
Again, it's definitive and, in many ways,
most familiar expression.
Yet Locke did not arise ex nihilo, nor did anyone.
Locke's writings come from somewhere and from some source.
They were prepared in many ways, in part
by Machiavelli, who had died approximately a century
before Locke's birth, but more importantly,
by another English writer, or by an English writer with whom
we have spent some time, namely Mr. Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes.
Hobbes took Machiavelli's idea of the prince
and, in effect, turned it into a theory or doctrine
of sovereignty.
The Hobbesian sovereign is at the basis
of our ideas of impersonal, or what we might call
representative, government.
He transforms princely rule, Hobbes does,
into an office called the sovereign.
And this office is, for Hobbes, the creation
of a social contract, or covenant, as he calls it,
responsible to the agents or persons
who have created the contract.
Hobbes had taught that the sovereign is
representative of the people who create his office in order
to ensure peace, justice, and order.
Without the power of the sovereign,
we would find ourselves in a condition of nature,
a state of nature, a term coined by Hobbes
to indicate a world without civil authority,
or at least with only weak civil authority,
unable to enforce common rules and laws.
Hobbes gave voice to the doctrine of secular absolutism,
one that invests the sovereign with absolute power
to do whatever is necessary to ensure, again,
the rule of law, justice, and political stability.
And out of these rather harsh and formidable premises,
Locke created a different, what we
would think of as a more liberal constitutional theory
of the state, while being still, in many ways,
very dependent on the premises that Hobbes, again,
modifying Machiavelli, had undertaken.
Locke set out a process of domestication.
He set out to tame, or to domesticate,
Hobbes's fierce or harsh theory of absolute government,
which had found few defenders in his own day.
Locke's most important book, political,
at least his most important work of political theory,
of political philosophy, is his two treatises
of civil government, of which we are only reading the second.
The book we have before us is called this,
often simply referred to as the second treatise.
But you will probably have suspected, I think,
that the second treatise was preceded by a first treatise.
The first treatise is much longer than the second treatise.
And it was an elaborate and painstaking,
one could almost say deconstruction,
of the theory of the divine right of kings, which
in his era had received expression
by a man named Robert Filmer.
His name appears, I think, occasionally
in the second treatise.
Filmer had written a book called Patriarcha.
And the Patriarcha had argued that all political authority
derives from the grant of authority
that God had given to Adam, and therefore
that all legitimate authority has divine right behind it.
Locke's first treatise is a very important, but also,
I have to say, extremely tedious work.
And you should be grateful that I am not assigning it to you.
But it's a very interesting book in its own right
of, in many ways, biblical criticism and exposition.
But it's only in the second treatise
that Locke set out to set out his own positive theory
of government, as it were.
This book was written, we now believe,
shortly before the famous Whig Revolution of 1688.
And in it, Locke sets out his theory
of parliamentary supremacy, rule of law,
and constitutional government.
Locke was, to put it maybe slightly oddly,
Locke was, in his day, to some degree,
what Aristotle was to his.
The second treatise is intended as a practical book.
It was a book addressed not so much
to the philosophers of his age, but to Englishmen,
written to them in the everyday language of their time.
He wrote to capture, in a way, the common sense of his time.
Although, this is not to say Locke was not,
at the same time, a deeply controversial figure.
Locke had the ability, and it's a very desirable ability,
to take, in many ways, radical or even revolutionary ideas
and express them in a kind of language that
makes people believe that this is what
they had thought all along.
And that is, to some degree, the genius of the second treatise.
In many ways, that is easier for us
because Locke's language has become, for us,
the kind of, I would almost say, common sense
or shorthand language for the way we think about politics.
And it was, again, a mark of his genius
to be able to create that language
and give it a stamp that seemed to make people believe
that this is what they had simply been thinking all along.
Locke was, himself, a deeply political man.
But he was also, at the same time,
as I've just been hinting, perhaps, a very reticent one.
He lived in a period of intense religious and political
conflict.
He was just a boy in school when a king, Charles I,
was executed.
And he was an adult when another king, James II,
was overthrown and forced into exile.
Locke lived.
I mean, he was a younger contemporary of Hobbes.
But he lived in a period of immense civil conflict
and war.
Locke spent many years at Oxford,
where he was both a student and a fellow.
And he was suspected, throughout much of his time
there, of harboring radical political sympathies.
But he was so cautious and careful in expressing them
that, after many years, even those closest to him
were unclear as to what his opinions were.
The master of Locke's own residential college
at Oxford, Balliol College, described Mr. Locke
as the master of taciturnity, a master of taciturnity,
because he could not discover, through questioning and so on,
Locke's opinions on religion and political matters.
