Fake news, influencer pagati, Testate compiacenti e video falsi, la propaganda cinese non ha limiti

NTD Italia
259 iscritti
American Thought Leaders con Jan Jekielek
Account falsi online, audio manipolati, deepfake, reti di amplificazione artificiale… Il Partito Comunista Cinese sta diventando sempre più creativo nel manipolare l’opinione pubblica del mondo intero.
link originale: https://www.theepochtimes.com/epochtv/from-deep-fakes-to-impersonation-networks-inside-chinas-aggressive-campaigns-to-manipulate-you-sarah-cook-5724265
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#IntelligenzaArtificiale #Deepfake #disinformazione
When we look at these disinformation campaigns,
we see things that only create confusion.
They pretend to be voters,
and they exasperate polarization
to sow confusion and discord in a foreign democracy.
Fake online accounts, manipulated audio, deepfake.
The Chinese regime manipulates Americans, Canadians, Taiwanese and more in an increasingly creative way.
A deepfake video seems to be getting high.
It was reposted by a series of fake accounts linked to the Chinese Communist Party.
Sarah Cook, an independent analyst on China,
has been studying the Chinese regime's online campaigns for years
and explains that there are five tactics the regime uses to influence the mass media.
All you have to do is convince or deceive a single real journalist
to influence the entire media ecosystem.
This is American Thought Leaders, and I am Yannie Chielek.
Sarah Cook, it's a pleasure to have you at American Thought Leaders.
It's a pleasure to be here.
Lately, I've been analyzing the advent of artificial intelligence.
I've just tried the new functions of Grok.
It's really surprising.
And recently, the Chinese regime has very often used these deepfakes.
What is happening?
So, the Chinese Communist Party
has been trying to influence the media around the world for many years.
I believe that in the last decade, it has intensified its activity
and has become more sophisticated, more coercive and more subdued.
For example, Taiwan has always been its number one target.
And in January, the elections were held.
Some accounts, evidently linked to the Chinese government,
have released a fake video based on a real interview in 2022
with a US senator in Ukraine.
So, in view of the Taiwanese elections, this video pops up on TikTok.
But the senator no longer talks about Ukraine.
In the video, he says that if Taiwan wins the elections,
the party displeased with the Chinese regime,
the United States will increase military aid to Taiwan.
He says this around how deepfake war is.
In practice, he plays the game of propaganda
that the PCC directs to the Taiwanese voters.
That is, if you vote for this party, there will be war.
If, on the other hand, you vote for the other party,
which is more favorable to Beijing, there will be peace.
AFP did the fact check of this video and unmasked it.
The PCC took a video of an American deputy,
altered the audio and tried to change the movement of the lips
to make it look like he was making these fake comments
during the elections in Taiwan.
Another example is what happened in Canada.
There have been several campaigns on profiles linked to China
that have tried to damage the reputation of parliamentarians
with a series of videos and posts
in which they pretended to be a Chinese dissident
who actually resides in Canada
and made him say things about ethical violations and criminal acts
that concerned Canadian politicians of every political party.
And in these fake videos, this activist was also made to say things to discredit him,
such as heavily denigrating and racist sentences against Muslims.
So it's a situation where they use videos of real people,
but their speeches are manipulated.
And this seems to be a much more effective thing
than the use of artificial intelligence avatars,
which are easier to recognize.
One of the most recent examples dates back to last month,
this time in the Philippines,
where the fake was about the current president, Marcos Junior.
On the day of his speech to the people,
a video is published that makes it look like he is using drugs,
and then it turns out that the video had been published
by some Filipino activists of the former president.
It was a fake video amplified by a Chinese government consultant.
They probably did it because they don't love Marcos Junior,
because he has taken a much stronger position
than the influence of China in the South China Sea.
In short, there are many tactics and manipulations
put in place against politicians from different countries.
Artificial intelligence is therefore able to alter the lips
and make it look like a person is speaking another language
in an incredibly convincing way.
I've seen it done personally,
but this is just one of the many methods of the Chinese regime.
Let's give the viewers a complete picture of how all this works.
Sure.
The Chinese Communist Party has a long tradition
of influencing information around the world,
which has intensified in the last ten years.
In a project I worked on,
we analyzed the situation in 30 countries,
and the United States and Taiwan were the first two targets.
But in the first places there were countries like the Philippines,
Nigeria, Argentina and Kenya.
