China Champions an ‘Open’ AI Future—So Long as Others Do the Opening

Commentary by Hu Manman

China has once again put forward a global artificial intelligence governance initiative that opposes technological monopolies, restrictions, and exclusionary arrangements. It also simultaneously calls for fewer barriers so that the benefits of AI can reach countries around the world, particularly developing nations.

That message was reinforced at the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping promoted open-source AI as a global public good, pledged greater support for developing countries, and argued against unequal access to advanced technologies.

On paper, the concept is lofty and generous. Advanced technology, it suggests, should benefit all humanity, and those who hoard it behind closed doors risk falling short of their international responsibilities. There is nothing objectionable about such principles. The question is whether those advocating them are willing to live by the same rules.

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One could argue that it’s easy to demand generosity when your own pockets are empty. The real test comes when you finally have something others want. The same principle applies to nations: What matters is not what a country says about openness when it needs access to someone else’s technology, but what it does when it controls something others need.

The rare-earth exception

China’s approach to critical minerals offers one answer. After establishing a dominant position in rare-earth processing and portions of the critical-minerals supply chain, Beijing did not characterize those resources as achievements to be freely shared for the development of humanity. Instead, it imposed export licensing requirements and restrictions.

Gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony, and certain medium and heavy rare earths have all been subjected to Chinese export controls. Once these materials became valuable strategic leverage, the vocabulary shifted from “openness and sharing” to “national security” and “national interests.”

There is nothing unusual about a country protecting resources it considers strategically important. The contradiction emerges when similar measures adopted by other countries are condemned as “technological monopolies” or “unilateral coercion.”

When openness meets national interest

The case of Manus offers an even sharper illustration. The AI company, founded by a Chinese team before relocating to Singapore, was acquired by Meta in a deal reportedly worth more than $2 billion. Beijing subsequently moved to unwind the transaction amid concerns that Chinese AI talent, technology, and intellectual property could fall into the hands of an American company.

The message conveyed through those actions is difficult to reconcile with the rhetoric of unrestricted technological openness: Advanced AI is not merely another commodity, and valuable talent is not necessarily an international public resource free to move wherever markets take it. When national interests are at stake, Beijing appears willing to build walls of its own.

That makes what China’s AI initiative leaves unsaid arguably more revealing than what it contains. Beijing opposes other countries using their technological advantages to restrict China’s access, but does not promise never to use its own technological or resource advantages against others.

Instead, it calls on leading nations to tear down barriers without explaining whether China would do the same if it becomes the global leader. And while advocating AI that benefits humanity broadly, it continues to treat domestic technology, data, intellectual property, and talent as strategic assets whose movement can be restricted.

A double standard on strategic resources

This is less a logical oversight than a careful exercise in language. “Opposing technological monopolies” appears, in practice, to mean opposing monopolies over technologies China has yet to master. “Openness and sharing” works best when what is being shared are someone else’s chips, models, and equipment. China’s rare earths, data, talent, and algorithms, meanwhile, remain subject to national security considerations.

There is no need to immediately reject such initiatives, nor to applaud them at face value. Simply place the promises of openness alongside China’s restrictions on critical minerals and sensitive technology and consider them together.

On one side, Beijing calls for open doors while carefully and strategically locking its own. It condemns monopolies while guarding every strategic advantage it possesses. This is not internationalism. It is a very old Chinese bargain: “Your advantages belong to the world, but mine belong to the nation.”