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Good afternoon everyone, just a couple of things here at the top, and we'll get right to your questions. Secretary Austin spoke by phone yesterday with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umarov to discuss current battlefield dynamics, Ukraine's ongoing operations, and Ukrainian reconstitution and training efforts. During their call, Minister Umarov provided an update on the impact of Russia's continued attacks in Ukraine. Secretary Austin and the Minister also discussed the next Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting, which will be held next month, in support of Ukraine's urgent security assistance requirements. As we've said, since Russia's illegal and cruel invasion two and a half years ago, the DoD will continue to support Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further Russian aggression. A full readout of the phone call is available on defense.gov. Separately, the Department of Defense continues to closely monitor the situation in the Middle East and take steps to mitigate the possibility of regional escalation by Iran or its proxies. The Department's recent adjustments to the U.S. military posture in the region have enabled us to bolster U.S. force protection, increase support for the defense of Israel, and to ensure the United States is prepared to respond to various contingencies. As you've heard us say previously, we remain intently focused on de-escalating tensions in the region, while also remaining focused on securing a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal to bring all of the hostages home and to end the war in Gaza. Will that take your questions? We'll start with AP, Lita Baldor. Thank you, Pat. Two things on Ukraine. One, have you or has the Pentagon seen any significant Russian movement back into Kursk at this point? Can you at least give us some sort of broad assessment about what you're seeing, even if you're seeing nothing at all? And then I have a second question. Sure. Again, without getting into an operational update here, we have seen indications of Russia moving a small number of forces into Kursk, the Kursk region, to respond. I would say generally speaking, though, Russia has really struggled to respond. And you continue to see some Ukrainian advances in that regard. But again, I'd refer you to Ukraine to talk about its operations and to Russia to talk about its own forces. And then secondly, did the Ukrainians ask anything or are they asking anything from the United States in order to help with the operation there? Are they asking for any specific weapons systems or other support? I don't have anything to announce from the podium. As I mentioned, we'll be conducting the Ukraine Defense Contact Group here in September, which again is always the opportunity to meet with our allies and partners to talk about Ukraine's most urgent defense needs. And as I highlighted, we're committed to making sure they have what they need to defend their sovereign territory and deter future Russian aggression. Noted. Thank you. Welcome back again, Lucas. Well, as you know, we're not going to talk about operational timelines. We will preserve flexibility as we always do. And again, we'll stay focused on the operational objectives that I highlighted. What happened to as long as it takes? You're talking about the Middle East? Well, again, Lucas, I know you've covered this region for a while. We've had a significant force presence in the Middle East for a very long time, upwards of 30,000 plus U.S. forces operating with partners throughout the region. And I don't foresee that changing anytime soon. In what regard? Like where do you want to start? Like diplomatic, economic, informational? I'm not going to get into a philosophical discussion. I think we've been very clear in terms of we're focused on... Well, you're providing a very broad scope for getting into geopolitics. So if you can define your question a little bit better. All options are on the table. Regarding the Russian forces that have been moving into Kursk, are they from inside Russia or have they been pulled from Ukraine or Ukrainian front lines? Yeah, I'm not going to have any further details to provide on that. Thanks.Charlie. Thanks, Pat. In terms of the destruction of the Glushkovo Bridge, the Russians are suggesting Western weapons. Are HIMARS being used in this fight? So I appreciate the question. Again, I'm going to have to refer you to the Ukrainians to talk about their operations and what they are or are not using. Yes, please. Again, I'd refer you to the Ukrainians to talk about what they're employing in their operations. So, Brad. So when the secretary spoke with the Ukrainian defense minister yesterday, did they discuss long-range strikes into Russia and is the U.S. considering reversing that policy? So I'm not going to be able to provide more detail than what we've included in our readout other than to say our policy when it