Just think of that.
There used to be a very wonderful bust of Locke
in the lobby of the British Art Center.
And I used to recommend to students,
when they were down in that part of campus,
to stop in and look at his face.
Because, as with Machiavelli and others,
the face is very revealing.
And I used to ask people to see, do you detect in here
the sense of the master of taciturnity?
That his college master has discussed.
Locke was a private secretary and a physician
to a man named Anthony Ashley Cooper, later
known as Lord Shaftesbury.
Shaftesbury had a circle, the Shaftesbury circle
of political followers, who were opponents of the monarchy
and who were forced into exile in 1683.
Locke followed them into exile and spent several years
in Holland in 1683 before returning to England,
again, shortly before the Whig Revolution,
where his book, The Second Treatise, was published,
and where he lived until his death in 1704.
Just two years ago, in fact, Yale, at the Beinecke Library,
held a major conference in commemoration
of the 300th anniversary of the death of Mr. Locke.
So those are a few things about his contributions
and his context.
I want to begin today the substantive part of this talk
by focusing on the theme that, in many ways,
forms the central core of Locke's political doctrine,
his theory of natural law.
This is a term that has come up from time to time.
There is no modern thinker that I'm
aware of who makes natural law as important to his doctrine
as does Locke.
The best way to observe the working
or to reconstruct the working of natural law
is to follow a procedure that we have seen before,
to think about what is the condition of nature,
the state of nature, where we can see the natural law
in its operative form.
The state of nature for Locke, in many ways as for Hobbes,
is not a condition of ruling and being ruled
as it is for Aristotle.
The state of nature is not a political condition.
Locke describes the state of nature
as a condition of perfect freedom.
While Aristotle said that we were, by nature,
members of a family, a polis, a moral community of some kind
bound by ties of civic or family obligation,
Locke understands by the state of nature
a condition without civil authority or civil obligations.
The state of nature is not, for him, an historical condition,
although he does occasionally refer
to the vast tract of North America
as suggesting a condition of nature.
But the state of nature is a kind of thought experiment.
What is human nature like in the absence of authority?
The state of nature, Locke suggests to us,
is not an amoral condition as it was for Hobbes.
It is not simply a condition of war of all against all.
The state of nature, he tells us,
is, in fact, a moral condition.
It is governed by a moral law, or a natural law,
that dictates peace and sociability.
There is a moral law of nature that
determines that no one should harm
another person in their life, liberty, or possessions.
This law, this natural law, Locke
affirms willeth, willeth the peace and preservation
of all mankind.
So the natural condition for Locke
is a moral state, one in which a natural law, again,
dictates the peace, peace, and preservation.
It is not a war of all against all.
Locke's natural law, in some ways,
seems like a very traditional form of moral law,
familiar to readers of his time, readers
who would have been familiar with the natural law
tradition, going back to Cicero, the Roman Stoics,
St. Thomas Aquinas, and in Locke's own day,
an important Anglican divine by the name of Richard Hooker.
Locke's theory of moral law, or natural law,
sounds comforting and traditional.
And to some degree, it is.
All civil authority has its foundation
in a law of reason that is knowable by virtue
of our rational capacities alone.
The law of nature declares, according to Locke,
that we are all, in his famous term,
the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise
maker.
And as products of divine workmanship,
we ought never to harm anyone in their lives, liberties,
or possessions.
Locke, again, seems to effortlessly weave together
the Stoic tradition of natural law
with these Christian ideas of divine workmanship
into one seamless whole.
You can see the way in which Locke's rhetoric here
and his writing brings together different strands
of the philosophical and theological tradition,
weaving them together in a kind of effortless whole, almost.
Do not be simply seduced by this.
Why do I say that?
Because even within the same paragraphs,
Locke's natural law, the law that, again, mandates
or dictates peace and preservation of all mankind,
turns into a right of self-preservation.
From the beginning, you have to say
it is not altogether clear even whether the natural law is
a theory of moral duty, duties that we
have to preserve others, duties and obligations,
or whether it is a theory of natural rights
that mandates that the highest priority be
given to individual self-preservation
and whatever is necessary to achieve the preservation
of the individual.
The state of nature is a condition
without civil authority.
The law of nature, in other words,
has no person or office to oversee its enforcement
or its application.
So the state of nature that he once describes or early
describes in the book as a condition of peace
and mutual distrust quickly degenerates
into a condition of civil war or of war
where every individual serves as the judge, jury,
and executioner of the natural law.
The state of nature quickly becomes
a Hobbesian condition of essentially
every man for himself.
