Taiwanese national-security officials say this year’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership retreat at Beidaihe is expected to focus heavily on Beijing’s strategies toward the United States and Taiwan, including four major approaches aimed at weakening resistance to unification.
According to an Aug. 10 report by the Central News Agency (CNA), the officials assessed that Beijing’s Taiwan strategy would center on opposing what the CCP calls “seeking independence through military means,” strengthening what it describes as substantive governance over Taiwan, cultivating sectors of Taiwanese society that oppose independence and support unification, and treating Taiwan’s year-end local elections as a key measure of the success of its Taiwan policy.
The officials also assessed that Beijing’s strategy toward Washington would involve using trade and phased purchases to draw the United States closer while seeking to isolate Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
The information has not been independently confirmed, and Beijing does not release minutes or publicly acknowledge the informal leadership discussions that take place at Beidaihe. Reuters describes the annual gathering as a secretive retreat whose start is generally inferred from leadership movements, security measures, and official appearances in the coastal resort.
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Courting the US while isolating Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan
Taiwan’s national-security officials told CNA that this year’s Beidaihe leadership retreat began around Aug. 3 and was expected to last approximately two weeks. They assessed that political and personnel issues would dominate the informal discussions.
Separately, Chinese state media reported that 60 experts invited by the CCP Central Committee and State Council attended an official vacation program at Beidaihe from Aug. 1 to 7. The program’s theme was “Striving Forward with the 15th Five-Year Plan,” according to People’s Daily. That officially publicized program involving experts is distinct from the closed-door discussions believed to take place among senior Party leaders.
One major subject identified by the Taiwanese officials is the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee. Beijing has officially announced that the plenum will be held in October and will focus on issues related to “full and rigorous Party self-governance,” according to China’s State Council website, citing Xinhua. Taiwanese officials assessed that discussions at Beidaihe would also consider the plenum in the context of preparations for the CCP’s 21st Party Congress in 2027.
The second major subject, according to CNA, is Beijing’s strategy toward the United States and Taiwan.
President Donald Trump said in July that Chinese leader Xi Jinping will visit the United States on Sept. 24. Reuters reported that the planned meeting follows Trump’s earlier visit to China and comes amid continued negotiations between Washington and Beijing on trade and other issues.
Against that backdrop, Taiwanese national-security officials assessed that Beidaihe discussions would address how Beijing should approach Washington before the 21st Party Congress.
The first element would involve using purchases and trade interests to draw the United States closer. According to the officials, Beijing could fulfill previously promised purchases in stages according to strategic need, allowing China to maintain a continuing series of economic incentives for Washington while seeking to isolate Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
The second objective, according to the assessment, would be to block a new round of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to prevent them from interfering with Beijing’s regional strategy.
Third, Chinese leaders would seek to exploit developments in the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East to create what the Taiwanese officials characterized as strategic opportunities in which U.S. power is diminished while China’s relative position grows.
Taiwan strategy encompasses four major areas
On Taiwan, the officials identified four major strategies they believe are being considered by the CCP leadership.
The first is opposing what Beijing describes as “seeking independence through military means.” According to the CNA report, Taiwanese officials assessed that Beijing views increased Taiwanese military spending and expanded deployment of drones as developments that could undermine what the CCP considers its advantageous position in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing would therefore seek to mobilize political and other forces against such measures.
The second strategy is to strengthen what the officials described as Beijing’s “substantive governance” over Taiwan. This would involve gray-zone pressure using legal, psychological, diplomatic, and military means intended to constrain Taiwan’s international space and weaken perceptions of Taiwan as a sovereign political entity.
The third strategy would involve devoting available resources to cultivating groups and individuals in Taiwan that oppose formal Taiwan independence, resist independence-oriented policies, and support eventual unification with China.
The fourth concerns Taiwan’s local elections at the end of 2026. According to the Taiwanese officials, Beijing considers the elections an important test of the effectiveness of its Taiwan policy and intends to provide what the CNA report described as the “maximum support” possible to “patriotic forces in Taiwan.”
The reported emphasis on cultivating sympathetic political forces comes as cross-Strait policy has again become a contentious issue in Taiwan’s domestic politics.
Kuomintang (KMT) Chair Cheng Li-wen recently said during an online program that “Taiwan has never been independent” and “Taiwan has never been a country,” according to NOWnews.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Lin Chun-hsien responded on Aug. 9 by arguing that Taiwan is already a sovereign state whose official name is the Republic of China (ROC).
Lin also highlighted comments Cheng made earlier in her political career, when she had said that “the Communist Party and the Kuomintang are the same” and called for “building our own country.” He questioned why her position had changed so substantially.
Lin further asked whether Cheng’s passport says “People’s Republic of China” or “Republic of China.” Taiwan, he argued, already possesses a government, territory, population, and sovereignty and therefore does not need an independence referendum to establish its status.
Focus on purging the ‘three impurities’
Personnel matters are also expected to feature prominently in the Beidaihe discussions, according to the Taiwanese officials.
Within the military, discussions are expected to include whether vacancies among senior generals and theater commanders should be filled. Within the Party, the officials said Beijing is preparing a one-year campaign related to “advancing comprehensive and strict Party governance,” aimed at targeting what the CCP calls the “three impurities” and “three types of people.”
According to the Taiwanese officials, the “three impurities” refer to ideological impurity, organizational impurity, and behavioral impurity.
Ideological impurity was described as disloyalty to Xi Jinping. Organizational impurity includes forming internal factions or cliques, while behavioral impurity includes being viewed as pro-American or maintaining what Beijing regards as illusions about “peaceful evolution.”
The officials assessed that after the Fifth Plenum, the CCP would carry out a broader rectification campaign targeting these categories, with the process proceeding in stages ahead of the 21st Party Congress to prepare for future personnel changes.
Regarding the criteria for the CCP’s next leadership lineup, the Taiwanese officials assessed that absolute loyalty to Xi as the Party’s central leader would be a principal requirement. Candidates would also be expected to demonstrate confidence in Beijing’s ability to “defeat the United States” and commitment to the CCP narrative of “the East rising and the West declining.”
For senior military appointments, the officials said familiarity with and adherence to “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” would be an additional criterion.
Beidaihe’s secretive political role
Beidaihe, a seaside resort in Hebei Province, has played a distinctive role in CCP elite politics since the Mao era.
China Daily reported that from 1953 to 1965, many of the CCP leadership’s major summer meetings were held there and consequential political decisions were made from villas in the resort. The formal summer administrative system was ultimately abolished in 2003 under then-CCP leader Hu Jintao.
Contemporary Reuters reporting from 2003 described Hu’s move as an effort to end the longstanding tradition of exclusive summer gatherings among senior leaders.
The political role of Beidaihe nevertheless did not disappear. Informal gatherings later resumed, although Beijing stopped officially documenting collective leadership meetings there.
Reuters reported on Aug. 3 that Chinese authorities still do not formally confirm the annual leadership retreat. The appearance that day of Cai Qi, a Politburo Standing Committee member and one of Xi’s closest aides, at a meeting with experts in Beidaihe was widely interpreted by analysts as signaling that the 2026 leadership retreat had begun.
Historically, Beidaihe has offered serving and retired CCP leaders an opportunity for informal discussions over personnel, policy, and other sensitive matters outside the Party’s normal institutional meetings. Analysts cited by Reuters, however, say the scope for genuine bargaining has narrowed considerably as political power has become increasingly concentrated under Xi.
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