Study Says China’s Population Could Be Far Smaller Than Official Data Suggests

A new study by U.S.-based demographer Yi Fuxian is challenging one of the most basic assumptions about China’s economic future: How many people actually live there.

Yi, a senior researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, argues that China’s population may be overstated by roughly 130 million people. His analysis suggests the country had closer to 1.27 billion people in 2020, rather than the 1.412 billion reported in China’s seventh national census.

If current fertility trends continue, Yi projects that China’s population could fall to around 320 million by 2100, roughly half the United Nations’ current medium projection of 633 million.

The findings, published in the independent journal Contemporary China Review under the title “China’s Population Data Manipulation,” draw on school enrollment and graduation figures, vaccination records, household registrations, birth data and mortality statistics to test China’s official population figures against other datasets.

RELATED: Chinese Banks Face Backlash Over Loans to Help Workers Pay Social Insurance

Questions over census figures

For the best of our weekly content！

You are now signed up for our newsletter

Check your email to complete sign up

Yi traces what he sees as major discrepancies in China’s population statistics back at least to the 2000 census. Using the 1990 census as a baseline and adding subsequent births, deaths and international migration, Yi estimated China’s 2000 population at roughly 1.223 billion, which is tens of millions below the officially reported 1.266 billion.

He has also questioned later adjustments to China’s fertility statistics. The 2010 census recorded a total fertility rate of 1.19 children per woman, but demographic estimates were subsequently revised upward. Yi argues that repeatedly assuming higher fertility and birth totals contributed to delayed recognition of the speed of China’s demographic decline.

His more recent analysis uses several independent indicators. Among them are BCG tuberculosis vaccine supplies, which are administered to newborns in China. Yi notes that the number of vaccine vials distributed in 2018 through 2020 appears difficult to reconcile with the much larger number of births recorded in official demographic statistics.

He also compared population counts from dozens of areas with the number of people recorded during mass COVID-19 testing campaigns, arguing that the latter figures were consistently lower than census totals. Taken together, Yi estimates China’s 2020 population at roughly 1.27 billion.

UN forecasts a steep decline

Even without accepting Yi’s lower population estimate, mainstream demographic projections point to a dramatic contraction. The United Nations’ World Population Prospects 2024 estimates China’s population at approximately 1.42 billion in 2024 and projects it will fall to about 1.22 billion by 2054 and 633 million by 2100 under its medium scenario.

Yi believes even that projection is too optimistic. Under a scenario in which China’s total fertility rate remains around 0.8, his model puts the population at roughly 1.01 billion in 2050, 620 million in 2075 and 320 million by the end of the century.

If true, Yi argues that overstating the number of children and younger adults would have implications extending far beyond demographic statistics. Younger households are major sources of demand for housing, education, food, clothing and other consumer goods. If those age groups are smaller than policymakers assume, domestic demand could also be weaker than expected.

Serious economic repercussions

A smaller workforce could further intensify pressure from population aging, pension costs and a shrinking tax base. Yi also argues that inaccurate population assumptions may have distorted projections of China’s economic rise. “This means that China’s economic, social, defense, and foreign policies, as well as international investment decisions and foreign governments’ policies toward China, have all rested on flawed demographic data,” he wrote.

“The consequences are profound. Inflated figures led Chinese economists to project that China’s economy would far surpass America’s, feeding Beijing’s ‘East rising, West declining’ strategic miscalculation. The same distortions shaped global assessments of China’s trajectory, fueling ‘Thucydides Trap’ narratives and strategic anxiety among U.S. policymakers and China analysts,” he added.

China’s demographic problems themselves are no longer in dispute. Birth rates have fallen sharply despite Beijing abandoning the one-child policy and later encouraging families to have two and three children. What remains uncertain is their true scale.