Recently, claims have emerged that former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji was placed under close surveillance by personnel assigned by the Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and Xi Jinping’s closest political ally, Cai Qi during his final years.
The Chinese Communist authorities were reportedly concerned that public mourning for Zhu could trigger a situation that might spiral out of control. Before Zhu’s death, his longtime ally Lou Jiwei was reportedly investigated, while another former associate, Fang Xinghai, was confirmed to have fallen from power. After Zhu’s death, Ma Zhongzhi, a former aide who had worked with him for 21 years, also died suddenly.
Zhu Rongji reportedly kept under close surveillance by Cai Qi’s men
According to a report by the Chinese Communist Party’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji died at 11:06 a.m. on Aug. 12, 2026, at Beijing 301 Hospital at the age of 98.
Zhu’s death has attracted considerable attention both inside and outside China.
On Aug. 12, an anonymous source inside the CCP system told The Epoch Times that security guards, secretaries, doctors, and nurses around Zhu Rongji had been assigned by Cai Qi, director of the CCP Central Committee’s General Office. The source claimed that Zhu’s every move was monitored and that even his medical treatment in his later years required Cai’s approval.
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The source said that, compared with Li Keqiang, Zhu had always been relatively “obedient.” “After Zhu retired, he lost all his political edge, which is why he lived to 98. By comparison, Li Keqiang was ‘disobedient’ and died at 68.”
In response, one online commenter said: “This corroborates that Li Keqiang was indeed murdered by the senior leader of the Chinese Communist cult terrorist organization!”
In recent years, reports of Zhu’s poor health have repeatedly circulated online. In 2020, photographs of Zhu celebrating his 92nd birthday in a hospital were posted online.
From 2022 through 2026, false reports about Zhu’s death circulated repeatedly on social media.
In January 2026, another claim circulated on social media that Zhu had died at Huadong Hospital in Shanghai and that authorities were concealing his death. On Jan. 26 of that year, Cai Shenkun, an independent political commentator based in the United States, wrote on X that the timing of a Chinese Communist Party leader’s death from illness depends on the family and the current leadership.
Even if someone had been in a persistent vegetative state for a long time, the person could remain alive for another eight or 10 years if the family refused to withdraw life support. Unless the Central Committee ordered the life support to be withdrawn, he said, the obituary would already have been prepared, making it unlikely that the death would be secretly concealed as some outside reports claimed.
More than a month after CCP leader Xi Jinping broke precedent by securing another term at the 20th Party Congress, former CCP leader Jiang Zemin was officially announced dead on Nov. 30, 2022, from leukemia complicated by multiple organ failure. At the time, some observers argued that Jiang had been kept alive for years with various medical devices and that the timing of his death depended on when Xi’s central leadership ordered his life support to be withdrawn.
CCP leaders reportedly concerned that public mourning could trigger unrest
According to the source, China’s top leadership was concerned that public mourning for Zhu Rongji could become an outlet for broader dissatisfaction with the country’s political and social conditions, potentially fueling wider unrest, reported Creaders, an overseas Chinese-language news and discussion portal.
He said, “The CCP is mainly concerned that spontaneous public action could spiral out of control and even develop into a movement against the CCP. After Hu Yaobang died, for example, his death triggered a student movement. This was followed by a split among the top CCP leadership between those who advocated suppressing the student protests and those who sympathized with the students. As Deng Xiaoping saw the situation expanding, he became concerned that the student movement would continue to grow and that Zhao Ziyang might use it to expand his political influence. He ultimately decided to suppress the movement.”
The source said, “After Zhu Rongji’s death from illness, the authorities will likewise be highly vigilant about related public sentiment. Once they detect signs that mourning activities are spreading, the situation will very likely be reported rapidly to the highest level of power.”
Shen Ming-shih, a researcher at the Institute of National Security and Strategy at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told The Epoch Times that the CCP authorities would arrange Zhu Rongji’s funeral with the highest level of protocol while keeping the event low-key, and would completely suppress any large-scale public mourning activities that could potentially be used to express broader grievances.
