A bipartisan congressional probe has found that major Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies continue to maintain a presence inside critical U.S. internet infrastructure years after federal regulators restricted their operations on national security grounds.

On Aug. 4, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released the 49-page report, titled “Stranger Pings: Chinese Telecom Companies Infiltrate U.S. Infrastructure,” following an 18-month investigation. It found that China Mobile International, China Telecom Americas, and China Unicom Americas retain equipment and commercial relationships within U.S. data centers and internet exchange points despite losing authorization to provide certain telecommunications services.

Between 2019 and 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) denied or revoked the Chinese-owned companies’ Section 214 authorizations, concluding that they were vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the CCP.

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But investigators found the restrictions did not require the companies to remove physical equipment from third-party American data centers or prevent them from offering certain unregulated services, including internet transit, enterprise networking, and remote management.

Nearly 109,000 suspicious routing events

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The committee identified another potential vulnerability involving Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijacking, in which a network incorrectly announces that it controls internet addresses belonging to another network. The report compared the practice to placing “false detour signs on a highway,” meaning traffic diverted along the false route could potentially be copied, monitored, or manipulated before reaching its intended destination.

Chinese ICT Devices Enter Taiwan
Taiwan’s Ministry of Audit recently noted in its annual audit report that government agencies’ procurement oversight of surveillance cameras and other information and communications technology (ICT) products remains inadequate, potentially creating vulnerabilities in the nation’s cybersecurity defenses. (Image: Illustrative photo / Image source: Adobe Stock)

Analyzing global routing data from January 2018 through May 2025, investigators identified nearly 109,000 incidents in which networks associated with China or Hong Kong improperly announced U.S. internet address space. At least 477 American networks were affected, including major telecommunications providers, Fortune 500 companies, and critical infrastructure operators.

The committee cautioned that the data alone does not establish malicious intent in every case. However, investigators identified what they described as troubling overlaps between some routing anomalies and known Chinese state-linked cyber operations.

Links to hacker activity

One example involved Salt Typhoon, the Chinese state-sponsored hacking group blamed for a sweeping cyberespionage campaign against U.S. telecommunications networks. According to the report, between Sept. 22 and 25, 2024, China Mobile International’s network appeared at least 192 times in active routing paths to 58 groups of IP addresses associated with Salt Typhoon attack infrastructure.

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The ‘Sandow Switch’ that once was used by the Alcoa coal power plant now provides electricity for the Whinstone U.S. Bitcoin mining facility in Rockdale, Texas, on Oct. 9, 2021. On April 13, CISA warned that critical U.S. power grid hardware has open vulnerabilities being targeted by APT groups, which are often foreign government hacking teams. (Image: MARK FELIX/AFP /AFP via Getty Images)

U.S. officials said the hacking campaign penetrated major telecommunications providers, including AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen Technologies, enabling hackers to access call records, communications, and other personal data involving high-profile targets.

The congressional report does not establish that the Chinese telecom companies knowingly participated in Salt Typhoon’s hacking operations, but argues that their continued presence inside U.S. infrastructure creates vulnerabilities that warrant greater scrutiny.

Lawmakers call for stronger regulation

Committee Chairman John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) warned that Americans may assume Chinese companies deemed security risks have already been removed from U.S. networks, while regulatory loopholes have allowed them to maintain a foothold. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) similarly said the findings demonstrate the need for continued security oversight of Chinese telecommunications companies.

John Moolenaar attends a panel discussion at The Hill & Valley Forum 2026, held at the Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium in Washington, D.C on March 24, 2026. (Image: Leigh Vogel via Getty Images)

The committee recommended expanding federal authority to remove equipment after licenses are revoked, subjecting data-center and network-management contracts to national security reviews, strengthening the FCC’s Covered List, and funding a broader “rip and replace” program for high-risk equipment.

It also called for greater cooperation with U.S. allies on BGP security standards, along with stricter network monitoring and record-keeping requirements by all tech corporations.

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