comes to long-range strikes has not changed. Thanks.Tony. On ATACMS in the Kursk offensive, do the Ukrainians have permission to use ATACMS to blunt a Russian counteroffensive So I'm not going to get into Ukraine's selection of capabilities as they conduct their operations. Our policy has not changed, which is in terms of using long-range strike capabilities to conduct deep strike. As you've heard us say, conducting counterfire or defensive operations across the border is permitted, and I'll just leave it there. Quick question. Last week you took a question on Afghanistan in terms of over-the-horizon strikes. It was in the context of ISIS-K. You didn't really elaborate on the extent to which since the withdrawal three years ago the United States is conducting over-the-horizon either surveillance or strikes against ISIS-K elements. Can you elaborate a little bit on that and the extent to which the United States is conducting those? Well, generally speaking, Tony, we're going to read out at the appropriate time any type of strikes that we've taken. I'm not aware of any that we haven't announced at this point. Certainly if we see imminent threats against the United States or our interests, we reserve the right to take appropriate action to include conducting over-the-horizon strikes. But I don't have anything to read out to you right now. Thanks. Jenny. Thank you, General. Two questions. The U.S. and South Korea, is underway in South Korea. North Korea accused this exercise of being aimed at invading North Korea. How will you react? Yeah, I mean, that's just patently false. As you know, these exercises are defensive in nature. They're also longstanding. And these are opportunities for our forces to work together on interoperability and to learn how to operate in dissimilar environments. Last weekend, the leaders of the United States and South Korea and Japan issued a joint statement commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Camp David Declaration. What will happen to the U.S. and South Korea and U.S. and South Korea-Japan agreement if the United States administration changes? Well, as I'm sure you can appreciate, I'm not going to get into hypothetical other than to say I think our alliance with Japan and South Korea are strong, stronger than they've ever been. And I think going into the future, you'll see them continue to get even stronger. Thanks. Let me go to the phone real quick here, take a couple. All right, let's go to JJ Green, WTOP. Thank you, General, for taking this question. I had a chance to speak with a spokesman from the Ukrainian military a day or so ago, and they mentioned that it would be very helpful for them if Western logistics, and speaking of the U.S. and the allies that are sending weapons, et cetera, to them, if the pace could be picked up to get those weapons to them sooner, considering what it is that they're doing and what they're engaged in now in Kursk and Belgorod. And just a second, really quickly, is this something that could be addressed at the next contact group, if not sooner? Yeah, thanks for the question, JJ. We are always looking at ways that we can expedite delivery of capabilities to the Ukrainians. And to your point, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group provides an excellent forum in which to have discussions, to look at processes, procedures, as it relates to ensuring that the Ukrainians have what they need on the battlefield to defend themselves. It's important to remember, first of all, that from the very beginning, the United States has worked very, very hard to rush vital capabilities to Ukraine, and that hasn't stopped. You see organizations like the Security Assistance Group Ukraine, which serves as a focal point for ensuring the onward delivery of those capabilities, but also recognizing the incredible complexity more than 50 nations working together to get this capability from their own stocks and often cases or contracting it and getting it to Ukraine. So that is work that is constantly ongoing and is evidenced by the fact that you continue to see Russian forces conducting offensive action in the east of Ukraine. We also recognize the vital importance of moving as quickly as possible, so we'll stay after it. Let me go to Lara Seligman, Wall Street Journal. Lara, are you there? Hi. Can you hear me? Can you give an update on the F-16 training in Ukraine, how that is going, and whether there are going to be American contractors helping out with the maintenance in Ukraine? Yes. So right now, as I understand it, there continues to be F-16 training in Arizona and in Denmark. In terms of within Ukraine, I don't have any updates to provide. I'd have to refer you to the Ukrainians on that front. As you know, they have received some F-16s. And in terms of DOD contractors, US DOD contractors, I'm not aware of any right now. All right. Come back to you, Morton. Two questions on the Middle East and then one on Ukraine. Have the USS Abraham Lincoln