China’s Flexible Workforce Could Reach 320 Million as Homelessness Concerns Grow

Recent reports and estimates cited by China analysts have suggested that the number of homeless people in China could run into the tens of millions, although reliable nationwide figures are difficult to verify. The reports come amid mounting concerns over China’s weak labor market, elevated youth unemployment, and the growing number of workers relying on temporary and gig-economy jobs.

U.S. columnist and political commentator Gordon G. Chang recently cited an estimate of 47.5 million homeless people in a an article for The Hill. Chang acknowledged that estimates vary widely and argued that China’s deteriorating economic conditions could mean the number has risen further.

A January report by United Press International (UPI) separately cited estimates circulating among Beijing-based analysts that put China’s homeless population at about 50 million. According to the report, roughly 60 percent were believed to be younger people, with an average age of about 33.

The figures have not been independently verified, however, and China does not publish a comprehensive nationwide homelessness count that would allow the estimates to be confirmed.

The reports have nevertheless drawn attention to increasingly visible signs of economic distress. Photos and videos circulating on Chinese social media have shown people sleeping in parks, under bridges, and in other public spaces, while other reports have documented unemployed workers using community service centers as places to spend their days while searching for jobs.

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The South China Morning Post reported in July that unemployed people in Guangzhou and other major cities have increasingly been using community service centers originally associated with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activities. Many of the centers offer free Wi-Fi, air conditioning, power outlets, reading areas, and inexpensive meals, making them attractive to people spending long periods searching for work.

The pressure is particularly visible among younger Chinese.

According to Reuters, citing data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics on Aug. 19, unemployment among urban workers aged 16 to 24, excluding students, rose to 17.9 percent in July, up sharply from 14.9 percent in June and reaching its highest level in 11 months.

The unemployment rate among those aged 25 to 29, excluding students, rose to 7.2 percent, while the rate among workers aged 30 to 59 declined slightly to 3.9 percent.

Youth unemployment has been politically sensitive since the unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds reached a then-record 21.3 percent in June 2023. Chinese authorities subsequently stopped releasing the age-specific figure while revising the methodology.

The National Bureau of Statistics resumed publishing the figures under a new methodology in January 2024, excluding students from the 16-to-24 category and adding a separate unemployment rate for people aged 25 to 29.

Chang argues that the growing signs of homelessness and economic disengagement are symptoms of deeper problems within Chinese society.

During the Biden administration, the United States also experienced a sharp increase in Chinese nationals arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border. Associated Press reporting in 2023 documented Chinese migrants making the dangerous journey through Latin America to the United States, with some citing weak economic prospects, unemployment, and China’s political environment as motivations for leaving.

The phenomenon became associated with Chinese expressions such as “runxue,” roughly meaning the study or art of “running” away from China, and “zouxian,” referring to taking irregular overland routes abroad.

For most Chinese people, however, leaving the country is not a realistic option. Among those who remain, expressions such as “lying flat” (躺平) and “letting it rot” or “giving up” (摆烂) have emerged as ways of expressing disillusionment with intense workplace competition, high living costs, limited social mobility, and other pressures.

China’s ‘flexible employment’ population expected to reach 320 million

China’s rapidly expanding population of so-called “flexible workers” provides another indication of major changes taking place in the country’s labor market.

The 2025 China Blue-Collar Employment Research Report, released by the China New Employment Forms Research Center, estimates that China had approximately 280 million flexible workers in 2025 and projects that the figure will reach 320 million in 2026.

The research center was jointly established by Capital University of Economics and Business and the China Association for Employment Promotion. According to People’s Daily, the study was based on 28,450 valid samples and examined changes in China’s blue-collar labor market between 2024 and 2025.

The report found that flexible employment surpassed 200 million people in 2021, reached about 240 million in 2024 and 280 million in 2025, and is expected to increase by another 40 million this year.

Reuters reported in July that flexible employment includes people without permanent full-time contracts, encompassing workers such as ride-hailing drivers, food-delivery riders, couriers, domestic-service workers, freelancers, livestreamers, and others working through temporary or platform-based arrangements.

The report estimates that China’s total blue-collar workforce reached approximately 427 million people in 2025, up slightly from 425 million in 2024.

Domestic-service employment increased by four percent to 46.8 million, while the number of food-delivery workers increased by six percent to 15.9 million. Ride-hailing drivers, truck drivers, and livestreamers, meanwhile, declined by between two and three percent, according to a review of the report published by ThinkChina.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that the country had 725.04 million employed people at the end of 2025, down from 734.39 million at the end of 2024.

Using the 2025 employment total as a rough benchmark, 320 million flexible workers would be equivalent to about 44.1 percent of China’s employed population.

The rapid expansion of flexible work has raised questions about job security, income stability, benefits, and the availability of conventional full-time employment.

Reuters reported that tens of millions of Chinese workers have shifted from formal jobs into the gig economy as the property downturn, automation, cost-cutting, weak domestic demand, and the adoption of artificial intelligence have put pressure on traditional employment.

The trend increasingly includes university graduates and former white-collar workers.

Reuters profiled a 30-year-old former software tester who turned to ride-hailing after losing his job. He said he was driving from 7 a.m. until nearly midnight and earning about 6,000 yuan per month after paying vehicle rental and charging costs.

Hong Kong Polytechnic University cultural anthropologist Yang Zhan told Reuters that the flexible-employment population is no longer made up primarily of migrant laborers, but increasingly includes members of the middle class and university graduates.

What counts as ‘employed’ in China

An important distinction concerns China’s statistical definition of employment.

Under the National Bureau of Statistics’ labor-force methodology, a person aged 16 or older is classified as employed if he or she performed at least one hour of work for compensation or business income during the survey reference week. People temporarily absent from existing jobs for reasons such as leave or temporary work stoppages can also be counted as employed under specified conditions.

