The escalating trade war, marked by high U.S. tariffs, is poised to drive China’s economy into negative growth, with GDP potentially declining by 3.1% to 5.2%. Transshipment trade is increasingly unviable due to prohibitive costs and global rejection. Export volumes to the U.S. may drop by 70-90%, exacerbating port congestion and unemployment pressures, affecting 20 million workers and 11 million graduates. Factory closures and domestic dumping of goods risk further economic strain. The yuan’s stability is threatened as foreign exchange reserves dwindle, potentially necessitating U.S. Treasury bond sales. Political tensions, evidenced by public dissent and internal Party struggles, compound economic challenges. A framework of “Unknown Unknowns to Known Knowns” highlights the uncertainties and known impacts, while public pragmatism undermines Party propaganda, signaling a critical juncture for economic and political stability.
00:00:00 Introduction to China's Economic Challenges 00:00:39 Impact of Trade Agreements and Tariffs 00:01:24 Analysis of Trade Volume and the 'Unknown Unknowns' Framework 00:01:50 The Four Quadrants Explained 00:02:41 Analyzing and Consolidating Information 00:03:07 Current 'Unknown Knowns' and 'Known Unknowns' 00:04:01 Fiscal and Monetary Stimulus Measures 00:04:20 'Known Knowns' and Their Impact on GDP 00:05:28 Port Overload and Decreased Freight Volume 00:05:53 Job Losses and Price Pressures 00:06:34 Domestic Dumping vs. Factory Closures 00:07:27 Impact on Export Volume and Manufacturing 00:08:17 Trade Volume Decline Scenarios 00:08:42 Why Not Redirect to Third Countries? 00:09:08 The Cost of Handling Abandoned Goods 00:09:44 Peak College Graduates and Job Market Pressure 00:10:11 Incident in Chengdu and Inefficient Governance 00:10:57 Growing Inefficiency and Repressive Machinery 00:11:52 Impact on Chinese Yuan's Exchange Rate 00:12:30 Decline in Export Trade Volume 00:13:02 Potential Decline in Foreign Exchange Reserves 00:13:32 Risks of Using Short-Term Dollar Debt 00:14:14 The Danger of Foreign Debt 00:14:53 Internal Politics and Decision-Making 00:15:33 Erosion of Authority and Negotiation Indicators 00:15:57 Examples of Policy Shifts and Weakening Control 00:16:30 Stories from Factory Owners 00:17:21 Public Awakening and Pragmatism 00:17:59 Outdated Rhetoric of Online Supporters 00:18:41 Conclusion and Call to Action
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today I'd like to discuss the trade war
and the potential decline in China's
GDP this year it's almost certain that
China's economy will experience negative
growth the reason is
straightforward if China attempts to
engage in trans shshipment trade moving
forward the costs will be
prohibitively high
during trade negotiations the United
States is likely to insist that other
nations strictly prohibit any
opportunities for trans shshipment trade
with
China furthermore under new trade
agreements where tariffs are applied
universally every country will face some
degree of overcapacity
unless other nations act irrationally
they are unlikely to assist the Chinese
Communist Party with trans shshipment
trade tariffs have already climbed to
145% and President Trump has recently
increased them to
245% by the time this video is released
tariffs on China may rise even
further as a result there's little need
to consider issues of elasticity other
countries will simply reject any
possibility of trans shshipment trade
with
China drawing on analysis from three
major financial media outlets and two
think tanks I estimate that China's
trade volume with the US will shrink to
just 10% to 30% of its previous level to
understand not only what is happening
but also why I'd like to introduce a
framework called unknown unknowns to
known
known this
framework consists of four quadrants the
first is unknown unknowns events we
cannot predict and are unaware we don't
know about this quadrant encompasses
potential risks and opportunities that
are the most challenging to anticipate
and manage the second quadrant is
unknown knowns situations where we know
something will occur but are uncertain
about its ultimate
impact the third quadrant is known
unknowns issues we recognize we don't
understand but have not yet addressed
these require clear plans and strategies
to acquire the necessary knowledge and
skills the fourth quadrant is known
known by analyzing these quadrants we
can clearly identify the information we
possess and quantify it we can also
pinpoint what we don't know develop
strategies to address those gaps and
either monitor or act to gather more
data ultimately this process
consolidates into known knowns enabling
informed
decision-m currently one of our unknown
knowns is that USChina trade
negotiations are highly likely to take
place however the duration of these
talks and their final outcomes remain
uncertain these are our unknown knowns
our known unknowns include the fact that
US China tariffs are unlikely to
increase further as additional hikes
would serve little purpose president
Trump has already raised tariffs from
125% to
245% rendering further increases largely
ineffective
additional tariffs would have a
negligible marginal impact on our
assessment of China's economic
outcomes we also know that President
Trump is eager to negotiate with China