or has the USS Abraham Lincoln Terrorist Strike Group and USS Georgia arrived in CENTCOM? They're still in transit, Orton, and we'll keep you updated on that front. But I do anticipate they'll be arriving soon. So I'm just curious. When you talk about bolstering US force protection and increasing support for Israel, isn't it true, then, that most of what you're sending hasn't even gotten to the AOR yet? No, I don't think that would be a fair characterization. Again, as I highlighted earlier, we already maintain a significant force presence. And it's also important to understand to look beyond episodic situations, right? So ensuring that we have the forces in theater to respond to something if it happens now, but also ensuring we have forces in theater to be able to respond to whatever could be next in terms of potential escalation and trying to de-escalate the situation. And that requires bolstering some of those capabilities. Again, one, to send a clear message, but two, to be able to respond in a longer-term scenario should we need to do that. So I'll just leave it there. And then just a quick Ukraine question. Is the U.S. ready to openly and publicly support Ukraine's operation in Kursk? If not, why not? Look, again, we're continuing to have the discussions with the Ukrainians in terms of their focus. You heard President Zelensky say it was to create a buffer zone, so we're having those conversations to learn more about what their objectives are. Again, if you take a step back from a U.S. perspective, our focus continues to be enabling Ukraine to be a free and sovereign country that can deter Russian aggression in the future. And so that continues to be our focus. As it relates to their operation in Kursk, as I mentioned, they clearly have compelled the Russians to struggle in their response. It has certainly demonstrated the creativity and the battlefield prowess of the Ukrainians. But when it comes to what their longer-term objectives are here, that's something that we're still discussing with them. Thank you. Sir. I haven't seen you in a while. Welcome back. Thank you very much, General. Actually, I was in Kurdistan. Many official sources, including Minister of Peshmerga, they told me ISIS is a serious threat in Iraq, in Syria and in the region. And he believes it is very important for all of Iraq international coalition to stay in Iraq. Do you have any comment on that? Well, as you know, the conversations with the higher military commission continue. I don't have any updates to provide on the outcomes of that other than to say that we, as part of the U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Dialogue, which includes Peshmerga representation, is looking at what the transition for the coalition OIR will be and what the future of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral security cooperation is. When it comes to ISIS, you're right, it does continue to be a threat. Certainly ISIS is not as capable as it was 10 years ago, but they do continue to pose a threat, particularly in ungoverned spaces within Syria and also as it relates to ISIS prisoners in Al-Hal that need to be repatriated. So this is something that we are not going to take our eyes off of and we'll continue to keep you updated on that front. Following question. Do you believe cooperation between Peshmerga and Iraqi army is important in ISIS and especially in disputed area like Kirkuk? Yeah, look, there's no question, first of all, that Iraqi security forces writ large, which includes Peshmerga, have played a vital role in terms of reducing the threat that ISIS poses. But as we've seen in places like Afghanistan, left unchecked, ISIS can start to make a resurgence. And so, again, we'll continue to work with our Iraqi partners, our Peshmerga partners to address this threat. Let me go to Konstantin and then I'll come to you, Carlo. Thanks, Pat. Yesterday, President Zelensky was quoted in Ukrainian media saying that he deliberately did not disclose plans of his Kursk mission to Western allies. Is that something that the Pentagon that dynamic is something that the Pentagon expects to be part of the relationship going forward? And is that a source of concern in this building? Well, you know, look, I think our commitment and support for Ukraine is strong, right? And we're going to be continue to support them for the long haul, as you've heard Secretary Austin and others say. We're going to always keep those channels of communication open because the better we understand what Ukraine's objectives are, the better we can support them. And so this is why we have multiple mechanisms to include frequent phone calls between Secretary Austin and his counterpart and forums like the UDCG where we can have those discussions. But at the end of the day, again, it's important to take a step back in terms of what we're trying to achieve here, and that's a free and sovereign Ukraine that is able to defend itself and deter future Russian aggression. Just