Consider the following passage in section 11
of the Second Treatise.
The damnified person, Locke writes,
someone who has been mistreated in the condition of nature.
The damnified person who has been injured or mistreated
has this power of appropriating to himself
the goods or services of the offender
by the right of self-preservation as every man has
a power to punish the crime to prevent it being committed
again by the right he has of preserving all mankind
and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end.
In other words, if you feel or if you have been wronged
or feel you have been wronged in the state of nature,
you have, according to the natural law for Locke,
the right to, as he puts it, appropriate to yourself
the goods or services of the offender.
And you have that to take from them,
their goods, their property, their services in some way,
whatever you feel appropriate as, again,
the person who has suffered some kind of wrong.
Every person becomes, as it were,
judge and executioner of the law of nature.
The fundamental law of nature, Locke says here,
is the right of self-preservation.
And this states that each person is empowered to do,
again, whatever is in his power to preserve him or herself.
Again, consider the following in section 16.
And one may destroy a man who makes war upon you.
May destroy another who makes war upon you
or has discovered an enmity to his being
for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion
because such men are not under the ties
of the common law of reason.
They have no other rule but that of force and violence.
So also, they may be treated as beasts of prey,
those dangerous or noxious creatures
that will be sure to destroy him
whenever he falls into their power.
Listen to that language.
From an original moral condition
where we are under a natural law not to harm others,
a law to preserve and protect the well-being
of others of our kind,
we have become like lions and wolves to each other,
beasts of prey and other noxious creatures.
What is the state of nature?
But in the words of Dorothy Gale,
lions, tigers, and bears,
oh my, this is what we are to one another.
This is what I've come to think of as Locke's bestiary.
And in fact, the second treatise is rife
with language of comparing human beings
to and our behavior to animals.
He speaks about lions and wolves.
Elsewhere, he speaks about cold cats and skunks and foxes.
If in fact we are all beings,
as he says, created under a natural law,
we seem to quickly degenerate
into almost bestial behavior,
beasts of prey, far from being cooperative
and peace-seeking creatures.
The very freedom that such beings as ourselves
enjoy in the state of nature
leads us to abuse that freedom
and in turn requires or is at the basis
of the need for civil government.
However, in the meantime,
the question that any reader of the second treatise
has to ask of themselves,
and I hope you put this forward
in your sections to one another,
is whether the natural condition,
as Locke understands it,
is one overseen by a moral law
of justifying or sanctifying peace and security,
or whether Hobbes's, excuse me,
Locke's state of nature
is simply a thinly veiled description,
a thinly papered over description
of the Hobbesian war of all against all.
Was Locke simply Hobbes
in some way in sheep's clothing?
Remember his famous catheternity.
Locke seems to be speaking
two very different languages, in other words,
one of traditional natural law
that holds out duties to others as primary,
and the other in some ways
a modern Hobbesian conception of natural rights.
That maintains the priority of right
and each individual's right to self-preservation.
Is Locke, in other words,
and this is perhaps more of an historical
than a theoretical question,
is Locke a member of the ancient,
in some ways, Ciceronian and Thomistic tradition
of natural law, or a modern Hobbesian?
Do his politics derive from a theological conception
of divine workmanship,
or an ultimately, you might say, naturalistic conception
or account of the human passions
and the struggle for survival?
Do his priorities go to duties or to rights?
Or is Locke simply confused?
Is he confusing two different languages
or is he being intentionally ambiguous in his account?
A recent book by a well-known scholar of Locke
has argued, I think quite powerfully in some ways,
that Locke's idea of equality in the state of nature
specifically relies upon a certain kind
of Christian theological context of argument.
Locke's statement in paragraph four of the Second Treatise
his statement that there being nothing more evident
than that creatures of the same species
and rank promiscuously born
to all the same advantages of nature
should also be equal to one another.
That Locke's statement that creatures of the same species
and rank should be equal to one another,
this is said to rely upon and depend upon
a very specific religious argument.
What it means to belong to a species
and why belonging to the same species
confers a special rank or dignity on each of its members
only makes sense according to this recent interpretation
if you believe or if it is believed
that the species in question
has a specifically moral relation to God.
The question, I think,
is whether Locke's idea of equality
in the state of nature
or his idea of the moral law in the state of nature
relies upon this belief
or whether it can be inferred from such things
as the basic principles of freedom,
whether this can be inferred, as it were,
from purely non-theological naturalistic premises
or grounds.
Locke, to be sure, is silent in the Second Treatise
about the theological foundations of his position.
There are no discussions of important theological figures
such as Jesus or Saint Paul or the New Testament,
at least in the Second Treatise.