It is therefore a global phenomenon,
but this is a small part, as we have said,
of what we call disinformation and content manipulation campaigns.
Because there are five ways
in which they influence the sphere of information outside.
One is propaganda.
Think of all the propaganda organs of the regime.
Often it is evident that they are Chinese agents,
but often they are also included in the local press.
I put in their inserts, like China Watch,
which are spread all over the world.
We counted 130 headlines in 30 countries where they do these things.
Then there is the element of disinformation.
Excuse me if I interrupt you,
because this word disinformation has been a bit abused in recent times.
Some people use this term just because they don't like a content.
What do you mean by disinformation?
So I think one key element is that
I think the discriminating factor is the deliberate spread of falsehood,
of false or misleading content.
More and more often it is a mix of truth and falsehood,
which makes it more difficult to recognize.
On top of that, often the tactics used to spread this content
are coordinated and not spontaneous.
You see entire networks of fake profiles acting in a coordinated way on social networks.
Or they are influencers,
who then find themselves being paid or controlled in any way by the regime.
Maybe you see content appear simultaneously on six different platforms.
That's what we mean most when we talk about disinformation campaigns,
which are sometimes called influence operations.
Or we talk about non-authentic coordinated behavior on social platforms,
that is, coordinated and multiform actions aimed at deceiving users in a certain country,
or even more countries.
It is a relatively new phenomenon.
The Russians have been doing it for a long time.
China started around 2017.
Then there is censorship.
Propaganda and disinformation try to eliminate certain contents,
while in censorship the Chinese regime uses the economy,
bullying, violence and computer attacks to eliminate the contents it dislikes.
And then you get to situations where companies with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party
actually control the broadcasting infrastructure.
And here we are not necessarily talking about suppressing the contents of a foreign television station,
but of Chinese companies that manage digital television networks in some parts of Africa,
or that are responsible for apps like WeChat and TikTok.
And this is a different way in which manipulation can occur.
And then the last one, which is seen a little more in the south of the world, is training.
The attempt to export abroad the information control model that the PCC uses in China,
teaching foreign officials how to influence public opinion.
In short, here you see a massive operation
that displaces several sectors of the party apparatus and the bureaucracy,
and even external agents.
And the ultimate goal is to make the world a safe place for the Chinese Communist Party,
to denigrate enemies, to put China in good light,
and more and more often, especially with disinformation campaigns,
to sow confusion and discord in foreign democracies.
Sometimes it is content that someone has published and that this machine, so to speak, amplifies.
Maybe some are true, but extremely divisive.
And this is probably the most difficult problem.
Yes, especially if it is not clear that there are these false accounts networks.
I believe that some of these are discovered and eliminated.
And that's how I get to know them.
Because there are IT security companies, ONG, think tank,
technological companies that publish reports in which it is said,
we closed these accounts and this was their operating mode.
Sometimes this is the only way to find out.
Obviously a user is not able to understand it.
But when the material is eliminated, the damage is already done.
In short, on this, it is not really the purpose of the interview,
but there is a growing concern for censorship in Western democracies.
It is a very difficult problem to deal with.
Because obviously you want to give people the opportunity to communicate with each other.
But there are these very effective forces in the sowing of mass discord and false information.
And maybe in influencing elections.
Yes, as I said, the Kremlin has been active in this field for a long time.
But I think that sometimes resources are underestimated
and the growing sophistication that the Chinese government is putting on the field.
To date, they have not taken a massive action to try to change the outcome of the American elections.
And I think it partly depends on the fact that there is a rare bipartisan consensus
on the fact that the PCC is a problem and that we must have strong policies
on human rights, trade, responsibility, Hong Kong, etc.
I see many bipartisan activities in Parliament on these issues.
And I think this helps the resilience of the Americans.
But I think you also see examples like the one I mentioned about Taiwan.
There are countless, or in the Philippines,
where perhaps the PCC is less afraid that things will turn against it.
So if there is a political will to use these tactics to try to influence the outcome of the elections,
they do it.
And all this gives an idea of what could happen in the United States at the presidential level,
at the legislative level, and more likely to happen,
and in Taiwan, where independent MPs are targeted by the parties.
It is more than anything else about understanding the position of that person
towards the Chinese government,
how much has been explicit in terms of human rights.
In some cases, it is shocking and very evident that these are falsifications by American voters.
It is a phenomenon that is becoming more and more frequent,
as confirmed by the analysis of Microsoft or Meta,
started around 2020.