a quick follow-up. Sorry. No, you would say that there's no change in the closeness of the relationship between the U.S.? Absolutely not. Thank you, Pat. A couple of follow-ups. So a follow-up to Warren's question. USS Georgia is still not in the CENTCOM AOR? Is that what you just said? It's in transit. In transit? It is heading towards the CENTCOM AOR? Why are you asking your question so incredulously? It's taking them an awful long time to get there. That's why I'm just trying to track to make sure that it is indeed going to CENTCOM. OK. Just wanted to make sure. And then on Ukraine, just to follow up to Lita's question, there have been other attacks outside Kursk. There was a drone attack that targeted a fuel depot 700 kilometers south of Kursk, about 250 kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. Is that pulling any Russian forces outside of Ukraine? Have you seen them? If they're not moving into Kursk, have you seen them pull back to Russia? What can you say on how these attacks have updated and affected the battlefield in Ukraine? Yeah. Broadly speaking, Carla, again, what you see is the vast majority of Russian forces along the eastern front in Ukraine occupying Ukrainian territory and focused on, in some areas, largely defensive, but in some areas focused on offensive operations attempting to take additional Ukrainian territory. As it relates to any type of Ukrainian operations inside Russia that you're referencing, that's inside Russia. So, I mean, they already have forces inside Russia. I just don't have anything on that. All right. Let me go back to the phone here. Jeff Schogol, Task and Purpose. Thank you. Can you bring us up to date on the number of attacks and wounded in Iraq and Syria against U.S. troops? And also, can the Defense Department name which cruisers were sent to the Middle East? I don't think I've seen those ships named. Thank you. Thanks, Jeff. In terms of the injuries that were at Ramallah Landing Zone, I think you were briefed on Monday. 11 personnel had been treated for TBI and smoke inhalation. All 11 of those, to my knowledge, have returned to duty. In terms of the cruisers, just to clarify something. So within the Department of Defense, we have an acronym that we typically use, CRUDES, which stands for Cruiser Destroyer. And so, you know, there was some information out there in terms of cruisers going to the AOR. Right now, there are no cruisers in the AOR, but we often use that term also loosely to refer to destroyers. So CRUDES, Cruiser Destroyer. So we do have destroyers in both the UCOM and the CENTCOM AOR. Hopefully that helps to clarify. All right, let me go to Joseph Al-Arabiya. Thanks, Pat. I just wanted to ask again on Iraq today. Iraq's foreign minister said several developments led to the postponing of the announcement of the end of the coalition presence in Iraq. But he also said there had not been any response to the attacks on U.S. troops, particularly at al-Assad's air base due to what he said was diplomacy. Were you guys asked to hold off or not respond to any of these recent attacks, specifically the most recent one that led to I guess 11 injured U.S. personnel? Yeah, thanks, Joseph. So a couple of things on that. So first of all, as Secretary Austin has said many times, we're not going to tolerate attacks on our forces. And we will always respond appropriately in a time and manner of our choosing. As for any type of diplomatic discussions, I don't have anything to read out to you, nor am I going to get into those types of private discussions. OK, time for a few more. Yes, sir. Thank you, General Ryder. My name is Mushfiqul Fasol, representing South Asia Perspectives. How does the Pentagon view the role of the Bangladesh Army in supporting peace and stability under the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus? Is there any collaboration or communication between the United States and Bangladesh military during this transitional period? Well, as you know, we do have a defense relationship with Bangladesh. We will look forward to working to support our shared values and interests such as a free and open Indo-Pacific. I don't have anything to read out right now in terms of any types of contact. As it relates to the Bangladesh government, of course, we would expect human rights to be observed and there to be an avoidance of any type of violence. But I would refer you to our State Department for any questions about the U.S.