He discusses these issues at length elsewhere.
These may be, in some way,
thought of as background considerations,
but the question remains, I think, for us
whether these are deeply embedded in Locke's arguments
about divine workmanship
or whether or not that language of divine workmanship
simply serves as a kind of window dressing,
again, for a purely secular naturalistic theory
of human nature and political authority.
Very important issue, I think,
in coming to understand Locke.
And indirectly, very important
for how we come to think of the American regime
because I'll just say simply as a kind of footnote
to what I've been saying,
if Locke is thought of in some ways
as his doctrine as being in some ways
at the founding principle of the American regime,
Declaration of Independence, most notably,
it becomes very important.
It becomes part of a contemporary public argument
whether those foundations owe their authority
to some kind of theological doctrine.
As Jefferson calls it in the opening of the Declaration,
the laws of nature and nature's God
seems in some way to have kind of Lockean overtones to it.
Do our founding documents imply a theology of some kind?
Laws of nature and nature's God?
Or are those principles, again,
purely of a naturalistic secular kind
that can do without theology altogether?
That is an argument,
a kind of scholarly and academic argument to be sure,
but it spills over into many of our public debates
over the role or place of religion in public life.
Whenever we talk about issues of the appropriateness
of issues like school prayer
or should the Ten Commandments be publicly displayed
in courthouses or in other public places,
or if you wanna take another famous Jeffersonian position,
is there a kind of absolute firewall,
a wall of separation between religion and the state?
These issues that we very much work on today
and think about are, you can see,
deeply embedded in how we think about Locke
in those opening sections of the Second Treatise
dealing with natural law and the state of nature.
So you can see, again, how these ideas penetrate deeply
into the marrow of our public or political culture.
Are we so different?
Have we become so different?
Will people living 300 years from now
think of us as so different,
and our public debate so different
from those that animated the public issues
in the time of John Locke?
Maybe not, maybe we aren't that different.
So, okay, enough for contemporary.
Let me go back to Mr. Locke.
The core of Locke's theory of natural law
in the state of nature
is arguably lodged in his account of property.
Chapter Five of the Second Treatise.
If you remember anything about Locke after this class,
remember Chapter Five.
It is, by all accounts, maybe Chapter 19 as well,
the theory of revolution,
but Chapter Five, account of property,
certainly, in many ways,
one of the most characteristic doctrines
of Lockean political thought.
Locke's view of human nature
is that we are very much a property-acquiring animal.
Aristotle said we were political by nature.
Locke says we are property-acquiring beings.
Our claims to property derive from our work.
The fact that we have expended our labor,
our work on something, gives us a title to it.
Labor confers value and is the source of all values.
The state of nature is a condition, he tells us,
of communal ownership,
what Karl Marx would have called primitive communism.
The state of nature is given to all men in common,
Locke says.
Parts of it become private property
only when we add our labor to something.
We read a famous formula from Sections 27 and 28.
Every man, Locke says, has property in his person.
This, nobody has any right to but himself.
We all, in other words, have a certain,
we come into the world with a certain private property,
property in our person.
No one else has a right to that.
The labor of his body, Locke continues,
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
For labor being the unquestionable property
of the laborer, no man but he can have a right
to what is once joined to, at least where there is enough
as good left in common for others.
That labor, Locke says, puts a distinction
between him and the common.
That added something to them more than nature,
the common mother of all had done,
and so they become his private right.
So we have moved here in this one paragraph
from the state of nature, which he says is common to all,
to a condition of rudimentary private property,
which we have in our body, our person,
which he says also includes the labor of the body
and the work of the hands, how we expend our activity.
That labor, he says, which puts something
between us and the common becomes the source
of ownership of things around us,
and that ownership then, in turn, becomes a right.
So they become, he concludes there, his private right,
the source of a right to property.
The natural law, as Locke seems to be saying,
dictates a right to private property,
and it is to secure that right
that governments are ultimately established.
In a striking formulation, Locke tells us
that the world was created
in order to be cultivated and improved.
Those who work to improve and develop nature,
who add to nature through the labor of their body
and the work of their hands,
those who develop and improve nature
are the true benefactors of humanity, of humankind.
God gave the world to men in common, he said.
Section 31, God gave the world to men in common,
but since he gave it to them for their benefit,
and the greatest conveniences of life
that they were capable to draw from it, he writes,
the world was given for our convenience,
he says, to be drawn from,
it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated.
And then he adds, he gave it to the use
of the industrious and the rational,
and not to the fancy or covetousness
of the quarrelsome and contentious.
God gave the world for our improvement of it,
and therefore he gave it to the industrious
and the rational.