It was seen in the midterm elections of 2022,
and now, in view of 2024, it is used more.
These are real accounts that pretend to be American voters.
Sometimes they publish more provocative and divisive content for both political parties.
Sometimes it is precisely there that some of the memes generated by artificial intelligence are seen.
In other cases, they use the same fake personalities on multiple platforms.
In this way, of course, everything seems more real.
An example are certain accounts that were spread by families of US military personnel.
One of these accounts launched a petition on US policy towards Taiwan,
trying to reduce US support for Taiwan,
and obtained 300 signatures.
So they impersonate real citizens.
And the petition has a link to Taiwan,
but most of the content has nothing to do with Taiwan.
It talks about racial issues and other American social issues,
so it is not easily traced back to China.
Another recent discovery is that these accounts are starting to do surveys.
Questions like, what do you think of this or that?
In practice, they are trying to get answers from real voters,
and the suspicion here is that it is a sort of informal operation
of data collection on public opinion, of intelligence,
and that these answers can then be used in future operations during elections
to decide which content or which accounts are more credible, or things like that.
So there is a constant evolution and a learning process
by intelligence agencies, or Chinese regime propaganda,
or whoever is behind all this.
Let's move on to Taiwan, which is a microcosm.
At the beginning I mentioned some shameful behavior,
but they do everything and could use these methods anywhere.
Yes, absolutely.
And I believe that the 2018 elections in Taiwan
were the first time the world has noticed
that the Chinese Communist Party is doing disinformation similar to that of the Kremlin,
trying to influence the elections with the use of content farms,
false accounts and false information of all kinds.
And then with every subsequent election in Taiwan in 2020,
and now with the political elections in January 2024,
there has been an evolution,
with the use of artificial and generative intelligence and with false audio.
And this is even more manipulative and insidious,
because in this way there are not even some of the clues
that could be obtained with a video.
One of the most disconcerting examples in Taiwan
regarding the use of manipulated audio
was the day of the elections.
There was an important magnate who had run for office,
but had not yet supported any of the two candidates.
On the day of the elections,
an audio of a person who pretended to be him
came out declaring that he supported the candidate in favor of Beijing.
Other times they said that the winner of the elections
had a lover and illegitimate children, and they published it.
There have also been false DNA tests and things like that,
or the avatars of artificial intelligence
that were made by media leaders to report the news.
An element of this campaign was an e-book
on the secret history of former President Tsai Ing-wen.
It was full of lies and various accusations,
and it was broadcast a couple of weeks before the elections
on various platforms.
And that's what we mean when we talk about coordination.
In some cases, this content is also sent to real journalists.
In this way, it is enough for a single real journalist
to be convinced or deceived and take the news back,
to get it into the media ecosystem.
In Taiwan, they arrested an online journalist
for publishing results of false polls
and discovered that he had relations with officials
of the Chinese regime in Fujian province.
The journalist published the results of these polls,
claiming that the pro-Beijing candidate was in the lead in the polls.
In part, it is about making the pro-Beijing candidates
seem more popular than they really are.
And then they try to insert information
that creates scandals and makes people question
the integrity of the pro-Beijing candidates,
to discredit the disliked part and make the other look popular.
Taiwan is a relatively new democratic state
and very proud of its democratic regime.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why people
respond immediately and are skeptical,
because they realize that they are in the mirror
of the Beijing regime, which then puts its own,
with all the various air raids, etc.
At Epoch Times we deal a lot with various persecuted minorities,
in particular transnational repression.
These methods are used in a transversal way.
I know it's a topic you wrote about.
These disinformation campaigns of the Chinese regime
have three goals.
Politicians, but it is a latent ability.
Then they pollute the democratic process,
pretending to be electors and exasperating
the already existing polarization.
And the third is to target those who
perceive them as enemies of the PCC.
For example, recently an American YouTuber
went to China.
We were at the peak of the evidence
of mass arrests of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang
and of people who disappear in a very high number.
He accuses that the Chinese regime rejects them.
In short, this American YouTuber goes to China,
to Urumqi, and talks to these Uyghurs,
showing how happy they are and so on.
But then it turns out that the trip is paid
by the propaganda organs of the Chinese regime.
This is just an example.
There are other more coordinated and manipulated campaigns.
There are videos of Uyghurs who say they are happy,
who say that everything is fine
and that there are no arrests, etc.