-Bangladesh relationship at large. Thank you. Charlie. Thanks, General. Between the Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, the ships that are in the Med now, I count around a dozen destroyers, a submarine that will one day get there. What kind of fight are you gearing up for? And so first of all, let's be clear about, you know, I noted a bit of snarkiness in your question there, but the submarine is in the Mediterranean, which is in the Yukon AOR. OK. So first of all, I mean, it's in proximity of the region that we're talking about moving into the central command region, again, to provide capacity there. And in terms of what we're getting ready for, it's exactly what I read out at the top, which is enabling us to bolster force protection, the defense of Israel, and also be ready to respond to a wide variety of contingencies. I understand the focus on this moment in time, but we in the DOD are a planning organization, and in addition to being ready for now, we're going to be ready for that wide variety of contingencies of what may come. To do that, you have to have capability and you have to have capacity. And so that's exactly what we've done, and that's exactly what we'd be prepared to do going ahead into the future. Thanks. Sir. Yeah. President Zelensky said it wouldn't have been necessary for them to move into Kursk if its supporters, including the U.S., cleared them to launch deep strike missions at military targets inside Russia proper. Is this fair or not? Or is this true or not with the White House? Yeah. I'm not going to comment on President Zelensky's statement. Certainly I'll let his comments speak for themselves. Again, there should be no question that the United States supports Ukraine and its fight for freedom and to preserve its sovereignty and to deter future Russian aggression. And that's what we continue to remain focused on. While you're going to see various shifts on the battlefield from time to time as we've been watching this for two and a half years, we remain laser focused on that end state in terms of enabling them to defend their sovereignty and deter future Russian aggression both urgent battlefield needs and long-term defense needs. And that's what we'll continue to stay focused on. Ultimately at the end of the day, it's up to the Ukrainians to defend their country and we're going to continue to communicate closely with them on what those needs are and evolve as the situation on the battlefield evolves. All right. Last two. Yes, sir. Thanks, General. So on the two major wars that are going on in Ukraine and in Gaza, the civilian casualty rate in Ukraine by the Russian military is around 11,000 civilians, around 2,000 children. In Gaza, it's 40,000 civilians, 16,000 children. So that's eight times the number of children killed in one third of the time span by Israel. So my question for you is if you could tell us about the moral calculus that has led this administration to spend over $100 billion supporting Ukraine to fight back against Russia while we're spending tens of billions aiding militaries aiding Israel's military campaign in Gaza and using rhetoric, you know, like Russia's aggression, defending Israel, we're getting ready to defend Israel for a regional war potential in the Middle East. So with that stark civilian casualty contrast, why have you determined that Russia's the bad guy and Israel's the good guy? So again, let's take a step back in time here and look at how these conflicts started. Number one, Russia's illegal cruel invasion in February of 2022, essentially attacking its democratic sovereign neighbor unprovoked. October 7, Hamas killed over 1,200 innocent civilians, took over 250 hostages, half of whom are still being held today. And you continue to see the brutality of Hamas in terms of embedding itself within mosques, schools, hospitals, building a tunnel network underneath Gaza instead of spending money on the citizens that it purportedly was supposed to help govern. A tunnel network, oh, by the way, that's the size of New York City and goes multiple levels below the surface. So again, when it comes to the death of any civilian from a Department of Defense standpoint, that's absolutely not something we want to see, and this is something that we constantly, repeatedly, publicly and privately discuss with our Israeli counterparts. I think this is also why it's vital that this ceasefire be signed immediately and that the hostages can be returned so that this war in Gaza can end and innocent civilians can stop suffering, whether they be Palestinian or Israeli. So the distinction, real quick, on the provocation, and so are you saying that the tens of thousands of ethnic Russians in the Don who were killed prior to the war, that was not a provocation the record high deaths in the West Bank, that wasn't a provocation of Hamas? Yes, sir. Thank you, General. How do you determine that? Again, look, our relationship with Iraq is a strong one. We're there at the invitation of the government of Iraq, and we'll continue to have the discussions through the higher military commission and through our U.S.-Iraq joint security cooperation dialogue to look at not only what the future of the coalition is, but also what our longer-term U.S.-Iraq bilateral security relationship will be. And so, again, we'll have much more to provide on that in the future. I just don't have any updates to provide right now. I don't have anything on that. Thanks. All right. Thanks very much, everybody. Appreciate it.