He said, “Overall, Zhu Rongji’s death will not directly trigger a reshuffling of power at the top. But China’s current social and economic situation is sensitive. Under these circumstances, his death could perhaps become a symbol for legitimately venting dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation. It’s difficult to say.”
From supporting Xi to refusing to applaud him in public
After CCP leader Xi Jinping came to power at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, political elders including Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Zhu Rongji repeatedly made high-profile public appearances in support of Xi. Around the time of the 19th Party Congress, however, Xi’s administration made a comprehensive ideological shift to the left, prompting liberal-leaning officials and public intellectuals within the CCP system who had previously supported Xi to become dissatisfied with the situation.
On Oct. 18, 2017, at the opening ceremony of the 19th Party Congress, Xi bowed to the audience after delivering his report. Zhu Rongji did not join the others in applauding, instead looking coldly at Xi. Screenshots from footage aired at the time by CCTV, the CCP’s official mouthpiece, triggered considerable speculation and public attention.
朱镕基不知道是不是被习近平害死了
— 王姐在新加坡 (@wangcailian) August 12, 2026
习近平演讲后,朱镕基不鼓掌,冷眼看着习近平,公然在党内表达“我不喜欢习近平”这个信号,习近平虽然集权,但是无法轻易和党内老总理翻脸!只能憋着这口气,谁都制衡不了谁,值得一题的是,后来朱镕基再也没有出席习近平在的场合,不确定是不是被习包子封杀?… pic.twitter.com/bKshpwA7RO
On March 15, 2022, The Wall Street Journal published an article titled “China’s Economic Activity Contracts, Exposing Cracks in Xi Jinping’s Power,” which cited sources inside the Chinese Communist Party as saying that some retired senior CCP officials who still wielded political influence had recently spoken out against Xi Jinping’s desire to break with the established system of leadership succession. Zhu Rongji was reportedly among those opposed.
In recent years, rumors have generally pointed to cooperation between CCP elders and the Chinese military in opposing Xi. As a representative of the CCP’s reformist faction, Zhu Rongji was also regarded as one of the senior Party figures opposed to Xi, in part because he had publicly refused to show support for Xi on some occasions and had even openly criticized him.
Therefore, Zhu Rongji’s sudden death during the Beidaihe meeting period also carries a politically intriguing undertone.
Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan, the former secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, have widely been regarded as having a “mentor and protégé” relationship. In recent years, former associates of Wang in the CCDI and financial system have been investigated one after another by Xi Jinping. There have even been reports that Wang himself has been placed under house arrest.
Chen Pokong, a U.S.-based political commentator, told New Tang Dynasty Television that many CCP officials associated with the reformist faction indeed came from the circles of Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan, including former Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, who was reportedly investigated and later reappeared publicly. Chen said that Zhu left behind extensive political connections, which are now viewed with hostility by Xi Jinping.
On July 30, 2026, the CCP Politburo held a meeting and decided to convene the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Party Central Committee in October. The meeting will reportedly study “several major issues concerning advancing comprehensive and strict Party governance.”
The day after the meeting, the CCP announced that Xin Baonan, chairman of State Grid Corporation of China, and Guo Wenqing, general manager of China Minmetals Corporation, had been removed from their posts and placed under investigation.
Guo Wenqing was a former associate from Hebei of Li Zhanshu, a former member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. Zhu Rongji’s daughter, Zhu Yanlai, is married to Liang Qing, who worked at China Minmetals for more than 20 years. Liang and Guo had worked together for at least two years.
Zhu Rongji’s protégé Lou Jiwei reportedly investigated; makes sudden public appearance to dispel rumors
On July 31, 2026—the day Guo Wenqing was announced to be under investigation—claims circulated online that Lou Jiwei, a former Chinese finance minister whom Zhu Rongji had promoted and heavily relied upon, had also been investigated.
