In 2018, shortly after former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji attended a meeting of the Advisory Board of Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management, Chinese online self-media republished an article drawing on former CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan’s more than 30 years in politics, focusing on his views on public service, governance, and Chinese politics.
The article brought renewed attention to these two former Chinese leaders, both regarded as “Jiang Zemin’s nemeses,” and inevitably prompted a look back at their alliance and their bitter struggle against Jiang Zemin.
The Zhu Rongji–Li Ruihuan alliance
In 1987, Deng Xiaoping parachuted former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji into Shanghai as mayor to clean up the mess left behind by Jiang Zemin. Before taking up the post, Zhu twice sought advice from Li Ruihuan, then Party secretary and mayor of Tianjin. Li gave him five words of advice: “Choose the right breakthrough point.” Zhu and Li were both longtime political opponents of Jiang Zemin.
Before officially taking office as Shanghai mayor, Zhu Rongji had already conducted a series of research trips and investigations. Zhu later acknowledged that his approach to his work had been inspired by Li Ruihuan, then Party secretary and mayor of Tianjin. Zhu said that before coming to Shanghai, he had consulted Li twice, and “his experience was that you have to choose the right breakthrough point.”
Looking back today, Li Ruihuan’s five-word advice to Zhu Rongji—“choose the right breakthrough point”—was meaningful not only at the time but remains so today.
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Zhu Rongji went to Shanghai to clean up Jiang Zemin’s mess
The Man Who Was Jiang Zemin provides background on Zhu Rongji’s appointment as mayor of Shanghai. In 1985, Jiang Zemin, who was adept at ingratiating himself with those in power, was recommended by Shanghai Mayor Wang Daohan, who had insisted on resigning, to succeed him as mayor after serving as minister of the Ministry of Electronics Industry.
Although Jiang built his own political network and established a power base in Shanghai, residents suffered during his two years as mayor. In 1986, many basic necessities in Shanghai still had to be purchased with ration coupons. In 1986, Guangdong Governor Ye Xuanping turned over 250 million yuan in national taxes, while Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin, in pursuit of his own political achievements, turned over 12.5 billion yuan—50 times the amount paid by Ye Xuanping. In just two years, Jiang had reportedly plunged Shanghai residents into a situation where the government had to tackle the so-called “vegetable basket problem”—the challenge of ensuring adequate supplies of food and other basic necessities.
Regardless of how vigorously Jiang Zemin ingratiated himself with senior Party elders, the mess he had created was a reality that Deng Xiaoping had to confront. Deng therefore urgently dispatched Zhu Rongji, known as China’s “economic czar,” to Shanghai as mayor to clean up the situation. Jiang Zemin was moved to Party secretary, a position that required him to handle less day-to-day administration.
One sentence from Deng Xiaoping made Jiang Zemin jealous of Zhu Rongji
On the eve of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, then-CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang opposed the imposition of martial law. Jiang Zemin, then secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, was strongly recommended to Deng Xiaoping for the post of general secretary by Li Xiannian and Chen Yun, who had been treated particularly well during their visits to Shanghai.
Jiang Zemin was highly adept at ingratiating himself with senior officials but was widely regarded as lacking expertise in handling substantive matters, particularly the economy. In April 1991, Deng Xiaoping transferred Zhu Rongji back to Beijing to serve as vice premier of the State Council and director of the State Council Production Office, giving him responsibility for economic affairs.
On one occasion, Deng deliberately pointed to Zhu Rongji and told Jiang Zemin: “I don’t understand economics. He does!” The implication, according to the article, was clear: “You don’t understand economics. He does.” Jiang reportedly felt a mixture of emotions upon hearing this and became even more jealous and resentful of Zhu Rongji.
After Deng Xiaoping died in February 1997, Jiang Zemin’s power expanded rapidly. He controlled the military and had become the CCP’s “core” leader. The one area he could not directly control was economic decision-making, which remained firmly in the hands of Zhu Rongji, the “economic czar.” In April 1999, Zhu Rongji visited the United States but failed to secure U.S. support for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. A month later, a U.S. aircraft bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. Jiang Zemin used the incident as a pretext to strip Zhu of his power. From then on, Jiang and Zhu engaged in a bitter power struggle.
‘Jiang faction’ implicated in Yuanhua smuggling case; Zhu Rongji personally oversaw investigation
In April 1999, citing rampant smuggling along China’s coastal regions—which was affecting state tax revenues and disrupting the economic order—Zhu Rongji ordered the establishment of a special task force to investigate. The Yuanhua case soon erupted. The massive Xiamen Yuanhua smuggling scandal of 1999, dubbed “China’s No. 1 economic case,”was personally overseen by then-Premier Zhu Rongji.
Because several key figures associated with the “Jiang faction” were implicated in the Yuanhua case, Zhu Rongji used the investigation to strike at Jiang Zemin. Lai Changxing later claimed while in Canada that he had been able to smuggle large quantities of strategic goods, including oil and private automobiles, with the support of Jiang’s secretary Jia Ting’an and Jia Qinglin, then secretary of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee.
Jiang, on the one hand, obstructed efforts to extradite Lai Changxing and, on the other, had Zhu Rongji’s close associate Zhu Xiaohua, then chairman of CITIC Group, arrested on bribery charges. In the end, however, the power struggle between Jiang and Zhu over Lai Changxing ended with Zhu Rongji losing influence and gradually withdrawing from the political stage.
Li Ruihuan known as the ‘Jiang nemesis’
The discord between Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan had long been an open secret. Li reportedly looked down on Jiang in terms of his thinking, style, and abilities, while Jiang was likewise deeply dissatisfied with Li. Although Li Ruihuan was often sidelined during those years, he was unwilling to remain silent when he disagreed with Jiang’s actions, further deepening their conflict.
In the early years, Li Ruihuan was one of the few senior officials in Zhongnanhai willing to confront Jiang Zemin directly, earning him the nickname “Jiang’s nemesis.” According to sources described as knowledgeable about the CCP’s internal affairs, Li and Jiang engaged in an open and covert power struggle for years. Jiang kept a close watch on Li: whenever Li traveled to inspect localities, Jiang’s office would reportedly call local officials after his departure to ask whom Li had met and what he had discussed. On one occasion, one of Jiang’s close associates reportedly warned a senior local official to be wary of Li Ruihuan.
Li was also said to be the only member of the Politburo Standing Committee at the time willing to speak openly and risk offending Jiang Zemin.
Before the 16th CCP National Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin, already 76, was reluctant to relinquish power. In an effort to persuade Jiang to retire and hand over the leadership to Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan reportedly offered to retire early himself, thereby helping bring Jiang down as well and ensuring a smooth transition to Hu Jintao.
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