and is determined to challenge it
directly
third it is highly probable that the
Chinese Communist Party will implement
additional fiscal or monetary stimulus
measures this year to mitigate the
effects of US tariffs on China's economy
and
society fourth our known knowns are as
follows exports constitute about 19.6%
6% of China's GDP with exports to the
United States accounting for 14.7% of
total exports at current tariff levels
China's exports to the United States are
expected to decline by 70 to
90% additionally the industrial
multiplier for China's export products
ranges between 1.5 and two this allows
for a clear calculation we can quantify
the overall economic drag from tariffs
by multiplying the
19.6% export share by the
14.7% US share of China's exports then
by the 70 to 90% decline and finally by
the supply chain multiplier of 1.5 to2
the result indicates that the trade war
will reduce China's GDP by roughly 3.1%
to 5.2%
however this represents only the initial
structural impact on China's GDP
consider the current situation ports
such as Nancha in Guangjo Shaku in
Shenzhen and Yantan are overwhelmed with
containers stacked seven layers high the
maximum height possible freight volume
has significantly
decreased from our existing known we can
infer two additional points first the
export industry supports approximately
140 million to 180 million jobs creating
employment pressure for at least 20
million individuals second the backlog
of goods will exacerbate price pressures
in an already weak consumer market
grappling with insufficient demand and
deflation these goods cannot remain in
ports or warehouses indefinitely as they
incur additional storage and port
fees if USChina tariff negotiations you
know don't really make any progress in
the near term then this huge volume of
goods will either end up being dumped
domestically or sold internationally
this will honestly put even more strain
on China's already fragile economy
and when you add in the unemployment
pressure that's affecting something like
20 million people the Chinese Communist
Party's costs for maintaining social
stability this year could really
escalate and
fast another possibility is that
factories might just clear out their
final inventory and then shut down
operations completely that would mean
absorbing the tariffs selling off all
the backlog at any price and then well
closing the factory once everything's
gone so a situation like this would
actually lead to a gradual decline in
China's export volume starting in May
and then you'd see a sharp drop in the
third quarter why is that well because
selling these goods domestically would
bring in even less money than selling
them after absorbing
tariffs at this point it's not even
about making a profit anymore it's about
figuring out which option lets factories
close down more quickly with the least
amount of loss every single day a
factory stays open it racks up costs
inventory wages utilities all of that
for Chinese manufacturers these are
pretty much the only options
left if they go with domestic sales
trade volume is going to decline
significantly starting in May or June
but if they decide to absorb the tariffs
cut prices and just liquidate inventory
then trade volume will decrease
gradually in May and June but you know
it'll really plummet in the third
quarter you may wonder why exporters
don't redirect goods to third countries
the answer lies in the nature of
manufacturing products are made to order
rooting these goods to other markets
results in what the trade industry calls
abandoned goods where the original buyer
cancels the order for various reasons
the best case scenario for abandoned
goods is selling them at a 50 to 60%
discount in less favorable cases it's 30
to 50% and in the worst cases only 10 to
20% this is the cost of handling
abandoned goods moreover finding buyers
for these goods involves significant
uncertainty
after evaluating all possibilities I
believe the most likely outcome is that
manufacturers will absorb the tariffs
clear their final orders and halt
production another pressing issue an
unknown known is that this year marks a
peak for college graduates in China with
over 11 million entering the job market
combined with the 20 million individuals
facing employment pressure due to the
trade war this creates not just economic
challenges but substantial political
pressure on the Chinese Communist
Party so I shared a post on my channel
about this incident in Changdu where
someone actually hung anti-communist
anti-inping banners on a pedestrian
bridge the following day the area was
just packed with plain clothes police
and officers honestly I find this pretty
perplexing the banner had already been
displayed so why would they deploy so
many police doesn't this just you know
amplify the incident's visibility
sometimes the Chinese Communist Party's
police actions seem almost comically
misguided as if they're actually
inviting the public to take notice of
what
happened this incident really highlights
the growing inefficiency of the Chinese
Communist Party's governance apparatus
it reveals a pretty clear reality
the party's repressive machinery has
become more and more
cumbersome a lot of its personnel just
lack
motivation merely showing up to fulfill
their duties without any real effort