And they are promoted and published in extremely suspicious ways.
Normal people do not publish spontaneously in that way,
not to mention that YouTube is banned in China.
Some Uyghurs were arrested
precisely because they had used a VPN
to access our social networks.
So how is it that all of a sudden
all these Uyghurs can go to YouTube
and talk about how beautiful things are
and how beautiful life is? Very suspicious.
This is an example.
The Tibetans and the inhabitants of Hong Kong
have been targeted by various computer attacks.
Sometimes there are also personalization of profiles.
If I'm not mistaken, one of the recent
accounts removed by META
concerns people who pretended to be Tibetan activists
and even a false consultant of Human Rights Watch
who defamed the Dalai Lama
and the Tibetan government in exile
accusing them of corruption, pedophilia and things like that.
So even in this case
it is about discrediting the enemies of the PCC.
And then there is the report published last week
by the Falun Dafa Information Center
which talks about a new campaign
against Falun Gong practitioners.
Some internal documents removed
talk about the broader planning
which includes three of the tactics mentioned
two of which have already been observed
that is, some very suspicious YouTubers
who publish content
which in part are obviously false
and in part are a strange mixture of false and some truth
but difficult to distinguish.
They defame Falun Gong and also the Shengyu Performing Arts.
Then there are examples of impersonation
of accounts on Wix
and more generally this impersonation tactic
is widely used by the PCC.
This begins to be very suspicious
it is not just one or two people
who say things in vain.
Now we have imitations of accounts
and reserved documents
which say that the Ministry of the Interior
orders to fully support these YouTubers
to provide their information
to use the army of 50 cents
that is, the army of trolls
and false accounts to amplify them.
They say to make a think tank
of the Chinese regime talk about it
to start manipulating
indeed it seems to me they use the word defamation
on Falun Gong in the results of research worldwide.
So you start to see these campaigns at more levels
there is a lot of misinformation in China
that targets Uighurs, Tibetans
and Falun Gong practitioners
but here we are talking about communities
outside China.
The PCC tries to influence public opinion
towards these groups
so that they do not receive support
for the atrocities on human rights
they are suffering
but also because some of these communities
are among the most critical voices
outside China towards the Chinese government
the PCC is using these tactics
to discredit its enemies.
I think it is interesting to look
at the internal materials of the PCC
because sometimes it itself publishes them on the Internet
one of the things that for me
was a real gold mine in my research
was to consult the websites of the local Chinese government
and see how at the local level
they talk about how these minorities are persecuted
how Chinese activists are persecuted
and what is done in terms of rewards
when you get to the local level
they can be extraordinarily transparent
obviously if you can read among the lines
the degree of repression they are using
I think that these campaigns aimed at the outside world
and some of these news leaks
usually come from some kind of internal source
that is close to the outside world
or to a particular community or cause
for example in December before the Taiwan elections
there was a Reuters news
on a note taken from a meeting
that coordinated their action
that was very explicit on how they would try
to influence the Taiwan elections
there were two things in particular
one was the attempt to influence the media and social media
through this kind of coordinated attacks
the other was to try to encourage those who live in China
but are originally from Taiwan
and tend to be more Chinese-like
to come back to Taiwan to vote
offering low-cost flights and things like that
and then this series of documents contained in the last report
are very similar in the sense that they do not publish
the entire document
they are notes of internal meetings
meetings between the Ministry of the Interior
and a think tank and a financial entity of the regime
I think this is one of those really difficult things
to document
because it actually happens outside the platform
people are co-opted offline
and then they give their support in online content
sometimes they look like authentic people
while in other cases they are real influencers
who usually publish other content
but to whom it was asked to make propaganda
sometimes we have found these cases
an example is what I mentioned earlier on Xinjiang
there was another example
and it is the merit of two American YouTubers
who followed the trail
to unmask an organization of the PCC
in practice a Hong Kong company
had sent an email to 100 English-speaking YouTubers
claiming that there was a promotional opportunity
related to the sharing of some content
on tourism in China
they thought it was a bit suspicious
and pretended to want to do it
so they accepted
and then they received the response
that is, the promotion is over
but we have another client
and we offer you $2,000 to insert this material
already ready that we give you
material that claims that COVID
originated from the deer of the United States
