Why US-Taiwan Military Cooperation Is Becoming More Public

A report recently published by The Wall Street Journal revealed a phenomenon worth considering: U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, which had remained low-profile for decades and was not even officially acknowledged, is now gradually becoming public. This is a deliberate reframing of the message, according to the report, to confront China and to also reassure the Taiwanese public as well as the US allies in the region.

Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo revealed that U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation is closer than outside observers might have imagined. Taiwan’s military has even openly referred to U.S. military instructors as “English teachers,”effectively acknowledging the long-standing presence of U.S. personnel in Taiwan assisting with military training. This is not an ordinary news disclosure, but rather a carefully orchestrated political signal.

First, the message to Beijing is very clear: the United States has not truly withdrawn from the Taiwan Strait, and security cooperation between the two sides continues to deepen. But at the same time, the stronger message is directed at Taiwan itself, because the side that is genuinely beginning to lose confidence is not Beijing, but Taiwan.

This goes back to remarks made by Donald Trump not long ago. Trump said that the United States does not want to fly 9,500 miles to fight a war, but that the $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan is a good bargaining chip. While this statement did not make Beijing believe that U.S. policy toward Taiwan had fundamentally changed, for Taiwan it was like a bucket of cold water being thrown over it.

For a long time, Taiwan’s greatest strategic reliance has not simply been on how many weapons the United States sells it, but on the belief that the United States would ultimately intervene militarily. If that belief begins to waver, no amount of additional weapons can completely fill the resulting psychological sense of insecurity.

For the best of our weekly content！

You are now signed up for our newsletter

Check your email to complete sign up

The Wall Street Journal, citing the views of several U.S. scholars, said that the recent decision by the United States and Taiwan to publicly disclose more details of their cooperation—including joint patrols and U.S. military training of Taiwanese forces—was likely intended to address growing doubts within Taiwanese society about the U.S. commitment. In other words, the main purpose of this “going public” is not merely to deter China, but also to reassure allies.

In fact, the presence of “English teachers” in Taiwan is hardly news. In 2021, The Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. special operations forces and Marines had already been secretly assisting in the training of Taiwan’s military. In recent years, U.S. lawmakers have made frequent visits to Taiwan, retired U.S. military commanders have publicly appeared in Taiwan, and exchanges between the two sides have become increasingly frequent, creating what is essentially an “open secret.”

Many people tend to understand U.S. policy toward Taiwan in one simple sentence: the United States will definitely defend Taiwan. In reality, that is not the case.

What the United States has actually codified in law is the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States to provide Taiwan with the means necessary for its self-defense, but does not commit Washington to sending troops to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. For decades, the United States has pursued “strategic ambiguity”—on the one hand, hoping to deter Beijing from launching military action, while on the other, seeking to prevent Taiwan from taking provocative steps based on excessive confidence in U.S. support.

Therefore, deploying U.S. military “English teachers,” selling weapons, and sharing operational experience with Taiwan are all consistent with U.S. policy. But whether the United States would directly enter a war has always been left deliberately flexible.

This is also why, whenever a U.S. president discusses whether Washington would send troops to defend Taiwan, statements often appear inconsistent or even contradictory. The very point that needs to remain ambiguous is whether the United States would actually intervene militarily.

The report also noted that from May to June this year, the number of Chinese coast guard vessels operating around Taiwan increased by nearly 90 percent compared with the same period last year. In particular, Chinese coast guard vessels began appearing frequently in waters east of Taiwan, a considerable distance from mainland China. This is a classic example of gray-zone operations.

By using the coast guard rather than the navy, the CCP can lower the threshold for military confrontation while continuously exhausting Taiwan’s surveillance resources and psychological resilience.

For this reason, the United States has recently made a point of publicly releasing photographs of joint patrols with Taiwan’s Coast Guard. The underlying message to Beijing is that U.S.-Taiwan cooperation is not limited to their militaries but has also extended to maritime law enforcement and security in the gray zone.

The focus of competition between the two sides is gradually shifting from warships and missiles to a contest over day-to-day presence and influence.

For Taiwan, the real question worth considering is not how many “English teachers” the U.S. military has sent today, nor how many details of bilateral cooperation have been made public. Rather, if Taiwan’s security is built entirely upon the strategic ambiguity of another country, then the fundamental uncertainty may never truly have disappeared.