U.S. and Saudi Arabia Sign 30-Year Civilian Nuclear Agreement

The deal gives American companies a central role in developing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy sector while seeking to limit Russian and Chinese influence and preserve U.S. oversight of any future uranium-enrichment plans.

By yourNEWS Media Newsroom

The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a sweeping civilian nuclear cooperation agreement July 22 that establishes the legal framework for a 30-year partnership expected to direct billions of dollars in nuclear development toward American companies while expanding Washington’s influence over the kingdom’s emerging atomic energy program.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the agreement, commonly known as a 123 agreement because it is authorized under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. The two governments also signed a separate bilateral safeguards agreement intended to govern safety, oversight and nonproliferation requirements as Saudi Arabia develops reactors and related infrastructure on its territory.

“Together, these two agreements lay the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar partnership that advances several priority economic and strategic objectives, including nuclear nonproliferation,” the U.S. Department of Energy said in a statement announcing the deal.

The agreement is expected to give U.S. companies a leading role in supplying reactors, technical expertise and other components needed to build Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear sector. American firms would provide new power reactors and associated technology, while companies from other countries could participate in secondary roles. Westinghouse Electric and its AP1000 reactor design are expected to be among the principal commercial beneficiaries.

The arrangement also contains a potentially significant provision involving uranium enrichment. Under the agreement, American companies could construct an enrichment facility inside Saudi Arabia if a joint U.S.-Saudi study concludes that domestic enrichment is necessary for the kingdom’s civilian energy program. Such a facility would allow Saudi Arabia to produce nuclear fuel on its own soil, but it would also give Washington a direct role in determining how the capability is developed, supervised and limited.

Uranium enrichment can be used to produce fuel for civilian nuclear power plants, although the same underlying technology can become proliferation-sensitive if uranium is enriched to substantially higher levels. The administration’s position is that U.S. participation, safeguards and long-term oversight will reduce the risk that Saudi nuclear infrastructure could be redirected toward military purposes.

The provision is likely to remain one of the most closely scrutinized elements of the agreement. Previous U.S. nuclear cooperation deals have sometimes required partner nations to renounce domestic enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, but Saudi Arabia has resisted permanently surrendering those options. The new framework appears to preserve the possibility of enrichment while placing its development within a joint review process involving the United States.

The Wall Street Journal first reported details of the agreement.

Beyond nuclear energy policy, the deal carries substantial commercial and geopolitical importance. Russia and China are among the world’s dominant exporters of nuclear power technology, financing and construction services, and both have sought greater influence in energy markets across the Middle East. By positioning American companies at the center of the Saudi program, the administration aims to prevent Moscow or Beijing from becoming Riyadh’s principal nuclear partner.

The agreement could therefore strengthen the U.S. nuclear manufacturing and engineering sectors while binding Saudi Arabia more closely to American technology, fuel services, safety systems and regulatory standards for decades. Because nuclear plants operate for many years and require continuing maintenance, training and technical support, the country that supplies the reactors can retain considerable strategic and commercial influence long after construction is completed.

“These agreements reflect our two nations’ shared commitment to strengthening U.S.-Saudi commercial relations, delivering prosperity at home and security to our allies abroad,” Wright said. “Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation, while relying on the world’s best nuclear technology and scientists, designed right here in the United States. Thanks to President Trump, the American nuclear renaissance is underway and will deliver long-term benefits to the American and Saudi people.”

Wright had discussed the emerging nuclear partnership during his first overseas trip as energy secretary in April 2025, when he visited the region and held talks concerning energy cooperation and American participation in Saudi Arabia’s long-term development plans.

Saudi Arabia has sought civilian nuclear power as part of an effort to diversify its energy system, meet rising electricity demand and reduce the amount of oil burned domestically for power generation. Building nuclear plants could allow the kingdom to preserve more crude oil for export while adding a dependable source of electricity to support industrial growth and population expansion.

For the United States, the partnership also offers an opportunity to revive domestic nuclear exports after years in which Russian and Chinese state-backed companies gained ground internationally. Those competitors often combine reactor construction with government financing and broader diplomatic arrangements, making it difficult for private U.S. firms to compete without strong federal support.

The agreement is expected to direct major contracts toward American suppliers, including reactor manufacturers, engineering firms, fuel-service companies and specialists in nuclear safety, waste management and plant operations. Westinghouse’s AP1000 design is considered a leading candidate because of its existing use in international projects and the company’s experience working with foreign governments and utilities.

The pact does not guarantee that every planned Saudi reactor will be supplied exclusively by an American company, but it gives U.S. firms a preferred and central position. Foreign contractors could still participate in construction, financing or supporting roles, depending on how individual projects are structured.

Congress may still attempt to block the agreement. Some lawmakers have opposed nuclear cooperation with Riyadh because of concerns about proliferation, regional security and Saudi Arabia’s stated interest in preserving enrichment capabilities. Under the review process for a 123 agreement, Congress could move to reject or alter the arrangement, but overcoming a presidential veto would require a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate.

That threshold makes congressional termination difficult unless opposition becomes broadly bipartisan. Supporters of the agreement are expected to argue that rejecting U.S. participation would not necessarily stop Saudi Arabia from pursuing nuclear power and could instead drive the kingdom toward Russian or Chinese suppliers operating under weaker American oversight.

Critics are likely to focus on whether the safeguards are strong enough to prevent enrichment technology from creating a future weapons option. They may also seek more information about inspection rights, fuel limits, enforcement mechanisms and what would happen if Saudi Arabia violated the agreement’s conditions.

The Department of Energy said the bilateral safeguards arrangement and 123 agreement together establish high standards for nuclear safety and nonproliferation. The full effectiveness of those protections will depend on how the agreements are implemented, how closely facilities are monitored and whether the United States retains authority to halt assistance if the kingdom departs from its commitments.

The deal represents one of the most consequential energy agreements between Washington and Riyadh in years. It combines Saudi Arabia’s desire for a large civilian nuclear program with the Trump administration’s effort to expand American nuclear exports and reduce the influence of strategic competitors.

If the planned projects move forward, U.S. companies could spend decades designing, constructing and servicing Saudi nuclear facilities. The partnership would also give Washington a continuing role in one of the Middle East’s most sensitive emerging energy programs, including any future decision over whether uranium enrichment is necessary.

The agreement now moves into a period of congressional review and project planning, but its signing establishes the foundation for a long-term U.S.-Saudi nuclear relationship that could reshape both the kingdom’s energy system and the competitive balance of the global nuclear industry.