Natalie Winters, an American conservative journalist, recently published an investigative report on her personal website. The report reveals that a Beijing-based external propaganda organization—whose charter explicitly mandates loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party’s top leadership—allegedly funded the establishment of an unofficial communication channel.
This channel enabled retired U.S. officials who had previously held key positions in the national security apparatus to engage in direct contact and dialogue with personnel from official Chinese research institutions responsible for nuclear weapons development. The article draws primarily on publicly available Chinese-language reports, some of which have since been deleted or removed by the relevant organizations.
The force behind the scenes: The China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF)
According to the investigation, the organizer of this series of events is the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF). U.S. congressional investigators have previously characterized the organization as a tool for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to conduct political influence operations, identifying it as an extension of Beijing’s United Front system.
CUSEF’s mainland China affiliate, the Pacific International Exchange Foundation (PIEF), was established in 2012 with initial funding of approximately 20 million RMB from CUSEF and operates under the guidance of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. According to the disclosed PIEF charter, the foundation explicitly upholds the overall leadership of the CCP; it is required to establish a Party organization and allow Party representatives to attend management meetings, with the Party organization holding the authority to review major decisions and external engagements.
The U.S. participants in these exchanges are largely retired senior officials with long-standing careers in national security who retain influence and connections in Washington.
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Reports suggest a methodical approach to the hierarchy of these exchanges: the Chinese side categorizes dialogues into unofficial “Track II,” the “Track 1.5” space between official and non-governmental spheres, and formal government-to-government “Track I” diplomacy.
Through non-governmental channels, they gradually lay the groundwork—defining directions and agendas—for subsequent, higher-level formal talks. The reporter alleges that this arrangement effectively allows private dialogues, conducted without official diplomatic status, to serve the function of pre-screening issues and testing positions; the impact of these discussions often precedes, and even shapes, the trajectory of negotiations in official channels.
The Grandview Institution, which has hosted numerous such dialogues, was established in 2013 and describes itself as an independent research organization headquartered in Beijing. Dedicated to fostering dialogue between China and other nations, it consistently emphasizes its “Track II” diplomatic nature in public reports on its activities. However, reports indicate that the think tank receives both funding and organizational support from the Pacific International Exchange Foundation, reflecting a close relationship between the two entities.
Timeline for communication escalation
According to a Sept. 25, 2024 notice published by the Pacific International Exchange Foundation (PIEF) and cited in Winters’ investigation, the first China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue was held by Beijing-based Grandview Institution from Sept. 20 to 22, 2024, with support from PIEF. The talks covered sensitive issues including nuclear policy and strategy, crisis management, regional hotspots, and the future of U.S.-China strategic stability. U.S. participants included former Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Rose Gottemoeller.
One month later, in October 2024, Guoguan Think Tank hosted the first “Nuclear Failure Safety Dialogue” in Beijing. The discussion further went into specific technical issues such as nuclear command and control processes, nuclear force deployment, and even the post-launch destruction mechanism of ballistic missiles and the possibility of early warning data sharing.
By April 2025, the level of participation had risen significantly. The U.S. delegation included prominent retired military leaders, including a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Before the meeting, U.S. participants also held talks with officials from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, and met with a vice minister of the CCP Central Committee’s International Department. Winters argued that, by this stage, the exchanges had moved beyond the realm of purely academic dialogue.
By October 2025, the second “Nuclear Failure Safety Dialogue” was held in Beijing. U.S. participants included the former Secretary of Energy, the former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the former senior officials of the National Nuclear Security Administration. They are all senior people familiar with the formulation of U.S. nuclear policy and the management and operation of nuclear agencies.
The Chinese side sent a number of researchers from the China Institute of Engineering Physics, including the head of the strategic research center of the institute and his deputy, an associate researcher, and a deputy director from the Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute under China National Nuclear Corporation to attend the meeting. The China Academy of Engineering Physics is the official unit recognized by the U.S. government as responsible for the research, development and testing of China’s nuclear weapons.
It has been included in the U.S. export control list since 1997. Also present at the meeting that day were scholars from the Department of International Relations of Tsinghua University, the Development Research Institute of Fudan University, and an international issues research institution in Shaanxi. The talks covered the U.S. nuclear safety review system, global nuclear situation, China’s nuclear safety procedures, emerging technologies and possible international cooperation. The next day, the U.S. personnel attending the meeting also met with the relevant person in charge of the Arms Control Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officials from the International Department of the CPC Central Committee.
In December of the same year, the third “China-U.S. Strategic Security and Stability Dialogue” was held as scheduled. A senior person in charge of the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation personally attended and co-chaired the meeting. China once again sent a deputy person in charge of the strategic planning research institution under the Nuclear Industry Group, and other relevant personnel from the Institute of Engineering Physics attended as observers.
Topics discussed at the meeting included traditional nuclear deterrence theory, the development of emerging technologies, the possible impact of artificial intelligence on nuclear security, and crisis management and control mechanisms. The original reports on the conference website have since been deleted, and the relevant links are currently inaccessible.
Funding and influence networks continue to attract attention
The investigation also noted that Winters had previously cited Foreign Agents Registration Act filings showing that the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation funded trips to China for reporters and editors from several major U.S. media outlets. The foundation’s outreach has also extended to congressional staff, think tank scholars, and other members of the U.S. policy community.
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