their presence actually ends up
heightening public discussion of these
kinds of events and despite China's
information controls peer-to-peer
communication is well pretty much
unstoppable
i'm confident that similar incidents
will increase this year and honestly I'm
curious to see how many more resources
the party will allocate to such
ineffective
responses another known impact is the
Chinese UN's exchange rate last year
China's average monthly export trade
volume was approximately $300 billion
starting in May even in the best case
scenario with a 70% reduction in US
trade China's export trade volume would
decrease by an average of
30.8
billion per month in the worst case
scenario with a 90% reduction it would
drop by 39.7 billion
so what this means is that China's
monthly export trade volume would fall
to somewhere between 260 billion and
$270 billion and that's not even
considering any extra anti-dumping
measures or non-tariff trade barriers
from other countries if those kinds of
measures are actually put in place
China's monthly exports could you know
dip below $250
billion if this happens even in the most
optimistic scenario where industrial
flight doesn't speed up China's foreign
exchange reserves could decline by about
300 billion to 400 billion it's pretty
likely that China will keep selling US
Treasury bonds since honestly there just
aren't many other options not doing so
well it risks a collapse of its foreign
exchange debt
china has give or take $500 to $600
billion in usable foreign exchange to
help stabilize the UN's exchange rate
assuming industrial capital doesn't flee
more quickly each time the yuan drops to
a new price range the cost of
stabilization rises exponentially
unless the party is willing to take the
risk of using short-term dollar
denominated debt to support the UN a
failed gamble here could really you know
drive the UN's exchange rate right
toward
collapse the reasoning is simple if
China begins using short-term dollar or
foreign exchange debt to stabilize the
UN these funds borrowed by domestic
companies through dollar bonds or
foreign exchange loans are merely held
by the People's Bank of China not owned
by
it pursuing this path would signal the
collapse of China's foreign exchange and
credit systems while domestic debt can
be mitigated through measures like
printing money foreign debt is different
the Chinese Communist Party cannot print
US
dollars the party's internal politics
and decision-m now face another
challenge the tension between ideology
and economic reality unlike President
Trump who avoids obstacles Xiinping
tends to confront them headon the
failure of tariff retaliation policies
will likely trigger economic and social
instability in
China within the party there are
undoubtedly voices opposing these
policies with shei as the focal point of
criticism this creates an internal power
struggle over control of economic policy
from this point forward each misguided
policy she pursues will further erode
his authority the question of when she
will negotiate with Trump is not merely
a matter of time we cannot simply
predict 3 months 5 months or a year
instead we must look for events as
indicators that negotiations are
imminent
for instance the white paper movement
during the pandemic ended China's
extreme zerocoid policy the downfall of
military figures like Meia and Hweong
signaled she's weakening control over
the military the depletion of the
treasury and economy halted China's
extravagant diplomacy
as the saying goes bodhicattvas fear
causes but Xiinping fears
consequences so a Chinese blogger
recently shared the stories of two
veteran factory owners one who made
lamps and the other who produced laith
tools for machining both of these folks
had been running their businesses for
almost 20 years with one based in Wukshi
and the other in Fosan
but in March both of them ended up
shutting down their factories and had to
lay off more than 300 workers both
businesses depended heavily on exports
right now leaving their machinery idle
means they lose money but running it
actually leads to even bigger
losses when someone asked who was to
blame for all this both owners answered
without hesitation the foolish Communist
Party
this really shows a wider awakening
among a lot of Chinese people the
party's propaganda just doesn't carry
much weight when people are struggling
to survive you know Chinese culture is
super pragmatic and most people just
ignore the party's indoctrination back
when the economy was doing well people
had enough to eat and wear and honestly
most folks just tuned out the party's
bragging but now with the party having
messed up China's domestic and foreign
policy economy and politics things have
gotten a whole lot
worse i have noticed too that the
party's online supporters people often
call them little pinks keep using the
same old arguments basically their
points come down to three things first
you've been predicting China's downfall
for over a decade yet our economy
remains strong second China's GDP growth
is the highest in the world so stop
baselessly criticizing us third your
claims lack logic these three lines just
get repeated over and over and honestly
there isn't any real substance just
slogans
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