these two YouTubers refused
but they had a whole exchange of emails
and they publicly denounced it
making two videos on each of their channels
telling everything
but one of the places where I like to dig the most
are the documents of the registration of foreign actors in the United States
the FARA
yes, exactly, here you can find traces of money
there is a group of public relations companies
that do all kinds of things
and try to influence American newspapers
on behalf of various subjects of the United Front
that is, the Chinese regime
one was the PR company with a contract
with the consulate of New York
to promote the Beijing Winter Olympics
through influencers on social media
and this is an example where the content
may not be misinformation
as it was in the case of the origin of COVID from deer
but it shows the existence of money flow
through different intermediate levels
the case of the influencers is much more insidious
because it is more manipulative
it is not a situation in which you simply create
a false profile from nothing
and suddenly you start doing these things
now the point is that
even without giving direct funding
the Chinese regime has many false accounts
and YouTube and some of these websites
are based on monetization
so sometimes there is a not outlined countdown
which could be
I know that if I publish this message it could be amplified
and so suddenly this influencer
reaches 100,000 followers
and has a video with 600,000 views
and so obviously he has earned more money
than just doing his normal views
so the amplification happens in part
thanks to Chinese account networks
sometimes it is difficult to prove
but we know that they do it
to make them seem more popular
than they really are
Let's go back to these two YouTubers
at some point they tried to find
current employees of Shen Yun Discontent
and they found a surprising number of these people
who then ended up in a subsequent reportage
of the New York Times
How common is this type of approach?
The Chinese government
and I think you can see it especially in Taiwan
and sometimes there can be a precise action
but many times it is automatic
so there is an unintentional amplification
as you can have from other influencers
in 2020 a study by the University of Cardiff
found that these accounts
linked to the Chinese regime
published things like for example
that during the elections
electoral cards were burned
and they were retweeted by real people
and they spread and got a million views
In the Freedom House study
similar examples have been found
in 13 of the 30 countries
in Spanish, in other languages
a real influencer can see a content
and amplify it without knowing
that it actually comes from a fake account
and that's how he gets the likes
when you read the technical reports
on these fake accounts
usually fake accounts don't have much following
but just one tweet is amplified
by one with 800,000 followers
that suddenly becomes mainstream
there is a resonance box
and at this point the mainstream media
say what's going on here
let's make a piece too
and here we often take advantage
of our political division
and our existing vulnerabilities
We could talk for hours
about the manipulation of platforms
I've had many guests in the program
who have talked about TikTok
something very important and very little understood in America
we know that TikTok is a significant tool
of influence of the Chinese regime
there are other similar platforms
there is also WeChat
but many don't even know what it is
I would like to talk a little bit about WeChat
because I think it is a real weakness
and I think it shows that what they do in Taiwan
they could do it here too
on TikTok for example
WeChat is owned by the Chinese company Tencent
in China it is strongly censored and monitored
and it is omnipresent
because in China it is necessary
not only to communicate with anyone
but also to pay, to order something
it is omnipresent and is used everywhere
in China if they close your WeChat account
they heavily limit your life
now this platform is available all over the world
and the difference that Bytedance makes
with TikTok outside of China
and Douyin inside
does not exist with WeChat
it is the same platform everywhere
there are some differences regarding accounts
but if you really want to have an account
to reach a large number of people
you need to have a Chinese identity document
or a company registered in China
so it is widely used by many Chinese in countries
like Australia, the United States and Canada
I was just about to say Canada
Yes, so there is this Chinese company
that does not even pretend to be separated from the PCC
as TikTok does
and that in fact decides who can talk to who
who can talk to American voters
of Chinese language
what content is shared, what content is amplified
what Chinese Americans can say to other Chinese Americans
and to the voters
there have been many complaints
in California there is a complaint of censorship against WeChat
by a group of American Chinese
who published something about the protests in Hong Kong in 2019
their account was closed
causing economic damage
because they also used it to promote their activities
many of their customers were American Chinese
and took appointments through the app
As for the elections
in Canada, for example, there have been some campaigns
aimed at specific MPs
in particular four MPs
