Secret Service Records Reveal Loaded Handgun Went Undetected at Trump Golf Club During Presidential

By yourNEWS Media Newsroom

WASHINGTON — Newly disclosed U.S. Secret Service records reveal that a member of President Donald Trump’s golf club in Sterling, Virginia, passed through presidential security screening with a loaded semi-automatic handgun in August 2025 and spent several hours moving around the property before discovering the weapon and notifying authorities himself.

The incident occurred while Trump was present at Trump National Golf Club, according to documents released following a federal Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch. The Washington-based government watchdog announced the disclosure Oct. 8, 2026, after obtaining 14 pages of heavily redacted Secret Service records detailing how the armed visitor passed through screening without the firearm being detected.

The newly released federal records describe an apparent breakdown in security screening at a location protected by the Secret Service during a presidential visit. Investigators determined that the club member carried the handgun inside a gym bag that had been visually inspected by security personnel, then proceeded to several locations throughout the facility without the weapon being discovered.

The visitor eventually reported the oversight to authorities after realizing that his Glock 43 pistol had remained inside the bag throughout his visit. According to an agent’s account, the man explained that he decided to alert security personnel because he “cares about POTUS,” using the abbreviation for president of the United States.

The disclosure provides additional details about an incident that previously prompted an internal Secret Service review and reportedly resulted in the administrative suspension of an agent responsible for searching the visitor’s belongings.

Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton criticized the agency’s handling of the incident, citing the assassination attempts against Trump and the importance of maintaining effective security at locations visited by the president.

“The Secret Service is a dangerous mess. Given the previous attempts on the president’s life, it is highly disturbing that this type of security lapse could occur—and that it takes a federal lawsuit to get a fuller picture into how a person was able to get a gun through a Secret Service checkpoint,” Fitton said in the organization’s announcement.

The newly disclosed documents center on an Aug. 31, 2025, visit to Trump National Golf Club, located approximately 25 miles northwest of Washington. The president was on the property when the visitor arrived around noon for lunch and recreational activities.

According to an internal email prepared by a Secret Service official, an assistant special agent in charge assigned to the agency’s Washington Field Office documented the sequence of events later that afternoon. The report identifies the visitor as a club member whose name was partially redacted, leaving the surname Kennelly visible.

The report states that the man entered the clubhouse through a designated entrance, where he underwent security screening. Officers used a metal-detection device and visually inspected his gym bag before permitting him to proceed inside.

The visitor subsequently ate lunch on the patio, visited the club’s recreational facilities and spent time at the swimming pool. Throughout those activities, the handgun remained in his possession inside the bag, according to the investigation.

The man reportedly discovered the firearm while changing clothes after using the pool. Realizing that security personnel had examined his belongings without identifying the pistol, he approached an official near an employee entrance to disclose what had occurred.

The Secret Service’s contemporaneous account states:

At approximately 1553 hours, a member of Trump National Golf [Club] (TNGC), [redacted] Kennelly, approached a [redacted]-stander and advised that he had inadvertently brought a pistol through a screening location and the pistol was not detected.

The report continues:

[Redacted] advised that, at approximately 1200 hours, he arrived at TNGC [Trump National Golf Club] to eat lunch and go to the pool. Upon arrival at TNGC, [redacted] entered the clubhouse through the [redacted] entrance and was screened at that location. [Redacted] advised that he was searched via a [redacted] metal detector and his bag was searched visually. [Redacted] then went on to eat lunch on the patio and then go to the pool. Upon changing his clothes after using the pool, [redacted] realized that he had inadvertently left his Glock 43 pistol in the gym bag and that the bag was searched without the pistol being found. It was at this time the member approached a [redacted]-stander at the employee entrance and advised of the situation because he ‘cares about POTUS.’ WFO PI [Protective Intelligence] was notified and SAs [special agents] [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted] responded.

The notification prompted an investigation by the Washington Field Office’s Protective Intelligence personnel. Special agents interviewed the visitor, examined the handgun inside his bag and reviewed surveillance recordings to establish whether his account matched his movements through the club.

The video evidence corroborated the man’s description of entering the facility and submitting his belongings for inspection. Investigators also observed him carrying the bag through several areas of the property after passing through the checkpoint.

The agent’s report described those findings:

WFO PI interviewed [redacted] and viewed his pistol in his bag. TNGC camera footage was reviewed. [Redacted] was seen on camera entering the club and having his bag searched as he described. [Redacted] was also on camera on the patio eating lunch, going to the pro-shop, the men’s locker room, moving through the pool house, and at the pool. [Redacted] is seen on camera with his bag at each location.

Surveillance information reviewed by investigators indicated that the visitor entered the property at approximately 11:59 a.m. He was recorded at lunch shortly afterward and later moved upstairs before entering the golf club’s pro shop around 1:20 p.m.

The records show him proceeding to the locker room shortly after 1:24 p.m. and returning to the pro shop approximately six minutes later. Additional surveillance entries documented his movements around the property, including a departure through the front entrance shortly after 1:32 p.m.

The sequence established that the visitor had moved through multiple areas of the property while carrying a handgun that had not been identified during the initial screening process. The approximately 3:53 p.m. notification brought the oversight to the attention of federal agents several hours after the man had first entered the facility.

The records do not establish that the visitor intended to threaten the president or anyone else at the club. His decision to disclose the weapon voluntarily was consistent with his reported explanation that he had inadvertently left the pistol in his bag.