Locke seems to suggest in that very phrase
that the state will be a commercial state,
that the Lockean Republic or the Lockean State
will be a commercial republic.
Think of that, ancient political theory,
Plato, Aristotle, regarded commerce,
regarded property as in many ways subordinate
to the life of the citizen.
Plato would have instituted a kind of communism of property
among the guardians of his Calipolis.
Aristotle regarded the necessity,
thought of the necessity of private property,
but simply as a means to allow a few of those citizens
to engage in political life.
Economy, you might say,
was always subordinate to the polity.
Locke turns this doctrine,
this ancient and medieval doctrine as well,
on its head in many ways.
The world belongs to the industrious and the rational,
those who through their own effort,
through their labor and work,
increase and enhance the plenty of all.
It is only a relatively short step
from John Locke to Adam Smith in that respect,
the great author of The Wealth of Nations.
Again, about a century after,
just under a century after Locke's second treatise.
For Locke, and let me just go on a little more about this,
there are no natural limits to property acquisition.
And this is, in a way, the essential point.
The introduction of money or coinage
into the state of nature,
issue I'm not going to talk much about here,
but that becomes an important moment in his chapter five
in his account of the state of nature.
The introduction of money
makes unlimited capital accumulation
not only possible, but even a kind of moral duty.
It becomes our duty to enhance and work upon
the raw materials of the natural world around us.
By enriching ourselves,
we unintentionally work for the benefit of others.
Consider the following remarkable sentence.
A king of a large and fruitful territory in America,
he says, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse
than a day laborer in England.
Because, of course, our work, Locke thinks,
has enhanced the plenty of all in some way.
The creation of a general plenty,
the common wealth,
and think of the way in which the revealing use
of that term common wealth, the wealth of all,
is due in many ways to the emancipation of labor
from the previous kinds of moral and political restrictions
imposed upon it by the ancient philosophical
as well as religious traditions.
Labor becomes, for Locke, the source of all value
and our title to common ownership.
And in a remarkable rhetorical series of shifts,
he makes not nature,
but rather human labor and acquisition
the source of property
and of unlimited material possessions.
He begins this chapter, chapter five,
with the assertion, think about it,
that God hath given the world to men in common,
once again suggesting that the original state
is one of common ownership.
He then suggests that every person
is the owner of their own bodies
and that one acquires a title to things through labor
that we have mixed with that common world.
But what starts as a very, very modest title
to the objects that we have worked on,
his example is something as sort of simple
as picking apples from a tree.
The act of picking gives us a title to the apple.
That very simple or rudimentary form of property
soon turns into a full-scale explanation
of the rise of property
and a kind of market economy in the state of nature.
Labor accounts, he tells us,
for 10 times the amount of value
that is provided by nature alone,
he says at 37, section 37.
Our labor enhances the value of nature 10 times.
But he then goes on to add very quickly,
I have here rated the improved land very low
in making its product but as one to 10
when it is much nearer a hundred to one.
Our labor advances things a hundredfold.
Shortly later in section 43,
he says that the value of anything is improved
a thousandfold due to labor.
Again, what began as a fairly rudimentary discussion
of the origins of private property
at the beginning of section five, chapter five,
limited by the extent of our use and spoilage
has by the end of that same chapter,
you might say morphed into an account
of large-scale ownership with considerable inequalities
of wealth and possession.
By the end of chapter five,
there appears to be almost a direct link
between Locke's dynamic theory of property in chapter five
and James Madison's famous statement
in Federalist number 10 that, as Madison says,
the protection of different and unequal faculties
of acquiring property is the first object of government.
The very Lockean proposition in the Federalist.
Locke gives, in other words, to commerce,
to money-making, to acquisitiveness,
a kind of pride of place and a sort of moral status,
you might even call it,
that it never enjoyed in the ancient and medieval world.
The new politics of the Lockean state
will no longer be concerned with glory, honor,
humos, virtue, but Lockean politics will be sober,
will be pedestrian, it will be hedonistic
without sublimity or joy.
Locke is the author of the doctrine
that commerce softens manners,
that it makes us less warlike,
that it makes us civilized,
something that reaches its, you might say,
highest expression in the 20th chapter
or the 20th book of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws.
Commerce does not require us, for Locke,
to spill blood or risk life.
It is solid, reliable, thoroughly middle-class in some ways.
Locke is, again, the great author of the idea
that the task of government is to protect
not just the rights of property,
but the right to acquire and build upon the property
that we already own.
So I want to end on this note and begin on Wednesday
talking a little bit about what we might call
John Locke and the spirit of capitalism.