The one-hour threshold is therefore used to determine whether someone is statistically employed; it is not itself China’s definition of flexible employment.

The NBS has said its methodology follows international labor-statistics standards. Its definition of unemployed people generally covers those who have no work, have been seeking employment, and are available to begin working.

The broad employment definition means that a person doing a relatively small amount of paid work can be considered employed for statistical purposes. Reuters noted that the gig economy therefore provides an employment buffer that can help keep measured unemployment lower even when workers cannot find conventional full-time employment.

This does not mean flexible workers are necessarily unemployed. Many work substantial hours and earn regular incomes. However, workers in the category often lack the permanent contracts, predictable income, employer-backed benefits, and social-security coverage typically associated with conventional employment.

Gig sectors show signs of saturation

Some industries that previously absorbed workers displaced from other sectors are now showing signs of crowding.

Reuters reported that Chinese cities have issued warnings about saturation in ride-hailing markets as the number of available drivers has grown faster than demand in some areas. The blue-collar employment report found that average earnings for China’s approximately 37.2 million ride-hailing drivers fell by 1.8 percent in 2025.

Chinese-language reports have also cited transportation regulators in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Sanya, and other cities warning of excess ride-hailing capacity.

According to reports summarizing those regulatory warnings, some drivers have been working more than 11 hours per day while receiving fewer than 10 orders on average, sharply reducing their earnings after vehicle and operating costs are deducted.

Food-delivery workers have faced similar pressures. In some cities, riders have reported having to wait before being allowed onto platforms because too many couriers are already online, while payment per delivery has come under pressure.

At the same time, the educational profile of gig workers has been changing.

Reuters reported that China’s flexible-employment economy is increasingly absorbing university graduates and former white-collar employees who had expected to find work in sectors such as technology, finance, property, and internet services.

The trend suggests that while flexible work provides an important source of income, at least part of its rapid expansion reflects workers accepting nontraditional employment after failing to secure the types of jobs they originally sought.

Social-security concerns grow with gig workforce

The growth of flexible employment is also creating challenges for China’s social-security system.

Unlike conventional employees whose companies make mandatory contributions on their behalf, many flexible workers must arrange and finance much of their own social-insurance coverage.

According to a report published by China’s National People’s Congress website, 70.57 million flexible workers were participating in the urban employee basic pension program at the end of 2024, while 66.159 million were participating in employee medical insurance.

Those figures are far below the broader estimates of the country’s flexible workforce.

Reuters reported that low participation in social insurance poses risks both for workers and for China’s welfare system as the population ages. Workers with unstable incomes may also be more inclined to save rather than spend, potentially weighing on domestic consumption.

Chinese authorities have acknowledged gaps in the system and are attempting to expand protection.

China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced that occupational-injury protection for workers in new forms of employment was expanded nationwide beginning July 1. The program had reached nearly 29.9 million cumulative participants by the end of June.

The ministry has also said it plans to expand social-security coverage for workers in flexible and new forms of employment, encourage greater participation in employee pension programs, and develop regulations governing labor protections for workers on digital platforms.

The Chinese government and state media generally portray the expansion of flexible employment as a result of technological change, the platform economy, and workers seeking more diverse employment options.

Critics, however, argue that the speed of the increase also reflects declining access to stable full-time employment.

Commentators dispute the meaning of the figures

Chinese current-affairs commentator Wenzhao has offered a much more pessimistic interpretation of the flexible-employment numbers.

In a recent program, Wenzhao argued that at least half of China’s estimated 280 million flexible workers in 2025 should effectively be regarded as unemployed or severely underemployed.

He said he tested several assumptions using AI models and obtained estimates suggesting an overall unemployment rate of 21 to 23 percent, potentially reaching 30 percent under more aggressive assumptions.

Wenzhao also argued that Beijing faces a difficult fiscal dilemma. In his assessment, the CCP cannot significantly reduce the number of civil servants and employees of Party-affiliated institutions without risking political and social instability, while falling land-sale revenues and fiscal pressures have limited local governments’ room to maneuver.

Increasing borrowing may temporarily relieve those pressures, he argued, but would also increase China’s debt burden and make a longer-term recovery more difficult.

He believes that without substantial government intervention—including greater direct assistance to households and measures to reduce debt-related burdens—Chinese people could face a prolonged period of economic hardship.

The rapid increase in flexible employment, he argues, indicates that the adjustment could continue for years.

‘Lying flat’ and disillusionment with the system

Chang, meanwhile, connects China’s economic pressures to a broader sense of social and political disillusionment.

In his recent article, Chang cited Charles Burton, a former Canadian diplomat and China specialist at the European think tank Sinopsis, as saying that nationwide burnout is reflected in movements such as “lying flat” and “letting it rot,” which he described as forms of passive resistance among people who see their economic and political futures as increasingly bleak.

Burton argued that under CCP leader Xi Jinping, the Party has responded by tightening state control over public life, censoring media, imposing ideological restrictions on education, and exercising greater influence over popular culture. His comments were reproduced in Chang’s article published by The Hill and syndicated by Yahoo News.

Piero Tozzi, senior director for China policy at the America First Policy Institute, similarly told Chang that Xi’s governing model draws upon what he called China’s “proto-totalitarian Legalism,” arguing that the CCP increasingly seeks “total societal control.”

These are political assessments rather than findings established by the employment data.

What the available data does show is a significant transformation in China’s labor market.

The country’s total employed population fell by more than 9 million between the end of 2024 and the end of 2025, according to official statistics. Youth unemployment among non-students aged 16 to 24 reached 17.9 percent in July. At the same time, one major labor-market study estimates that the flexible workforce grew from 240 million in 2024 to 280 million in 2025 and could reach 320 million this year.