Nevertheless, the ability to carry a loaded firearm through a protective screening checkpoint without detection raised concerns about the reliability of security procedures at presidential venues.

A separate Secret Service Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division report confirmed that the incident did not require changes to the president’s movements.

“No protective movements were affected by this incident,” the report stated, adding that “There is no reported media coverage of this incident.”

The newly obtained records also include photographs of handwritten investigative notes, a Virginia driver’s license and the license plate of a Mercedes-Benz associated with the investigation. Identifying information on the driver’s license and vehicle registration was redacted before the records were released.

The documents provide a partial account of the agency’s response but leave several questions unresolved, including how the firearm escaped detection, whether screening personnel followed the applicable procedures and what corrective measures were implemented afterward.

The incident attracted additional scrutiny because of the Secret Service’s broader responsibility to protect Trump following previous attempts on his life.

On July 13, 2024, a gunman opened fire during Trump’s campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, striking him in the ear and killing a spectator. Two other attendees were seriously wounded before a Secret Service countersniper killed the gunman, Thomas Matthew Crooks.

A second apparent assassination attempt occurred Sept. 15, 2024, when an armed suspect was discovered near Trump’s golf course in West Palm Beach, Florida, while he was playing golf. A Secret Service agent opened fire after spotting the suspect, who fled and was subsequently arrested.

Those incidents intensified scrutiny of the agency’s protective operations, including perimeter security, coordination among law enforcement personnel and procedures used to identify potential threats before they can approach a protectee.

The Virginia incident raised a different security concern because the handgun entered the protected location through an established screening checkpoint rather than through a perimeter breach or an encounter outside a secured area.

According to earlier reporting cited by Judicial Watch, a Secret Service spokesperson explained that agents conducting guest screenings at the Sterling golf facility used handheld metal detectors rather than walk-through screening equipment.

The agent responsible for examining the club member’s bag was reportedly placed on administrative leave while the agency reviewed the incident. The newly released documents do not establish the final outcome of that personnel review or whether disciplinary measures were subsequently imposed.

A follow-up communication dated Sept. 1, 2025, suggests that Secret Service personnel were also concerned about the possibility of encountering the visitor again while carrying out protective duties.

“In case we’re out on the course and this guy shows up again they want a full interview with him,” one Washington Field Office employee wrote to another, according to the released correspondence.

The documents do not indicate whether that additional interview occurred or what information investigators might have obtained from it.

Judicial Watch’s involvement began after the organization attempted to obtain federal records concerning the security lapse through the Freedom of Information Act.

On Nov. 18, 2025, the watchdog submitted a request to the Secret Service seeking materials associated with its internal investigation. The request covered investigative reports, agents’ notes, witness interviews, audio and video recordings, and other documents connected to the incident.

The organization also requested emails and text messages exchanged among members of the president’s protective detail regarding the armed visitor and the failure to detect the handgun.

After the agency failed to provide a response within the required statutory period, Judicial Watch turned to federal court.

The organization announced its lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security on April 30, 2026, seeking to compel disclosure of the requested records. The action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which has jurisdiction over disputes involving federal agencies’ compliance with public records laws.

The federal complaint, filed as Judicial Watch Inc. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Case No. 1:26-cv-01447, challenged the government’s failure to respond to the request and sought the production of records subject to disclosure under FOIA.

The resulting release of 14 heavily redacted pages offers a more detailed account of the incident than was previously available publicly. It confirms the sequence of events described by the visitor, documents the investigative response and identifies the existence of additional materials reviewed by federal agents.

However, the redactions also limit what can be determined from the disclosed information. Names of federal employees and certain identifying details have been withheld, while the records do not provide a complete explanation of the screening failure or a comprehensive account of the internal investigation’s final findings.

The presence of a Glock 43 inside a gym bag that was examined without the firearm being discovered highlights the importance of both equipment and personnel procedures in presidential security operations.

The Glock 43 is a compact semi-automatic pistol designed for concealed carry. Its relatively small dimensions allow it to fit inside personal belongings, making effective screening particularly important when firearms are prohibited from entering a secured location.

In this case, the weapon was reportedly loaded and remained with the visitor as he traveled through the clubhouse and recreational areas. The fact that the man voluntarily disclosed the firearm prevented the oversight from remaining entirely undetected, but his notification came only after he had spent several hours inside the facility.

The disclosed records do not establish that Trump was in immediate proximity to the visitor while the handgun was present. They do confirm that both men were on the property during the same period and that the visitor had passed through security measures implemented for the president’s presence.

That distinction is important in assessing the incident. The records demonstrate a failure to detect an unauthorized firearm entering a protected location, but they do not establish an attempted attack or indicate that the visitor intended to harm the president.

Judicial Watch has characterized the incident as an example of inadequate presidential security and has argued that the agency’s failure to respond promptly to its records request delayed public access to information about the breach.

The watchdog’s latest disclosure adds to continuing scrutiny of the Secret Service following a series of protective security controversies involving Trump. Although the available records indicate that the club member reported the firearm himself and that the president’s movements were unaffected, the incident illustrates how an undetected weapon can remain inside a secured location despite established screening procedures.

More than a year after the incident, the released materials document what happened at the checkpoint and how investigators reconstructed the visitor’s movements. They leave unanswered whether the Secret Service completed its review, what conclusions officials reached about the screening failure and whether changes were made to prevent another armed visitor from passing through presidential security without detection.