According to a post by the Global Wealth Management Forum’s WeChat account, Lou attended a seminar in Beijing on Aug. 8, 2026, titled “Progress, Challenges, and Strategies for Revitalizing Existing Local State-Owned Assets,” held by the Global Wealth Management Forum, where he delivered concluding remarks.
Lou’s rapid public appearance amid widespread online reports that he was under investigation appeared to be intended to dispel the rumors. Some reports claimed that Lou had indeed recently been questioned by the CCDI, but it remained unclear whether he was merely cooperating with an investigation or had actually gotten into serious trouble.
Cai Shenkun wrote on X that although Lou Jiwei was scheduled to make a public appearance on Aug. 8 to dispel the rumors, that did not mean he would necessarily “land safely.”
Cai said Xi Jinping’s purge of senior figures and their associates from previous administrations had already extended from Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Wang Qishan, Wen Jiabao, and Li Ruihuan to Zhu Rongji. He added that any ministerial-level official who had close ties with influential veteran Party figures could become a target before Xi secures another term at the 21st Party Congress.
Zhu Rongji’s former associate Fang Xinghai falls from power
On July 24, 2026, Fang Xinghai, former vice chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, was removed from his post and placed under investigation. From 1981 to 1986, Fang studied in the Department of Economic Management at Tsinghua University. In 1984, Tsinghua University established its School of Economics and Management, with Zhu Rongji serving as its first dean. Fang also attended Zhu’s lectures on multiple occasions.
Fang later studied in the United States and worked at the World Bank. He once disclosed that his decision to return to China in 1998 was prompted not only by an invitation from Zhou Xiaochuan, then chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, but also by an appeal from Zhu Rongji. In 1997, while meeting foreign guests, Zhu reportedly lamented, “Why haven’t my students come back?” Fang subsequently returned to China.
Some online commenters pointed out that Fang Xinghai’s downfall shortly before Zhu Rongji’s death and on the eve of the Beidaihe meeting, along with rumors that Zhu’s former protégé Lou Jiwei had been detained, would have been particularly devastating news for Zhu.
Zhu Rongji’s former associate Ma Zhongzhi dies suddenly
The day after Zhu Rongji’s death, his former associate Ma Zhongzhi also died suddenly.
According to an obituary issued by the General Office of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, Ma Zhongzhi, a former Party committee member of the CSRC and former chairman of the boards of supervisors of major state-owned enterprises (vice-ministerial level), died in Beijing on Aug. 13, 2026, after medical treatment failed. He was 82.
Ma had worked under Zhu Rongji for many years within the State Council and securities regulatory system.
In April 1991, Zhu Rongji was transferred from his post as Shanghai Party Secretary to become a vice premier of the State Council, where he was placed in charge of economic and financial affairs. In October 1992, Zhu was promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee at the 14th Party Congress and subsequently became executive vice premier of the State Council. From October 1992 to June 1995, Zhu concurrently served as director of the State Council Securities Commission; from July 1993 to June 1995, he also concurrently served as governor of the People’s Bank of China.
In 1991, Ma Zhongzhi was transferred to the headquarters of the People’s Bank of China, where he served as deputy director of the Securities Management Office and concurrently as secretary-general of the Securities Association of China. In October 1992, Ma was tasked with establishing the Office of the State Council Securities Commission and became its deputy director, overseeing its operations. In January 1995, he was promoted to director of the office, becoming the “chief aide” to Zhu Rongji, who was then director of the State Council Securities Commission. In September 1997, Ma was promoted to become one of the founding members of the Party leadership group of the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
After Zhu Rongji succeeded Li Peng as Chinese premier in March 1998, he spearheaded the establishment of the State Council’s special inspector system and organized training programs for the special inspectors. In November of that year, Ma Zhongzhi became a special inspector of the State Council (vice-ministerial level). On June 22, 2000, Ma transitioned to become chairman of the board of supervisors for major state-owned enterprises, a position he held until retiring in June 2007.
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