three of whom are of Asian origin
one of them was the subject of a defamatory campaign on WeChat
because he is from Hong Kong
and the consulate did not like what he said about Hong Kong
they thought it was too critical
and that it would introduce policies
that could allow the entry of a larger number of refugees
who are now fleeing Hong Kong
after the deterioration of the situation
so there was a defamation campaign using the WeChat app
and then there is also the offline manipulation
in which the Chinese consulate
puts pressure on local organizations of the Chinese community
so that they do not invite candidates to speak to their voters
or they try to put pressure on people
so that they do not volunteer for some campaigns
or even, in some cases, not to vote for them
so candidates who try to represent
the Asian-Canadian community in an authentic way
are basically cut out
excluded
due to the greater influence of the Chinese Communist Party
in some of these communities
and in the United States
Exactly
These channels are completely penetrated
in the US cable TV
and not only in the Chinese language
as, for example, CGTN in Spanish
When I think one of the things I did
when I looked at the influence in the United States
I looked at the cable TV packages in Chinese
and I found that there was a lot of influence
and it is CCTV
a Taiwanese broadcaster known to be Chinese-Chinese
Phoenix TV
based in Hong Kong
whose previous owner had ties with the Chinese military
and is now purchased by a Chinese state entity
and then other Hong Kong channels
which are now among the last ones left
This is the cable package usually purchased
in most of the United States
This is to say how there are more levels of influence
and this, I believe, is a serious disservice
for Americans of the Chinese language
without access to the Internet
Online there are obviously many more opportunities for information
but for those who live in a world made only of newspapers
or for those who read only WeChat
as many American Chinese do
the vision of reality can be very distorted
and not only of Chinese reality
but also of American reality where these people live
or maybe they live in the cities where they can see
NTDTV, our Chinese-associated television network
All this is really disturbing
and obviously has consequences
There is an aspect that in some ways is more difficult to describe
It is very difficult to be a journalist in today's China
There has been a kind of reciprocity
in the last administration
that has repatriated some people
but you have to accept some rules
written and not written
rather rigid to be able to do journalism in China
and in general a head to many restrictions
How does the regime force journalists to behave
who want to work there?
When we talk about censorship
the pressures and restrictions on foreign correspondents
are a key tactic
that is articulated on several levels
Many foreign newspapers are banned
Their websites are censored in China
so even if they produce content in Chinese
they are practically cut off from the market
It is surprising that subjects like the United States
are not so involved
because it is a commercial matter
The Chinese regime does not want to read news
about China written by independent newspapers
As for correspondents
there are restrictions on appearances
and not only
Those who try to make reports in a certain part of the country
can be criticized
And then there is a serious obstacle
and it happens more and more
that is the pressure on the sources
so for the Chinese it is increasingly dangerous
to talk to foreign journalists
And then there is another more recent phenomenon
that the Association of Foreign Correspondents in China talks about
The Chinese release a statement
and now they are accusing foreign correspondents
accusing them of citing them without authorization
And then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
checks whoever can help the journalist
So if you go on a trip for a report in Beijing or Shanghai
in practice they check who can be your driver
who can be your translator if you need it
who can be your guide
who cleans the offices
These people must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
First of all, this creates a whole series of surveillance
even non-digital
not to mention the level of digital surveillance
that foreign correspondents undergo
And then there is also the fact that trying to tell facts
that the PCC does not want and knows
puts the Chinese in danger
and the regime knows that this is a deterrent
for foreign correspondents
The number of foreign correspondents has decreased
and not only Americans
Before there were four or five Indian correspondents
There was a colleague who did excellent reports
He was able to ask the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for information on a Freedom House report
And the answer was
It's all false
Which obviously meant that it was all true
All four of these correspondents were fired
This also happened to European correspondents
And then again
many African heads cannot keep correspondents in China
because it is incredibly expensive
and it can take a year even just to get the visa
In short, in my opinion
the control over journalism in China
Let's turn the question around
The reality that you describe
What impact can it have on the way
that, for example, some of these newspapers
talk about the Chinese in America?
