Lucretia Hughes Klucken
Secretary Markwayne Mullin cites security risks from Chinese-made voting-machine components ahead of 2026 midterms
WASHINGTON — The Department of Homeland Security will require states seeking full federal election-security grants to conduct random manual audits of paper ballots following the 2026 midterm elections, citing concerns about foreign-made components used in American voting machines.
Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin outlined the requirement in a memorandum to the White House Transparency Task Force.
“The Homeland Security Grant Program requires states to trust but verify the results produced by the voting machines,” Mullin wrote.
States seeking full grant awards must demonstrate that they conducted random post-election hand counts of paper ballots to identify possible errors or manipulation, according to the memorandum.
A senior White House official said the audits would likely examine approximately 5% of ballots cast, although the final procedures may vary based on federal grant conditions and state election laws.
The policy does not give DHS direct control over state elections. States retain primary responsibility for administering elections under the Constitution.
The department is instead using federal grant requirements to encourage — or pressure — states to adopt the audits. States that refuse could receive reduced federal election-security funding.
Mullin said the audits are part of a broader DHS effort to protect election infrastructure and improve public confidence in vote totals.
Paper-ballot audits compare electronically reported results with voter-verifiable physical ballots. If the hand count closely matches the machine tabulation, election officials gain additional evidence that the equipment operated correctly. Significant discrepancies can trigger a larger examination or full recount.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission says post-election audits can detect errors, confirm that voting systems operated accurately and strengthen public confidence. There is currently no single national auditing standard, and state procedures vary widely.
Some states use fixed-percentage audits. Others conduct risk-limiting audits in which the number of ballots examined depends on the margin of victory and the statistical evidence needed to confirm the result.
The DHS directive also raises concerns about the voting-system supply chain.
Mullin said components manufactured by companies in China or other adversarial nations create “significant security risks,” even when the final voting systems are assembled and certified in the United States.
“These vulnerabilities mean that malicious actors could potentially compromise election infrastructure at any stage of the supply chain, even before the machines are assembled or deployed,” Mullin wrote.
He warned that a compromised component could potentially create an entry point for hackers targeting multiple machines or jurisdictions.
The three largest voting-system vendors — Election Systems & Software, Hart InterCivic and Dominion Voting Systems — account for more than 80% of the American market. Executives from all three companies acknowledged during a 2020 congressional hearing that some components used in their systems were sourced from China.
The vendors have said foreign sourcing is sometimes unavoidable because certain electronic components are no longer produced domestically in sufficient quantities.
Election Systems & Software states that components obtained from China-based manufacturers undergo the company’s quality-assurance and security-testing process.
A foreign-made component is not proof that a voting machine has been compromised. Federal officials have not presented evidence that China or another foreign government changed American vote totals through voting machines in a previous election.
That distinction must be made clear.
The existence of a vulnerability does not establish that someone successfully exploited it. But responsible security policy does not require officials to wait until after an attack before closing an identified weakness.
A declassified National Intelligence Council assessment concluded that China, Iran and Russia possess the technical capability to access certain American election-related networks and systems. The assessment also said foreign actors would probably avoid attempting to alter vote totals because doing so without detection would be difficult and could provoke retaliation.
That should not become an excuse for complacency.
America would never knowingly place its military communications, nuclear systems or most sensitive intelligence networks at the mercy of components that could be manipulated by a foreign adversary. The equipment used to record and count the votes that determine the leadership of the country deserves the same serious examination.
Hand-counting a random sample of paper ballots is neither radical nor partisan.
The process does not automatically assume fraud. It tests whether the reported result can be independently verified.
Republicans should support audits when their candidates win. Democrats should support audits when their candidates win. Election security cannot become something either party favors only when it distrusts the outcome.
Critics may challenge DHS’s authority to attach the requirement to federal grants, arguing that the administration is using financial leverage to interfere with state election administration.
Those legal and constitutional questions deserve scrutiny. Federal officials should not manipulate election procedures to benefit one party, and audit standards must be transparent, uniform and established before ballots are cast.
But the underlying security principle is difficult to dispute: Machines should never be expected to audit themselves.
Every jurisdiction should use voter-verifiable paper ballots, preserve a documented chain of custody and conduct meaningful post-election audits before certifying results.
If the electronic count is accurate, the paper ballots will confirm it.
If it is not, the American people deserve to know.
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