Yes, I mean I would say that's only one
of the many instruments of pressure
In some cases it was used to put pressure
on the mass media around the world
Another problem are the large mass media
conglomerates that have other contents
especially sports or entertainment
that are trying to enter China
Let's remember the case of the Houston Rockets manager
who tweeted about the protests in Hong Kong
ESPN received a lot of negative criticism
for having broadcast it in China
And there was also a note
from an ESPN chief of staff
ordering journalists to pay attention
to how the protests in Hong Kong were treated
Not to mention the NBA agreements in China
and things like that
And if you go into broader issues
like the China Daily
that gives money to publishers to print inserts
sometimes millions of dollars
in some cases they give money
just to print the paper editions
So there are an infinity of instruments of influence
One of the phenomena is the offer of free trips
in China by the Chinese government
and sometimes they are complete scholarship
very tempting for poor nations
They go to learn Chinese
And here we have a combination of real skills
taught together with propaganda
with lessons on the Marxist way of doing journalism
Or there are guided visits
aimed at making people believe that China
is a democracy because it has a parliament
And journalists who did not know it
especially those who come from Latin America
from Africa, maybe then they go home and say
China is really a democracy
I had never understood how open and democratic it was
And so you have the joint action of the newspapers
and the influencers on social media
And it also happens in the West
Even Huawei does it
If I'm not mistaken, Josh Rogin of the Washington Post
said he received an email from Huawei
offering him a trip to China
Usually those who know China do not fall for it
But then the regime no longer goes to the correspondents of China
but to the leaders of the mass media
or to people who deal with other issues
and who are not specialized in China
And of course these people will be more subject
to be convinced
So there is an influence at the level of mass media
property and finance
And then sometimes there is the targeting
and the cooperation of the journalists themselves
And here you can have a mixed situation
within a certain newspaper
On the one hand, you can have correspondents from China
very competent and very valid services
On the other hand, pieces that seem to be written
under the dictation of some bureaucrats of the Chinese regime
And often they are journalists who are not experts in China
One thing that came to mind
is an article in the New York Times
written by Regina Ip
a high-ranking Hong Kong official
very favorable to Beijing
who talked about the law on national security
and how great it is for Hong Kong
What do you think of things like this?
The idea of publishing articles of opinion
by Chinese officials or by various types of officials
is quite common
In the United States, for a certain period
there have been public relations companies
that have stipulated contracts with the Chinese embassy
to publish articles of Chinese officials
in the main American newspapers
But it happens everywhere
In Nigeria, a newspaper had a section
that reported only comments from the Chinese consulate
There is therefore the problem of deciding
who can publish the articles of opinion
If a Chinese official writes it
there should be an opposite point of view
What kind of fact-checking do you do?
In some cases, even in the United States
There are interviews with Chinese officials
that are transcribed and then published
with the prohibition of modifying them
Or maybe it was the Chinese regime
that decided the questions
This is to give greater credibility to the Chinese official
and to ensure that the journalist receives
the approval to interview the Chinese official
I have analyzed some interviews
that several Chinese ambassadors
have given to the main US headquarters
such as CNN, NPR, or Meet the Press
On the one hand, the journalists
often tried to be sly
and to put the ambassador in trouble
On the other hand, these ambassadors
are very cunning and know how to trick
So basically, by doing this
they continue to provide a public
of millions and millions of American consumers
with the statements of a Chinese ambassador
for example on COVID, which we know to be false
Sometimes we are faced with the question
of the articles of opinion
that are written by other intermediaries
that are not revealed
There was a case in Romania
where someone wrote on Huawei
saying that we should not worry
about security issues related to Huawei and 5G
It was later discovered that in reality
it was paid by Huawei
There have been cases of commentators
in the United States or think tanks
who received funding through multiple
other intermediaries linked to the United Front
and Hong Kong officials
and who wrote editorials
on local American newspapers
in which they encouraged to engage more
with China, to make more investments,
more trade, etc.
I think this is the point
where the situation becomes really turbid
In terms of newspapers, for example,
it is necessary to have clearer guidelines
on transparency or identification
both for the inserts that the Chinese government
inserts in local media
and for the articles published by people
who clearly represent the Chinese regime
For this purpose, it is necessary
at least to have a real fact-checking
and to have the rule of law
that would normally apply to anyone
The news that triggers the most anger
of the Chinese regime are those on human rights
Let's talk about this
Well, I think the merit is that there are independent
newspapers all over the world
who are trying to discover the things
that the PCC wants to hide
A lot of what we know about Xinjiang
and how Uyghurs are persecuted,
about Tibet, about what happens
to lawyers for human rights, about Hong Kong
and what happens to the detainees,
is due to the coverage of some Western heads
In some cases it is Western media
in others it is Chinese media
in others it is participating journalists
who run many risks
For TV journalists it is particularly difficult
to interview them in China
because it is forbidden to record the images
of the police beating up old protesters
who complain about pensions
not to mention interviewing someone
who is even more threatened
like a Uyghur in China or a Falun Gong practitioner
Another gap is represented
by the finances of the Chinese leaders
In some cases some pieces have been published
and it is not about human rights
but it is still very important
and the PCC does not want it to be known
There have been excellent investigative articles
but we also know that there has been censorship
from above, especially in Bloomberg
to stop this kind of reporting
and then I think that cases like the Falun Gong human rights crisis
in China still remain a big gap
Some of the strategies and sources
that have been used to discover
what is happening in Xinjiang
to highlight what is happening in Tibet
to show what is happening
for example to the protests of the white paper
and things like that should be used for other issues
like the persecution of Falun Gong
or the persecution of Christians
which is not talked about much
but in reality it influences many Chinese people
all over China, not only in the peripheries
and in the different regions
and then it has many other implications
on the Chinese governance
because for example if we talk about Han Chinese
arbitrarily detained or tortured to death
it is different from what is happening in Xinjiang
which is a minority area
what happens there is still something horrible
and tragic for those families
but if we talk about broader implications
related to the rule of law
what happens in Fujian or Liaoning or Guangzhou
is different, they are parts of China
where businessmen and foreign diplomats
have more possibilities to get away
for this reason I think it is necessary
to talk more about some of these types of abuses
that occur there and really think
what it means for us to understand today's China
I think these are some of the gaps
that it would be nice to see filled
using perhaps more diversified sources
or some kind of different ingenuity
because it is really important to understand
what is really happening in today's China
and the implications not only for China
but also for the United States or for the rest of the world
Well, look, I think one of the things
that was really helpful in my research
over the last 10 years
is that there is a real capacity for resilience
we should not overestimate the capacity of the PCC
nor underestimate what the little things can do
One of the things that we have discovered
is that of the 30 countries we have examined
at least half have shown resilience
Taiwan and the United States
had very high levels of resilience
In some cases, however, all that is needed
is a report on how the PCC acts on its influence
This can have a really significant impact
in terms of awareness
like, for example, exposing these disinformation campaigns
In Italy, there was a journalist
who wrote two articles
One article describes how he found a fake campaign
on Twitter that made Italians believe
that they should thank China for the COVID aid
a much larger number than they actually did
In another article, he examined the contents
of the public broadcaster
which has drawn some of these agreements
with the Chinese state media
and the way in which the latter spoke of China
and there was a lot of imbalance
These articles had a huge impact
I think these are the kinds of things
that sometimes one or two people in the country
or a group of NGOs are enough
and some of these data analysis
and systematic investigations
like those that are done by civil society
in places like Taiwan
to make people more aware of the tactics
They provide the government and the tech companies
with information on what they can do
and raise public opinion
about the fact that this is a real thing
and it could happen
And I repeat, it is not limited to places
like Taiwan or the West
There are training courses for journalists in Africa
Some new think tanks are being born
There are projects in places like Poland or Romania
and things like that
It is really stimulating to see the level of awareness
and commitment that in some cases people are putting
because they see what is happening
They are not so worried about the great rivalry
between the United States and China
as they are about the invasion of the freedom of the media
of national sovereignty and of the electoral integrity
of their countries
There is still a lot of work to be done
I think that for ordinary users
if you see something that is too much in line
with what the Chinese Communist Party wants you to believe
you should be a little skeptical
I would like to encourage people
to keep an eye on this kind of accounts
because, I repeat, sometimes it is a little more obvious
like for example a clear goal of the Chinese Communist Party
but if it is someone who has a fake account
that impersonates other American voters
it is much more difficult to identify
So I think that one of the areas of democratic resilience
that we have is to try to reduce political polarization
to maintain some of these bipartisan areas
to invest in national entities
that can carry out these investigations and revelations
and also to support our Chinese diaspora
in being able to have access to better and more information
not only about China
but also about what is happening in America
We are in the closing
Sara, you have a new sub-stack on which you are writing
and of which I will be a keen reader
because I love your work. Can you tell us about it?
It is called Under Reporter China
The idea is to examine some of these problems
some of these things
whether it is the persecution of some minorities
of political prisoners of which no one speaks
or to use all these ways and different sources
to see how the Chinese Communist Party
is trying to influence the media
and the information outside China
and try to reveal all this
The intention is also to give people
the opportunity to understand it better
both for the work I am doing myself
and to try to amplify the really good work
that is carried out all over the world
by the people who deal with this
but whose voices are sometimes silenced
so we want to give them a push
Sara Cooke, it was a pleasure
It was a pleasure for me
Thank you all from Jan Jekielek
for joining me and Sara Cooke
in this episode of American Thought Leaders
